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Abstract 
This purpose of this paper is to explore how the different jurisdictions under 
consideration here treat the legal notion of causation.  These jurisdictions are the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France and Luxembourg.  The problem of 
causation has been described as insoluble and I shall not be trying to solve it.  
Rather I shall consider how each of the jurisdictions here treats causation in the 
law, the better to ascertain whether there can be any common European idea of 
causation in this field.  The reason for this is not only as two of the European 
projects aiming at codification in tort law seek to attempt if not strictly a definition 
of causation then recommendations in ways in which it could be refined.  The 
European Court of Justice itself has been mandated to extract general principles 
common to European Union member states with regard to non-contractual 
obligations which can be applied when faced with a problem in tort law.  
 
I must necessarily explain the notion of causation more generally before 
considering causation in the law so causation itself is understood.  Within the 
sphere of causation in the law, there are a number of theories that I examine, 
which can be found, to a greater or lesser extent (or sometimes not at all), in one 
form or another, in the jurisdictions under consideration.   
 
My conclusion is that there can be no common idea in causation from which 
principles in furtherance of any European codification projects may be stated.  In 
most cases in court, a discussion of causation is not even entered into, as it is not 
controversial.  There can be no “common sense” solutions in cases where 
causation is in doubt.  I offer no principles.  I make only one suggestion at the end 
with regard to experts’ reports.  
 
The originality I hope to bring to this area of law is that this will be the first work 
that considers French (and Luxembourg), German and British law under one 
cover.  I conclude by what seems to be the opposite view from many jurists in that, 
who hold that, however courts may arrive there “the results are [or will be] just 
the same” in causation.  
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Table of Important Terms for Translation 
I have kept many of the the primary sources I have obtained in their original 
language and a modest amount of French and German will be required to read this 
paper from beginning to end.  Where others have translated the sources into English, 
I have indicated this.  To that end, I insert here a table of frequently used (or 
important or both) terms that will be used in this paper for ease of reference.  Of 
course, the translations will not be exact, especially given the subject matter, but I 
have made my best efforts to select the mot juste. 
English French German 
allocation  allocation Zuweisung 
appearance apparence Auftreten 
aptitude aptitude Eignung 
argument argument Herbeiführung 
to ask too much  trop demander  überfordern 
blow of fate coup de sort Schicksalsschläge 
causation causalité Kausalität 
certainty certitude Gewißheit 
chances of success perspectives Erfolgsaussichten 
consent consentement Einwilligung 
to consider considérer Erachten 
consideration considération Betracht 
defendant défendeur  Beklager (Bekl) 
disclosure liability obligation d’information Aufklärungspflicht 
emergency urgence Dringlichkeit 
expert’s report une expertise Gutachten 
failure manquement, défaut Misserfolg 
intent intention vorsätzlich 
intervention  intervention Eingriff 
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leading important leitend 
liability responsabilité Häftung 
mistake erreur Fehverhalten 
necessity nécessité Notwendigkeit 
negligence negligence, imprudence Farhlässigkeit 
nosocomial infection infection nosocomiale nosokomiale Infektion 
omission omission Unterlassung 
over-sensitive hypersensible zimperlich 
plaintiff demendeur Kläger (Kl) 
possible possible etwaigen 
prospects (prognosis) perspective (prognostic) Aussichten 
reasonable raisonnable einsichtig 
strange étrange, bizarre eigenartig 
strict liability responsabilité sans faute Gefährdungshaftung 
tort law responsabilité civile unerlaubte Handlung 
unalterable immuable unumstößlich 
 !  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This paper examines the rules applicable to the study of causation, in particular in 
medicine, in delictual1 liability in four European jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France and Luxembourg.2 I hope to show at the end of this paper that 
there are no common rules in causation that can be found following a study of these 
jurisdictions and that projects that purport to advance some kind of commonality or 
suggestions in this area must necessarily be modified.  I ultimately focus in my 
conclusions, not unsurprisingly then, on the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) 
and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR). These are two projects that 
aim to provide some kind of model harmonisation of tort law in due course.  Even 
they appear to disagree on causation, but more of that later.  The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) also plays a role.  It has been specifically mandated to decide on matters 
of non-contractual obligations by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union as amended (TFEU).  It has been instructed to find “general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States” when ruling on non-contractual liability 
where it has jurisdiction.3 It is my contention, as I hope to show, that there are no 
such common principles.  Notwithstanding this finding, it must be accepted that this 
article of the TFEU and the ECJ itself are both here to stay, at least for the 
foreseeable future and I do suggest one way in which the ECJ could ultimately 
change its approach.  It is important to recognise from the outset that I am making 
absolutely no recommendations with regard to the codification of causal principles.  I 
suggest nothing to those who have drafted either the PETL or the DCFR.  I do this 
not from a destructive will or desire but simply because I do not find that causation 
lends itself to any kind of codification.  This was not my hypothesis, and, in the 
scientific tradition, I happily admit it.  I did hope to be able to analyze causation in 
the jurisdictions in consideration and thereafter be able to contribute to some 
generalizing principles in the area.  This was my aim.  After my research, however, I 
find this impossible. I hope my reasoning becomes clear in my findings.  This then is 
the crux of the paper.  Before, however, considering this further, I think it is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 the word “delictual” shall be used interchangeably here with the word “tortious”. 
2 although the United Kingdom is not one civil law jurisdiction, the rules of causation in delict are 
sufficiently similar to be considered here together.  
3 Art 340 TFEU 
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necessary to understand what causation is and why it is important.  I do this in this 
introduction. 
 
It is causation that links the delictual act to the tortfeasor. Causation, therefore, is a 
question of prime importance to a lawyer and goes to the root of any true 
understanding of culpability: how the law treats “cause”, what the law means by “the 
plaintiff4 caused the injury” can often, however, be quite at odds with what the 
average reasonable person may understand by causation. This paper will not attempt 
to deal with all problems in causation5 but shall focus rather on one area of delictual 
liability in particular: liability in the field of medical negligence. This is an area of 
causation that has proven fecund for the development of causal problems. There are 
so many uncertainties and variables connected with the human body that often the 
law has had to prove inventive to arrive at a particular result in the name of justice.  
 
I shall argue here that such is the state of the case law at the moment in all four 
jurisdictions that a search for any kind of common principle or principles in this area 
is fruitless and ought to be abandoned. I submit that the search for a common 
understanding of causation should be jettisoned and principles cannot be suggested 
selecting the “best” from each jurisdiction.6 My work is not, however, based on this 
idealistic universalism.7  My approach is multilateral (between more than two legal 
systems), synchronic (contemporary systems) and both substantial and procedural, 
and, although I do not attempt to discover an optimal uniform law, I do not eschew a 
borrowing of ideas and solutions from other jurisdictions.  I am, however, more 
interested in a critical, or perhaps more observational functional analysis (roughly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 the word “plaintiff” will be used here as opposed to any other variation thereon: save where there 
is a Scots case where I shall refer to the “pursuer”. 
5 such a treatment would be extremely difficult, if not impossible.  
6 R MICHAELS, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, Duke Law School Legal Studies, 
Research Paper Series, No 87,  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=faculty_scholarship  
7 G MOUSAOURAKIS, “Comparability, Functionalism and the Scope of Comparative Law”, 
(2008) 41 Hosei Riron 1 
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how different legal systems respond to similar scenarios) that allows for a “tolerance 
and critique” of the different laws.8  
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 R MICHAELS, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, Duke Law School Legal Studies, 
Research Paper Series, No 87, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=faculty_scholarship, 
at p42, I am paraphrasing 
! ! ! ! !! 6!
1.2 Schema 
This paper was in part inspired by many an interesting discussion that I had with 
students past and present confirming indeed the contention that there is no such 
thing as universal “common sense”.9  Causal arguments often refer to “common 
sense”.10  Our ideas of common sense vary considerably and this was brought out in 
various arguments in class.11 I submit that only where causation is not in dispute is 
there a common sense idea of what it is!  In the vast majority of cases in tort, 
causation is never in dispute.  I might even go so far as to say that where it is in 
dispute then there can be no “common sense” idea of what it is.  
 
This introduction will consider preliminary matters about which a word or two I 
think need be said: certain comparative notions and ideas, what the problems in 
medical causation actually are, proving causation in the law and how this is different 
from proving causation in science, burdens of proof and the jurisdictions concerned. 
Chapter 2 will then examine certain causal theories that form the basis, or lay claim 
to form the bases, of the jurisdictions under consideration.  I believe it is essential to 
have an understanding of these and related theories before embarking on a 
consideration of the jurisdictions themselves.    It is important to describe these issues 
here, as they will be treated to a greater or lesser extent in later chapters.  
 
Chapter 3 shall focus on the United Kingdom and Chapters 4 and 5 on France and 
Luxembourg, and Germany respectively. These shall consider medical causation and 
the peculiarities involved in the particular jurisdictions, the better to contrast causal 
approaches in the final chapter.12 
 
I shall try to avoid making a critical analysis of the solutions found by each 
jurisdiction.  It is not the purpose of this paper.  I shall also reflect on the use of other !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 S LLOYD-BOSTOCK, “The Ordinary Man, and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and 
Responsibility” (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 143 
10 HLA HART HLA and T HONORE T, Causation in the Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1985), Chapter 2 
11 the classic “poisoned canteen” problem and the case of Dillon v Twin State & Gas Electric Company 
(1932) 85 NH 449 proved insightful examples for students. 
12 for asbestos and hepatitis C infections, for example 
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kinds of evidence such as statistics, expert evidence and anecdotal evidence.  I submit 
that there is no pan-European agreement with regard to which causal theory to 
follow and that the theories are so malleable in any case that a judge can claim to be 
following one theory while in reality just applying policy.  Even “common sense” can 
be regarded as a theory.    
 
Chapter 6 shall be the essence of the paper.  Here I shall make the classical 
comparative lawyer’s analysis of all countries considered in this paper to assess 
whether there is any commonality in the field of causation.  Although such an 
approach may be commonplace, I do not find it simplistic, ineffective or inefficient as 
I think it can highlight important and crucial differences to substantiate my core 
argument.13  This notwithstanding, I do try to make immediate comparisons where I 
find this relevant and allow these to build into my overall conclusion.14  My ultimate 
finding is that there is no commonality.  Given this, I shall then move on to criticise 
such projects that attempt to find or assert principles in the area of causation in the 
law that should be followed by courts or tribunals.  The two in question are the 
PETL and the DCFR.  It is also in this chapter that I shall consider the role of the 
ECJ.  It is, after all, mandated to make certain findings in the area of non-contractual 
obligations and therefore necessarily make findings in the area of causation.  I shall 
comment on the TFEU in this regard.  The ECJ has already had questions of 
causation come before it and I shall consider the relevant case law together with 
other determinants of causation at this level. 
 
I hope the main contribution to originality is the bringing together of three important 
European legal families, together with the ECJ where it has been so mandated, and 
considering causation’s treatment by those systems to inspire those who ultimately 
foresee some kind of common tort law in Europe to reflect on whether such 
principles could be adapted.  Just by considering one essential element common to all 
the jurisdictions – namely causation - in tort law and by showing that sometimes even 
what might be considered the “easiest” cases would not be treated similarly. On this !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 J REITZ, “How to do Comparative Law” (Autumn 1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 
617 at 634  
14 ibid  
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basis, I suggest that it is unwise to extract principles from case law.  Therefore I 
suggest that either the projects must remove any expansion on the understanding of 
the word “cause” (as causation cannot be codified) or if they do not, any application 
thereof will be so vague and nebulous as to mean nothing at all.    
  
! ! ! ! !! 9!
1.3 Jurisdictions and Approach 
As mentioned, this paper shall consider four jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, 
Germany and France and Luxembourg.  The first is chosen as Scotland is my home 
jurisdiction and the United Kingdom is a common law jurisdiction.15 Germany is 
chosen because its tradition tended to rely more on philosophical approaches to 
causation – at least historically - than the other three jurisdictions.     Finally France 
and Luxembourg are chosen, as they are both Civil law jurisdictions with which to 
compare the common law jurisdiction of the United Kingdom.  I also currently 
reside in Luxembourg.  I hope these four jurisdictions will provide enough breadth in 
their history, traditions and scope to allow for a comprehensive and full analysis of 
causation in so far as it is deals with medical liability on which to base an evaluation 
of causation in the European projects.   The three largest jurisdictions will have been 
the most fertile for case law and academic writing so unless otherwise stated, I shall 
consider France and Luxembourg together.  Any reference to France should be taken 
to include a reference to Luxembourg also and I hope no umbrage is taken by 
Luxembourg readers.   Where appropriate, reference will also be made to some 
theories that could be of further interest from the United States of America or 
Australia but which, strictly speaking, are outwith the scope of this paper but which 
are worth consideration in the context.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Scotland is a “mixed” jurisdiction often compared to that of Quebec, Louisiana and South 
Africa. 
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1.4. Comparative Notions 
It is the essence of any legal system based on fault that the defendant’s acts or 
omissions be shown to have caused the damage.  This is recognised in all the 
jurisdictions under consideration.  Indeed, according to Aristotle, it is the essence of 
even moral responsibility that we are liable for our voluntary or mixed actions.16 
Aristotle's classification of (1) the agent; (2) the act; (3) the object or medium of the 
act, and sometimes also (4) the instrument (5) the aim and (6) the manner, are 
principles17 that are reflected when considering the art of a medical practitioner and 
whether or not he has acted lawfully in the execution of his task.   Causation is used 
to determine lawfulness and responsibility. Causation is also important for 
psychological reasons. The jurisdictions here may have attempted to extract or posit 
certain causal principles theoretically. Although causation has classically been based 
on theories, I shall argue that in medical liability at least, such theories have become 
so intermingled, confused and uncertain that often the case law is confusing, puzzling 
and counter-intuitive and not at all what a reasonable person (or several of them 
together) may jointly predict.  If causation were simply a question of common sense 
or what the man in the street thought, then similar problems in the different 
jurisdictions would not result in such diverse results.18  I shall implicitly argue against 
the neo-Aristotelian19 methodology’s approach in comparative law in that there 
cannot be found a ius commune or ius gentium with regard to causation.20 While many of 
the problems in the four jurisdictions are similar, the solutions are not necessarily 
comparable. In the end, case law shows it comes down to a question of public policy, 
judicial predilection, common sense, whatever that may mean, or a mixture of some 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 ARISTOTLE, The Nichomachean Ethics, (London, Penguin Books, 2004) p50 
17 ibid, p43 
18 for example, loss of chance, as we shall see. 
19  essentially, and according to Aristotle, that everything strives towards its perfection 
philosophically: its telos.  Similarly, it could be argued, law strives also towards a telos or causa finalis 
which must be its perfection.  For a nice summary, see MICHAELS R, “The Functional Method 
of Comparative Law”, 2005 Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No 87, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=faculty_scholarship 
at pp7-9 
20 J ESSER, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Rechtsfortbildung, 1956 or J GORDLEY, “The 
Universalist Heritage” in Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (2003), eds, P 
LEGRAND, R MUNDAY, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp31-45  
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or all of these.  Causation is used as an effective controlling device in the law and for 
public policy makers.21 It is the perfect tool.22 It can be used for whichever policies 
tort law aims to pursue if these can indeed be determined.23 There is already a 
certain amount of awareness of other jurisdiction’s approaches to causation or 
indeed, cross-fertilisation on the subject.   I submit it is a mature legal system that 
approaches its enquiry in such a way.   For example, Lord Bingham in Kay's Tutor v 
Ayrshire and Arran Health Board24 at para 32 stated 
If....a decision is given in this country which offends one's basic sense of justice, and if 
consideration of international sources suggests that a different and more acceptable 
decision would be given in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, 
this must prompt anxious review of the decision in question.   
 
I would agree with this. While it is not strictly part of this paper, I would indeed 
advocate contemplating other jurisdictions’ solutions where appropriate. This, 
however, is something quite different from stating how the law “ought” to be in a 
European sense.25 
 
The question of who caused the medical injury or, in essence, causation, is then of 
the utmost importance in understanding this paper.  There are so many variables in 
each case to consider that make the study of it at once exciting and arduous. Before I 
set out on a study of causation in the realm of medical liability, I would like to state 
simply that science simply does not understand perfectly how the body works nor 
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21 including judges 
22 M HOGG “The Role of Causation in Delict” 2005 Juridical Review 89 
23 G CALABRESI, “Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr”, The 
University of Chicago Law Review 69; where Calabresi notes two goals with tort as a functional 
concept, viz Compensation Goals and Deterrence Goals 
24 1987 UKHL 17 
25 R MICHAELS in his article contributes a brief discussion of Neo-Kantian law in this vain ; see 
MICHAELS R, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, 2005 Duke Law School Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, No 87, 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2033&context=faculty_scholarship 
at pp17-19  
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how all the factors that impact on the body affect it.26  The examples abound. 
Science may be able to predict statistically on the one hand, that if person A smokes 
twenty cigarettes per day, then he is more likely to develop lung cancer than person 
B, someone who does not.  This, of course, is assuming that all other things are equal.  
This is the essence of such problems.  All other things are never equal.  This is why 
courts in Europe are reluctant to allow recovery in such cases.  Statistics are only of 
limited use.  They can never tell the whole story.  They are only generalisations.  
What if person A also worked in a particularity sooty environment for twenty-five 
years? How do courts take into account variables to which nearly everyone is exposed 
every day? These include fumes from vehicles, radiation, asbestos and other chemical 
products.  Also, perhaps person A had a particular genetic predisposition to lung 
cancer.  How should courts consider that, if indeed they should at all? These are all 
questions with which courts could be confronted and scientific uncertainty is an 
element with which courts have to deal.  Each of us lives with these risks daily and yet 
courts have to decide whether a particular defendant is responsible or not.  In tort, it 
is often causation that is of the essence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 this is not to say that science will never know. 
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1.5 Problems in Medical Causation 
It is perhaps due to this uncertainty described above that it may be thought that a 
defendant has an automatic advantage.  After all, it is for the plaintiff to prove his 
case.  While in general all jurisdictions under consideration follow, courts have often 
found ways to help a plaintiff who is hindered by scientific uncertainties.   This is 
more evident in some countries than in others.  Courts have been particularly 
creative in their jurisprudence and procedure when determining whether a case has 
been proven or not.  If a case has not fallen within a decided ratio already, courts are 
often willing, indeed eager, to develop the law.27 For example, the concept of “loss of 
a chance”, as yet unknown in British in medical liability cases (although not 
categorically excluded for the future) or German law, allows plaintiffs in France to 
obtain damages for a loss of the chance of recovery or loss of chance of survival.  This 
avoids some of the procedural difficulties that may exist where the standard of proof 
in France may at first sight appear higher than in the United Kingdom.28 So while 
there may be a procedurally lower standard of proof in the United Kingdom,29 
France allows loss of a chance.  This is only one example of a difference yet an 
important one.   
 
So what of the actual problems themselves? What kinds of problems arise where the 
issue at stake is that of causation in medical liability? There are two kinds of medical 
negligence which it is important to distinguish.  There is what has been called 
treatment malpractice and there is also disclosure malpractice. 30  The former 
concerns an iatrogenic act or omission during the actual medical intervention itself.  
It includes the whole gamut of treatments from beginning to end: from diagnosis, 
prognosis to post-operative care. It is where the care-provider has been at fault in 
some way and this, if causation between the fault in treatment and the plaintiff's 
damage is proven, will allow the plaintiff to recover in delict.  A typical example 
might be where a surgeon has left surgical equipment inside a patient and this leads 
to further physical damage to tissue that would not have occurred but for the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 
28 In France or Luxembourg, a plaintiff generally has to convince a judge so that the judge has an 
intime conviction of the veracity of the plaintiff's claim.  This shall be considered more fully infra. 
29 on the balance of probabilities 
30 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, (Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2008), p1 
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negligence of the surgeon.31 However, what about the case where a plaintiff was 
negligently discharged from hospital following heart surgery even though he had a 
chest infection?32 The resulting thrombosis (from the chest infection) led to the loss of 
one leg.  The doctor could not have detected the chest infection and the patient was 
asymptomatic.  Should the hospital be rendered liable for the eventuation of such a 
risk or should the causal chain be broken somewhere? Should there be some kind of 
“security obligation” (to translate from the French) the moment a patient enters a 
hospital? These are questions that shall be considered here.  
 
Disclosure malpractice, on the other hand, is concerned with the care-provider’s 
failure to advise a patient of certain risks associated with a medical procedure such 
that this in some way vitiates the patient’s consent.  In general, a patient should 
consent before receiving medical treatment.  A patient should on the whole be told 
about the risks inherent in a procedure although there are certain dissimilarities 
among the jurisdictions.  The important causal aspect to investigate here is where a 
patient has not been made aware of a disclosable risk inherent in a procedure, what 
would that patient have done had that patient known of the risks?  Courts are on 
their guard for claims of self-serving plaintiffs who suggest that they would not have 
undertaken the operation at all. Courts are also sensitive to history, which often 
shapes current policy.  Germany will not go too far in supplanting what it thinks as a 
reasonable decision for that of the plaintiff’s given its history in World War Two with 
forced medical experiments.  What we can see, however, in general during the 
twentieth century, is a move away from very much a paternalistic attitude of “doctor 
knows best” to a position at the beginning of the twenty-first century where patients' 
rights groups are becoming ever more vocal.33  
 
The essential problem in proving medical causation lies in its uncertainty.  As 
mentioned above, science is often not at that stage where it is able to say definitely 
that variable x, or variables x and y, jointly caused the patient's injury, z, with one 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 the phrase “but for” is of the essence when considering causation and it is one that shall be 
considered again and again. 
32 Brown v Lewisham and North Southwark Health Authority (1999) PIQR P324 (CA) 
33 for example, The Patients' Association in the UK 
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hundred per cent certainty.  The danger here is that courts may on occasion reward 
a plaintiff with damages where the defendant's act or omission did not actually cause 
the damage and value judgements are made that are peppered with metaphors like 
“breaking the chain of causation”.  This is a policy choice.  For example, where an 
employee who had polio was injured at her work and a doctor negligently advised 
amputation of the employee’s leg, the bank where the employee worked was 
nonetheless found liable on the basis that the negligent advice did not “break the 
chain of causation”.34  Responsibility was shared.  Here the courts are dealing with 
an omission. He had omitted to discuss the implications of such an operation and he 
did not advise on possible alternatives. The plaintiff could not prove it was only the 
doctor's omission caused the damage.  It will be shown that it is difficult to bring such 
cases within any traditional theories of causation.35 Yet a court is holding that both 
the bank and the employer “caused” the damage.  I suggest such decisions are more 
linked to procedural evidential rules and simple policy decisions of the court.  This is 
not to criticise but simply to recognise.  
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Webb v Barclays Bank (2001) Lloyds Medical Reports 500 
35 these theories themselves shall be considered herein 
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1.6 Proving Causation in Science and Proving Causation in 
Law 
Even though a care-provider’s acts or omissions may be said in law to have caused a 
particular outcome, this does not mean that they have done so in fact.  Courts are 
there to judge a result in law.  A judge is not an expert in science or in medicine.  
He may, however, have recourse to an expert or experts.  A judge’s decision in 
theory is independent of that of the expert yet in reality often closely follows it.  In 
English law a judge can choose not to follow an expert's opinion but the situations 
where it would be appropriate not to do so have not been made clear. 36  In 
Luxembourg, judges can appoint one or more experts but they usually appoint one.37 
It has been held that they may even disregard the expert opinion.38  I have sympathy 
for judges to know what to do where experts disagree.  I suggest that it is not for 
judges to pronounce on such medical controversies but a judge is rarely (is not) called 
on to do so.  As Penneau said, what would be the point of a judge's requesting an 
expert opinion and then not to follow it but replacing it by  
...sa pseudo-connaissance livresque, les véritables problèmes juridiques qui sont 
pourtant seuls de sa vértiable compétence.39 
 
A judge may consider an expert’s qualifications, experience, his credibility in the 
witness stand where this is part of normal procedure, the evidence of other witnesses 
and, of course, the general standard of proof.  The whole of the evidence must be 
considered.    In the United Kingdom, I think there is close scrutiny of scientific 
witnesses given the possibility for cross-examination.  Courts should necessarily be 
criticised for making a judgement that does not stand up to closer scientific analysis.  
It is for courts to consider other evidence such as other witnesses, aetiology, 
epidemiology, and probability.  Courts should also consider the functional aim of tort 
law in their jurisdiction.  Courts are always pursuing some overall policy.40  Where !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771 
37 Art 264 Luxembourg Code of Civil Procedure: experts’ differences must be expressed in a 
report. 
38 CC 1 13 Feb 1985, JCP 1985 II 20388 
39 J PENNEAU, Faute et erreur en matière de responsabilité médicale (Paris, LGDJ, 1973), 99 
40 see generally F GIGLIO, The Foundations of Restitutions for Wrongs, (Oxford and Portland, Hart, 
2007) and T KEREN-PAZ Torts, Egalitarianism and Distributive Justice (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007) 
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should the risk ultimately fall? With this in mind, changes in ideas of causation have 
often been brought about by particular catastrophes that have caught the public's 
attention resulting in special systems.  I find such systems important for an 
appreciation of causation, as, in my opinion, such special schemes necessarily show 
how a jurisdiction recognises where there could be causal problems for a plaintiff and 
comes to her support.  In France, for example, the scandal of contaminated HIV 
blood brought about legislation to provide for compensation. 41  Similarly, the 
Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) 2009 Act and the Compensation 
Act 2006 have shown how parliaments are quick to respond to perceived injustices in 
causation.42 It can therefore be seen that proving a causal link in law is something 
other than proving a causal link in science.  More general societal, moral or political 
factors may be taken into account before providing justice in an individual case.   
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 loi du 4 mars 2002 
42 Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL 20 
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1.7 Burdens of Proof and Other Procedural Matters 
Causation cannot be separated from the idea of burden of proof.  The jurisdictions 
have adopted varying approaches. Each has its proponents and its detractors.43 I am 
not going to enter into a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each.44  It 
is not enough to say that but for the behaviour of the care-provider the plaintiff 
would not have suffered the injury.  The burden of proof is usually on the plaintiff 
and he must convince the court to a certain standard that his injury was caused by 
the defendant. In France, a judge must have an intime conviction that the plaintiff's 
version of events is true.  What will appear a prima facie higher standard of proof 
than in the United Kingdom is actually diluted to a considerable extent by recourse 
to certain causal presumptions45 and use of doctrines such as the loss of chance (perte 
d’une chance).    The idea of overall burden of proof and how this may shift during the 
course of a civil trial shall be considered.  The law has invented the concept of the 
burden of proof and what the law treats as only probable can often result in the 
certainty of even full recovery for a plaintiff.  What has probably caused a loss 
becomes what has certainly legally caused a loss.  Science differs from law.  The truth 
is not necessarily sought in a courtroom but rather that the plaintiff prove his case.   
Such notions are not necessarily familiar to non-lawyers. Consideration of such issues 
then, I submit, accentuates my argument that causation is not a common sense 
concept.  It is necessarily linked to procedure and procedure varies.   
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43 however, for an interesting discussion on the topic, see M FAURE and V BRUGGEMENT, 
“Causal Uncertainty and Proportional Liability” in L TICHY (ed) Causation in Law (Prague, E 
Rozkotova, 2007) p105 
44 ibid 
45 for example arts 1384 et seqq French Civil Code, famously “On est responsible non seulement 
du dommage que l'on cause par son propre fait, mais encore de celui qui est causé par le fait des 
personnes dont on doit répondre, ou des choses que l'on a sous sa garde.” 
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Chapter 2: Understanding Causation  
2.1 Introduction 
I propose to set out here the various causal theories common to the traditions of each 
of the jurisdictions under consideration. These theories are those that have formed 
the backbone of much causal reasoning in the law.  I shall also consider some of the 
more modern theories and approaches that have influenced causal thinking especially 
from the last century.  I could trace thought and deliberation on causation from 
Aristotle (or before) and work forward from there. However, this would bring nothing 
new and simply be a summary of old arguments (if not simply a history).  In this 
chapter, I shall consider how causation relates to other disciplines and how causation 
in the law cannot be totally divorced from causation in other fields; second, I shall 
show why and how causation is important in the law.  Common sense and conditions 
shall then be examined before an estimation of the use of logic is made in the world 
of causation in the law.  I think it is important to consider logic as the lawyer and 
scholar must be precise and accurate when they make causal statements.46  “Jane 
caused John’s head injury” tells us nothing about responsibility or space-time 
relations in the scenario.  It is important that all these themes are introduced as I find 
them important when criticizing ultimately those who purport to find common 
principles in tort law and apply them European-wide.  
 
This part of the paper should be considered as a general introduction to the different 
kinds of theories and approaches used in causation.  I shall refer to these notions 
liberally in this paper.  Problems and approaches in this section will not necessarily 
focus only on medical negligence and they are presented rather as an introduction to 
the kinds of challenges with which lawyers are faced when causation is an issue. I 
present the problems in medical negligence this way as a more rounded 
understanding of causation can be gleaned from the problems that are faced in 
causation in general. 
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46 and particularly when drafting their writs  
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2.2 Causation in Law and Causation in Life 
First, causation is not some dry, academic, esoteric or abstruse concept for use only 
by the initiated but rather, it is an idea that can be intuitively understood by all, is 
used by all in daily life and is appreciated by all in our everyday actions and 
omissions.  Indeed causation in law can be seen as a subset of causation in life.  Law 
is, of course, part of life but like other concepts in common parlance when applied to 
the law, causation in the law has an autonomous meaning.  This is not to say that it 
has an agreed meaning even in law but when causation is spoken of in law, it is 
generally used as a device to allocate responsibility.  The general answer to the 
question “what is causation?” will most probably depend of whom it is asked and in 
which field that person works.  There can be no one thing as causation in itself valid 
for all disciplines.47  Whether or not “cause” actually exists is a more philosophical 
argument and is outwith the scope of this work.48  However, this is not to say that 
philosophical theories will not be considered.  Modern philosophical writings have 
been influential in the law. They form the foundation of causation in Germany (and 
from there to France). Germany’s case law and academic writing is often today still 
based on it.49  The seminal treatise of Causation in the Law by Hart and Honoré was 
published only in 1952 and it was a considerable contribution to our understanding 
of different causal approaches to legal problems.  To exclude philosophical writings 
then from this paper would be folly.  Indeed much French doctrine refers explicitly to 
the reception of equivalence and adequacy theory50 by virtue of the German modern 
philosophers who themselves referred to Roman, Greek and Enlightenment 
philosophers. So to divorce completely philosophy from an understanding of 
causation - and therefore causation in medical liability - is wrong; to invoke such 
philosophical luminaries in every legal causal problem is equally wrong and would 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 J STAPLETON, “Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences” (2003) 119 Law 
Quarterly Review  388 
48 see D HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature (Dover Philosophical Classics, 2003); and in general the 
debate between the Enlightenment philosophers of rationalism and empiricism.   
49 see HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law Causation in the Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1985) p432 where they state that “Unlike the Anglo-American writers who have 
made piecemeal contributions to the study of causation, Continental jurists have not hesitated to 
apply to the law philosophical doctrines of considerable complexity.” 
50 for which, see infra 
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not help in leading to reparation of a wrong but rather to an interminable academic 
debate on epistemology and metaphysics.  This is not the purpose of the law.  
 
Causation in law is a particularly mercurial and evasive concept to define.51  One 
(reasoned) response is just as valid as another.  Although an approach to the causal 
problem may be understood in different ways by the sciences and arts, causation in 
law retains significance, an idea, or at least an understanding, the purpose of which 
can be said to be distinctly sui generis. There may be dispute about its function, 
interpretation or purpose subject to the multifarious interpretations of jurists, lawyers 
and scholars within each jurisdiction.  Causal hypotheses may come from legal 
families which purport to emphasise “common sense”;52 other postulates may stem 
from jurisdictions which underline a more philosophical, statistical or mathematical 
approach to the subject, at least in their theories;53 and some countries’ conceptions 
may appear prima facie in disarray or inconsistent.54 Indeed, in all of the jurisdictions 
under consideration, special regimes have been created where the need to show 
causation in a traditional sense has been greatly mitigated and there exist some 
systems of near strict liability. Whether or not these are exceptions from a general 
rule is not clear as it suggests the existence of a general rule.   Some may even be of 
the opinion that causation (or at least paying heed to causation) in the law is 
unnecessary and consequently may advocate its abolition. 55  None of these 
interpretations is relatively more valid than the other overall.  Jurisdictions have their 
own margins of appreciation and the case law abounds.  Those who call for 
causation’s abolition, would surely recognise, or at the very least not deny, the crucial 
role that causation today plays in tort law today.  Very crudely, one is liable for the 
legally recognised damage one has caused and it is this that can serve as the tertium 
comparationis for this study.  
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51 see in general HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law 
52 the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and the United States of America  
53 Germany 
54 France 
55 I imagine this would have to be in conjunction with the abolition of tort law altogether as is the 
case in certain jurisdictions such as New Zealand  
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2.3 Causation and Other Disciplines       
What has been said above, however, is meant not to isolate causation in the law from 
causation as may be understood in other disciplines. Causation in the law derives and 
borrows meanings from causation in science and philosophy.  Causation is not 
readily definable in these other disciplines.  To take an example from science, 
Newton’s law a=f/m allows us to say that forces causes acceleration, not that f/a 
causes the mass.  As Pearl noted 
Such distinctions are not supported by the equations of physics, and this leads us to 
ask whether the whole causal vocabulary is purely metaphysical, “surviving, like the 
monarchy…”56 
 
So it is important to react when we hear or see the word “causation”, reflect and pay 
special heed that we are using the word in a focused and concentrated way, the better 
to enhance other people’s understand of what we mean. Causation in the law does 
not seek objective knowledge.  It may well be true to say in the natural sciences that 
“Smoking causes cancer” or “Climate warming is a causal effect of industrialisation” 
but it would be wrong to translate these into a legal case.57  If causation is not 
sometimes readily definable in other subjects, then why should it be so in the law?  I 
think the short answer is it is like the proverbial elephant: unable to be described but 
we know it when we see it.  More than this, the law must have, if not a definition of 
causation, then at least an appreciation or a conception of what it is.  This is not to 
say that everyone agrees on such an appreciation or conception.  This is why lawyers 
should be aware of all causal arguments.  Law is there inter alia to assist people to 
assert their rights or find remedies when they have been wronged.  
  
Use of metaphysical language in law ought to be discouraged.  It is not the place of 
the courts to pronounce on whether causation can be part of the world itself or 
whether it is only part of our perception.  Is it possible, in fact, to know à priori a law 
of changes to determine all phenomena58 independent of experience or are we !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 J PEARL, Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
at p338, quoting Bertrand Russell  
57 K NUOTIO, “Some Remarks on the General Philosophy of Causality and its Relation to 
Causation in the Law”, in L TICHY (ed) Causation in Law (Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) 27 at 28 
58 I KANT, Critique of Pure Reason (New York, Dover Publications, 2003), p138 
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doomed never to know that the sun will rise tomorrow, leave everything to chance, 
but still go about our lives using a constant conjunction?59  It is interesting – but 
perhaps not so in a writ.  I do not wish, however, to ignore many of the causal 
paradigms that are to be found within works of philosophy. 60  An interesting 
interpretation is put on Man’s fall from Grace in the Garden of Eden hours after 
Adam’s eating from the tree of knowledge. Adam is “already an expert in causal 
arguments.”61 God never asks for the cause but just for the facts:   
Have you eaten from the tree from which I commanded you not to eat? 
The man said, “The woman you put led me.  She gave me some fruit from the tree 
and I ate it.”62 
 
Eve then refers to the serpent in similar tones.63 Causation is seen here to pass or 
allocate responsibility.  This has been its function even from the earliest days and this 
is still its function today.  What can be said with certainty with regard to causation is 
that a full understanding of causation – even in the law - is necessarily a multi-
disciplined approach. However, this paper is concerned with just one approach: 
causation in the law and more particularly causation in medical liability. Whether 
one’s profession is that of lawyer, philosopher, psychiatrist, scientist, economist, or 
indeed theologian, problems of causation will most likely be encountered at some 
point. If legal writing on the subject is comparable to that in the aforementioned 
disciplines, I am sure there will be no shortage of reference material.  Crucially, the 
law is ready and able to borrow ideas of causation from other disciplines and apply 
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59 the argument from HUME that continually seeing the same cause and effect leads to a constant 
conjunction, leading to probability allowing us to lead our lives.   He makes clear, however, that we 
cannot “…penetrate into the reason of the conjunction”: see, D HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature 
(New York, Dover Publications 2003), p67 
60 For a gentle introduction into the subject, I used the following: ARISTOTLE, The Metaphysics 
(London, Penguin Books, 2004); D HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature (New York, Dover 
Publications 2003); I KANT Critique of Pure Reason (New York, Dover Publications, 2003) 
61 J PEARL, Causality: Models, p332 
62 The Bible, Genesis, Chapter 3, v 11-12, taken from The New International Version, (Sevenoaks, 
Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1990) 
63 ibid, v 13, “The woman said, 'The serpent deceived me and I ate it'”  
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them appropriately.  New theories, or their variations, and policies in causation are 
arising frequently and it is important for lawyers and scholars to recognise them.  
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2.4 Responsibility and Causation 
The role that causation plays in tort law is a pivotal one.64  Along with injury and 
fault, it is one of the hurdles that must be surmounted by a plaintiff who claims 
reparation from a defendant.  All jurisdictions under consideration here accept that A 
is liable to B to make reparation to B if A causes a legally recognised harm to B 
through A’s fault.  A could also be said to be responsible morally for harm he has 
caused to B whether or not A has a legal remedy against B.  For example, if A had 
arranged to meet B for a dinner and A decided at the last minute that he would 
rather stay at home and B had expended money (for example, on a new suit) in the 
knowledge of the up-coming dinner, then it could be said that A is responsible for (as 
he caused, though everyone would not necessarily agree on this) B’s expenditure even 
though A would have no legal remedy against B.65 The law simply does not recognise 
social contracts in this way.66 Blameworthiness, responsibility, culpability, fault and 
even guilt: if these can be imputed to the tortfeasor and only if, can be said that he 
caused the legally recognised damage will he be able to recover in tort.  It is the 
essence of the maxim: damnum iniuria datum.67    However, “cause” is the problem 
verb.  In none of the legal jurisdictions under consideration is it defined or even 
refined.  It would be extremely difficult to do so.  The PETL and the DCFR attempt, 
however, legally to define it or at least expand its application.  In the jurisdictions 
under consideration, causation’s application is left to the courts or academic writers 
or both.  
 
Further, causation’s role can be seen as an intuitive response to liability or a “get out 
controlling device”.68  It is not the only one.  A first-year law student in the United 
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64 G RAVARANI, La responsabilité civile des personnes priveés et publiques, (Luxembourg, Pasicrisie 
luxembourgeoise, 2006), 5, “C'est en effet au 17ème siècle que la faute accéda de son rôle du 
cause, parmi d'autres, de la responsabilité civile, à une condition nécessaire de toute 
responsabilité.” 
65 although for an interesting European comparison, see J GORDLEY (ed), The Enforceability of 
Promises in European Contract Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), “Case 4 – a 
promise to come to dinner”, p105  
66 J THOMSON and HL MACQUEEN, Contract Law in Scotland (Edinburgh, Butterworths, 2000), 
2.64 
67 J THOMSON, Delictual Liability, (Edinburgh, Butterworths, 1999), p1 
68 M HOGG, “The Role of Causation in Delict”, (2005) Juridical Review 89 at 93 
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Kingdom would generally learn the common-law basis of establishing liability in 
negligence69 for damnum iniuria datum is 
(i) showing a duty of care existed;70 
(ii) showing the duty of care was breached; 
(iii) showing a causal relationship between the plaintiff’s injury and the 
defendant’s action or omission. 
 
Showing a causal relationship between fault and damage is a reminder of what was 
said previously.  The ideas of causal relationship, cause, effect or result can appear 
nebulous and inherently emotional and subject-dependent.  In any (legal) situation, 
can we really say “If a, b”? Such logical deductions are far too formulaic for the law 
and unhelpful, especially when dealing with the area of medical science.  This does 
not, however, mean they should be eschewed in toto.  It can often be difficult when 
the law and science meet (medical negligence cases) to affirm what was the cause-in-
fact of a particular injury.  If legally we ought not71  to take into account all 
antecedent causes, where do we stop? This is the eternal problem.  The answer 
depends on the field of study.  This is a paper on law and solutions in law are 
considered principally.   
 
To return to the criteria noted above with regard to foundations of delictual liability, 
perhaps the first “escape route” for not finding a defendant liable could be found in 
the first of these tests.  That a plaintiff must show a duty of care exists involves an 
appraisal of what is “fair, just and reasonable.”72 Often, however, it is clear that a 
duty of care exists and this cannot be used as a controlling device.  Resort could then 
be had to causation.  If causation is a matter of dispute in the case, I submit it cannot 
be resolved intuitively by common sense.  If it were simply a question of common 
sense, the matter would not have to come to court in the first place.  
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69 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 
70 following the tripartite test in Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 
71 and none of the jurisdictions does notwithstanding reference to the theories sine qua non and 
equivalence 
72 Caparo v Dickman as [1990] 2 AC 605 per Lord Bridge at 616-618 
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So notions of causation and responsibility are very closely related.  The answer to the 
question “Did person A cause loss x?” is very often the same as the answer “Is person 
A responsible73 for loss x?” – but not always.  So although the two concepts of 
responsibility and causation are linked, they are not synonyms. 
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73 with all the suggestions and conceptions of responsibility that this may entail 
! ! ! ! !! 28!
2.5 Common Sense, Causation and Conditions 
In causation, appeal is unfortunately often made to “common sense” solutions.74 
Indeed much of Hart and Honoré’s seminal work on causation focuses to a great 
extent on “common sense”.75  I suggest any notion of “common sense” is a glib one 
to which judges can refer when they are incapable of explaining a certain solution.  It 
is for this reason among others that I believe that it will be impossible to come to 
some common understanding about causation.  Notwithstanding where Hart and 
Honoré note 
Common sense is not a matter of inexplicable or arbitrary emotion, and the causal 
notions which it employs, though flexible and complex and subtly influenced by 
context, can be shown to rest, at least in part, on stateable principles; though the 
ordinary man who uses them may not, without assistance, be able to make them 
explicit.76  
 
I would not agree with this statement.  If the principles were common sense, then the 
person who used them ought to be able to state them.  Indeed a judge perhaps more 
than anyone should have a duty to state them.  Why would such principles not be 
stateable? In any case, common sense is not an agreed concept among human beings 
and I would suggest that there are no stateable principles.77 It is not just the ordinary 
person who may have difficulty explaining the principles.  Judges struggle too. 
Perhaps when a judgement is reached empirically, and, typically without much 
explanation or reasoning, as I found was often the case for French judgements, then 
there are hidden “common sense” principles behind the decisions.  It may be the 
case, but surely an appropriate elucidation would not be improper in the context to 
avoid confusion or indeed fallacious or inaccurate principles being presumed from 
such judgements.  Linked to this, Hart and Honoré also suggest, and their comment 
may well be legitimate, that because there appears to be an obsession with words 
such as “cause and effect”, that this may lead us to believe that there is only one 
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74 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, Chapter 2 entitled “Causation and 
Common Sense” 
75 ibid 
76 ibid, p27 
77 S LLOYD-BOSTOCK, “The Ordinary Man, and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and 
Responsibility” (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 143 
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notion of causation.78 Linguistically, do we know the difference between the words 
“effect”, “consequence” or “result”? To adapt their examples to medicine, the 
patient's recovery was a result of the operation; its effect may lead to the greater 
happiness of the patient with longer life as a consequence.79 Are these words really 
interchangeable in this sentence? It is suggested then that “common sense” can be at 
once useful and dangerous. It is useful in that it allows for public policy flexibility but 
dangerous in that it makes the vindication of rights more difficult and elusive as resort 
to the reasoning behind such arguments need not be expansive. 
 
Common sense would dictate, for example, that it was not oxygen that caused the 
fire but rather (say) a short circuit. However, it is not necessarily clear prima facie 
how a court should treat the following cases from a “common sense” point of view: 
 
(i)   Example 1 
An accused supplied drugs to a victim.  The accused supplied the victim with not 
only the drugs but also with a syringe for the immediate self-injection.  The accused 
injected him and died.80 Should the accused be charged with murder rather than just 
manslaughter? Did the accused cause the death? 
(ii) Example 2 
An accused left a wine bottle containing arsenic on a window-sill.  She knew that her 
husband was an alcoholic. She left the house.  He drank the solution and died.81 
Should the wife be held responsible? Did the accused cause her husband’s death? 
 (iii)Example 3 
A boy, playing on a bridge, falls. Before he hits the ground, he hits electricity wires 
that have been negligently left there by a defendant electricity company.  The boy is 
electrocuted.  If he had not been electrocuted, he would have been killed when he hit 
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78 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p27 
79 Their examples are that of a prisoner’s acquittal being a result of a trial, its effect on the public 
being astonishment leading to a change in the law as a consequence 
80 R v Kennedy (no 2) [2008] 1 AC 269 
81 RGSt 1 (1880) 373, 374 
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the rocks, or at least he would have been seriously injured.82 Did the electricity 
company cause the boy’s death? If so, how should the boy’s life be valued for the 
purposes of ascertaining damages?  
(iv) Example 4 
Fire a burns house x before fire b, where b was a certain event to burn house x 
anyway. Perhaps many juries would regard fire a as the cause.  But what if two fires, a 
and b, started independently then later joined together to form one greater fire, fire c, 
and then destroyed house x?  If Mr Z was responsible for fire a, should he be held 
liable for the loss to the owner of house x?83 Did Mr Z cause the damage to house x? 
 
All the above problems have had suggested solutions in law.  Does this mean that 
these are also common sense solutions? I suggest not.  How do we begin to answer 
these questions where, there is no intuitive answer where all can agree?  In this 
regard, I must agree with Stapleton where she criticises Hart and Honoré in that  
[they] acknowledge that such notions [of common sense] are not hard-edged and 
may not provide clear answers in borderline cases.  Yet despite this they assert that 
there is a “central core of commonly agreed meaning” which they go on to enunciate 
and analyse at length…the authors pay little, if any, attention to empirical work 
concerned with these phenomena.  They simply state that “the ordinary person” uses 
words in such and such a way, according to a particular causal connection in such 
and such circumstances, as if these were established facts.  
 
I agree.  There is empirical research on how people view causation and they did not 
quote it.84 With regard to the above examples I cited, people will disagree; there will 
not be one uniform solution.  This is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. It just is.   
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82 Dillon v Twin State & Gas Electric Company (1932) 85 NH 449 
83 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p89 where they note that in New York 
since 1886 it has been the law that if a fire negligently started spreads to buildings, damages may 
be recovered only in respect of the first of the buildings affected 
84 S LLOYD-BOSTOCK, “The Ordinary Man and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and 
Responsibility”, (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 143; Hart and Honoré’s second edition was published 
in 1985 so after this article was published.  
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Generalizing theories only answer part of the problem.  For example, it would now 
appear to be a generally accepted fact in common parlance that smoking can cause 
lung cancer and consequent death but in no case in Europe has any action been 
successful against a tobacco company. 85  Why is this? This may seem initially 
surprising to some but the reasons for this lie at the heart of causation in the law.  To 
cite the above example, to state that leaving poison on a shelf causes death is as 
meaningless as the statement “car accidents cause death”.86 The context must always 
be considered.  All evidence must be considered to update any probalistic function.87 
Not to individualise evidence is irrational.   This is why, for example, cases against 
tobacco companies are rarely successful.  Some cases in France, and indeed 
legislation in Scotland, have gone to the other extreme essentially based on a 
precautionary principle where no damage as such has been shown.88 Yet some may 
consider this a question of iniuria rather than causation.  I shall consider this further 
below. 
 
2.5.1 Causes and Conditions 
Causes should be distinguished from mere conditions.89 The real test is often, for the 
purposes of law, was there a human voluntary (or negligent) interference or omission 
from the normal course of events which made a difference in the way things 
developed?90 Conditions can be seen as the “background” and cause something !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 McTear v Imperial Tobacco 2005 CSOH 69; in France, see the Affaire Gourlain JCP 1998 II n° 1 
0088 and now in the Netherlands, see A KEIRSE, in H KOZIOL and BC STEININGER (eds), 
Tort and Insurance Law Yearbook, European Tort Law 2008 (Springer, Vienna, 2009) pp481-483  
86 JL MACKIE, The Cement of the Universe, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980), see Chapter 3 
on Causal Regularities 
87 J PEARL, Causality: Models, p310 
88 Bouygues Telecom case at JCP E 2009.1336 and Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) 
Act 2009 allowing for the recovery of pleural plaques.  These pleural plaques may induce fear of 
future asbestos-related disease in their hosts but are not harmful in themselves.  They may increase 
the risk of some future disease but I would agree with Wright where he notes that “Risks are 
merely abstract ex ante statistics that report the frequency of occurrence of some harm given a 
specified set of conditions….risks per se do not constitute an actual setback to another’s equal 
external freedom through an invasion of the other’s rights in his person or property, as is required 
for an interactive justice wrong”: R WRIGHT, “Liability for Possible Wrongs: Causation, 
Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof”, (Summer 2008) 41 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 
1295 at 1296 
89 for which, see HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p28 
90 ibid; a modification of HLA HART’s and T HONORE's test at p29; this idea of “the normal 
course of events” is similar to adequacy theory, for which, see infra 
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which interferes with or “manipulates” this.91 Yet in medical liability, it can be 
difficult to differentiate.  Medical science is not a perfect science.  It can often be 
difficult to say what the normal course of events is or would have been.  While it may 
be thought of as normal for a patient undergoing an operation not to die under 
anaesthetic,92 the statistics are more difficult when determining (say) why a person 
has developed cancer.   In short, in as much as it is possible to say that anything 
normal, that would have been there anyway, that is in accordance with natural laws, 
can be said to be a mere condition.  Oxygen can be said to be a condition of a fire (at 
least on Earth!).93 There is generally oxygen in a room in the normal course of 
events.   
 
Arguments as to what is a cause and what is a condition are at the heart of causation 
in medical liability.  To what extent are diseases, predispositions and hastened death 
caused by conditions that is to say, the environment itself?; this is something that 
happens, or rather, something that is, in the natural course of things.  Being born is, 
after all, a cause of dying but this statement is useful only for philosophers and it 
would seem absurd if introduced into a writ.  The jurist has to be aware of spatial and 
temporal limits to the parameters surrounding effect, e, death (or injury), and it is 
doubtful that being born would be a relevant cause – it is more likely to be a 
condition – indeed a causally irrelevant one – in the law in any case. 
 
Having now distinguished causes from conditions, I propose to consider theories in 
causation.  I begin with the equivalence of conditions theory.  
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91 K NUOTIO, “Some Remarks on the General Philosophy of Causality and its Relation to 
Causation in the Law”, in L TICHY (ed), Causation in Law, (Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) 27 at 28 
92 Chances of this alone are 0.01% to 0.016% as noted in “Survey of Anaesthesia-related Mortality 
in France”, A LIENHART, 2006, Anaesthesiology, 2006, 105: 1087-97 
93 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p35  
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2.6 Theories in Causation 
2.6.1 Equivalence of Conditions 
The equivalence of conditions theory can be said to be the starting point of the 
classical theories in causation that must be understood before a true comparative 
analysis of causation in medical liability proper can begin.  Glaser’s formulation of 
the equivalence theory in Austria was later adopted in Germany.94  It states that the 
sum total of each of the phenomenon that caused a particular outcome can be 
regarded as the cause: in other words, all causes are “equivalent”.95 This has since 
developed to cause in fact or the sine qua non theory.  Hart and Honoré sum it up 
nicely when they state that if we look to the past of any event then there is an infinite 
number of events, each of which is a necessary condition of the given event and so, as 
much as any other event, must be called a cause.96 They note that this is called the 
“cone” of causation in that the series of causes “fans” out as we go back in time.97 
Glaser states 
if one attempts wholly to eliminate in thought the alleged author [of the act] from the 
sum of the events in question and it then appears that nevertheless the sequence of 
intermediate causes remains the same, it is clear that the act, and its consequence 
cannot be referred to him…98 
 
Traeger in his writing also considered the most often cited theory of conditio sine qua 
non.  He writes simply and logically.  His Kausalbegriff is still the most often cited work 
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94 J GLASER, Abhandlung aus dem österrichen Strafrecht (Vienna, Tendler, 1858, Bd 1) 298 (some of the 
following spellings may seem odd to modern readers of German but I quote directly); “Es gibt für 
die Prüfung des Causalzusammenhanges einen sicheren Unhaltspunct; versucht es, den 
angeblichen Urheber ganz aus der Summe der Ereignisse hinwegzudenken, und zeigt sichs dann, 
daß nichtsdestoweniger der Erfolg eintritt, daß nichtsdestoweniger die Reihenfolge der 
Zwischenursachen dieselbe bleibt, so ist klar, daß die That und deren Erfolg nicht auf die 
Wirksamkeit dieses dieses Menschen zurückgeführt warden können.” 
95 von BURI takes this further by saying that where four-fifths of one mill pond provides the water 
to turn a mill wheel and another mill pond provides one-fifth of the water, then each must be 
regarded as the cause: M VON BURI, Die Kausalität und ihre strafrechtlichen Beziehungen, (Stuttgart, 
Verlag von Ferdinand Ente, 1885), p2: “Wenn das Umschwingen eines Mühlrads ein bestimmtes 
Quantum Wasser verlange, und aus zwei oberhalb der Mühle gelegnen Sammelteichen A 4/5, 
B1/5 desselben abgelaffen, so könne nicht behauptet warden, daß A zu 4/5 und B nur zu 1/5 den 
Umschwung des Rades verursacht habe.” 
96 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p69 
97 ibid, they cite G WILLIAMS, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence, (London, 1951), p239 
98 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p443 
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on causation in Germany’s courts today.99  He notes initially that every legal theory 
on causation has emanated from the conditio sine qua non.100 He then goes on to say 
that the next question is which of the many conditions of an event as a result of their 
attributes (Eigenschaft) can be considered as efficient, predominant and adequate 
(wirksamster, überwiegender, adäquater usw.) so that they may be called a cause.101 Traeger 
then distinguishes the legal category into which an injury or event falls.  If it is 
possible to remove the antecedent condition and the legal categorisation changes 
thereby, then it is no longer possible to say that the particular antecedent condition 
was actually a legal condition.  For example, if for the legal categorisation of bodily 
injury K (let us call this Wirkungskategorie-K), factor x was required then the removal of 
this factor x would result in the consequence Wirkungskategorie non-K.102 So removing x 
would change the legal categorisation of damage.  He summaries this idea of 
conditions by stating that a condition in the sense of conditio sine qua non is one 
where 
...jeder Umstand, der nicht weggedacht werden kann, ohne dass der dann 
vorhandene Zustand überhaput nicht mehr in die betreffende juristische 
Erfolgskategorie W fällt.103 
 
It is this elimination in thought, or wegdenken and hinwegdenken, where Traeger allows 
us to imagine another possible world.104  However, it is not the conditio sine qua non 
theory as we know it today so we could conclude, “Adam and Eve are the cause of all 
torts”. This is not what the law proposes.  This is more akin to philosophical 
theorising than legal practicality.  Interestingly, Hart and Honoré conclude their 
section on the rise of the theory of conditions with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 L TRAEGER, Der Kausalbegrif im Straf- und Zivilrecht (Marburg, NG Elwert’sche, 1904): HLA 
HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p471, ft 29; or at least they affirm it was the most 
often cited work in German courts in 1985 when the second edition of Causation in the Law was 
published.  
100 Der Kausalbegriff im Straf- und Zivilrecht, s38, “...dass jede juristische Kausalitätstheorie von der 
condicio sine qua non auszugehen hat.”  
101 ibid 
102 ibid, p42 
103 ibid 
104 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p443, where they cite GLASER’s 
Abhandlungen aus dem österreichen Strafrechte I, 298; for more, see supra 
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In the civil law the theory of conditions has had very little success, courts preferring 
on the whole to make use of adequacy theory or of the metaphors associated with the 
individualizing theories.105 
 
I shall consider adequacy theory itself shortly.  
  
2.6.2 Counterfactuals and Logic 
Counterfactuals and logic are central to causal problems. Lawyers may not 
recognise the latter as much as the former and even then, lawyers may not refer to 
them as “counterfactuals”.  It is right that they should be considered with 
equivalence theory.  Counterfactuals, as far as lawyers are concerned, are possible 
philosophical worlds in which they can imagine that which has actually happened 
as “contrary-to-fact”.106 To modify the example quoted by Collins, Hall and Paul 
If the glass had not been struck then it would not have shattered and thus caused the 
plaintiff injury.107  
 
What this implies is the factual scenario that glass has indeed been struck, and, as a 
result of this striking, has caused the plaintiff loss.  The shattering is counterfactually 
dependent on the striking or as we can now say, the striking of the glass (say a 
window) is a conditio sine qua non of the plaintiff's injury.   Assuming that the court 
in question allows recovery for such injuries (legal causation) then the plaintiff will 
most likely recover the cost of the shattered glass together with resultant legally 
recognised damage from the defendant.  This can be represented in the following 
way where x is the striking of the window and y is the shattering of the window: if x ---
> y.  If, however, the defendant can show that where he had not struck the window, 
the window would have shattered in any case and caused the plaintiff damage, it may 
be the case that the defendant would not be held liable.  Philosophically and logically, 
what the lawyer is doing is demonstrating to the court that there exists another 
possible world where the window would have shattered at (say) approximately the 
same time and the plaintiff would have suffered the same damage in any case and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
105 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p445  
106 J COLLINS, N HALL and LA PAUL “Counterfactuals and Causation: History, Problems and 
Prospects” in J COLLINS, N HALL and LA PAUL (eds) Causation and Counterfactuals (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 2004), p1 
107 ibid, p2 
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therefore the defendant should not be held liable.   Arguing in such a way can be 
seen as weak counterfactual.108 This means that the striking was not necessary for the 
shattering of the window.  A strong counterfactual argument by contrast would be 
that if the window had not shattered then it would not have been struck.  This means 
the only possible way that the window could have been shattered is by its being struck 
(by the defendant).  Philosophy and logic are then useful.  Of course, it is not the 
lawyer's task to prove to the court that the window would shatter in any event as a 
result of (say) a nuclear war at some undetermined point in the future; rather a court 
will limit such counterfactual worlds in space and in time. 109 In medical negligence, 
strong counterfactuals are extremely rare.  
 
Mill noted that a cause is “…the sum total of the conditions positive and negative 
taken together…which being realised, the consequent invariably follows.” 110 
Davidson, in his article, cites one of Mill’s examples of Smith’s death from falling 
from a ladder.111 He notes that Mill would say that a slip from a ladder is not 
necessarily followed by death.  Mill writes 
If we do not, when aiming at accuracy, enumerate all the conditions, it is only 
because some of them will in most cases be understood without being expressed, or 
because for the purpose in view they may without detriment be overlooked. For 
example, when we say, the cause of a man's death was that his foot slipped in 
climbing a ladder, we omit as a thing unnecessary to be stated the circumstance of 
his weight, though quite as indispensable a condition of the effect which took 
place.112  
 
So we miss vital information.  What were the surrounding circumstances? How much 
did Smith weigh? How solid was the ladder in the earth? Was the ladder made of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
108 J MACKIE, “Causes and Conditions”, in Causation, SOSA E and TOOLEY M (eds), (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007) p33 at p39 “sufficient…in the circumstances” 
109 see generally, J MACKIE, “Causes and Conditions”, in Causation, SOSA E and TOOLEY M 
(eds), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007)  
110 JS MILL, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (8th ed, London, 1886), Book I, chap V, s3; 
taken from the Project Gutenberg Ebook online project, p409  
111 D DAVIDSON, “Causal Relations” in SOSA E and TOOLEY M (eds), Causation, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007), p76 
112 JS MILL, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive (8th ed, London, 1886), Book I, chap V, s3; 
taken from the Project Gutenberg Ebook online project, p403 
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durable material? The set of circumstances is almost endless and certainly unique. It 
is possible to gage probabilities of similar deaths in similar (identical?!) situations but 
we can never predict such situations as, of course, we only know the circumstances 
post-facto.  This is how a court treats medical cases of causation in particular. It 
strives to know all the facts by individualisation.  The facts in each case are particular 
to that patient and once the court has as many of the facts as it can ascertain, it 
should then gage probability.  Thereafter the court will ask itself whether the plaintiff 
has discharged his burden of proof.    
 
It is suggested that as far as the law is concerned the injection of temporal necessity is 
essential.   Davidson posits six sentences.113 It is interesting to see how five of these 
sentences can be adapted to conform to case law:114  
(i) it is a fact that Jack fell down; 
(ii) Jack fell down and Jack broke his crown; 
(iii) Jack fell down before Jack broke his crown; 
(iv)Jack fell down which caused it to be the case that Jack broke his crown; 
(v)That Jack fell down explains the fact that Jack broke his crown. 
Now (i) and (ii) essentially are descriptive only.  If they are to be adapted to the law, 
number (ii) does not mean that Jack's falling down is the cause of his breaking his 
crown.  Indeed the time between Jack's falling down and breaking his crown is 
unknown.  In (iii) “before” is simply an adverb of time. Jack could indeed have fallen 
down in 1982 but have broken his crown in 2000. Number (iv) is more helpful.  Here 
there is a causal connection that can be used but again the time between the two is 
unknown.  There may be a question of causal potency to be ascribed to Jack’s falling 
down causing it to be the case that he broke his crown.  Once we introduce the 
ontology of time Davidson explains 
there exists events e and e’ such that e is a falling down of Jack, e’, is a breaking of his 
crown by Jack, and e caused e’. 115 
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113 D DAVIDSON, “Causal Relations” in Causation, p79  
114 original italics 
115 ibid, p80 
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Sentences like “The short-circuit caused the fire” then look quite vacuous for their 
singularity as they omit a space-time analysis.116  Once we introduce time, matters 
look more precise either in 
There exist times t and t’ such that Jack fell down at t, Jack broke his crown at t’, and 
t preceded t’ 117or  
The one and only falling down of Jack caused the one and only breaking of his 
crown by Jack.118   
 
Logical formulations such as these are important in understanding causation.  As we 
shall see later on, there are many events where time is important.  There is much 
case law dealing with asbestos-related diseases.  These bear witness to a long gap 
between the breathing in of asbestos fibres and the developing of a disease. The 
above sentences can also be adapted to fit cases like “Mr Smith smoked 30 cigarettes 
a day for 40 years and he developed lung cancer”.  This counterfactual is not that he 
would not have developed lung cancer.     
 
It could be questioned whether such logical analyses are either necessary or helpful in 
questions relating to medical liability. I propose that they are.  In medical science, 
uncertainty pervades.  It is often crucial to know what would have happened in the 
event that the care-provider had not been negligent. What judges and lawyers are 
often doing is postulating possible worlds where (normally) delictual behaviour is 
supplanted for correct behaviour.  Yet such “perfect possible worlds” are sometimes, 
from the facts of the case, not the ones to be postulated. For example, it is not enough 
to say that had the ship been fitted with a life ring that the crew would have been 
saved.  The behaviour to postulate is whether the crew would have grabbed the life 
rings, had they known how to swim with one and so on.  Yet the problem with using 
the conditio sine qua non formula with omissions is that, as Magnus has noted, an 
omission as such is almost meaningless as there are many possible acts which have 
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been omitted.119 It is crucial to ascertain precisely which act has been omitted.  It is 
important to disregard conditions and concentrate on cause: in theory, at least.    
Further, as noted above, temporal considerations can be fundamental, especially in 
the area of medical negligence.  It is no use for a lawyer to say, “Dr Smith performed 
his operation negligently and Mr Smith suffered injury”; first, we need a factual 
(conditio sine qua non or counterfactual correlation) connection between Dr Smith's 
performing the operation and the injury (à la Jack’s crown examples given above). 
The two events must be proximate enough in time to allow the court to recognise 
causation.  The correct counterfactual question must be posed in proceedings; and 
what is the philosophical counterfactual world to which the court must have regard? 
In the recent Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board it was held that a lower court had 
erred in this regard and that the proper question which should have been asked was 
not what the pursuer would have done in the event she had been advised of the 
minimal risk of a grave consequence but rather what the plaintiff would have done if 
she had been advised moreover of the risk of shoulder dystocia.120 So counterfactual 
questions change with time; therefore causation changes with time.  It is not a fixed 
concept.   
 
There is also a difference between causation and explanation as was shown by 
sentence (v) of the “Jack’s crown” sentences above.  A care-provider’s fault in 
performing an operation may well explain an injury yet the law may not allow 
recovery for it for some reason.  For example, in the United Kingdom, only fault that 
meets the standard of “negligence” will be recoverable.   In France, recovery is 
allowed for even a faute légère.  Yet, as shall be seen, for all these logical arguments that 
are made, courts will often decide in a way simply having regard to public policy.121  
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119 U MAGNUS, “Causation by Omission”, in L TICHY (ed) Causation in Law, (Prague, E 
Rozkotova, 2007) p95  
120 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 at per Lord Kerr and Lord Reed at 103 
121 and they will openly say this: Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 
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2.7 Adequacy Theory 
Adequacy theory is a refinement of the equivalence theory.  With the equivalence 
theory, every antecedent can be regarded as a cause.  With adequacy theory, what is 
considered is to what extent an event becomes more probable statistically122or what 
normally follows in the “natural course of events”.123 It was used so that attributions 
of liability were to be based on foreseeability rather than only pure factual 
causation.124 The theory was born in Germany but also now has an extensive use in 
France. 125   The history of the theory shall be considered here and France's 
refinement of it shall be considered in the French chapter. 
 
It was von Kries who was interested in probability and statistics.  His writings reflect 
this.  For him, a given contingency was an adequate cause of harm if it satisfied two 
conditions: 
i. it must be a sine qua non of the harm; and 
ii. it must have increased the objective probability of the harm by a significant 
amount.126 
 
Von Kries held further that the actor's subjective knowledge must be taken into 
account.  If the actor was mistaken in any way, then this should be considered.127 
Rümelin put forward an idea of objective hindsight taking into account the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 See J VON KRIES, Die Prinzipien der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (Freiburg, Mohr, 1886) and HLA 
HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, pp 467 et seqq; F BYDLINSKI has referred to the 
exclusion of liability where an individual has caused a damage “mechanically”, though I am really 
not sure what this means: see F BYDLINSKI, “Causation as a Legal Phenomenon”, in L TICHY 
(ed) Causation in Law (Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) 5 at 17 
123 RGZ 81 (1913), 362 
124 K NUOTIO, “Some Remarks on the General Philosophy of Causality and its Relation to 
Causation in the Law”, in L TICHY (ed), Causation in Law (Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) 27 at 31 
125 G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, Traité de droit civil: Les conditions de la responsabilité (3rd ed, Paris, 
LGDJ, 2006), 340-1: “Mais c’est incontestablement la théorie dite la ‘causalité adéquate’ qui a 
exercé la plus grande influence tant en France qu’à l’étranger.  Ne retenant parmi les conditions du 
dommage que celles qui contenaient la ‘possibilité objective du résultat’, les partisans de cette these 
font appel à l’idée de ‘prévisibilité’ en précisant généralement que cette notion doit s’apprecier 
objectivement et non d’après la psychologie de l’auteur.”: evidently ‘l’étranger’ does not include 
the United Kingdom.   
126  J VON KRIES, “Über die Begriffe der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Möglichkeit und ihre 
Bedeutung im Strafrecht” (1889) 9 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 528 
127 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, pp482-484 
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knowledge of all mankind and such events as were discernible to the optimal 
observer.128 Traeger thought this was too limiting and added the knowledge that the 
“originator” of the condition should have had in mind.129 
 
Traeger then appraises von Kries and Rümelin’s objective and subjective adequate 
theories respectively.130  This is the crescendo to the climax of his theory later on 
where he writes that 
Eine sich also conditio sqn eines bestimmten Erfolgs erweisende Handlung oder 
sonstige Begebenheit ist dann adäquate Bedingung des Erfolgs, wenn sie generell 
begünstigender Umstand eines Erfolgs von der Art des eingetretenen ist, dh wenn sie 
objectiven Möglichkeiten eines Erfolgs von der Art des eingetretenen generell in 
nicht unerheblicher Weise erhöht.131 
 
This “increased possibility judgement” is made taking into account general human 
experience at the time of the event and all circumstances an optimal observer could 
know at the time of its occurrence (die einsichstigsten Menschen132) and furthermore those 
that were known to the tortfeasor himself (ferner die dem Täter selbst ausserdem noch 
bekannten waren).133 This is much attributive knowledge.  
 
Some commentators have translated the “possibility judgement” as “objective 
probability”.134 Perhaps this is not the most appropriate translation at this stage of 
Traeger’s exegesis.  This idea of probability is brought in later on in Traeger’s 
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128 M RÜMELIN, Die Verwendung der Kausalbegriffe im Straf- und Zivilrecht (Tübingen, Mohr, 1900), 
p19 where he writes “Es wird also allerdings vorausgesetzt, was dem Täter bekannt war oder 
bekannt sein mußte, außerdem aber auch, was sonst bekannt war oder bekannt geworden ist, zB 
die durch nachträglichen Verlauf aufgebeten, aber zur Zeit der Tat schon vorligenden Umstände, 
sowie das gesammte Erfahrungswissen der Menschlichkeit.  ”
129 L TRAEGER, Der Kausalbegriff im Straf-und Zivilrecht (1904), (Marburg, NG Elwert’sche, 1904) 
p136 et seqq for Traeger’s critique on Rümelin 
130 ibid, pp130-144 
131 ibid, at p159 
132 the actual quote is in the dative 
133 ibid, at p159 
134 for example, W van GERVEN, Tort Law, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000), p400 
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writing.135 Traeger affirms that the adequate cause is simply not something that is a 
typical normal cause and an adequate condition is not simply a condition that brings 
about a normal, general result.136 He notes that simply because a man dies of 
traumatic fever is not a normal progression from the condition of an injury but he 
states that it could possibly be considered as an adequate condition of the death.137 
Traeger also considers simply that probability must be considered from “the rules of 
life” (nach der Regel des Lebens) and rejects any abstract formulae in this regard.138 
Simply then he sums up that a result whose objective possibility as the result of a 
particular tortious act given ex ante general knowledge was not increased, is simply an 
accident.139 As Hart and Honoré conclude, the Traeger principle of description as to 
whether a given act should be considered as causally relevant for increasing the 
probability should now be stated in the negative, viz 
that circumstances not known or knowable either to the actor or a most prudent man 
are excluded from the description. 140  
 
The notion of “description” then is important when it comes to explaining the act.  
The example given141 is that of shoving a man from a cliff to his death.  Von Kries 
said that the act should be described as “giving a shove on the edge of a cliff” only if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 L TRAEGER, Kausalbegriff, pp162 et seqq; interestingly he compares subjective and objective 
probability and indicates how this might be calibrated: “Auch wenn nun unter vorauszusetzenden 
Bedingungen diejenigen mit inbegriffen warden, die – zwar selbst für den einsichtigsten Menschen 
nicht erkennbar – zur Zeit der Handlung dem Täter bekannt waren, so wird dadurch das 
Wahrscheinlichkeits- oder Möglichkeitsurteil nicht zu einem subjectiven 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile, es bleibt vielmehr ein objectives.  Den nest ist nach wie voz zu fragen, 
ob unter Voraussetzung der genannten Bedingungen die objective Möglichkeit eines Erfolgs von 
der Art des eingetretenen generell erhöht wird.  3. Das Möglichkeitsurteil wird auf Grund des 
gesamten Erfahrungswissens gebildet.  Stren genommen ist das Wahrscheinlichkeits- oder 
Möglichkeitsurteil zwar nur dann objeectiv, alllgemeingültig, wenn es auf Grund vollkommenen 
nomologischen Wissens abgegeben wird, aber da wir nie oder doch fast niemals festellen können, 
ob wir solch vollkommenes Wissen besitzen, so ware das Möglichkeitsurteil überhaupt 
ausgeschlossen.”  
136 ibid, p161 
137 ibid, p162 
138 ibid, p165 
139 ibid, p166, “...ein Erfolg, dessen objective Möglichkeit durch eine bestimmte Handlung oder 
ein sonstiges Ereignis in vorher erkennbarer Weise generell nicht erhöht wird, schlechthin als 
zufälliger gilt.” 
140 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p483 
141 ibid 
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the actor knew he was standing on the edge of a cliff.  Traeger said that the act must 
be so described if the most prudent of men would have realised this (ie the optimal 
observer at the time the event occurred) and this is the view that has now been 
adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof (“BGH”), the German Federal Supreme Court.142    
 
What we have now is a theory which holds that there is no causation if the event 
would only have happened “in general and [not] under abnormal, completely 
improbable circumstances” or if the circumstances were “unique” and “quite 
improbable to which no attention would be paid if events had followed a normal 
course.”143 Of course there are elements of probability here and the extent to which 
the probability of an act's occurring increases depends on the adaptation of the 
adequacy theory in a particular jurisdiction.  It is France and Germany that have 
paid judicial heed mostly to adequacy theory while the United Kingdom tends to 
shun such theories favouring the condictio sine qua non theory and legal causation.  
 
Stauch notes that compared to the common law approach of “reasonable 
foreseeability”, the use of adequacy theory in Germany is arguably stricter.144 Only 
that which constitutes a co-incidence could in theory be excluded from adequacy 
given the objective and subjective knowledge with which a defendant can be 
attributed.  To obviate such potentially boundless liability, courts in Germany have 
developed yet another test and it is one which has been received to a certain extent in 
the United Kingdom but less so in France.   
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142 ibid 
143 W GRUNSKY, “Die Ursache muß danach im allgemein und nict nur unter besonders 
eigenartigen, unwahrscheinlichen und nach dem gewöhnlichen Verlauf der Dinge außer Betracht 
zu lassenden Umständen geeignet seinm einen Erfolg dieser Art herbeizuführen.  Ob eine Ursache 
adäquat kausal ist, beurteilt sich nicht ex post danach, wie die Dinge effecktiv verlaufen 
sind…maßgeblich ist vielmehr der ex-ante-Standpunk der Schädigers….” Weise erhöht” Münchener 
Kommentar Bügerliches Gesetzbuch (3rd ed, Beck, München, 1994), Band 2, §249, at 40c 
144 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence in England and Germany (Oregon, Hart Publishing, 
2008), p55 
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2.8 The Purpose of the Rule Violated 
Another causal theory is that of the protective purpose rule.  In Germany, this is 
called the Schutzzwecklehre.145 Here causation is only established if the damage is one 
that the rule was designed to guard against and this is usually set out in legislation. 
Sometimes it can be difficult to ascertain the policy or rule in question.146 France 
does not recognise the purpose of the rule violated to show causation.147  This also 
encroaches on areas of legal policy such as should the defendant be left without a 
remedy, the need for deterrence, and the respective social status between the 
parties.148There is then a division between those who believe that courts should not 
attempt to find policy and those who think that it is at least appropriate.149 Courts 
should then reduce problems to solutions that are acceptable to society for the time 
and place.  Others believe that in a search for “cause” we should at least try to 
discern some rules from which solutions to future cases could be hypothesised.150 
Courts may attempt the latter but ultimately, and as this paper seeks to show, the 
former prevails.   
 
I propose to show in this paper that as legal policy differs so much from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction there can be no harmonisation of the rules of causation as may be 
proposed by the drafters of PETL or the DCFR.  Although France does not 
recognise the purpose of the rule violated in causation, its case law on causation 
reflects the mores of that country.  Crudely, it is more victim-friendly than (say) the 
United Kingdom. Germany is more sensitive to what risks must be disclosed to 
patients than (say) the United Kingdom.  This is partly a result of its history.  
Causation is used as a controlling device.  Policy also differs from country to country 
with the special liability systems inaugurated in each jurisdiction.  Therefore I suggest !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
145 U MAGNUS, “Causation in German Tort Law”, in J SPEIR (ed), Unification of Tort Law: 
Causation, (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000), p65 
146 ibid 
147 S GALAND-CARVAL, “Causation under French Law”, Unification of Tort law: Causation, J 
SPIER (ed) (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000) p53 at p57 
148 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability, (Oxford, Hart, 2006), p71 
149 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p103 
150 ibid, p105 
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that as policy plays a central role in causation, there can be no harmonisation of 
causation across Europe. 
  
! ! ! ! !! 46!
2.9 Other Factors 
So while the equivalence theory, adequacy theory and purpose of the rule violated 
are three central theories that are referred to time and time again in case law and in 
academic writing with regard to causation, there are a number of other important 
principles to take into account.    
 
As shall be seen in this paper, the following questions arise independently of the 
above theories whether or not they are being considered part of them or not: 
• What is the legal policy? 
• What was the causal “force” or “efficiency”? (proximate cause) 
• Can we hold this purported tortfeasor liable or, was indeed the “chain of 
causation” in some way broken? 
• Is the result just? 
 
Ultimately, of course, causation has one design: to determine who is 
responsible.  Research will often lead to the unearthing of “causal 
generalisations”.  These can be seen as particular conditions that usually result in a 
particular event.  For example, the firing of loaded gun at the skull of a man usually 
results in his death.  This can be seen as a casual generalisation.  Such generalisations 
are not, however, always so easy to state.  In Re Polemis,151 it was held that where a 
plank in the hold of a ship was negligently dropped causing a spark which caused 
vapour to ignite then the defendants were liable for a resulting fire even though that 
fire was not reasonably foreseeable.152  The court’s reasoning here was that as some 
damage was reasonably foreseeable then all damage as a direct consequence of that 
the fire was recoverable.  This case has often been criticised and it is obvious 
why.  The ratio would appear to hold that there was ultimately no limitation on 
damages. This is a ratio to be expected from a tortfeasor who had deliberately caused 
the fire but perhaps not where it is a negligent act.  In The Wagon Mound153 certain 
employees had acted negligently allowing oil to leak from a ship which covered the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 [1921] 3 KB 560 
152 ibid 
153 [1961] 1 All ER 404 
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water and the shore.  Welders nearby produced hot metal which caused the oil on 
the water to ignite.  This in turn caused substantial damage to the wharf and the 
ships that were moored there.  It was held here that although some damage to the 
wharf was foreseeable, damage by fire was unforeseeable by the spillage. The ratio of 
The Wagon Mound is that a man is only responsible for the probable consequences of 
his act 154  and in turn reasonable foreseeability became the effective test for 
remoteness of damages.155 This can be seen here as either a kind of common-sense 
“ordinary man in the street” test156or an adequacy test.  I have not found any overt 
reference to adequacy theory in the United Kingdom in any of the cases I have 
researched.   
 
In this case, Viscount Simmons, delivering the judgement for their Lordships, was 
highly critical of the test applied in Re Polemis.  He excused it party by opining the law 
of negligence qua independent tort was recent and the full implications had never 
been examined.  Following The Wagon Mound, however, Re Polemis was no longer of 
sound law in the United Kingdom.157  
 
It can be seen therefore that the above two examples provide some of the clues to the 
principles and concepts in a search for causal principles.  As was stated in Re 
Polemis158 
In whatever form we state the rule of ‘natural and probable consequences’, we must 
remember that it is not a logical definition, but only a guide to the exercise of 
common sense.  The lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in 
the logical and metaphysical controversies that beset the idea of cause.159 
 
This paragraph is somewhat unfortunate.  First, I am not clear as to what a “logical” 
definition is and, on the contrary, merely by considering counterfactuals, a lawyer is 
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154 ibid, 422 
155 ibid, 426 
156 ibid, the words actually used at 424 
157 it never had been the law of Scotland 
158  The Wagon Mound [1961] 1 All ER 404 at 570  
159 citing Sir F Pollock, The Law of Torts, (1887), pp35, 36 
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involved in philosophy and logic.  The lawyer imagines possible worlds but does not 
necessarily do so in such a way that he is perplexed or confused or in a way that need 
baffle the court.  A medical negligence lawyer will certainly at some point in his 
career be confronted with causation in “Jack’s crown” scenario. When a court is 
saying that the defendant caused the plaintiff's damage, it is simply saying that the 
defendant legally caused the plaintiff's damage.  It is a pity that courts are often so 
willing to pooh-pooh logic or philosophy in this way as if it had nothing to do with 
real situations when in reality, philosophy and logic are arguably at the very heart of 
causation.   
 
However simple such a ratio may be to quote, it still leaves the lawyer with the 
problem of ascertaining what common sense is.  Sir F Pollock above merely muddied 
the already turbid waters of causation by referring to common sense.   The 
judgement in The Wagon Mound was simply that the negligent welding operation of 
the employees did not cause the damage to the wharf.  This may appear perhaps 
prima facie perplexing.  The acts of the employees factually caused the damage to the 
wharf.  The court limited recovery to “natural and probable” consequences of their 
action so the causal chain to the fire was not completed or the debris that caught fire 
and lit the molten metal “broke” the chain of causation.  Their acts did not legally 
cause the damage to the wharf but they did factually.  This is all the court is holding: 
nothing more and nothing less.    
 
It can be seen then that causation is inseparably linked up with foreseeability.  
Damages will only be limited (often) to what is foreseeable.  Some express the test in 
contract (and medical relationships in France and Germany are generally in contract) 
as what was in the “reasonable contemplation of the parties”.160  But it is suggested 
that courts do not really require to use “foreseeability” and they mix causal language 
with the language of damages.  I would suggest that it is possible simply to do away 
with ideas of limiting damages to what is foreseeable and include everything in a 
causal argumentation.  Courts simply need to hold that the defendant did or did not 
cause the plaintiff’s damage (or caused it to the extent they determine).  Such 
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160 HL MacQUEEN and JM THOMSON, Contract Law in Scotland (Edinburgh, Butterworths, 
2000), p238 
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arguments, however, are strictly outwith the scope of this paper.  In any case, what I 
aim to show here is how policy can be used by courts at the same time as they co-opt 
causal terminology.  I cited case law of what may be “reasonable foreseeability”, 
“common sense” or that given event a, the “natural and probable consequences” are 
cause, b.   Yet this is all terminology perhaps reminiscent of adequacy theory.  It may 
be and as I shall show, these terms often dissolve into one.  
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2.10 Conclusion 
Causation matters then because it appeals to our intuitive notions of justice and 
causation is reflected in all of the jurisdictions under consideration.  One is only liable 
for legally recognised harm caused.  Causation is also a controlling device in as much 
as it can provide the link between harm done and responsibility.  It matters because, 
especially in hard cases, it can be difficult to know which theory, if any, to 
apply.  There are a number of problems in all the jurisdictions relative to causation in 
general.  I wish to concentrate primarily on the subject of medicine and disease. 
Recurring themes can be seen in each jurisdiction and I have outlined in this chapter 
a number of those theories. 
 
Each jurisdiction approaches causation in a different way.  This usually reflects the 
society.  How causation is understood is a result of, among other things, openness to 
philosophical reception, history, the legal system itself (inter alia is precedent 
important?), policy and any special regimes in place. To try to deduce common 
principles or guidance from the abundance of case law and academic writing on the 
subject, I think is not only impossible, but also pointless.  I hope to show simply that 
there are no such common principles and even if those that certain European 
projects advance are applied, the causal language of them leaves enough room for 
manoeuvre for courts to do what they want. Such rules are unconvincing.    
 
I wish to underline again that when a court says that A caused B’s death, it should be 
understood to mean that A is legally responsible for B’s death and nothing more.  It 
should not be understood by the public to mean that given A solely caused (in a wide 
sense) B’s death.  There are always individualising factors and any judgement or 
interpretation of a scenario that does not account for these should be treated with 
scepticism.  For example, if B stabs A, but A is a haemophiliac, we should say B 
caused A’s death.  Now we do not mean that B scientifically or medically caused A’s 
death; rather B precipitated A’s death from that uncertain moment in the future 
when it was going to happen anyway.  It is the blood leaking from the stab wound, 
resulting in a lack of a flow of oxygen to the brain which would ultimately and 
scientifically cause A’s death.  His haemophilia must be taken into account as a 
contributing cause scientifically, perhaps not legally.  For the jurist, however, it is 
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only B’s stabbing of A that is relevant: nothing else.161  The leaking of the blood from 
the stab wound and ultimately brain death are almost conditions for the jurist: they 
occur naturally from the stabbing in the normal course of things.   
 
Humans are moral actors and must be held liable generally for their voluntary 
acts.162 Each of the jurisdictions under consideration acknowledges this link in some 
form or another.163 There would appear no reason to abandon it for its own 
sake.  Here there is commonality.  As mentioned above, humans are not always in 
agreement as to when it is most fitting to use causation to attribute responsibility.  In 
this way, causation serves as a controlling device and it would be disingenuous to say 
that it is clear for a lawyer at the outset what a court will decide in difficult cases as 
these are often simply resolved by public policy.  That is why, I suspect, none of the 
jurisdictions in their codes have attempted a definition of causation and that is why I 
am sceptical of codes or principles that attempt to prescribe such rules.  
 
In this chapter, I have sought to introduce causation in the law from first principles.  
This has necessitated a brief history of causation in the law together with an 
explanation of some concepts that I will refer to in this paper such as the equivalence 
theory and adequacy theory.  This more instructive and explanatory chapter aims to 
form a precursor to the main thrust of this paper which is to deny the validity of such 
sections of European projects in tort law in so far as they attempt to define or expand 
on causation.  They attempt to see how problems might be solved in the given 
jurisdictions and from this deduce certain principles which they have then published.  
I do not believe that this is possible and I hope to show this in particular with regard 
to causation in medical liability.   
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161 of course, the defendant's counsel may well argue that his haemophilia should be taken into 
account but many jurisdictions have rejected such notions in favour of the “thin skull” rule. 
162 at least, this is the society in which we live at the moment; see ARISTOTLE, The Nichomachean 
Ethics, Chapter 3; also MacAngus v HM Advocate 2009 SLT 37 and Sheriff Stoddart's commentary on 
the same in the Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, April 2009 
163 Art 1382 French and Luxembourg Civil Codes and § 823 German BGB 
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In order to substantiate my argument then, evidence is necessary.  It is to this which I 
now turn by a consideration of how causation is treated in each of the jurisdictions 
under consideration here: the United Kingdom, France and Luxembourg, and 
Germany.  The final chapter of this paper shall then summarise this evidence 
demonstrating that harmonisation projects in so far as they relate to causation must 
be futile.   
 
However, it would be wrong of me not to consider causation in tort law as it has been 
considered by the ECJ.  It must consider tort law in general in accordance with 
principles common to the member states.  My contention is, at least in the area of 
causation, that there are none.  I suggest only that the TFEU must be amended the 
better to reflect the reality of ECJ decisions with regard to non-contractual 
obligations.  I offer nothing further in this regard.  I think by now it should be clear, 
that I believe there are no stateable principles on which causation can be based 
which can be applied with any consistency.   
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Chapter 3: Causation in the United Kingdom 
3.1 Introduction 
Proving causation is essential to establishing delictual liability.   The search for the 
causal link in the United Kingdom is similar to that in the other jurisdictions under 
consideration here.  It is an attributive inquiry.164 That is, how does a court attribute 
what has happened to the defendant and allow the plaintiff to recover? The method 
in the United Kingdom is what shall now be considered.   
 
Fault liability remains the basic principle of liability in the United Kingdom.  The 
plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, that that duty 
was breached and that the plaintiff suffered damage caused by the defendant.  These 
are the basic principles of Donoghue v Stevenson,165the most fundamental case in British 
tort law.166   
 
The burden of proof remains squarely with the claimant.   He must prove his case on 
the balance of probabilities.  This means that the claimant must persuade the judge 
that his version of events was “more likely than not”. In theory this is a standard of 
51% but “A judge deciding disputed questions of fact will not ordinarily do it by use 
of a calculator.”167  
 
Traditionally the search for causal attribution in the United Kingdom is based on a 
judicial dichotomy of an analysis of causation-in-fact and causation-in-law.  It is a 
two-stage test and any textbook in tort will refer to this.168  It is perhaps a nice 
division but it is not often clear what it means in practice.   Although Thomson writes 
that the first essential is that the defender's acts or omissions are a cause of the 
pursuer’s damage and this is a question of fact, he does not further expand on this 
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167 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 909, as per Lord Mackay at 916 
168 B MARKESINIS and S DEAKIN, Tort Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) p185; 
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other than quote case law.169  I think Markesinis and Deakin are more candid and 
forthright.  They state that the use of the two stages of enquiry “factual” and “legal” 
is by no means free of controversy.  What was apparent from reading the case law 
was that even the former factual analysis requires a value judgement in itself and is by 
no means obvious or clear.  I shall treat this in more detail in the final chapter.  
Traditionally, at the first stage, the question is asked: but for the plaintiff's act or 
omission, would the defendant still have suffered the loss? If the answer is yes, then 
the defendant would be absolved at this point. There would be no need for further 
enquiry and the litigated circumstances may be termed  “mere conditions”.170  If the 
answer is no, then the court would move on to a legal cause analysis. It is at this 
second stage when notions and vocabulary such as “direct”, “proximate”, “efficient” 
and “reasonably foreseeable” can be introduced.  As I shall show through the case 
law, this is principally a test of policy.   
 
Many of the cases illustrating causation stem from medical negligence. I shall 
consider here areas of British law that have been controversial. In the United 
Kingdom, there would appear to be now more emphasis on legal causation (in the 
policy sense), epidemiology, and, loss of chance.  I shall now examine factual and 
legal causation as they are treated in the United Kingdom.   
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169JM THOMSON, Delictual Liability, p135; this is a Scottish textbook so I keep the terms 
“pursuer” and “defender”.  
170B MARKESINIS and S DEAKIN, Tort Law, p185 
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3.2 Causation in Fact or the conditio sine qua non 
In the United Kingdom, there are a number of cases in medical liability which 
illustrate the concept of causation-in-fact.  Case law is at the heart of British law and I 
shall set out the facts of some important cases first leaving my commentary on them 
to the end. 
 
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee171is the epitome of the “but 
for” test.  Here the plaintiff’s husband drank poisoned tea and died.  Although he 
presented himself at hospital, the attendant doctor told him just to go home.  This 
was negligent and a breach of the doctor’s duty of care.  It was found, however, that 
Mr Barnett would have died anyway as he would not have had the chance to take the 
antidote before he died.  
 
In Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board,172 Andrew Kay was admitted to 
hospital with suspected meningitis on 28 November 1975.  He was about two and a 
half years old.   He was given about three hundred times the required amount of 
penicillin.  The health board did not deny negligence.  They did deny negligence for 
some of the sequalae, namely, deafness and associated behavioural dysfunction.  
Deafness was a relatively common occurrence in any case with children who had 
suffered from meningitis.  There were no reported cases, however, of overdoses of 
penicillin in se causing deafness.  The pursuers relied somewhat on McGhee v National 
Coal Board173 but Lord Keith of Kinel concluded that there was no evidence on which 
to apply the ratio of there being a material increase in risk.174 Indeed there was no 
evidence at all in this case that giving an overdose of penicillin to a child could in fact 
have caused his deafness.  Neither was it accepted simply that just because there was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
171 [1968] 1 All ER 1068 
172 [1987] UKHL 17 
173 see infra at 1973 SC (HL) 37, 1973 SLT 14 following on from Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings 
(1956) SC (HL) 26 which held that where there were two potential sources of danger operating 
concurrently then if one of them materially contributed to the plaintiff's injury then the conditio 
sine qua non test would have been overcome. In McGhee, it was held that where there was a 
material increase in risk following on from two sources of danger operating consecutively then if it 
could be established that there was a material contribution to the risk then the conditio sine qua 
non test would also be overcome. 
174 Bailli, p14/19 
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a material increase in risk in neurological damage globally175 that this included 
deafness.  Lord Mackay of Clashfern noted 
The next step is to consider whether there is evidence that the overdose materially 
increased the risk of deafness.  In my opinion, it is not right to ask whether it 
materially increased the risk of neurological damage when the evidence available 
distinguishes between different kinds of neurological damage...In none of those 
[cases] who survived an overdose [of penicillin], and the number of cases is very 
small, was the particular type of neurological damage which results in deafness found 
to have occurred.  I cannot accept that it is correct to say that because the evidence 
shows that an overdose of penicillin increases the risk of particular types of 
neurological damage found in these cases that an overdose of penicillin materially 
increases the risk of a different type of neurological damage, namely that which 
causes deafness when no such deafness has been shown to have resulted from such 
overdose.176   
 
So what His Lordship was opining here was that although penicillin may cause 
damage which was general neurological damage, it was not deafness.  There were 
twelve study results from intrathecal overdoses of penicillin: in eight the result was 
death, in two the result was complete recovery and in the last two, the result was 
permanent neurological damage although it was not deafness.177 What is required 
then, and this might remind us again somewhat of Traeger's principle above, is that a 
specific kind of damage, K, is required to have been caused.  Neurological damage in 
this case, ie non-K, was, therefore, too vague, although K may have been its subset.   
 
In Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority,178 the issue of causation was somewhat 
clouded and obscured with that of professional negligence.  Here, a child, Patrick !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Lord Mackay of Clashfern p 18/19 
176 Bailli, p17/19 
177 ibid 
178 [1997] 4 All ER 771; this case is perhaps most famous (or notorious) for the dictum of Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson who observed at p9/7  (Bailli) that with regard to the medical standard of care 
and expert evidence “...if, in a rare case, it can be demonstrated that the professional opinion is not 
capable of withstanding logical analysis, the judge is entitled to hold that the body of opinion is not 
reasonable or responsible.  I emphasise that in my view it will very seldom be right for a judge to 
reach the conclusion that views genuinely held by a competent medical expert are unreasonable.”  
This would be an interesting subject for further comment in itself but is unfortunately outwith the 
scope of this paper. 
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Nigel Bolitho, was admitted to St Bartholomew’s hospital under the care of a senior 
paediatric registrar, Dr Horn. Although a nurse asked Dr Horn to attend, she failed 
to attend on two occasions. Patrick later collapsed, was unable to breathe, suffered 
cardiac arrest and later died.  It was accepted that Dr Horn was in breach of her duty 
of care in not attending on Patrick.  It was held in evidence that even if Dr Horn had 
attended, she herself would not have intubated.  The plaintiffs led evidence that 
intubation would have been appropriate in the circumstances.  The defendants led 
evidence that intubation would not have been appropriate in the circumstances.179 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson appears to note two issues in causation.  He states180 
There were, therefore, two questions for the judge to decide on causation: (1) What 
would Dr Horn have done, or authorised to be done, if she had attended Patrick? and (2) 
If she would not have intubated, would that have been negligent? 
 
The answer in fact was that she would not have intubated.   The court accepted the 
expert evidence advocated on behalf of the defendants in that intubation was not 
necessarily a routine procedure but carried risks with it and therefore that non-
intubation was not negligent.181  
 
This case raised the question of proof of causation when the negligent act was one of 
omission.  Interestingly, His Lordship noted here that the question “what would have 
happened?” would not have been determinative in itself of causation.  For example, if 
it had been established that Dr Horn would not have intubated and not intubating 
would have been contrary to accepted medical practice, then she should not escape 
liability simply by proving that even if she had attended, the same damage would 
have occurred anyway because she would have committed some other breach 
thereafter!182 His Lordship in this case referred to the analysis of Hobhouse LJ in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
179 The plaintiffs led eight medical experts, the defendants three 
180 [1997] 4 All ER 771, Bailli p5/9 
181 The court firmly stated that medical negligence is a legal question and not one to be determined 
by doctors.  Re-stating the locus classicus test of medical negligence in Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 583, McNair J affirmed that a defendant would have to show 
that he acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by a “reasonable body of medical 
men” (at p 587; later adjectives of “responsible and respectable” are added.); this case, of course, 
must now be read with the caveat of the recent Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 
11 which now holds that “informed consent” is part of British law 
182 This makes me re-think Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital [1968] 1 All ER 1068 which I 
mentioned above 
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Joyce v Merton, Sutton and Wandsworth Health Authority183where he opined 
Thus a plaintiff can discharge the burden of proof on causation by satisfying the 
court either that the relevant person would in fact have taken the requisite action 
(although she would not have been at fault if she had not) or that the proper 
discharge of the relevant person's duty towards the plaintiff required that she take 
that action. The former alternative calls for no explanation since it is simply the 
factual proof of the causative effect of the original fault. The latter is slightly more 
sophisticated: it involves the factual situation that the original fault did not itself 
cause the injury but that this was because there would have been some further fault 
on the part of the defendants; the plaintiff proves his case by proving that his injuries 
would have been avoided if proper care had continued to be taken. In the Bolitho 
case the plaintiff had to prove that the continuing exercise of proper care would have 
resulted in his being intubated.184 
 
So what does this mean for a plaintiff?  First, if a plaintiff can show that the action to 
be taken by the defendant would have been constitutive of negligence then the 
plaintiff overcomes the causal hurdle.  For example, in this case, if the plaintiff could 
have shown that intubation would have been a negligent course of action and that Dr 
Horn would have intubated had she attended then the causal hurdle would have 
been overcome.  The second condition of this disjunction would require that the 
plaintiff prove his case by showing that his injuries would have been avoided if the 
proper care had been taken. In this case then, it required that the plaintiffs show that 
proper care was Patrick's intubation.   This factual enquiry, of course, remains in the 
realms of hypothesis and it is intriguing to observe how the courts confront causation-
in-fact with omissions.  It shows how courts can convert investigation of fact into 
normative counterfactual investigations. 
 
What I have tried to illustrate here with regard to a few cases in factual causation is 
that it is often not simple to agree on which is the correct causal solution.  Even with 
what would appear simple cases such as Barnett cited above, some would say that it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183(1996) 7 Med LR 1 
184 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] 4 All ER 771, p5/9, Bailli 
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would be unfair to leave the defendant in this case without a remedy.185 The doctor 
after all clearly breached his duty of care.  Cases like Kay’s Tutor show how philosophy 
of causation is still relevant in analysing cases regardless of how judges may belittle a 
philosophical analysis (for example, Traeger’s analysis) in other cases.  Bolitho again 
deals with philosophical hypotheticals and counterfactuals in the case of omissions 
particularly.  It suggests how a condictio sine qua non can be determined.  
 
Yet this strict “but for” rule would be harsh if applied absolutely.  I turn now to the 
dilution of the sine qua non test in the United Kingdom in cases where a rigorous 
application of the test would lead to injustice.  It is this I wish to examine more fully 
to understand factual causation in the United Kingdom.  
 
3.2.1 Factual Causation – Dilution of the “but for” test  
The strict application of the “but for” test in British law could have produced harsh 
results and the courts have recognised this.   In certain cases therefore, its strict 
application has been regulated.  
 
In Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings, 186 the plaintiff developed pneumoconiosis from 
breathing dust in the atmosphere at work.  The dust came from two sources: the first 
source was a hammer and the second, machines in the workplace.  It was held that if 
the plaintiff could demonstrate that one of the two sources had materially 
contributed to his injury then he could recover from his employer.  Whatever was 
material was more than de minimis.  The plaintiff was able to show this and he 
recovered.  This is perhaps an unremarkable decision in itself.187  
 
In McGhee v National Coal Board,188the plaintiff was employed by the National Coal 
Board and worked in a hot and dirty kiln.  Each day he cycled home.  There were no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 I took a poll among my second year tort students this year and out of the 42 students I had, 18 
disagreed with this decision, 20 agreed with it and 4 were undecided.  I do not have precise data 
from other years but I can recount anecdotally only that it is not only one or two who disagreed 
with this decision; quid then “common sense” in causation in the so-called “easy cases”?  
1861956 SC (HL) 26 
187 J STAPLETON, “Law, Causation and Common Sense”, (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
111 at 127 
1881972 SC (HL) 37 
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on-site washing facilities where he could clean himself before going home.  The 
plaintiff contracted dermatitis.  The House of Lords held that the employer breached 
its duty of care to the employee by not providing on-site washing facilities. There 
were two sources of danger which operated consecutively and the defender was only 
responsible for the second.  The problem for the pursuer was that he could not prove 
that not having the showers materially contributed to his dermatitis.   Yet the House 
of Lords expanded its approach in Wardlaw.  There are two famous dicta by Lord 
Reid and by Lord Salmon and it is worth quoting them here.  Lord Reid laid the 
foundation.  He reasoned 
But it has often been said that the legal concept of causation is not based on logic or 
philosophy.  It is based on the practical way in which the ordinary man's mind works 
in the every-day affairs of life.  From a broad and practical viewpoint I can see no 
substantial difference between saying that what the defender did materially increased 
the risk of injury to the pursuer and saying that what the defender did made a 
material contribution to the injury.189 
 
Lord Salmon went further in his eschewal of philosophical niceties 
In the circumstances of the present case, the possibility of a distinction existing 
between (a) having materially increased the risk of contracting the disease and (b) 
having materially contributed to causing the disease may no doubt be a fruitful 
source of interesting academic discussion between students of philosophy.  Such a 
distinction is, however, far too unreal to be recognised by the common law.190 
 
What was shown, however, was that cycling to work materially increased the risk of 
his contracting dermatitis.  This ratio was applied to dilute the “but for” test still 
further and mitigate the injustice that its application would have caused.   
 
In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services, 191  two different employers, E1 and E2, 
employed the plaintiff, P, at different periods of his active working life.  During his 
employment P developed mesothelioma as a result of over-exposure to asbestos.  It 
was impossible to say whether the cancer was caused during P's employment with E1 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189ibid at 53-54 
190 ibid at 62 
191 [2003] 1 AC 32 
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or E2 or indeed with both employers.  It was, however, accepted that the risk had 
been materially increased by his overall exposure to asbestos. It was difficult to state 
that one employer “materially contributed to” the contracting of mesothelioma.  
There was then a problem of sequentiality, concurrence and synergies which raised 
points of scientific evidence.  This case progressed on the basis that mesothelioma 
may be contracted by the inhalation of a single fibre and clearly the chances of 
inhaling a single fibre are increased the more one is exposed to asbestos.  Asbestosis, 
on the other hand, is generally affected by the total amount of dust that is inhaled.  It 
was therefore scientifically impossible to isolate the “guilty” fibre either when P was 
working for E1 or when he was working for E2.   The plaintiff recovered based on 
the materially contributing to the risk ratio.  
 
There is a subtle difference between McGhee and Fairchild and it is this.  In McGhee, the 
illness was sustained as a result of the defender’s behaviour even if the illness might 
not have been actually brought about as a result of the defender’s negligence; it was 
contracted by his conduct.  In Fairchild, the ratio goes further by holding that the 
defendant may be liable even when the illness could have been caused by another 
person completely based on the scientific evidence of the “guilty” fibre. Second, as 
Thomson notes, there are limitations to Fairchild.192The ratio applies only when it is 
scientifically impossible to establish the cause of the plaintiff's injury.  Further, 
although the sources of danger can be different, it must be shown that each source 
could in fact have caused the pursuer's injury.  This is why the pursuers failed in Kay's 
Tutor as there was actually no evidence that penicillin could in fact have caused the 
child's deafness.  Lord Nicholls wanted to make sure that “There must be good 
reason for departing from the normal threshold ‘but for’ test”.193 
 
It is difficult to know what to make of Fairchild.  There is a difference between an 
increase in risk in itself and an injury consequent on an increase of risk of causing the 
disease.  As Horton Rogers has stated, the limits of Fairchild are unclear and it is 
intended to apply where conventional proof is impossible not just difficult. 194  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192JM THOMSON, Delictual Liability, p141 
193 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32 at para 43 
194 in B KOCH (ed) Medical Liability in Europe: a Comparison of Selected Jurisdictions, (Berlin, de Gruyter, 
2011), p179 
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Another limitation is that the agents must have caused the damage in substantially 
the same way.   
 
Lord Bingham in Fairchild cited the study of van Gerven in that both France and 
Germany would find a remedy for the plaintiff but based on different legal principles: 
Germany would use principally risk-creation together with a certain reversal of the 
burden of proof.195 France, for its part, would have perhaps adopted an approach 
similar to the classic hunter cases where it could not be established which of the 
hunting party fired a shot into a forest and injured the plaintiff.  The Cour de 
cassation has held that the whole group was liable.196  
 
Ending his comparative discourse, Lord Bingham noted that “most jurisdictions 
would, it seems, afford a remedy to the plaintiff.”  I suggest that His Lordship is 
correct in his analysis for those jurisdictions forming part of this study.   
 
Lord Hoffman also appealed to the idea notion of a principled approach eschewing 
notions of “common sense” stating that 
...there is sometimes a tendency to appeal to common sense in order to avoid having 
to explain one’s reasons.  It suggests that causal requirements are a matter of 
incommunicable judicial instinct.  I do not think that this is right.  It should be 
possible to give reasons why one form of causal relationship will do in one situation 
and not in another.197 
 
“Common sense” is often indeed referred to in dicta where causation is an issue.  It 
contributes only to unpredictability.   
 
In Barker v Corus,198 there were similar facts, only here some of the employers had 
become insolvent.  The House of Lords held that the plaintiff could only recover 
proportionately and the defendants were not jointly and severally liable.  Following a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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196 Litzinger v Kintzler (CC 2, 5 June 1957, D1957.497) 
197 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services [2003] 1 AC 32 at para 53 
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political backlash against this judgement, it was left to Parliament to reverse this 
aspect of the judgement with the Compensation Act 2006.   
 
In Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority,199 a boy was born three months premature.  
His life was in the balance.  He survived nonetheless.  He succumbed to retrolental 
fibroplasia (RLF).  This is an incurable condition of the retina which caused total 
blindness in one eye and severely impaired vision in the other. A catheter was 
negligently inserted into the heart instead of the aorta.  This resulted in a false 
reading of oxygen pressure.  He sued the health board in negligence.  The Court of 
Appeal held that the burden of proof lay on the defendant to show that it was not in 
breach of its duty the plaintiff also had to show that this damage did not result from 
such breach of duty.200 Much was made of the case law, especially Wardlaw and 
McGhee relative to both the ratio of “material contribution” and the shifting of the 
burden of proof respectively.  Mustill LJ at appeal held that  
If it is an established fact that conduct of a particular kind creates a risk that injury 
will be caused to another or increases an existing risk that injury will ensue; and if the 
two parties stand in such a relationship that the one party owes a duty not to conduct 
himself in that way; and if the other party does suffer injury of the kind to which the 
risk related; then the first party is taken to have caused the injury by his breach of 
duty, even though the existence and extent of the contribution made by the breach 
cannot be ascertained.201 
 
So Mustill LJ took McGhee and applied it to this case holding that even though we 
cannot be sure of the presence or degree of the contribution, it is the creation of the 
risk of injury that is important.    
 
The dissenting judgement by Sir Nicolas-Browne Wilkinson VC in the Court of 
Appeal was later lauded by Lord Bridge in the House of Lords.  There were five 
other noxious agents at play here for which the defendant was not responsible and 
these could have been responsible for the child's injuries.   It was never proven the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 [1987] UKHL 11 
200 ibid, Bailli, p4/20, relying on McGhee v National Coal Board [1973| 1 WLR 1 and Clark v 
MacLennan [1983] 1 All ER 416 
201 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority, p6/20 (Bailli) 
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excess oxygen caused or contributed to the RLF suffered by the plaintiff.  There was 
no evidence as to which of the six possible causes could have caused the injury.  If 
precedent is accepted, this is a hard case but a right one.  Lord Bridge expressed 
sympathy for the plaintiff and remarked that 
Many may feel that such a result serves only to highlight the shortcomings of a 
system in which the victim of some grievous misfortune will recover substantial 
compensation or none at all according to the unpredictable hazards of the forensic 
process.202 
 
He goes on to note that it is not for the courts to change issues such as proof of fault.  
This is for Parliament and society would not benefit if the law were made more 
unpredictable.203 Further in evidence, Lord Bridge quoted Sir Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson VC where he said 
“In the McGhee case there was no doubt that the pursuer's dermatitis was physically 
caused by brick dust; the only question was whether the continued presence of such 
brick dust on the pursuer's skin after the time when he should have been provided 
with a shower caused or materially contributed to the dermatitis which he 
contracted.  There was only one possible agent which could have caused the 
dermatitis, viz brick dust...In the present case the question is different.  There are a 
number of different agents which could have caused the RLF.  Excess oxygen was 
one of them.  The defendants failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent one of 
the possible causative agents (eg excess oxygen) from causing RLF.  But no-one can 
tell in this case whether oxygen did or did not cause or contribute to the RLF 
suffered by the plaintiff.  The plaintiff's RLF may have been caused by some 
completely different agent or agents, eg hypercarbia, intraventricular haemorrhage, 
apnoea or patent ductus arteriosus.  In addition to oxygen, each of those conditions 
has been implicated as a possible cause of RLF.”204 
 
So it is important then, for the purposes of causation, to distinguish between those 
cases where there is only one noxious agent and where recovery will be allowed for 
increase in risk or materially contributing to the risk and cases like Wilsher where 
there is more than one agent and it cannot be established which one agent caused the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 ibid, p14/20 (Bailli) 
203 ibid, p19/20 (Bailli) 
204 ibid, p12/20 (Bailli) 
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injury or if the relevant agent contributed to or materially increased the risk of the 
damage, as was the case here. 
 
So while the “but for” rule remains the norm in theory, it has been relaxed in certain 
situations where an injustice would result in practice.  I submit that “but for” is not 
really a principle rule but that these theories exist in parallel.  The case of McGhee in 
particular has been criticised by a number of leading academics. 205  Hogg, for 
example, suggested that it would be wrong to equate risk creation to causation.  He 
suggested that risk of harm is not the same as causing actual harm.206 His example is 
that of driving a car creates a risk of causing a pedestrian harm.  I would partly agree 
with Hogg in theory when he notes that 
...McGhee fundamentally undermined the rule that a connection, demonstrated by 
counterfactual analysis, was needed between harm and loss before causation could 
be established.  It opened up the possibility that a defender might be held liable for 
damage which in actuality he had not caused.207 
 
The problem with McGhee, of course, is that it is entirely retrospective.  It looks back 
at the risk that was created and considers this as causal – even if indeed the defendant 
may never have caused it.  I think Hogg is being somewhat overdramatic in his 
statement that McGhee opens the possibility that a defendant may be held liable for a 
damage he did not cause.  I do not think it matters that the “rule” of condictio sine 
qua non was undermined.  Justice had to be done and this was the way to do it as the 
courts saw fit.208 This was always the case given the standard of proof we have in the 
United Kingdom.  It is only necessary to prove one’s case to 51% in any case.   
 
While the McGhee ratio was concerned with material increase of risk, there were limits 
on its ambit as stated above; for example, there must have been one noxious agent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 See for example, M HOGG, “Re-establishing Orthodoxy in the Realm of Causation”, (2007) 
Edinburgh Law Review 8 and JM THOMSON, (2003) 7 Edinburgh Law Review 80 
206 ibid, M HOGG at p13 
207 ibid 
208 I do readily understand, however, a Scots lawyer’s preference to principle over equity, not that I 
advocate particularly one over the other.  For a severe example of how Scots law has stuck rigidly 
to its rules in property law, see Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66 a case ultimately over-ruled by the 
House of Lords.  
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only and there must have been a breach of duty.  So while I agree that the 
counterfactual “but for” test was not just diluted but replaced in this case, I am not ill 
at ease with the McGhee ratio together with its limitations.  For me then Wilsher is not 
a refusal to follow McGhee but simply a problem about proof and is easily 
distinguishable.  
 
The hypothetical of the “but for” plays a significant role in any causal enquiry and I 
now wish to examine this aspect of causation in the United Kingdom more closely.   
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3.2.2 Hypothetical Causation 
The essence of the “but for” test is the counterfactual.  What would have happened if 
the defendant had not acted as he did? What would the plaintiff done had she been 
aware of the risks that were kept from her before consenting to a medical 
intervention? This simple question can create numerous problems but essentially the 
test in the United Kingdom (but not with regard to the disclosing of risks) is that set 
down in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority209 that where a doctor can show that 
there exists a body of responsible medical opinion which believes that the treatment 
was not negligent then the doctor will usually not be held to have acted negligently.  
However, such opinion must have a logical basis and the court ultimately decides the 
issue, not experts – at least in theory.210  This shows that causation is a value 
judgement.  
 
One case I should like to consider in the United Kingdom with regard to the advising 
of risks is that of Chester v Afshar.211 I would like to consider this case in some detail as 
it shows perhaps the situation when the plaintiff genuinely does not know what she 
would have done.212 This case is also important from a number of other aspects.  It 
deals with a doctor's failure to warn, policy reasons to allow causation and certainly 
shows, in my submission, that there can be no “man in the street” understanding of 
causation.   
 
In this case, Miss Chester was recommended to undergo surgery by a neurologist, Mr 
Afshar.  Mr Afshar failed to warn Miss Chester of a one to two per cent risk that she 
could suffer cauda equine syndrome after the surgery.213 This risk did eventuate, 
however, but there was no suggestion whatever that Mr Afshar performed the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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operation negligently.  It could not be established evidentially that even if Miss 
Chester had known about the risk she would have gone ahead with the operation (the 
counterfactual).  All that could be established was that she would not have gone 
ahead with the operation on that particular day. She would have obtained further 
advice and considered other options.  There was no doubt that Mr Afshar was 
negligent in not informing his patient of the small risk but the problem in this case 
was causation: no counterfactual hypothesis could be established in the long term 
about whether she would have gone ahead with the operation or not.   The House of 
Lords held, by a majority of only 3:2,214 that causation could be established and this 
mainly on grounds of public policy.  I would like now to consider what causal ratio (if 
any) can be extrapolated from this case.   
 
As mentioned, the problem here was that Miss Chester could not show that had she 
known about the risk that she would not have gone ahead with the operation. She 
said that she did not know what she would have done.  She testified she would not 
have gone ahead with the operation that day but would have taken advice.  So the 
“but for” test was not passed. She should therefore have failed in her claim but, as 
Lord Hoffman noted 
the claimant has failed to prove that the defendant's breach of duty caused her loss.  
On ordinary principles of tort law, the defendant is not liable.  The remaining 
question is whether a special rule should be created by which doctors who fail to 
warn patients of risks should be made insurers against those risks.215 
 
The majority in this case held that causation (both factual and legal) was established 
essentially on grounds of policy.  Reference was made to the Australian case of 
Chappel v Hart216where a patient underwent an operation without having first been 
warned of a small risk inherent in the procedure.  It was established in this case that 
had she known of the risk, she would not have proceeded at that time but rather at a 
later time under the supervision of a more experienced surgeon.  Recovery was 
allowed on the basis of a loss of chance to have the operation performed by a more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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215 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 para 32 
216[1998] HCA 55 
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experienced surgeon.   
 
Chappel was used in Chester to allow recovery based specifically on “common sense” or 
“loss of opportunity to pursue a different course”217and even that Mr Afshar had a 
duty to inform; he did not inform and that therefore the vague and nebulous “legal 
consequences must follow”.218 It is somewhat strained, I find, to apply such reasoning 
to the facts as Miss Chester did not make a case as to what chance she had lost.  It is 
important to remember that she did not state that she would not have submitted to 
the operation and nor was it proven that there would be fewer risks inherent in the 
operation had she proceeded with it in the future.  As Hogg notes, a plaintiff must 
still show that there was the chance of avoiding injury, and, that but for the 
defendant's fault, the plaintiff would not have lost the chance.219The plaintiff did not 
show this.  What does exist in Chappel by contrast is an indication that a more 
experienced surgeon may have been available and that, had Mrs Hart been warned, 
she would have deferred the operation to a more experienced surgeon.  In my 
opinion, Chester is distinguishable as such circumstances are not present here.  
Although strictly outside the ambit of this paper, I suggest rather that the approach of 
the minority in this case was the more consistent with the law.  While the “but for” 
test is not a comprehensive nor exclusive test of causation, there was no other rule-
based replacement for it.220 Perhaps Lord Hope sums up the feeling of the majority 
most succinctly in Chester at paragraph 73 where he opines “Yet the patient to whom 
the duty was owed is left without a remedy.” 
 
Lord Hoffman, for his part, focuses on principle.  He opines at paragraph 56 
The concepts of fairness, justice and reason underlie the rules which state the causal 
requirement for liability for a particular form of conduct (or non-causal limits on that 
liability) just as much as they underlie the rules which determine that conduct to be 
tortuous. 
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He continues 
The problem in this appeal is to formulate a just and fair rule.  Clearly the rule must 
be based on principle.  However deserving the claimants may be, your Lordships are 
not exercising a discretion to adapt causal requirements to the individual case.  That 
does not mean, however, that it must be a principle so broad that it takes no account 
of significant differences which affect whether it is fair and just to impose liability.221 
 
From this, I think we can see that Lord Hoffman is criticising rules based on policy.  
Lord Hope quite openly states that his decision is one of policy, and does not hide 
this nor pretend to rationalise using previously established causal principle.  At 
paragraph 87, he opines 
On policy grounds therefore I would hold that the test of causation is satisfied in 
this case.  The injury was intimately involved with the duty to warn.222   
 
It is unclear what can be extrapolated from this.  This is a policy decision but His 
Lordship appears to be stating that where an injury is “intimately involved” with a 
duty to warn, then there is liability.  I do not understand what “intimate 
involvement” means nor how it magically resolves the causal puzzle.  
 
The majority in Chester has overridden the requirement for causation with policy 
while paying lip-service to causal satisfaction.  Only Lord Hoffmann broaches the 
possibility of creating a special rule in which he sees the potential for a modest 
solatium award.223From this case, it would appear that there is no clear agreement as 
to when policy should prevail and similarly, prediction is not a simple task. So while I 
may criticise Chester for not being consistent with causal rules that had developed to 
date,224 I submit that cases like these go some way towards proving the central theme 
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of this paper: that in the area of medical liability, there is no certainty or clear idea of 
causation and nor can “common sense” principles be derived therefrom.   It can be 
seen that even with a majority of 3:2, their Lordships were certainly not in agreement 
as to the correct decision.  There was no common sense decision and this was 
certainly not a correct decision in the sine qua non sense. This leads me then to the 
second test in British law: legal causation.  After the sine qua non test has been 
fulfilled, the question arises as to whether the courts are going to allow the causal 
chain to be broken for some reason or whether they are going to allow it to be 
completed.  Legal causation can be used even when factual causation returns an 
unsatisfactory answer (as I showed with Chester above).  It is this that I shall now 
consider.   
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3.3 Legal Causation (causa causans) 
As Thomson notes, it is not enough that the defendant’s act is the sine qua non of the 
plaintiff’s injury, it must also be the legal cause or the causa causans.225  Thomson’s 
example is that of A, who drops a brick on B’s toe.  B is taken in an ambulance to 
hospital.  The ambulance is driven negligently such that it crashes and B dies.  
Should B’s executors then have a claim against A, who dropped the brick and 
certainly was (inter alia) the factual cause of B’s death.  The question here is should B 
be held to be the causa causans.  
 
Whether or not a defendant is held to be liable is often analysed in terms of 
reasonable foreseeability or remoteness. The defendant’s act must have as its 
reasonable and probable consequence harm, to the plaintiff.  There are many cases 
which set out how the criterion of foreseeability is to be judged.  It is to be judged by 
the courts as to what the reasonable person foresaw and not as to what the particular 
plaintiff foresaw.226   
 
Similarly, if a doctor negligently amputates a leg from a patient then the doctor 
would be liable for the patient’s loss of earnings and psychiatric stress.  This is what is 
called derivative economic loss.  If the plaintiff contends, however, that as a result of 
this negligence, he was unable to purchase a winning lottery ticket that he was in the 
habit of buying, then these losses would normally be considered as too remote.   In 
England, it used to be the case that loss, even though it was not reasonably 
foreseeable, could be recovered provided it was a direct consequence of the harm.227 
As can be imagined, this could lead to liability to a great extent.  English courts later 
developed a test that if damage is unforeseeable then there can be no recovery.228  So 
tests of remoteness, foreseeability and causation, in my opinion, all smelt into one.   
In Scotland, the test has been one that is much more Continental, at least in theory 
perhaps. It has been held that the test is not where a loss was reasonably foreseeable 
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but rather where it happened “naturally and directly” from the delict.229 As ever, a 
consideration of some case law can give us an idea of legal causation in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
In Sabri-Tabrizi v Lothian Health Board230 the pursuer had a sterilization which failed.  
She became pregnant but had a termination.  She then knew she was fertile and had 
sexual intercourse with her husband even though she took precautions.  The 
defenders admitted liability for the first pregnancy but not for the second.  Lord 
Nimmo-Smith agreed.  He found 
She avers that she took precautions, but in so far as there remained a residual risk, in 
a question between her and the defenders I think that it is unreasonable of her to 
expose herself to that risk.  Accordingly I regard her decision to have sexual 
intercourse in the knowledge that she was not sterile as constituting a novus actus 
interveniens, breaking the chain of causation, with the result that the defenders 
cannot be held liable for the second pregnancy and the consequences thereof.231 
 
In Webb v Barclays Bank plc and Portsmouth Hospitals,232the claimant injured her polio 
affected left leg for which the defendants were responsible.  The consultant surgeon 
advised her to have an above the knee amputation.  This advice was negligent.  The 
Court of Appeal held that the negligence of the consultant surgeon did not “eclipse 
the original wrongdoing” and the employer's liability - Barclays Bank - was assessed 
at 25% while the health trust's was held at 75%.   So what is discernible then in these 
two cases is a limitation of causation’s scope, and a formulation of its application, in 
terms of a novus actus interveniens. 
 
In Bailey v Ministry of Defence,233 the plaintiff returned from holiday in Africa with 
possible gallstones.  Inspection was by way of an Endoscopic Retrograde 
Cholangiopancreatography (ERCP).  Following this ERCP there was a period of lack !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
229 Campbell v F and F Moffat (Transport) Ltd 1992 SCLR 551, 1992 SLT 962, OH 
230 1998 SC 373 
231 ibid at 378 
232 [2001] EWCA Civ 1141 
233 (2007) EWHC 2913 (QB) 
! ! ! ! !! 74!
of care and in particular a failure to resuscitate.  At the same time, the plaintiff 
developed pancreatitis.  There was, however, no allegation that pancreatitis was a 
result of the hospital’s lack of care.  The plaintiff later suffered brain damage when 
her air passages were blocked following her vomiting on lemonade.  The question 
before the court was did the weakened state of the plaintiff materially contribute to 
the brain damage.  Accepting the judge’s conclusions, Lord Justice Waller stated that 
the weakened state of the plaintiff caused her body not to react naturally to vomiting 
and this did not in any way break the chain of causation.234   
 
What I find common in these cases (and indeed in many of the cases in this chapter) 
is that although a break in the chain of causation is actually referred to, in essence 
what the courts are doing, is stating policy reasons. These judgements, I suggest, are 
policy ones and need not use such causal wording.  Indeed, I think it impossible, 
especially in the realm of legal causation, to attempt to state causal principles and 
what we have time and time again is an application of policy. Although judges might 
claim to rely on what the man in the street thinks, I suggest that there are no 
common sense answers to such cases and if there are no common sense answers to 
such cases then it is impossible to extract principles from them when ultimately such 
cases are based on policy. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
234 ibid, at para 32 
! ! ! ! !! 75!
3.4 Loss of Chance 
In Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority,235 the House of Lords held that a Court of 
Appeal judge erred in law when he allowed for recovery for loss of a chance.  Here 
the plaintiff suffered injury when, as a 13-year old boy, he climbed a tree and fell 
injuring his left femoral epiphysis.  He was taken to hospital but there was a failure to 
diagnose this injury and he was sent home.  A few days later he returned to the 
hospital and this time he was diagnosed accurately.  The question that arose here was 
whether “but for” this initial mis-diagnosis, would the subsequent avascular necrosis 
of the epiphysis have eventuated? Evidence from both medical experts was at two 
extremes.  On the one hand, the plaintiff’s expert said due to the injury sustained in 
the fall, the rupture of such a high proportion of blood vessels supplying the epiphysis 
with blood was such that necrosis was bound to develop.236 He said that although 
there was a “small chance”237 that necrosis would not have developed, the delay had 
made it inevitable.  Lord Bridge identified the reasoning of the lower judge.238 The 
Court of Appeal judge in his own words faced the dilemma of classification of the 
issue: was it a case of causative negligence or was it a case where the real question 
was quantum? Lord Bridge opined that he knew of no principle of English law which 
would permit recovery for the plaintiff even at a discount from the full measure of 
damages to reflect this chance.  Loss of chance in tort was not recognised. He did not 
rule out future recovery for loss of chance.239 Lord MacKay considered American 
authority in his judgement.  In Herskovits v Group Health Co-operative of Puget Sound240 in 
the USA, a plaintiff’s tumour was not diagnosed on first examination.  If it had been, 
there was a 39 per cent chance that he would have survived for more than 39 years.  
When he was eventually treated, this had reduced to 25 years.  Although the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Superior Court of King County held for the defendants, the Supreme Court of 
Washington reversed this.  They based their decision inter alia on the American 
Restatement of Torts and also the principle by Dore J that 
To decide otherwise would be a blanket release from liability for doctors and 
hospitals any time there was less than 50 per cent chance of survival, regardless of 
how flagrant the negligence.241 
 
Lord Mackay noted that Dore J concluded that this was sufficient for the matter to go 
to the jury and for them to decide on proximate cause while pointing out to them 
that such reduction in the opportunity to recover did not necessitate a total recovery 
against the negligent party.242 Lord MacKay also referred to the use of statistics alone 
in such cases243underlining the fact that they must be backed up by individualising 
evidence. So the ratio of Hotson was that it is not possible to recover for a loss of 
chance in cases of medical negligence.  In quoting Lord Diplock in Mallett v 
McMonagle,244 Lord Mackay set out the fundamental principle of proof in English law 
in that 
“In determining what did happen in the past the court decides on the balance of 
probabilities.  Anything that is more probable than not it treats as certain.”245 
 
This is something that shall be discussed in the comparative chapter and the 
differences with France and Germany (and between France and Germany) are 
readily apparent.  Lord Ackner does not favour extending the loss of chance doctrine 
as 
...to do so would be to propound a wholly new doctrine which has no support in 
principle or authority and would give rise to many complications in the search for 
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mathematical to statistical exactitude.246 
 
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, he is not entirely correct in that it is 
recognised where medical negligence is not in issue.  In Chaplin v Hicks,247  a case 
referring to the loss of a chance of securing valuable employment, His Lordship 
suggested that there would be “formidable difficulties” in applying these analogies to 
medical negligence cases.248 He did not expand on this.   Yet he did say that perhaps 
this case was not a “suitable occasion for reaching a settled conclusion as to whether 
the analogy can ever be applied”.249  In Hotson then as the plaintiff could not prove 
causation above 50% on the balance of probabilities, his claim necessarily failed.     
 
Lord Ackner further referred to Bagley v North Herts Health Authority,250 where the judge 
discounted an award for the parents of a stillborn child, as there was a 5% possibility 
that the child would have been stillborn anyway.  Lord Ackner criticised this 
reduction as the causal hurdle that must be overcome is proof on the balance of 
probabilities.  It was shown that on the balance of probabilities the hospital’s 
negligence caused the still birth, indeed almost to a degree of certainty: that should 
have been an end of the matter. What comes across in this judgement at any rate is 
that such chances cannot be given a monetary value and cannot be regarded as an 
asset the diminution in the value of which by a tortfeasor results in a discrete action 
of loss of chance.251 
 
Another case where there could have seen some development of the loss of chance 
doctrine was in Gregg v Scott.252 In this case, Dr Scott negligently diagnosed Mr Gregg.  
The latter attended on the former for a consultation.  He presented Dr Scott with a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
246 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1988] UKHL 1 at 16  
247 (1991) 2 KB 786 
248 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1988] UKHL 1 at 4 
249 ibid 
250 (1986) 136 NLJ 1014 
251 Hotson v East Berkshire Area Health Authority [1988] UKHL 1 as per Lord Mackay of Clashfern’s 
judgement at 5 et seqq 
252 [2005] UKHL 2 
! ! ! ! !! 78!
lump under his left arm.  Dr Scott said it was not harmful and sent him away.  Some 
nine months later, Mr Gregg consulted another doctor who said it could possibly be 
innocuous but sent him for tests nonetheless.  The disease spread.  It was stated (not 
without opposition on behalf of one of the Law Lords) that his chances of disease free 
survival253had been reduced from 42% to 25%.  This case was ultimately decided in 
the House of Lords on a 3:2 majority.  The decisions make for fascinating reading.  
The case was held against Mr Gregg.  He could not recover even though Dr Scott 
had been negligent in not referring him initially to a consultant.  His case was 
presented initially as one of pain and suffering for increase in the size of the tumour 
but then turned to one of loss of life expectancy or loss of the chance to avoid the 
damage.  This was new.  I should like to turn first to those Law Lords who gave 
dissenting judgements in this case. 
 
First, Lord Nicholls recognised that it would be impossible to say with certainty what 
would have happened had Mr Gregg been correctly diagnosed.  Rightly he 
appreciated that the prospects of assessing chance of survival are open to such 
speculation and filled with many variables.254 So would Mr Gregg's cancer have been 
at such an advanced state but for Dr Scott’s negligence? Lord Nicholls reminded us 
that the law defines the claimant's actionable damage by reference to opportunity 
that was lost rather than a loss of a desired outcome that was never within his 
control.255 He noted that indeed lost opportunity had been endorsed in other areas.  
For example, where a solicitor negligently failed to lodge a writ in time, the court 
assessed the probability of success, which the solicitor’s negligence had prevented the 
claimant from pursuing.256 He noted, referring to Tony Weir, that of course, losing 
the chance of saving a leg is not the same as losing a leg itself but that is not a reason 
for declining to value the chance for whose loss the doctor was directly 
responsible257and that justice required in the latter case as much as the former that 
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the loss of a chance should constitute actionable damage.258 
 
From a policy perspective also, he reproached the floodgates argument as one that is 
always advanced whenever the law is under development and in any case, the 
righting of a wrong weighs more.259 Whether indeed it would cost more on the 
British National Health Service (NHS) he said was a matter of speculation and stated 
this a matter for parliament.260 
 
Notwithstanding the inherent uncertainty in knowing whether Mr Gregg belonged to 
the 58% survivor or 42% non-survivor category, the law has often found solutions for 
evidentiary lacunae. The ratios of “material contribution to” or “material increase in 
the risk of” were novel at the time.261  
 
However, as his Lordship opined, medical negligence cases are different in that the 
patient’s actual condition at the time of the negligence will often be determinative of 
a sine qua non answer.262  For example, in contrasting Gregg with Hotson, there was a 
factual question that ultimately determined the legal outcome.   The factual question 
was did the child actually have enough blood vessels to keep his left femoral epiphysis 
alive?  The answer to this then determines whether the avascular necrosis would have 
been avoided and, as His Lordship rightly noted, many cases are not like this.  The 
present case, for example, is one of these.  In Gregg, the answer in the hypothetical 
world to initial mistaken diagnosis could not provide an answer as to what the 
outcome would have been if he had been treated promptly.263 His Lordship then 
formalised this dichotomy and stated either there is a Hotson-type case where there is 
really no uncertainty on the usual probability basis or they fall into the present case 
where there is a lot of uncertainty.   
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
258 Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 at para 25 
259 ibid, at para 48 
260 ibid, at para 54 
261 for example in Bonnington and McGhee 
262Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2 at para 35 
263ibid, at para 37 
! ! ! ! !! 80!
If Mr Gregg could only prove his case to 51% then he would recover all his damages.  
The defendant could not then deduct 49% from total damages.  As Horton Rogers 
noted, if we allow a person with a 30% chance of recovery 30% of his damage, the 
other side of the coin is that we could not refuse to reduce the damages of a person 
with a 70% chance of recovery.264 This was recognised by the claimants in Gregg v 
Scott.265  
 
Lord Hope for his part also allowed recovery.  Interestingly, he took the position that 
the case was not only about loss of chance. It was, rather, about loss and damage 
caused by the enlargement of the tumour due to the delay in diagnosis: reduction of 
prospects of a successful outcome being consequential on the enlargement.266 
 
Lord Phillips entered into a detailed discussion of statistics and challenged the 
interpretation of the evidence.  He criticised the expert's model from which statistical 
evidence was deduced as it included all ages and also people with other “unrevealed 
personal characteristics.”267  At the time of the hearing, Mr Scott was still alive.  The 
expert put his chances of surviving then at 20-30% though normally anyone who had 
a second relapse as Mr Gregg had, only had chances of surviving of around one in 
six.  His Lordship criticised the statistical evidence as it did not put Mr Gregg in a 
further sub-category.   We can see then how judges often have to enter into the 
minutiae of causation and should indeed scrutinise reports in this way.  I shall 
consider statistics in more detail later.   
 
Lord Hoffman is in the majority opinion here.  He recites a chronology of loss of 
chance268before saying that 
One striking exception to the assumption that everything is determined by 
impersonal laws of causality is the actions of human beings.269 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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This was part of the reason, he posited, why we treat non-medical loss of chance 
different from medical loss of chance cases. 270The law treats humans as having free 
will and the ability to choose different courses of action, however strong the reasons 
may be for them to choose one course rather than another.271 He opined that 
…the true basis of these cases is a good deal more complex.  The fact that one 
cannot prove as a matter of necessary causation that someone would have done 
something is no reason why one should not prove that he was more likely than not to 
have done it.272 
 
He also noted that academic writers have suggested that in cases of clinical 
negligence, the need to prove causation restricts liability and that Mr Scott should 
have a remedy.  He suffered a wrong which should be put right.  Lord Hoffman’s 
opinion is that adopting such rules would mean the jettisoning of a lot of authority.273  
 
I think we see the essence, however, at the end of his judgement.  Lord Hoffman 
noted there that adopting possible rather than probable causation would be such a 
change to the determinants of liability as to require parliament to intervene.  He also 
argued that this would have a serious effect on insurance companies and the National 
Health Service. In Hotson it was simply a matter of proof as to whether there were 
enough blood vessels at a given moment.  In Gregg, we must posit a hypothetical. The 
chances in Allied were nonetheless valued and able to be assessed in a way that 
medical chances were not.  
 
Baroness Hale’s approach is that a defendant would always be liable as the other side 
of the coin in a loss of chance case.  At paragraph 223, she gives an example of A’s 
negligence probably causing B’s loss of a leg.  A pays B the value of the leg, 
£100,000.  If A probably did not cause the loss, A pays B nothing.   If a loss of 
chance approach were used, she argued, A’s negligence probably caused a reduction !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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in the chance of B’s keeping his leg less the chance it would have happened anyway. 
So, if the chance of saving the leg were very good, say 90%, the claimant would get 
£90,000.  If the chances were relatively poor, say 20%, the claimant would get 
£20,000.  She saw both scenarios as unsatisfactory as the claimant would get less 
than full compensation and the defendant could end up paying a substantial sum for 
which by definition, he cannot be shown to be responsible.  
 
The logical extension of this is that a defendant would almost always be liable for 
something.274 There would be more complex expert testimony and negotiations and 
trials would become a great deal more difficult.  There would also be consequences 
for the insurance industry and such a great policy change as this could not be 
introduced in the United Kingdom at this stage.   Yet perhaps the irony in this case, 
as Baroness Hale rightly pointed out, was that the most serious of adverse outcomes 
had not happened.275  Mr Scott had survived.  What had the doctor’s negligence 
caused in this case? Where was the damage?   
 
The kernel of all this is that loss of chance claims are not permitted in the United 
Kingdom in medical negligence cases.  They are permitted in France and 
Luxembourg as we shall see in later chapters.  What is important is not whether they 
should be permitted or not but rather French courts and doctrine have a different 
understanding of what causation actually is.  The case examples I have given above 
would, I am almost certain, be decided otherwise in France.  Yet I have found in 
comparative textbooks (as I shall show in the comparative chapter) that many 
comparative lawyers are all too ready to disregard and discount these differences.  
The drafters of PETL in their commentaries also allow loss of chance but do not state 
it outright in the text.  This is not an insignificant difference and in my opinion would 
result in a great divergence of decisions in the jurisdictions under consideration.  
 
I shall consider now the burden of proof in tort cases in the United Kingdom.  This is 
a procedural matter.  Whether a plaintiff can prove his case plays a crucial role in 
whether he is likely to be successful.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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3.5 Burden of Proof 
A plaintiff in the United Kingdom must prove that the defendant has caused him 
damage.  Other than certain matters which do not require to be proved, such as 
matters within juridical knowledge, he must prove this on the “balance of 
probabilities”, or to 51%.  This is called the legal burden (or persuasive burden). It 
never moves.276  If he can prove it, he recovers everything.  If he cannot prove it, he 
recovers nothing at all.  If, for example, he can only prove causation to 49%, he 
recovers zero.  As we have just seen, there is no recovery for loss of chance in the 
United Kingdom that would allow for proportionate recovery.  In addition, the 
burden of proof is never reversed no matter how seemingly grave or serious the fault 
may appear. There is, however, one device that resembles other procedural devices 
on the Continent: res ipsa loquitur.  It is not a presumption but just a state of affairs that 
needs explaining.  If a plaintiff can justify a res, then he tactically is well on his way to 
establishing causation.  Second, I should like to consider statistics as expert evidence 
in the United Kingdom.  Statistics often play a decisive role in determining whether it 
is likely that an outcome b was caused by action a.  Both res and the use of statistics 
are valuable to a plaintiff who wishes to prove a causal link.  
 
3.5.1 Res ipsa loquitur   
The present approach to the doctrine in the United Kingdom can be found in the 
case of Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority277 where it was held by Brooke LJ 
that 
(1) In its purest form, the maxim applies where the plaintiff relies on the “res” 
(the thing itself) to raise the inference of negligence, which is supported by ordinary 
human experience, with no need for expert evidence. (2) In principle, the maxim can 
be applied in that form in simple situations in the medical negligence field (surgeon 
cuts off right foot instead of left; swab left in operation site; patient wakes up in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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course of surgical operation despite general anaesthetic). (3) In practice, in contested 
medical negligence cases the evidence of the plaintiff, which establishes “res”, is likely 
to be buttressed by expert evidence to the effect that the matter complained does not 
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. (4) The position may then be reached at 
the close of the plaintiff's case that the judge would be entitled to infer negligence on 
the defendant's part unless the defendant adduces evidence which discharges this 
inference. (5) This evidence may be to the effect that there is a plausible explanation of 
what may have happened which does not connote any negligence on the defendant's 
part.   The explanation must be a plausible one and not a theoretically or remotely 
possible one, but the defendant certainly does not have to prove that his explanation is 
more likely to be correct than any other.  If the plaintiff has no other evidence of 
negligence to rely on, his claim will then fail.  (6) Alternatively, the defendant's 
evidence may satisfy the judge on the balance of probabilities that he did exercise the 
proper care.  If the untoward outcome is extremely rare, or is impossible to explain in 
the light of the current state of medical knowledge, the judge will be bound to exercise 
great care in evaluating the evidence before making such a finding, but if he does so, 
the prima facie inference of negligence is rebutted and the plaintiff's claim will fail.  
The reason why the courts are willing to adopt this approach, particularly in very 
complex cases, is to be found in the judgements of Stuart-Smith and Dillon LJJ in Delaney 
v Southmead Health Authority.278 (7) It follows from all this that, although in very simple 
situations the “res” may speak for itself at the end of the day, evidence adduced on 
behalf of the plaintiff, in practice the inference is then buttressed by expert evidence 
adduced on his behalf, and if the defendant were to call no evidence, the judge would 
be deciding the case on inferences he was entitled to draw from the whole of the 
evidence (including the expert evidence), and not on the application of the maxim in 
its purest form. 
 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine used in British courts with regard to 
evidence.  It means literally “the thing speaks for itself”.  In theory, the burden of 
proof still remains with the plaintiff but the defendant cannot – should not - remain 
taciturn.  The defendant ought to explain, justify or legitimise the evidence which the 
claimant has brought and if he does not, he stands a severe risk of losing his case.   
This was once seen as a complete reversal of the burden of proof and the view was 
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taken that such a thing would not happen without negligence.279 Giesen gives some 
instances of where a res speaks for itself.280 Some examples given are failing to 
dispense the proper medication,281causing injury to a healthy part of the body,282or 
performing an unnecessary mastectomy. 283  There have even been cases where 
doctors have operated on the wrong side of double organs or on the wrong patient 
altogether or have removed “large portions of the plaintiff's stomach, pancreas and 
the entire spleen” in the mistaken belief that an ulcer patient was suffering from 
cancer.284 Res ipsa loquitur is not a special rule of law and it does not reverse the 
burden of proof.  The initial presumption can either be strong or weak and this will 
affect the weight of the evidence that is required from the defendant to refute such 
hypothesis.  There is no standard of proof which the defendant must fulfil in his 
rebuttal but it has been said that “The res, which previously spoke for itself, may be 
silenced, or its voice, may, on the whole of the evidence, become too weak or 
muted.”285  
 
In Delaney v Southmead Health Authority,286 it was held that even if a case of res ipsa loquitur 
is made out in the first instance, it is always open to the defendant to rebut it either 
by giving an explanation of what happened which is inconsistent with negligence, or 
by showing that the defendants exercised all reasonable care.287 In this case, the 
plaintiff had sustained a lesion of the brachial plexus 288  following a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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cholecystectomy.289  It was found that the anaesthetist's practice of positioning the 
arm at 45 degrees without supination accorded with good practice.   
 
In some cases, however, the defendants made no explanation whatever.  In Cassidy v 
Ministry of Health,290 the plaintiff entered hospital for an operation on his left hand 
which required post-operational treatment.  At the end of the operation, it turned out 
that his hand was useless.   The trial judge had held that no negligence had been 
proven. On appeal, however, it was held that the onus lay on the hospital authority 
to prove that there had been no negligence on its part.    
 
Important was the way Lord Denning phrased his summary of res ipsa loquitur in the 
case.  He noted 
If the plaintiff had to prove that some particular doctor or nurse was negligent, he 
would not be able to do it.  But he was not put to that impossible task: he says, “I 
went into the hospital to be cured of two stiff fingers.  I have come out with four stiff 
fingers, and my hand is useless.  That should not have happened if due care had 
been used.  Explain it, if you can”. I am quite clearly of the opinion that that raises a 
prima facie case against the hospital authorities...They have nowhere explained how 
it could happen without negligence.291 
 
This is the characteristically simple language of Lord Denning.  In extreme cases, a 
prima facie case is raised against the hospital authority.  This is different from 
reversing the burden of proof.  With res, some kind of explanation is called for.  In 
Cassidy, none was provided: therefore the defendants were held liable.  
 
In Roe v Minister of Health,292 two patients were operated on the same day.  Both 
operations were minor and the negligence here related to the administration of the 
anaesthetic.   The anaesthetic itself had been stored in sealed ampoules which 
themselves had been stored in a solution of phenol.  Both patients developed severe 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
289 the surgical removal of the gall bladder 
290 1951 2 KB 343 
291 ibid, at 366 
292 (1954) 2 QB 66  
! ! ! ! !! 87!
symptoms of spastic paraplegia caused by the phenol.  The phenol had entered the 
ampoules through “invisible cracks” that were not visible to the naked eye.   It was 
held here that the hospital was not negligent as the medical staff had adhered to the 
standard of medical care required.  I think, however, Lord Denning LJ summed up 
quite succinctly the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case again.  He opined 
The judge has said that those facts do not speak for themselves, but I think that they 
do.  They certainly call for an explanation.  Each of these men is entitled to say to 
the hospital: “While I was in your hands something has been done to me which has 
wrecked my life.   Please explain how it has come to pass.293 
 
His Lordship then proceeded to analyse negligence in itself here by considering duty 
of care, foreseeability and causation.  As far as causation is concerned, he noted that 
causation often depended on what was foreseeable and indeed as we know, the chain 
of causation is broken if something unforeseeable occurs.  What is intriguing here 
(even as far back as 1953) is that His Lordship noted that the ideas of duty, 
negligence, causation and remoteness run continually into one another and they are 
three different ways of looking at the same problem. I also think this farrago of norms 
does not help.  I comment here not for its own sake but because it is relevant to 
causation. The extent to which these norms interplay (especially with causation) and 
how this links with our overall understanding is something I shall leave for comment 
in the final chapter.    Lord Denning summarised by posing the question that 
negligence can be found in the answer to 
Is the consequence fairly to be regarded as within the risk created by the negligence? 
If so, the negligent person is liable for it: but otherwise not. 294  
 
This is telling: ideas of “within the risk” are concepts crucial to causation though 
make me think more of German notions of causation than British ones as we shall see 
below.  
 
A policy element was similarly discernible in Lord Denning's judgement.  This can be 
seen in the final paragraph of his judgement where he states that 
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One final word.  These two men have suffered such terrible consequences that there 
is a natural feeling that they should be compensated.  But we should be doing a 
disservice to the community at large if we were to impose liability on hospitals and 
doctors for everything that happens to go wrong.  Doctors would be led to think 
more of their own safety than of the good of their patients.  Initiative would be stifled 
and confidence shaken.  A proper sense of proportion requires us to have regard to 
the conditions in which hospitals and doctors have to work.  We must insist on due 
care for the patient at every point, but we must not condemn as negligence that 
which is only a misadventure.295 
 
I think then we must always be aware of simple policy reasons in causation.  
Although Lord Denning may well have been known as reticent to allow claims 
against doctors, we must be aware of when a decision – and therefore causation - is 
policy-driven and at least here, it openly is.296 
 
Therefore the plaintiff should normally submit a plea of res ipsa loquitur  where there is 
a set of circumstances that require some explaining by the defendant.  This will no 
doubt be backed up by expert reports.  It is more a tactical and strategical device: the 
burden of proof is not reversed but it would be an ill-counselled defendant who 
remained mute.  A defendant would do well to give a reasonable explanation of what 
has happened otherwise causation may be established. 
 
3.5.2 Statistics as Expert Evidence 
Using statistics to establish causation in medical negligence cases can be particularly 
contentious.  Epidemiological reports are, of themselves, not evidence.  Statistics are 
general so the problem remains in that a plaintiff must individualise the statistics to 
make them more relevant to her case. Experts must speak to epidemiological 
reports.297  
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Richard Goldberg argues, for example, that in the case of Vadera v Shaw298that the 
epidemiological evidence was not individualised.299 In this case, a 22-year old Asian 
woman was put on a contraceptive, Logynon. She had a blood pressure reading of 
150/100.  The question before the court was whether a brain stem stroke which Miss 
Vadera had suffered was a result of Logynon or not.  It was held that, from the 
epidemiological evidence available to the court, that nothing more than a 
relationship of chance could be established.  Goldberg challenges this finding. He 
maintains that “insufficient scrutiny of the expert evidence appears to have taken 
place”.300 Although the trial judge may have considered the epidemiological studies, 
Goldberg argues that no attempt was made to “...particularise the evidence to the 
individual patient in question...”.301]He criticises the decision as not enough scientific 
evidence was placed before the court.  Goldberg argues that Logynon, combined 
with the ethnic factors of Miss Vadera's being Asian and the possible hypertension 
were cumulative McGhee-type factors for a classic application of McGhee where the 
ratio of increase in the risk should have been applied to allow causation.  I think, 
however, that the issue of claimant-specific statistics comes into its own here and this 
was underlined by McTear v Imperial Tobacco Limited, 302  where it was held that 
epidemiological data cannot be used to draw conclusions about the cause of disease 
in any individual.303 It was also held that using epidemiological models in such a way 
obscures the underlying heterogeneity of the population including genetic profile, 
socio-economic status, workplace, diet and other exposures that make a major 
contribution to disease occurrence. 304In McTear v Imperial Tobacco Limited, 305  the 
defendant did not even accept that there was a general link between smoking and 
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lung cancer.306 The pursuers therefore had to be put to proof.  Lord Nimmo Smith 
found that the court had to be taught how to do epidemiology and that although an 
association might be held to lie between smoking and lung cancer, it was also 
necessary to show a causal connection.307 His Lordship criticised the pursuers for not 
having presented their case well and that in essence this was a missed opportunity for 
general causation to be established.308 Of course, this case failed also the pursuers did 
not go from the general to the specific. It may have helped them if they had studied 
some logic.   
 
Goldberg supports the use of Bayes' Theorem to personalise the general chance 
aspect of causation.309  He writes that the Bayes' theory could be used to evaluate the 
probability, A, before the use of new data and the probability after the utilisation of 
new data by using a general formula to allow for specific information in a given case.  
So for McTear, individualising factors could be personality traits, family history of 
lung cancer, stressful lifestyle, oral infections of the respiratory tract, alcohol abuse, 
vitamin A deficiency, low socio-economic status and residence in an urban area in 
the west of Scotland.   Therefore lawyers must be careful to individualise as much as 
possible their expert reports.   
 
In Wardlaw v Farrar,310 it was alleged that a doctor’s delay in admitting a patient to 
hospital had reduced his survival chances.  The statistics from the International Co-
operative Pulmonary Embolism Registry showed that 85% of patients survived a 
pulmonary embolism.  The patient in this case, however, had proven resistant to 
drugs in hospital and had subsequently died.  It was argued that it was this delay in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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diagnosis and presentation to hospital which had allowed the thrombosis to grow and 
her later resistance to drugs should be ignored.  The Court of Appeal held that this 
was incorrect and that all evidence must be taken into account and that a court 
should not “blind” itself to other evidence regardless of general probabilities.311 
 
Dr Barton noted the case of Hill v Tomkins312 where it was shown that when making a 
finding of generic causation a court had employed such biological criteria as (i) 
history of exposure; (ii) temporal relation; (iii) specificity of injury; (iv) plausible 
mechanism; (v) analogy; and (vi) exclusion of alternative aetiology.  Yet it must be 
remembered that this is generic causation.  As Dr Barton says, this is but a “condition 
precedent” to a finding of individual causation.313 
 
In the case of Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd314 the issue of causation in mesothelioma was 
again considered.  In this case, Mrs Costello worked in a factory where they made 
steel drums.  This process involved the release of asbestos dust into the factory 
atmosphere.  Although she worked mostly in the office, she spent time in the areas of 
the factory which were occasionally contaminated with asbestos.  She was also the 
subject of general low level, non-tortious, atmospheric asbestos.  The trial judge 
found that the defendants' exposure of Mrs Castello to asbestos over her working life 
at their premises “increased her background risk (of contracting mesothelioma) from 
24 cases per million to 28.39 cases per million, an increase of risk of 18%”.  He held 
that Mrs Costello had failed to establish mesothelioma because “there is only one 
occupational cause for the mesothelioma the claimant has to prove it is the likely 
cause.”315 Therefore the rule in Fairchild could not apply and the claimant could not 
succeed, as, on the balance of probabilities, her exposure to asbestos had not 
materially increased the risk that she would contract mesothelioma.  On appeal, and 
this is the crux of this case, Smith LJ held that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In my view, it must now be taken that, saving the expression of a different view by 
the Supreme Court, in a case of multiple potential causes, a claimant can 
demonstrate causation by showing that the tortious exposure has at least doubled the 
risk arising from the non-tortious cause or causes.316 
 
The Supreme Court unanimously did hold otherwise.  Lord Phillips said that the 
conclusion of a relevant risk (“RR”) above 2 would be a tenuous basis for concluding 
that the probable statistical cause was also the probable biological cause.  Lord 
Phillips left much to the future of aetiology of mesothelioma.  Reverting to the old 
Fairchild rules, he stated that had the trial judge considered an 18% increase in risk de 
minimis, he would have said so. 
 
Lady Hale began her judgement in Sienkiewicz, “I pity the practitioners as well as the 
academics who have to make sense of our judgements in difficult cases.”317  It is true 
that it may be difficult to predict the Supreme Court's decisions with regard to 
causation.  With regard to risk, she uses the oft-quoted example of the yellow and 
blue taxis in a given town.  If there are twice as many blue as yellow taxis on the 
roads, then it may double the risk that if I am run over by a taxi, it will be blue rather 
than yellow.   She then adds the caveat “...when I am actually run over it does not 
prove that it was a blue taxi rather than a yellow one...”.  In addition, it should also 
be remembered that the sense of “prove” here is not in the scientific sense, but rather 
on the balance of probabilities. She is quite scathing of judges' assessment of “overall 
probabilities” 
Why should what a (always middle-aged and usually middle class and male) judge 
thinks probable in any given situation be thought more helpful than well-researched 
statistical associations in deciding where the overall probabilities lie? As it seems to 
me, both have a place. 318  
 
I would agree with this approach and in short with Lord Mance's approach when he 
opined 
That epidemiological evidence used with proper caution, can be admissible and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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relevant in conjunction with specific evidence related to the individual circumstances 
and parties is, however, common ground and clearly right. 319   
 
Lord Rodger opined that he did not want to discourage statistics’ use in court.320  On 
the contrary, he noted that epidemiology was behind much of the evidence that a 
court would use when determining whether or not any given exposure had materially 
increased a risk.  Such evidence was therefore an important element in the proof of 
causation.  He quoted from Phipson on Evidence which notes that 
Where there is epidemiological evidence of association, the court should not proceed 
to find a causal relationship without further, non-statistical evidence.321  
 
I would also agree with Goldberg when he suggests that without scientific evidence of 
causation there should be no question of overcoming the burden of proof of 
causation in such cases.322  
 
A plaintiff should use statistics with care.  He should not rely on statistics alone but 
they should be an adminicle of evidence backed up, where possible, by experts’ 
reports, individualising evidence and why not Bayes’ theorem if it proves workable?  
 
Epidemiology and statistics must be open to the greatest scrutiny and it is therefore 
why I highlight their use in this chapter.  The one proposition I make in this paper is 
with regard to experts and their scientific evidence.  I am prone to favour the cross-
examination of such statistics, a course generally not favoured in Continental 
procedural law, where courts often (though not always) just order their own reports.  
Therefore again, there is not just one approach to establishing causation: there are a 
number and there is no underlying principle as to how this should be done.  
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3.6 Conclusions: United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom then there are, in theory, two tests that must be overcome for 
the plaintiff to establish causation: a factual test and legal test.  I have shown how 
courts generally treat factual causation.  If the plaintiff’s loss “would have happened 
anyway”, then the defendant cannot be held liable. This is not, however, so simple as 
it prima facie seems, and as the drafters of the PETL seem to think it is when they 
introduced the conditio sine qua non as their first principle in causation.  First, it is 
not always clear what to introduce into the hypothetical world when positing the 
counterfactual.  Sometimes evidence from witnesses is not clear.323  Also, should we, 
for example, substitute non-negligent behaviour or behaviour in concreto?  Second, the 
conditio sine qua non test was unsatisfactory in that it did not produce the justice 
sought in all situations that came before the court.  It therefore had to be modified.  
In Wardlaw, we saw perhaps the first dilution of the “but for” test where the House of 
Lords allowed for a “material contribution” to the disease to establish causation and 
then this was taken further in McGhee with a “material increase in the risk”. 
Assessment of probability is also fraught with difficulty, as I have set out.  There are 
experts’ reports to consider, epidemiology, aetiology and so on.  
 
If the “test” of factual causation is passed (whichever test is used), then the courts will 
then look at legal causation.  In the United Kingdom, this is often based on a test of 
reasonableness and precedent should govern future decisions.  I have given examples 
of these.  Sometimes there can be an overlap between what is factual causation and 
what is legal causation. This was seen in Chester.  Here there was uncertainty as to the 
counterfactual and Miss Chester did not, therefore, establish causation.  Yet quite 
clearly on policy grounds, Miss Chester could not be left without a remedy so there 
was causation – there was hardly agreement among the Law Lords but I would 
expect nothing else when faced with such puzzling and perplexing factual situations 
as were demonstrated in this case. 
 
Linked somewhat to factual causation and somewhat, I think, to legal causation is the 
issue of loss of chance.  We have seen how the United Kingdom refuses recovery for 
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loss of chance in medical negligence cases.   It was in Gregg v Scott324 that loss of 
chance was rejected only by a majority of 3:2.  It was rejected as the claimant was 
unable to show that on the balance of probabilities the delay in treatment caused his 
premature death.  Lord Hoffman went so far as to say that a change from possible to 
probable causation would require a “legislative act”.325 Grubb, Laing and McHale 
argue326 that there could be room to invoke a loss of chance argument where there is 
a significant medical uncertainty as to what the outcome would have been in the 
absence of negligence and where medical treatment has resulted in an adverse 
outcome and negligence increased the chance of that outcome.  It is a possibility. 
However, I think there is a reason why loss of chance has been permitted in non-
medical liability cases and has not yet been accepted in medical liability cases.  There 
remains the problem of statistics.   It is difficult to individualise and thereby to assess 
the counterfactual.  Yet whatever arguments there may be for or against loss of 
chance, I wish to concentrate on the fact that there is this division on opinion.  Even 
in Britain there is division.  When the United Kingdom is compared with the other 
jurisdictions here, we shall see how practice in France diverges significantly from the 
United Kingdom, which differs significantly from Germany.  
 
So as I hope to have shown, often the dichotomy between what is factual causation 
and what is legal causation in medical negligence is not an easy one to make and it 
can be extremely difficult to predict the outcome of a case – even with a system of 
precedent – in the United Kingdom.  It is an area fraught with uncertainty as we can 
see with the separate judgements that are given in the United Kingdom.  There can 
be no idea of common sense causation.  
 
Inextricably linked to theory and substantive law of causation in the United 
Kingdom, as in all jurisdictions, is the procedure.  Procedure includes who has the 
burden of proof at any given moment and governs to what standard a plaintiff must !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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prove his case.  The burden of proof can determine causation and thereby who wins 
the case.  It determines only legal causation.  It does not determine what was the 
actual cause scientifically but rather what the law will accept as the cause. In the 
United Kingdom, a plaintiff must show probable causation and not possible 
causation only.  If he shows probable causation (res ipsa loquitur  may help him in this 
regard) then the plaintiff will recover all his damages.  If he shows less than 50% 
likelihood, then he will recover nothing, loss of chance not being permitted in the 
United Kingdom for medical negligence.  Procedure can therefore determine 
causation.   
 
As evidence, experts will often speak to their reports.  There will usually be experts 
for both sides and they can be examined and cross-examined.  As we have seen, 
statistics can be used in court but there is a warning about just using generalising 
statistics – without something more, then they are not particularly valuable.  What is 
interesting is the analytical enquiry and breakdown of these statistics in the United 
Kingdom.  They are scrutinised by judges in their written judgements much more so 
than in the other jurisdictions. There were divergences on opinion as to the use of 
statistics as we saw – even the right of judges in the United Kingdom given their 
social background to make such determinations on probability was called into 
question!327 This makes for fascinating and controversial reading which I imagine will 
continue to stimulate and fuel argument in this area for time to come.  It can be seen 
then that there are many pertinent variables when deciding an issue of causation in a 
“typical” medical case in the United Kingdom.  There is much uncertainty.  I do not 
find this surprising, as there is much uncertainty concerning the science the human 
body itself.   
 
To summarise then, to say that there are principles or rules which courts attempt to 
follow when solving a causal problem is true.  The important ones are generally 
factual causation, legal causation combined with procedure hurdles.  Factual 
causation started off with the conditio sine qua non. Yet this was unsatisfactory in all 
cases so the courts had resort to ratios such as the “material increase of risk” or 
“material contribution to injury”. As we have seen, however, it is not clear what !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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factual causation actually means.  Many of the cases that I cited above in causal 
theory were decided by a bare majority for example, McGhee and Chester. This does 
not bode well for any “common sense” concept of causation, be it factual or legal.  I 
believe this shows there is not one true understanding of what these concepts mean.  
So it is all very well to use ideas such as the “conditio sine qua non” test but when it 
comes to be applied in practice, it is difficult to say what it is.  This, together with 
procedure and related evidential issues I specified above, lead me to believe that 
projects such as DCFR in tort and PETL may be laudable in their ultimate aim, but 
their application is going to be so divergent in result that the paragraphs which seek 
to expand on causation, serve nothing.  
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Chapter 4: France and Luxembourg 
4.1 Introduction 
Showing a causal link between a legally recognised injury and fault is an essential 
requirement in French tort law. What should be noticeable when considering how 
France treats problems of medical causation is how much more unresolved and 
noncommittal courts are with regard to causal theory and how much more victim-
friendly the courts seem to be.  Judges will decide as per the facts before them and 
will not worry so much about precedent.  This comes from the important French 
principle that the judge has the “sovereign appreciation of the facts”.  Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that French judges have carte blanche to decide as they will.  If 
they do, a superior court will surely censure them.  What is perceptible, however, is 
that courts do not even purport to find themselves bound even by theory as will 
become apparent.  Some cases accept equivalence theory, others adequacy theory.  
In summary here, I believe it is the unpredictability of case law in France in the area 
of causation which makes it impossible to garner general principles of causation even 
in France; how much more difficult therefor to attempt to formulate what does not 
exist into a kind of project for higher principles of tort at a European level.  I hope 
the evidence I present here will show that.  
 
For the reader who has little or no knowledge of the French legal system or its 
principles, I should just like to explain two essential concepts which I shall refer to 
again and again: the difference between public and private hospitals and obligtions de 
résultats and obligations de moyens.   
 
First, if a medical negligence incident happens in a private hospital or clinic with a 
private doctor then the rules of contract under the French civil code will apply.  If in 
a public hospital, then French administrative law will govern the case.   The 
principles developed by the civil and administrative jurisdictions differ in some 
important respect328 and there are also two discrete sets of procedure.  Administrative 
liability lies with the administrative courts, that is the tribunaux administratifs, the Cours 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
328 S TAYLOR, “Clinical Negligence Reform: Lessons from France?”, (July 2003) 52 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 737 at 740 
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d'appel administratives and the Conseil d'Etat as the supreme court.329  Their decisions do 
not serve as precedents but they have strong authoritative weight.330  Any litigation 
for private bodies lies with the tribunal d'instance or de grande instance, Cours d'appel and 
the Cour de cassation.   
 
Second, there can be no full understanding of French contract law - the 
doctor/patient relationship is generally in contract law - without an understanding of 
the difference between what is an obligation de résultat and what is an obligation de 
moyens.331 The difference between the two is that with the former a certain guaranteed 
result has been promised the creditor.  A simple example would be a mechanic who 
promises to make a broken down car roadworthy again.  A physician's duty in 
contract, on the other hand, is only to act conscientiously and attentively in 
accordance with medical science when treating a patient. He is under no obligation 
to cure his patient.332 This is important as far as causation is concerned.  With an 
obligation de résultat, the plaintiff need only show that the promised result has not been 
achieved and then there is a presumption of fault.333 Where there is only an obligation 
de moyens, then no presumption is raised.  It is for the plaintiff to prove that there has 
been fault. It is prima facie more demanding therefore for a plaintiff to prove medical 
negligence as it is an obligation de moyens than if it were an obligation de résultat. The 
plaintiff must establish that the care provider has acted in a way that a reasonable 
doctor of the same experience and training in abstracto would not have acted that the 
victim is likely to obtain damages provided causation can be proven.  Negligence 
need not be proven in the British sense of the word.  Une faute légère is enough.334 The 
Cour de cassation in France has confirmed that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
329 Essay of S GALAND-CARVAL dealing with France in M FAURE and H KOZIOL (eds), 
Cases on Medical Malpractice in a Comparative Perspective  (Vienna, Springer, 2001), p101 
330 C van DAM, European Tort Law (2nd ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), p55 
331 R DEMOGUE, Traité des obligation en général, t V (Paris, Rousseau, 1925), n°1237 who essentially 
invented the distinction; for an interesting appreciation, see, M DIERRAT, “De la distinction 
entre obligations de moyens et obligations de résultat: pile ou face?”,  (2011) 15 Journal des tribunaux 
Luxembourg 61  
332 see infra 
333 Although a debtor can rebut this presumption by showing that he merely acted as a “reasonable 
man” or bon père de famille would have acted 
334 Lux 31 January 1990, n° 60/90 I 
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l'obligation de résultat emporte à la fois présomption de faute et présomption de 
causalité entre la prestation fournie et le dommage invoqué335 
 
The notion of obligations has an effect on the causal conclusion in a given case. If there 
is one of de résultat then there is, in effect, a causal presumption.   This means then 
that in an ordinary case of medical liability, there would not generally be a 
presumption of causation.   However, in certain situations, it has been held that there 
is an obligation de résultat.  For example, it has been held that a nurse who carries out 
an intramuscular injection has an obligation de résultat.336 A pharmaceutical laboratory 
also has such an obligation to provide blood free from vice and to have the qualities 
that one can expect that such blood has in the circumstances.337 
 
The use of ideas of obligations de résultat and de moyens, together with other 
presumptions as shall be seen below, has to some extent come to dilute a pure causal 
finding as the man in the street might understand it in individual cases of physician 
responsibility. 
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335 CC 1 16 Feb 1988, Bull n° 42; Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 1988.767, obs P JOURDAIN 
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337 JCP 1991.II.21762 
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4.2 Causal Theory in France and Luxembourg 
Before considering the detail of causation in medical negligence problems in France 
and Luxembourg, I think it opportune here to consider some of the philosophical 
theory which is considered to be the background of much of the French case law 
depending, of course, to what extent it is accepted the courts actually make use of 
causal theory in France rather than just “common sense feeling” to problems.  
 
The search for what causation in law actually is may never be theoretically found.  It 
is a complex problem. Resort is had sometimes simply to feeling or “sentiment”.338  
Positive law in the form of the Civil Codes of both France and Luxembourg is of little 
help when it comes to finding a clearer definition of what is meant by “causation” or 
“cause”. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code relative to delictual liability uses the 
verb causer and no further elucidation is given.  Article 1151 of the Civil Code (in the 
chapter referring to contracts) is often cited in case law and with academic writers.339 
It states that 
Dans le cas même où l'inexécution de la convention résulte du dol du débiteur, les 
dommages et intérêts ne doivent comprendre à l'égard de la perte éprouvée par le 
créancier et du gain dont il a été privé, que ce qui est une suite immédiate et directe 
de l'inexécution de la convention. 
 
This is often invoked for causal problems in delict too.340 The idea, however, behind 
this article is not strictly one of causation.341 It is one of damages.  The damages 
themselves cannot go further than providing the plaintiff with what are the 
immediate and direct damages as a result of the breach of contract.   Now it is 
suggested, and as I mentioned in the United Kingdom chapter, that this comes down 
to the same thing.   What a court is only ever stating is whether a plaintiff caused the 
damages sought be they “indirect” or “direct” damages.  When applying article 1151 
of the French Civil Code all that has been recovered is necessarily direct damages.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
338 H and L MAZEAUD, A TUNC, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et 
contractuelle, volume 3 (5th ed, Montchrestien, Paris, 1958) 1471; B STARK, H ROLAND, L 
BOYER, Les Obligations, (Litec, Paris, 1992) 1197 
339 F TERRE, P SIMLER and Y LEQUETTE, Les obligations (Dalloz, Paris, 2005) 860; B 
STARCK, H ROLAND and L BOYER, Obligations, 1200 
340 B STARCK, H ROLAND and L BOYER, ibid 
341 ibid 
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Therefore in every case where a plaintiff has been successful in France, it can be said 
that causation has allowed him to recover such damages as were direct. It follows 
then that only direct causation is recognised and anything short of this will result in a 
claim’s being dismissed.  This is a legal not a scientific distinction.      
 
France does not enter into the causal discussions in their case law that are often 
found among German and British jurists in this area. German influence in French 
causal theory is, however, widely admitted.342  Judges in France tend to take a more 
“common sense” or empirical approach – at least, that is what they like to think they 
are doing, and they constantly remind us that is what they are doing.343 This would 
be in line with judges having a sovereign appreciation of facts and rendering justice 
as appropriate in the circumstances.  Although there have been certain judicial nods 
to and acknowledgements of the equivalence theory in France where it was noted by 
the Cour de cassation with regard to an accident that 
...le dommage ne se serait pas produit, alors que si des fautes successives imputables à 
des auteurs différents ont pu jouer un rôle causal sur ce poste de préjudice...cette 
pluralité de causes...n'est pas de nature à faire obstacle à l'indemnisation de l'entier 
dommage par l'auteur initial, par application du principe de l'équivalence des 
causes dans la production du même dommage en matière de responsabilité 
délictuelle.344 
 
Certain writers hold that French case law seems to favour an adequate cause 
approach.  This adequate cause theory in France 
…[elle] s’efforce donc de rattacher le dommage à celui de ses antécédents qui, 
normalement, d’après la suite naturelle des événements, était de nature à le produire, 
à la différence d’autres antécédents du dommage, n’ayant entraîné celui-ci qu’en 
raison de circonstances exceptionnelles.345 
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342 H and L MAZEAUD and A TUNC, Traité, 1424 
343 ibid, 1197 where they note that answers to causal problems have not found a theoretical answer 
but they have in practice; again, H and L MAZEAUD and A TUNC, Traité, 1422 where the 
authors note that causation is a complex problem that is often resolved by “sentiment”. 
344 CC 2, 27 Mar 2003, Bull n°76  
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Mazeaud, Mazeaud and Tunc describe an application of the adequate cause as 
“seules peuvent être considérés comme causes d'un préjudice les événements qui 
devaient normalement le produire.”346 Quézel-Ambrunaz describes it as “la cause est 
une condition qui était objectivement de nature à produire le type de dommage qui 
est survenu”.347 A further requirement here then is that it is the type of damage that 
is important not the actual damage which occurred.348 What this means is that 
adequate causation will not consider “le dommage réel dans sa specificité, mais un 
type abstrait ou généralisé de dommage”.349 This is particularly important in medical 
negligence.  When examining whether a particular damage was caused by the 
negligence of a care-provider, in theory, probability should be taken into account.  
So, for example, if a medical practitioner is negligent in carrying out a particular 
operation, the question of whether (say) paralysis was probable as a result of such 
negligence should be addressed.  Such theoretical niceties are, however, dispensed 
with when it suits the court.350 However, what is also salient about the adequate 
cause theory is that it is a generalising theory.  This means that it will not take 
account necessarily of the individual propensities in patients.351  
 
Planiol is also among those French authors who rightly refer to German authorities 
(although he does not name them) when reflecting on the origins of French causation.  
He refers to the equivalence, adequate and causa proxima theories but perhaps to 
have a better idea of how such problems are solved in France, he notes 
Quand on veut fonder la responsabilité uniquement sur la causalité, il y a là un 
problème à peu près insoluble.  La jurisprudence française, fidèle à la théorie de la 
faute, ne paraît guère embarrassée par cette difficulté.  Il lui suffit que la faute figure !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
346 Traité, 1441 
347 C QUEZEL-AMBRUNAZ, Essai sur la causalité en droit de la responsabilité civile, thesis, (Paris, Dalloz, 
2010) 80 
348 ibid 
349 ibid 
350 for example, see aléas thérapeutiques infra 
351 See HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, Part III for generalising and 
individualising theories; essentially a generalising theory suggests that a cause is generally 
connected with some other kind of event, eg “smoking causes cancer”; individualising theories 
divide into “necessity” and “efficiency” theories; a necessity theory would hold that cancer 
necessarily follows from smoking (which is false) whereas an efficiency theory would allow for 
different degrees of causal potency in the causal link. 
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parmi les causes du dommage, quitte à déclarer qu'il y a une faute commune au cas où 
plusieurs personnes sont intervenues, ou si la victime a elle-même commis une 
faute.352  
 
However, it should be noted that French courts have not expressly rejected either 
theory. Galand-Carval notes that the case law would seem divided between the 
equivalence theory and the adequate cause theory. 353 The theories of a causa 
proxima and the protective purpose rule also appear to have been rejected in 
France.354 What courts often look for is whether the act has “joué un rôle” or 
“contribué” to the result and can therefore be considered among its causes.355  
 
Even academic writers do not appear to agree on which is the accepted causal 
philosophy in France.  Terré, Simler and Lequette write that case law has shown a 
marked predilection for adequate causality356 whereas Ravarani writes that the 
theory of the equivalence of conditions has been well received in France.357 I suggest 
that neither of these is a necessarily accurate reflection of reality. Viney and Jourdain 
appeared more accurately to sum it up when they stated 
Il y a longtemps qu’entre partisans de ‘l'équivalence des conditions’ et de la ‘causalité 
adéquate’, les points ont été comptés.  Pourtant le bilan n’est pas décisif…C’est donc 
plutôt d’après leurs résultats pratiques que l’on peut espérer départager les deux 
théories.358 
 
This would seem to be realistic and also corroborates what Galand-Carval has stated 
in that French courts have never categorically favoured one of the theories over the 
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other.359 In the case law I read from France, although my research was not focused 
on which of the two theories was more accepted in France, I also found that 
sometimes a court would refer to equivalence and sometimes to adequacy, without 
one theory dominating over the other.  
 
After an analysis of the two principal theories of causation that have been received 
into France, I would agree with Viney and Jourdain when they note that notions of 
“necessary condition” and “objective foreseeability” (or reasonable foreseeability for 
the common lawyer) are effectively used to define and establish a causal link in 
theory.360  They note that 
...il paraît légitime de recourir à la notion de probabilité ou de “prévisibilité objective” 
du dommage par rapport au fait dommageable, car s'il existe une probabilité 
suffisante, cela permet raisonnablement de présumer que le fait générateur a été 
effectivement une condition nécessaire à la survenance du dommage.  La proabilité ou 
la prévisibilité objective engendre ainsi une présomption de fait en faveur de la 
causalité.361 
 
They also note that even the precautionary principle, far from restraining the idea of 
causes, objective foreseeability actually enlarges the potential causes that could be 
considered as actual legal causes.362 It is not evident from the case law that there is 
necessarily a probability analysis made, rather resort is had simply to other causal 
devices or theories, be it loss of chance, risk theory or even the use of certain 
presumptions.363 
 
From the above, it can be seen then that this idea of probability is indeed what was 
conceived in the original formulation of the adequate cause theory. However, this 
conception is criticised by Viney and Jourdain as they say it can be difficult to know 
which kind of probability to chose; is resort to be had to an “objective probability”, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
359 see infra 
360 G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, Traité de droit civil 340-1 
361 ibid; they also give the example of someone who after living next to a nuclear factory contracts 
a disease that is provoked by radioactivity; it may have been so caused but it is normally rare. 
362 ibid 
363 See Bouygues Telecom, CA Versailles, 4 February 2009 08/08775 Legifrance, D 2009, 1369  
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or a “subjective probability” taking into account the state of the defender?364  They 
note that the supporters of the adequate cause theory would hold that only objective 
probability is to be considered but that 
pratiquement la distincition [entre la prévisibilité objective et la prévisibilité 
subjective] est bien difficile à faire.  L'analyse de la causalité en fonction de la 
“prévisibilité” est nécessairement tendancieuse dans la mesure où elle ramène 
indirectmement la causalité à la faute.365 
 
 
It can be impenetrable to extract what this means in practice and the cases must 
be studied.366 Even the courts in France have resort to notions of prévisibilité when, 
it is suggested what they should be referring to is causation.367 Personally, I find it 
difficult sometimes to divorce one idea from the other.  
 
It can readily how different causal analysis appears to be in France.  There is a 
theory that is adopted in France that is not used in the United Kingdom: the 
adequacy theory and in France even the seriousness of the fault itself can be used 
to establish causation – something which strictly speaking cannot be done in the 
United Kingdom.368 Germany again has other theoretical notions.    
 
I have considered here causation in France in theory and from first principles.  I 
shall turn now to a legal mechanism that is used both in France and in 
Luxembourg but has been specifically rejected in the United Kingdom (in medical 
negligence cases) and Germany (totally).  It is loss of chance.   
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367 G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, Traité de droit civil, 343 
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4.3 Loss of Chance (Perte d'une chance) 
One way that France overcomes the often unfair burden placed on a plaintiff of 
having to prove his case to the point of conviction intime (the high standard of civil proof 
in France) is of allowing recovery for loss of chance.369 As Ravarani notes, many 
decisions use this idea to lighten the burden of proof when causation is a problem for 
the plaintiff.370 But this is not strictly speaking its purpose.  Loss of chance should 
constitute a head of damage in itself if it is to be recognised at all.371 What exactly 
then is the loss of a chance?  In short, it considers the behaviour of a defendant that 
has deprived the plaintiff of a chance to avoid a loss (damnum emergens) or he has lost 
the chance of a gain (lucrum cessans).372 In medicine, this can either be the loss of 
chance of survival or the loss of chance to recover. The definition of the loss of a 
chance has been defined as “la dispiration actuelle et certaine d'une eventualité 
favourable”.373 Courts have said the chance must not be illusory but rather it must be 
réelle and sérieuse.374 If a causal link can be established between the loss of chance and 
the defendant's act, then the plaintiff should be awarded an amount representing not 
full damages, as it is impossible to know whether the plaintiff would actually have 
fallen into the category of those who would benefit if it were not for the fault of the 
defendant.  Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, as loss of chance is considered as a 
separate head of damages in France, the judiciary believes it is awarding the entire 
amount: not a percentage.  This is logical.  Courts use probability to determine 
whether the idea of loss of chance is suitable and the amount of the reparation.375 
Only France and Luxembourg among the jurisdictions under consideration here 
allow for recovery of a lost chance.  In medical negligence Penneau noted that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
369 G RAVARANI, La responsabilité civile, 1009; L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p37 and pp93 et 
seqq 
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371 Lux CA 21 Apr 2004, Pas Lux, p476 
372 F TERRE, P SIMLER and Y LEQUETTE, Les obligations, 700 
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374 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 1963, p334, obs A TUNC; CC 2 1 Apr 1965, Bull n° 336; 8 Nov 
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375 F TERRE, P SIMLER and Y LEQUETTE, Les obligations, 701; obs by P JOURDAIN Revue 
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il existe un abîme profond entre les chances statistiques d'évolution d'une affection 
donnée et les chances individuelles du patient atteint par cette affection; or chaque 
espèce déterminée, ce sont les chances individuelles qui sont en cause.376 
 
As Khoury notes, causal analysis in loss of chance involves the consideration of one of 
two hypotheticals: first, the hypothetical prognostic, the hypothetical used to asses the 
present if the past had been different; and the simple prognostic, the assessment of 
the future based on the present.377 As far as evaluation of chance is concerned, what 
ought to be considered are the individual chances of that particular patient.  While 
generalising statistics might play some role, what must be considered and evaluated is 
the actual plaintiff's loss of chance. 
 
Quézel-Ambrunaz notes that the French courts often use the following formula  
I=A(C-C') 
 
where I is the recoverable damages, C is the initial chance of survival, C' is the 
chance of survival following the defendant's tortious act and A is the total damages 
recoverable on death.378  
 
Loss of chance should also be differentiated from simply just taking a risk.  If 
someone undergoes an operation  (and let us assume he was warned of the risks) and 
a risk eventuates then the surgeon has not caused a loss of a chance of survival.  The 
patient took his risk and it eventuated.   The loss must lie where it falls. 
 
Courts have also had recourse to the loss of chance doctrine when considering cases 
of mis-diagnosis.  These cases have usually been analysed as the loss of a chance to 
avoid certain consequences following on from the mis-diagnosis.  I shall consider 
such cases here also.   
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4.3.1 Loss of Chance: Case Law 
As far as the case law is concerned, a case that is often referred to in French writing 
as the starting point of the loss of chance notion is that in Grenoble of 1961.379 In this 
case the plaintiff injured his wrist.  He went for a radiography but no injury was 
detected and he immediately resumed his work.  A few years later when he was lifting 
a heavy object, he experienced some pain and went back to his doctor who told him 
that on the X-ray, a fracture could in fact have been detected.   The plaintiff sued the 
doctor.  The court held indeed that the doctor had deprived the patient of the chance 
of recovery on which he should normally be able to rely.  This was followed with 
other decisions approving this including one where it was held that although it could 
not be established that the death of the patient was the fault of the surgeon, it was 
held nonetheless that he had deprived the patient of a chance of survival. 380 
Thereafter the Cour de cassation often used the term “perte d'une chance de 
guérison” or “de survie” making it clear that it was authorising only a partial 
compensation.381 
 
Another case in this area that is often mentioned in French academic writing is that 
of 17 November 1982 which has been regarded as interrupting the idea of loss of 
chance in France. 382  In this case, a doctor punctured a bone wall and 
notwithstanding the appearance of a haemorrhage, injected air.  The patient fell into 
a coma.  An expert's report tried to determine the cause of the accident.  It was noted 
that the injury to the blood vessel was not considered as a fault. With regard to the 
air in the blood (causing embolism), however, it could have been caused by either air 
in the syringe or extant air in the sinus. The juges du fond stated here that there was no 
causal link between the doctor's fault and the subsequent incapacity of the plaintiff.   
The judges of the première chambre civile nonetheless found the doctor liable for half the 
damages.   The Cour de Cassation quashed this judgement and stated that the loss of 
chance could only concern the evaluation of damages.   This is a case where there !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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was no causation between the fault of the doctor and the final damage.  This decision 
was seen as revolutionary at the time and it was thought that loss of chance's days 
were numbered.  I think this case can be seen rather as loss of chance's not being the 
“trump card” in the event that there is a lack of causation383 and it also illustrates that 
using loss of chance can only be relied on when there were strong chances of 
avoiding the damage and not when alternative causes of damage existed.384  So the 
doctor’s acts (or omissions) must have been at some stage causal.  As Khoury writes, 
this position contradicts the view that loss of chance can be seen as an autonomous 
head of damages and the argument that causation must be proven between that head 
of damage (not the final outcome) and the fault.385 Yet loss of chance came quickly 
back in favour in France and was used when causation was uncertain. 386  
Notwithstanding this decision, French courts still use loss of chance and indeed it 
remains the French courts' preferred method when faced with scientific causal 
uncertainty.387  
 
Loss of chance has also been used in France to deal with the situation where doctors 
have not sufficiently informed their patients of risks.  In one case,388 where a 
physician in France failed to inform a patient of a risk associated with a particular 
procedure (in this case a sinus decompression), it was held that this failure deprived 
the plaintiff of a chance to avoid a loss (perhaps by taking a more sagacious and 
informed decision). It was also held in this case that the loss of chance is a head of 
damages which is quite distinct from any bodily harm that was caused.  This would 
then seem to put into doubt the causal formula used by courts referred to above.389 
 
In a further case, a doctor continued in a diagnosis of sciatica of Mr Rocq.  In fact, 
the correct diagnosis was phlebitis and he had to be operated on urgently.  His front !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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left foot had to be amputated as this had developed an acute ischemia.390   The initial 
doctor was held at fault not for an incorrect diagnosis but for not carrying out further 
enquiries by virtue of an investigation by way of a Doppler examination.   The Court 
of first instance at Rochefort held that there was no causal link established on the 
basis of the first report it had ordered between the diagnosis and the amputation.  A 
second report was ordered.   The report noted that had an anti-coagulant treatment 
been begun 48 hours earlier then the phlebitis should not have occurred or at least 
should have been much less severe in its effects and that the chances of avoiding an 
amputation would have been much greater.   The Court of Appeal held nonetheless 
that loss of chance could not be used but not for substantial reasons but rather for 
procedural reasons.  It held that “aucune demande chiffrée pour perte de chance 
n'avait été formulée par M Rocq.”  The Cour de cassation held, however, that a 
plaintiff simply has to state his quantum and then it was for the 
juge consistant alors à en apprécier le bien fondé et à déterminer, par une 
appréciation souveraine, la fraction de ces préjudices correspondant à la perte de 
chance de les éviter si le médecin n'avait pas commis une faute. 
 
So it would appear then that the court can allocate damages “par une appréciation 
souveraine”. 
 
However, the case law in France has encountered some strains.  In one case, where a 
doctor arrived late at a labour and this resulted in the baby's severe brain damage, it 
was held that the doctors could be held entirely responsible where an expert's report 
said that such damage would “normalement” have been avoided if they had been 
there on time.391 The Cour de cassation criticised the Cour d'appel for only allowing 
for recovery of a lost chance.  So there is uncertainty.  What does the word 
“normalement” mean? Here the courts were at variance and it is this divergence I 
wish to highlight. 
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4.3.2 Commentary 
On the one hand, the doctrine of the loss of chance does lighten the burden of proof 
for plaintiffs in that where a plaintiff cannot prove convincingly that the defendant's 
act caused the damage, he may have resort to the idea of a loss of chance. It can be 
another weapon in the plaintiff’s litigious armoury.   Yet it has been used simply 
where it is difficult to prove a causal link.392 Resort to loss of chance is indeed a 
helpful alternative for a plaintiff in medical negligence cases.   It has more perhaps to 
commend it to an intuitive sense of justice that the “all or nothing” approach adopted 
in the United Kingdom.  Yet as I have stated, not all the jurisdictions accept loss of 
chance and this is the essence of this paper.  The acceptance of loss of chance, is, in 
my opinion, a major difficulty in arguing that there can be any kind of harmonisation 
of tort law either in some common principles or by the ECJ.  The PETL have more 
or less accepted loss of chance as shall become clear in my final chapter yet two of the 
other major jurisdictions of Europe have not.  There is a problem.  Similar cases do 
not have similar answers and it is this I shall address in the comparative chapter.  
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4.4 Nosocomial Infections and Medical Accidents 
Another area where causation is of interest for comparison is that of nosocomial 
infections and medical “accidents”.  In France, both the Cour de cassation and the 
Conseil d'Etat have both come to the same position, even if this has taken some time.  
The Conseil d'Etat has now held that if an infection is contracted in a hospital then a 
cause étrangère must be shown to avoid liability.393 Up until then, a hospital could 
argue that the patient’s germ was endogène, namely that the patient had arrived at the 
hospital with the germ, to avoid liability. This is not longer acceptable. The same 
principle applies now for private hospitals and the hospital will be held strictly 
liable.394 Private hospitals and doctors now have an obligation de sécurité de résultat that 
can only be rebutted by showing a cause étrangère.395 After five years then, the 
position of the public and private hospitals is now the same.396 As for medical 
accidents, the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d'Etat have differed in their 
approaches and I shall also consider this.  
 
4.4.1 Nosocomial Infection 
A nosocomial infection was defined in a Health Ministry Circular of 13 October 
1988 which stated that it was to be understood as: 
toute maladie provoquée par des micro organismes: 
-contractée dans un établissement de soins par tout patient après son admission, soit 
pour hospitalisation, soit pour y recevoir des soins ambulatoires; 
-que les symptômes apparaissent lors du séjour à l'hôpital ou après; 
-que l'infection soit reconnaissable aux plans cliniques ou micro-biologiques, données 
sérologiques comprises, ou encore les deux à la fois. 
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Commentators have noted that such infections can be divided into what have 
been called endogenous and exogenous types.397 The former can be seen when the 
patient is infected by his own germs but this infection is caused by a medical 
manipulation or intervention of some kind on the patient; the latter are typically 
the result of cross-contamination of instruments or infection from medical staff.  
The questions which arise are often ones of proof and therefore causation. 
 
4.4.1.1 Nosocomial Infections and droit commun 
At droit commun in 1996, the Cour de cassation replaced what was simply an obligation 
de moyens with a reinforced obligation in that a clinic 
est présumée responsible d'une infection contractée par un patient lors d'une 
intervention pratiquée dans une salle d'opération, à moins de prouver l'absence de 
faute de sa part.398 
 
Then in 1999, the Cour de cassation brought its case law into line more or less with 
the administrative jurisdiction when it held that health centres and doctors were now 
under an obligation de securité de résultat.399 With such an obligation, a hospital can only 
absolve itself if it proves a cause étrangère.  The administrative court had already 
held there was a presumption but did not go far as saying it could be rebutted only by 
a cause étrangère. On 29 June 1999, the Cour de cassation handed down three cases 
with important implications with regard to nosocomial infections, two of which are 
important for purposes of causation. 400 
 
In the first case, a patient was in hospital having a prosthesis fitted to her knee.  
Following its fitting, the patient developed a staphylococcus aureus at the knee in 
hospital.  This necessitated an operation and the re-fitting of the prosthesis.  She was 
forbidden from carrying out any professional activity.  Although the doctor failed in 
his obligation to inform the patient about the non-negligible risks of nosocomial 
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infections to allow the patient properly to choose whether or not to go ahead with the 
operation, the Cour de cassation confirmed 
Attendu que le contrat d'hospitalisation et de soins conclu entre un patient et un 
établissement de santé met à la charge de ce dernier, en matière d'infection 
nosocomiale, une obligation de sécurité de résultat dont il ne peut se libérer 
qu'en rapportant la preuve d'une cause étrangère.401 
 
In the second case, the victim underwent an arthroscopy on her knee but 48 hours 
later developed an infection in the hospital.  This necessitated further surgery even up 
to two years later.  The Cour de cassation referred to the last case in its ratio and held 
the doctor and the medical centre liable in solidum.402 The implications of these cases 
are the following.  First, the presumption of fault is now replaced by an obligation de 
sécurité de résultat. The law now is that only a cause étrangère, something much more 
difficult to prove, can absolve the physician or hospital and this shall be considered 
below.  The principle that can now be seen both at droit commun and has been 
abrogated to a certain extent at statute in that doctors in their own practice are not 
liable de iure for nosocomial infections.403 Fault must still be shown.  
 
In another case, similar to the one considered above, a patient underwent a knee 
operation and then developed a staphylococcus aureus at the knee in the hospital.404 
A Cour d'Appel dismissed the claim of the victim stating that it was an aléa 
thérapeutique and that the nosocomial infection could be attributed to a cause 
étrangère.  However, the Cour de cassation held that given it was a known risk, the 
infection could not come from a cause étrangère.  The physician may not have been 
at fault but it was nonetheless a decision for which the health centre was responsible.  
It is important then to consider briefly what could be a cause étrangère in these 
circumstances.  Jourdain tackles the question.405 He notes from the above case and 
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another406 that if the risk is known, then there is an element of foreseeability which 
necessarily excludes cause étrangère.  I suggest this is correct. He also notes 
interestingly that given an infection is linked to medical intervention itself and the 
migration of germs during the procedure then it is the procedure itself which has 
rendered such “migration” of germs possible.  So the invasive act is always a 
necessary condition.  This has been confirmed by the Cour de cassation.407 I approve 
of the terminology used by Jourdain here.  He notes that the intervention is indeed a  
“necessary condition”.  I find this helpful given the nature of what is happening if it is 
remembered that a condition can be differentiated from a cause in that a condition 
is something akin to a background or a stage upon which the causal actors play out 
their part.    It is the medical involvement which causes the germs to migrate 
thereby leading to the effect of a nosocomial infection.  Jourdain then goes on to 
consider the possibility of an epidemic's being considered as a cause étrangère.  He 
said it would.  I would tend to agree here.  There is no link as such between a 
medical act in the establishment and the nosocomial infection.  An epidemic, I would 
suggest is also unforeseeable and certainly exterior to the hospital.408 An infection as a 
necessary consequence of a cutaneous necrosis has also been held to be cause 
étrangère as exterior to the activity of the doctors.409 
 
From a policy point of view, there is also the intangible question of preferring to 
compensate victims rather than send them away from court empty-handed.  This is 
indeed difficult to quantify but I think, from the reading of French case law, it can be 
said that the impetus of the case law is certainly victim-friendly.410 This approach to 
hospital acquired infections finds no counterpart in the United Kingdom.  I submit 
therefore this is yet another aspect which shows that no common principles can be 
deduced from a “common” European case law or understanding of the subject.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In 2011, the Conseil d’Etat brought the administrative case law into line with that of 
the private case law.411 In this case the patient had died of pneumococcal meningitis.  
The Conseil d’Etat held, referring to the provisions of L1142-1 Code de santé publique 
(CSP) that it did not matter with the infection was exogène or endogène.  Accordingly 
after five years, the two jurisdictions appear to be aligned.   
 
I shall now consider the question of aléas thérapeutiques. 
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4.5 Causation and aléas thérapeutiques 
One area in which administrative law has differed from private law in matters of 
medical causation is that the Conseil d'Etat has in some circumstances allowed claims 
for what are called aléas thérapeutiques or medical “accidents” or “hazards”.  Medical 
accident is a loss that is not attributable to the patient's initial state of health or to its 
foreseeable evolution.412  Terré, Simler and Lequette give some examples of what 
could constitute the same.413 The hazard that results must be sudden and not be an 
evolution of an illness that the patient already has.  It is some sudden event.  They 
give examples of a total paralysis or serious nervous trouble following a simple 
operation, dying under anaesthetic or even contracting an infection.414  In the famous 
Bianchi case, a patient sued a hospital after she became paralysed following an 
operation under general anaesthetic.  The Conseil d'Etat in their famous ratio set out 
the conditions to be fulfilled for recovery.  It is worth quoting in full 
Lorsqu'un acte médicale nécessaire au diagnostic ou au traitement du malade 
présente un risque dont l'existence est connue et dont aucune raison ne permet de 
penser que le patient y soit particulièrement exposé, la responsabilité du service 
public hospitalier si l’exécution de cet acte est la cause directe de dommages sans 
rapport avec l'état initial du patient comme avec l'évolution prévisible de cet état, et 
presentant un caractère dêxtrême gravité.415  
 
The hospital was liable here because the injury occurred as a result of the medical 
act. This is strict liability and based on a risk,416 albeit a remote risk. The Cour de 
cassation has not accepted this idea yet.  It has confirmed that  
La réparation des conséquences de l’aléa thérapeutique n’entre pas dans le champ 
des obligations dont un médecin est contractuellement tenu à l’égard de son 
patient.417 
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Some commentators say, however, that it is only a matter of time before the two 
courts harmonise their approach.418 Some have also suggested that one way of 
identifying aléas thérapeutiques are that they have “rien à voir avec l'aléa dans l'exercise 
de médecine”.419 Viney and Jourdain would even go as far as to say that 
Il serait plus rationnel de fonder sur une obligation de sécurité distincte de l'oligation 
de moyens la nécessaire indemnisation des accidents médicaux.  Bien entendu,...cette 
obligation sera de résultat.420  
 
This idea of having an obligation de securité reinforces the idea that a hospital is 
responsible for the patient as soon as he enters the building.  This would essentially 
make proof of fault easier for the plaintiff. This means that hospitals or doctors would 
have an obligation de résultat in this respect.  Aléas thérapeutiques are not concerned with 
fault.    
 
However, there have been definitions of aléa thérapeutique other than in the Bianchi 
case.  Other commentators have suggested that perhaps it is “dommages accidentels 
sans faute prouvée résultant non de l'état du patient, mais de l'acte médical lui-
même”421 or even “dommage accidentel ayant un lien de causalité certain avec un 
acte médical, mais dont la réalisation est indépendante de toute faute”.422 Larroumet 
in his article states that the damage must result from the manifestation of the aléa.423 
Writing before the implementation of the law of 4 March 2002, Larroumet also 
discusses the reasons for allowing recovery for an aléa. Recovery for aléa must lie 
without anyone being liable.  It is, so to speak, just one of those things to expect from 
medicine as it is not an exact science.   Jourdain also forwards some arguments in 
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favour of recovery for aléa.  These are clearly policy arguments.  He notes that 
recovery should be allowed in the interests of justice.  Society benefits from medical 
progress and not everything is understood therefore why should someone who is 
harmed by an aléa be left without reparation when we all eventually benefit?424 
 
In other case law, it was held that a surgeon was responsible for all consequences of 
maxilla bone surgery, namely a total blindness in the right eye.425  A direct causal link 
was held between the bone disjunction and the vascular accident resulting in the 
blindness.  It was held that the doctor was not in any way at fault and in particular he 
had fulfilled his obligation d'information towards the patient as the eventuation of 
blindness was “jusqu'à présent inconnue des publications scientifique”.  It was held 
that the doctor was liable for damage due to the obligation de securité that was owed to 
the patient. The judgement was framed in terms of 
le docteur est responable de la cécité survenue à Mlle R au cours de l'intervention et 
résultant selon le rapport d'expertise, d'un accident vasculaire causé par le 
disjonction osseuse...les experts ayant éliminé tout pathologie préexistante ou tout 
cardiopathie emboligène, et qui ne constitue pas une évolution prévisible de 
l'affection pour laquelle elle était traitée. 
 
I wonder though how helpful (or indeed correct) it is to speak of the doctor's 
responsibility in this case.  Certainly there was a causal link between the medical 
intervention and the subsequent blindness but it surely not valid to say that the 
doctor was responsible therefor.  To aver that the doctor in any way breached an 
obligation de sécurité I find intuitively wrong and to hold him “responsible” I find is 
simply inaccurate.  This must be some kind of strict liability. 
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What would appear to be a more absorbing question, as Jourdain has addressed in 
an article, is what is actually fault and what is an aléa thérapeutique.426 In one case, a 
patient undergoing a coloscopy suffered a tear of the intestine during an examination.  
The court of first instance held for the plaintiff patient but the Cour d'appel held that 
the proof of fault lies with the patient and that the tear of the intestine was a risk 
inherent in the procedure.  It therefore refused to allow the surgeon to bear the 
consequences of, what the Cour d'appel saw, as an aléa thérapeutique. This was rejected, 
however, by the Cour de cassation as a coloscopy does not imply the tearing of the 
intestine and, assuming that there are no such predispositions of the patient, the Cour 
d'appel should have held that the surgeon committed a fault.   This follows previous 
case law which held that a physician is liable for carelessness and therefore is not 
liable for any risk inherent in a medical procedure.427 Jourdain notes that given that 
physicians deal with the human body, they should be subject to a higher standard of 
care, indeed he calls this an “obligation de précision”.428  This would then tend to 
raise a presumption of fault as far as the tearing or other harm or scarring to an 
organ in the course of a simple medical procedure.  The surgeon then has to show 
that it was not his fault or, in other words, that he did not cause it: for example, as the 
Cour de cassation left open the possibility, of showing that the victim had some kind 
of predisposition.  So the proposition is that some kind of fault would constitute a 
presumption of cause.   
   
As far causation and fault are concerned, provided that the patient has been 
adequately warned of risk and such a risk is inherent in the procedure (and it cannot 
be attributed to the physician), then a plaintiff cannot recover on the basis simply that 
this was a risk he chose to take: volenti non fit iniuria.429 The caveat to this is, however, 
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aléa thérapeutique.  A patient is obviously not warned about this.  The aléa must further 
not be related to the initial medical intervention.  If it turns out that it is sufficiently 
serious then at droit commun, the plaintiff could recover if treated in the public 
sector.430 Statute further provides that if there has been a “medical accident” of 
sufficient gravity then recovery can be made from the national solidarity fund.431  If 
the plaintiff does not reach the severity of gravity required then the loss must lie with 
the plaintiff.   
 
Aléas thérapeutiques have no counterpart in either United Kingdom or German law.  
There is no kind of strict liability in this regard. Policy is different. I suggest again 
therefore that this is a further example showing how jurisdictions treat the subject, 
making it impossible to have any common understanding of causation.  I submit 
that this further supports my contention that there is no need to expand on 
notions of causation in any European projects for harmonisation in European tort 
law.     
 
It falls now to consider the law of 4 March 2002 in greater detail with regard to 
causation. 
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4.6 Loi no 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 
4.6.1 Nosocomial Infections and Medical Hazards 
The law 2002-303 of 4 March 2002 (loi Kouchner) inserted article L-1142-1 I and II 
into the CSP.  It has been criticised for its imperfections.432 It is not the purpose of 
this paper to enter into this debate but rather to consider how this law changes our 
idea of causation in the medical domain.   This law433 inserted into the CSP that  
Art. L. 1142-1. - I. - Hors le cas où leur responsabilité est encourue en raison d'un 
défaut d'un produit de santé, les professionnels de santé mentionnés à la quatrième 
partie du présent code, ainsi que tout établissement, service ou organisme dans 
lesquels sont réalisés des actes individuels de prévention, de diagnostic ou de soins ne 
sont responsables des conséquences dommageables d'actes de prévention, de 
diagnostic ou de soins qu'en cas de faute. 
Les établissements, services et organismes susmentionnés sont responsables des 
dommages résultant d'infections nosocomiales, sauf s'ils rapportent la preuve d'une 
cause étrangère. 
 
Lorsque la responsabilité d'un professionnel, d'un établissement, service ou 
organisme mentionné au I ou d'un producteur de produits n'est pas engagée, un 
accident médical, une affection iatrogène ou une infection nosocomiale ouvre droit à 
la réparation des préjudices du patient au titre de la solidarité nationale, lorsqu'ils 
sont directement imputables à des actes de prévention, de diagnostic ou de soins et 
qu'ils ont eu pour le patient des conséquences anormales au regard de son état de 
santé comme de l'évolution prévisible de celui-ci et présentent un caractère de 
gravité, fixé par décret, apprécié au regard de la perte de capacités fonctionnelles et 
des conséquences sur la vie privée et professionnelle mesurées en tenant notamment 
compte du taux d'incapacité permanente ou de la durée de l'incapacité temporaire 
de travail. 
 
This law’s basic premise is still fault.  Health professionals and hospitals are liable for 
nosocomial infections unless they bring evidence of a cause étrangère and that is 
confirmed by the latest case law.  This law aimed at harmonising the rules of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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recovery in the public and private domain for iatrogenic complaint (affection iatrogène), 
nosocomial infection and medical accident.  The last one of these should cover aléas.  
There had been calls for reform for over 30 years. 434  In essence, medical 
professionals are only liable for fault. There is no expansion on what fault means and 
it would appear that any plaintiff would have to continue to use the droit commun in 
this regard.  
 
What can be seen here then is that with both nosocomial infections and medical 
accident, the normal approach to causation is diluted, if not disregarded altogether.  
For the former there was a convergence in the reasoning of the Cour de cassation 
and the Conseil d'Etat with regard to causation in that it was presumed unless a 
hospital could show otherwise.  However, the Cour de cassation then developed its 
case law to impose on hospitals or doctors an accessory obligation de securité for 
nosocomial infections allowing only a cause étrangère to absolve it.  For medical 
accidents, there was little convergence.  Indeed there was divergence and the law of 2 
March 2002 had to be enacted as it was unfair that recovery depended on whether 
the aléa manifested itself in a public or private hospital.  The idea of causation has 
been abrogated in this law and causation has been replaced by one of direct 
imputabilité where recovery is sought from the national solidarity fund.  If a claimant 
fails to meet the criteria of recovery from the national solidarity fund however, he 
must fall back on droit commun if he wants to try to bring a case against a public sector 
hospital. There would be no kind of recovery in the private sector for aléa 
thérapeutiques.  How long the separate jurisdictions can maintain this difference has 
been questioned and I would tend to agree with such questioning.435 Success or 
otherwise cannot be based on whether the plaintiff suffered her injury in public or 
private hospital alone. If the plaintiff wishes to recover from the national solidarity 
fund, then he need show that a medical accident, or hospital acquired infection is 
imputable (only) to the hospital.  So causation is being further watered down here.  
This is simply a policy decision in this area.  This shall be considered in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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comparative chapter.   I suggest this is yet further evidence that any common notion 
of causation to be extracted at a European level is impossible to find.  
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4.7 Disclosure Malpractice 
The obligation incumbent on a doctor to inform his patient of the risks involved in 
any medical procedure or intervention was established in French law in 1942.436 The 
risks inherent in a medical situation must also be considered from a causal point of 
view.  A patient must know to what she is consenting.  If she does not know then the 
question arises, would she have consented if she had known?: an essential causal 
question.  If she is not fully informed as the law requires, this could also constitute an 
attack on her bodily integrity.  In France, a physician must give her patient 
information that results in the “consentement libre et éclairé du patient”.437 Causally, 
what is being hypothesised here is the behaviour of a patient in the event that the 
person had been given more information on which to base her decision.  What we 
are interested in here is imagining a possible world where the plaintiff would not have 
taken the decision to go ahead with a given procedure.438  
 
Courts may consider that where the patient has not been properly informed that he 
has lost a chance to refuse treatment.439 Any recovery could potentially be limited to 
a particular percentage of the final loss.  The court would take into account the full 
state of the victim and try to assess what he would have done if he had been fully 
informed; this is where causation is important.440  
 
If the victim had been in terrible pain for years and his chances of surviving without 
the offered treatment were small, then a court might simply dismiss a claim as 
“illusory”.441 Where, on the other hand, the patient had (say) the option of whether 
to undergo a high-risk aesthetic surgery or an operation not seen as necessary then 
the courts might take another view.  A patient must be given a complete picture of 
the risks including those which, although minor, if they eventuated, could result in 
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436 CC req 28 Jan 1942, D 1942.63  
437 G VOGEL, Les grands principes du droit medical et hospitalier (2nd ed, Luxembourg, Promoculture, 
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438 or perhaps not gone ahead with it at a given moment, see Chester v Afshar (2004) UKHL 41 
439 CC 1 7 Feb 1990, Bull n° 39 
440 CC 1 20 Jun 2002, Bull n° 193; D 2000 Somm 471 
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serious consequences for the patient. A physician must give fair, clear and 
appropriate information on serious risks even if they are of an exceptional 
occurrence.  Each case must therefore retrospectively be considered on its merits with 
regard to the seriousness for the patient.   
 
A surgeon must also draw a patient's attention to any serious risks which could have 
mortal, aesthetic or disabling consequences having regard to the patient's 
psychological and social circumstances if such consequences would be of a nature 
such that they affect or influence the patient's consent.442 So where, for example, a 
defendant is informed only of paralysis in a patient consent form, when the risk is in 
fact paraplegia, then this would be an adminicle of evidence towards proof that the 
patient had not been adequately informed. 443  This is only an adminicle.  A 
standardised form, for example, would not in itself constitute consent especially 
where the document is not sufficiently clear and its terms are not understandable by 
the non-initiated.444 The patient must understand in a global sense and this will be 
established by further evidence.   
 
4.7.1 Obligation d’information: Case Law 
In a case from the Angers Court of appeal, where the plaintiff had been suffering 
from an ulcerative colitis, it was shown that a doctor had not informed his patient of 
a serious risk which eventuated relative to an intestinal perforation following a 
coloscopy for the removal of a polyp.445 The loss of a chance to refuse treatment can 
only be indemnified if it can be shown that, duly informed, the patient would 
probably not have gone ahead with the medical intervention and it is the juges du 
fond who assess this.446 Yet what criteria then should they use? This case held that 
judges should 
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...rechercher, en prenant en considération l'état de santé du patient ainsi que son 
évolution prévisible, sa personnalité, les raisons pour lesquelles des investigations ou 
des soins à risques lui sont proposés, ainsi que les caractéristiques de ces 
investigations, de ses soins et de ces risques, les effets qu'aurait pu avoir une telle 
information quant à consentement ou à son refus. 
 
This can be seen then as a causal guide for judges when establishing the logical 
possible world for any given patient.  Jourdain notes that it is a pity that the Cour de 
cassation did not refer to the “necessity” of the treatment as, if the treatment were not 
necessary, then a refusal would be less likely.447 Penneau notes that the test is one of 
reasonableness.448 What would have to be considered then is the attitude of a 
reasonable patient, or the abstract “bon patient”.  I would argue this is true to a 
certain extent but the Angers case did say the personality of the patient should be 
taken into account so there is a certain margin of appreciation: in short, the court 
must take the attitude that we do not have a death wish.  The test then is, I would 
argue, one of subjective probability within reasonable limits given that the court 
stated that no reparation can be granted where it is “…improbable qu'il eût refusé le 
traitement...”.  The case might well be different where a patient suffers simply from 
an irritation or a discomfort.  In such a case, a more in depth analysis would have to 
be made of the possible world and of the patient's likely reaction.  
  
In another case, an ablation of a nodule situated in the thyroid gland was followed by 
an exceptional complication.449 The precise reason for this was unknown but it lay in 
the lesion of a nerve.  The surgeon had committed no fault but the patient argued 
that the surgeon had not warned her of the risks of the operation.  The Court of 
Appeal rejected her argument on the basis that it was not shown that even if she had 
been informed she would have refused the operation.  In the expert's report it was 
confirmed that the operation was necessary even taking into account the risks.  The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
447 ibid 
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Cour de cassation, approving this decision, held that the patient had not shown the 
necessary prejudice and that this prejudice is “souverainement constatée par les juges 
du fond”. Jourdain criticises this judgement in that he notes that the control here by 
the Cour de cassation is somewhat “woolly” (lâche).450 He states that it must be quite 
difficult to prove as the prejudice consists not in the risks that have eventuated but in 
the chance to refuse the operation, ie the possibility to refuse.  This, however, 
contradicts what he writes in a previous article where he states that to recover for loss 
of chance, it is necessary that the patient show that he would have refused the 
operation if he had been correctly informed.451 It would seem to me that if recovery 
is sought for loss of chance then strictly speaking only the doctor's breach of the 
obligation d'information need be shown.  Yet in such cases, if inquiry is had to the 
possible world where the patient had been informed then it is a fiction to allow 
recovery for loss of chance so I would not necessarily agree with Jourdain on his 
criticism of this case.  Also in this case, the operation was indeed necessary. To hold 
that the patient is only seeking recovery for loss of chance, I think, may be pushing 
the boundaries of this concept too far and allowing the patient recovery where the 
logical possible world would deny it. If the possible world just has a “caractère 
illusoire” then I think Penneau put it best when he wrote “le dommage existe, dans 
son principe, mais il est nul quant à son contenu”.452  
 
There are a number of criteria that judges take into account including the health of 
the patient, his personality, the reasons and the risks inherent to the operation when 
assessing whether a patient would actually have refused an operation or not.453 Even 
with these criteria, causation will remain uncertain.  It is a protean concept that will 
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always be adaptable: and that is why, it is submitted, it is unsuitable for any kind of 
codification.       
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4.8 Burden of Proof 
Continental procedure in fact-finding differs most apparently form the common 
law in its inquisitorial approach.  The common law generally takes an adversarial 
approach but no system is purely adversarial or inquisitorial.454   Generally on the 
Continent, it is true to say that there is really no law of evidence as such.455  It may 
come as a surprise but hearsay is admitted, past convictions and even illegally 
obtained evidence.456  I would not go so far as to say there is no such thing as 
cross-examination but its use is certainly more limited than it is in the United 
Kingdom.  I do not comment on the pros and cons of each system in the round 
save for one recommendation I make at the end of this paper with regard to cross-
examination and scientific evidence. 
    
4.8.1 Causal Presumptions: Theory 
In general, in France there is as such no set standard of proof but rather the judge 
must have an intime conviction for the truth.457 So even though it might appear prima 
facie more difficult for a plaintiff to prove his case in a French court because the 
court is looking for a standard of proof that satisfies a judge’s intime conviction to near 
certainty,458 the use of judicial presumptions often eases the burden for the plaintiff in 
ways that are not mirrored in the common law.  French and Luxembourg law have 
resort to certain presumptions 459  which if established by the plaintiff make it 
extremely difficult for a defendant doctor, hospital or laboratory to defeat.  This in 
itself, as I shall show, can often make it easier for a plaintiff to recover in France or 
Luxembourg than would normally thought to be the case given the high standard of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
454 see generally F DAVIDSON, Evidence, p11 et seqq  
455 ibid ; there is certainly not, at the University of Luxembourg anyway, an undergraduate course 
called “Evidence” as I had as an undergraduate   
456 F DAVIDSON, Evidence, p11 et seqq 
457 This is nowhere stated in the French Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure. However, 
interestingly Art 304 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure requires each juror of the Assize 
Court to swear “to remember that the accused is presumed innocent and that he has the benefit of 
the doubt; to decide according to the charges and defence arguments following your conscience 
and your innermost conviction.” (my emphasis)  
458 See R WRIGHT, “Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability” in the Tort and Insurance Law 
Yearbook, European Tort Law 2008, (Vienna, Springer, 2008) 
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civil proof.  This is especially relevant in the areas of blood transfusions, hospital 
infections and the link between multiple sclerosis and the hepatitis B vaccine.  As 
Kinsch notes, even the “absence d’une autre cause apparent” can be a relevant 
factor.460  The plaintiff must, of course, bring enough evidence to establish these 
presumptions and such presumptions must be graves, précises and concordantes.461 This is 
relevant for causation in that if a prima facie case is made out then the tortfeasor's 
actions will be the origin of the damage and hence will have caused the damage in 
the legal sense.  These presumptions can almost be seen as a tactical or procedural 
burden.462  For example, it will be shown that if a plaintiff has contracted a disease 
that is typically contracted following a blood transfusion then depending on the 
temporal factors, the blood transfusion will often be seen to be the cause génératrice, that 
is, at the origin of the damage and therefore have legally caused the damage.  Only if 
the blood transfusion centre can actually prove that it was not at the centre of the 
damage (by say finding the blood donors and showing that they were not infected at 
the time of giving blood) that it will be able to absolve itself.  Again and again it must 
be remembered that these are only legal presumptions.  It does not mean that the 
blood actually and in reality caused the damage scientifically but courts are not 
always dealing with truth.  Judges must consider other factors of policy.  It will also 
be seen that policy in France that statute applies certain legal presumptions apply for 
a number of diseases.463  
 
The burden of proof under French law rests with the plaintiff and any defence must 
also be proved.464 The general principle in France is that the plaintiff must prove the 
causal link between the damage and the fault.465 If he does not, his case should be 
dismissed as a matter of course.  The plaintiff need only prove that the defendant's !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
460 P KINSCH, “Probabilité et certitude dans la prevue en justice” (2009) 2 Journal des tribunaux 
Luxembourg 37  
461 art 1353 French Civil Code  
462 see supra 
463 loi 2002-303 of 4 March 2002, art 102 for hepatitis C 
464 Art 9 French Code of Civil Procedure “Il incombe à chaque partie conformement à la loi les 
faits nécessaires au succès à sa pretention.” 
465 G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, Traité de droit civil, 362 “En l'absence de présomption légale, c'est 
le demandeur qui doit établir le lien de causalité entre le fait reproché au defendeur et le 
dommage.” 
! ! ! ! !! 133!
fault was one of a number of causes that can be imputed to the defendant not that it 
was the “real” cause. 466  However, this means in practice, of course, that the 
determination of cause is one for the courts and that in principle any doubt over 
causal relation should profit the defendant.467 This is, in any case, the basic principle.  
In France, it has succumbed to many an exception both at droit commun and at statute. 
 
Another way in which the French traditions differ to a considerable extent from 
the British and German traditions is the way in which causation is used to prove 
fault. Judicial presumptions were mentioned above but there are also certain 
causal presumptions which would not have any counterpart in the common law.  
There are perhaps less relevant for medical liability but they should be 
understood. The gardien of a chose is presumed responsible for any harm he 
causes.468 For example, the causal presumption will apply if my neighbour is the 
gardien of a frisbee that he throws to my injury.   The frisbee is at the origin of the 
damage.  My neighbour may be at fault here.  This will be decided after a proper 
consideration of the facts.    My neighbour could point to my walking through his 
garden as my contributory fault in order to reduce his responsibility. Now 
although the final decision of a Luxembourg and an English court may be similar, 
the processes of arriving at this decision stand in stark contrast to each other.   In 
France there would be a presumption of responsibility and thus causation.469 To 
cite Ravarani  here 
Certaines catégories de personnes sont soumises à une présomption de faute.  
Si la présomption de faute a tendance à disparaître en matière délictuelle, elle reste 
d’actualité en matière contractuelle. – Pour une seconde catégorie, il ne s’agit pas 
d’une présomption de faute qu’il serait possible de combattre par la preuve d’un 
comportement normalement diligent et prudent du présume fautif, partant par la 
preuve de l’absence de faute, mais d’une présomption de responsabilité, autrement 
dit de causalité.  Le comportement….est présumé être à l’origine du 
dommage.470  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
466 ibid and CC 1 31 May 1988, Bull n° 161 
467 ibid; Orléans, 5 Jan 1966, JCP 1966.II.17721 
468 art 1384 Luxembourg Civil Code  
469 G RAVARANI, La responsabilité civile, 900 
470 ibid, emphasis is the original author’s 
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What Ravarani says here then is that there is a presumption of responsibility in 
contract, or, what is important for the purposes of this paper, a presumption of 
causation.  The fault that is being considered is said to be the cause generatrice. This 
is an intriguing insight for a common lawyer. In the common law, it would be 
difficult to find such presumptions in causation other than those set out in statute. 
This shows then in France and Luxembourg how causation overlaps procedural 
law and how presumptions of fault, responsibility or causation are much more 
readily assumed by dint of the Civil Code.  Indeed, Wright even commented that 
this de iure shift of the burden of proof here “…effectively converts civil code 
provisions basing liability on fault into strict liability regimes.”471 
 
I do see his point and such a reaction from a common lawyer is understandable. 
There is, in effect, a strict liability for all those who are considered a gardien of choses 
and this does cover a large amount of tort law.   
 
4.8.2 Causal Presumptions and Inferences: Case Law  
The use of presumptions in French case law, I suggest, has often resulted in decisions 
in favour of the victim which would not necessarily have been followed in the United 
Kingdom or indeed in Germany.  The causes that shall be considered here include a 
case concerned with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, the hepatitis B472 vaccination and 
multiple sclerosis,473 hepatitis C,474 and HIV/AIDS.475  To begin, three cases that 
were decided on the same day are worthy of attention. 
 
The first case is concerned with the development of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.476 
Here it was held that where there was doubt about who supplied a defective growth !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
471 R WRIGHT, “Proving Facts: Belief versus Probability” in the Tort and Insurance Law-Yearbook, 
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472 an infectious disease affecting the liver 
473 a disease disrupting the flow of nervous cells to communicate 
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hormone then certain graves, précises and concordantes presumptions could be formed.  
In this case, the deceased had previously been asymptomatic. All patients who had 
been diagnosed with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease had been treated with a growth 
hormone emanating from France hypophyse.  The Institut Pasteur further treated 
the same growth hormone.477 With regard to the causal link, it was not sufficient to 
show the simple administration of a drug and the subsequent development of a 
pathology. Something more was required.  It was held that there it was essential to 
take all precautions that were necessary with regard to the extraction, purification 
and composition of the growth hormone and that 
les précautions recommandées n'avaient pas été suivies d'effet; qu'elle a pu en 
déduire l'existence d'un lien de causalité certain et direct entre les 
manquements à la prudence imputés à l'Institut Pasteur et le préjudice de 
contamination subi par Pascale Y...478  
 
So what can be seen here then is that if certain precautions have not been taken 
within a clinic then courts are willing to hold that a causal link exists, should a 
pathology later develop.  This would not necessarily be the case in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The second case handed down by the Cour de cassation on the same date was 
relative to the drug Isoméride used as a treatment for obesity.479  Ms Y was 
prescribed the drug and one year later developed primitive pulmonary arterial 
hypertension (HTAPP) necessitating bi-pulmonary transplant and heart surgery.  
This judgement was interpreted according to article 1147 of the French Civil Code480  
“in the light” of article 4 of the Product Directive 1985 where it is for the victim to 
prove the damage, the defect and the causal relationship resulting from a defective 
product.   On the one hand, the judgement momentarily seemed to favour the 
laboratories in that HTAPP had been mentioned as a potential side effect.  Such side 
effects were only “co-incidences” according to the epidemiological and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
477 as opposed to the Kabivitrum growth hormone 
478 my emphasis 
479 CC 1 24 January 2006, Bull  n° 35 
480 which inter alia provides that a debtor pay damages for the non-performance of an obligation 
provided it cannot be attributed to an external cause 
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pharmacological studies which could occur even in someone who was not taking the 
medication; so far so good for the laboratories. The Cour d'appel did not even 
approach the subject of whether Isoméride was a triggering factor (facteur déclenchant) 
and by taking an approach based on probabilities or possibilities, breached article 
1147 of the French Civil Code which provided that the victim must show a direct 
causal link between the taking of the drug and the infection of which she 
complained. 481  However, in the same studies it stated that dexfenfluramine, a 
component of Isoméride, was “un facteur favorisant HTAPP même si elle n'en était 
pas la cause exclusive”.  Not only this but also the fact that Ms X had a satisfactory 
state of health in 1993, the court report stated that Isoméride would have been a 
direct and partial cause in someone who had a predisposition to HTAPP and an 
adequate cause (cause adéquate) in the absence of any other explanation.  There was no 
other explanation and the Cour d'appel should have drawn graves, précises and 
concordantes presumptions from this report.   Further the fact that the medicine made 
no reference to a risk of HTAPP allowed the Cour de cassation to approve the Cour 
d'appel's finding that the product was defective.482 I again emphasise that there is a 
difference between scientific and legal causation.  A balance has been struck.   The 
judgement has a scientific basis (not perfect) and a legal one (other societal values 
taken into account).   Yet I wonder to what extent such a decision would have been 
similar in the United Kingdom given courts’ strict requirement that the plaintiff 
prove his case to 51% or more.  The fact that there could have been multiple agents 
causing the HTAPP here483 could further complicate matters in a British court.  
 
In the third case, again decided by virtue of article 1147 of the French Civil Code as 
interpreted “in the light” of the Product Directive 1985, concerned a Ms Y who was 
vaccinated against hepatitis B in September 1995.  She then developed Guillain-
Barré syndrome (a peripheral neuropathy).484 The Cour de cassation noted that the 
Cour d'appel had decided on the defective nature of the vaccine by the fact it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
481 “...et en s'en tenant ainsi à des possibilités ou probabilités de causalité, a violé le texte susvisé.” 
482 The characteristics of the product mentioned were “...seulement que des cas d'hypertension 
artérielle avaient été rapportés chez des patients généralement obèses sans qu'aucun lien de 
causalité n'ait été établi avec la prise d'Isoméride.” 
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mentioned as side effects “très rarement, des neuropathies périphériques.”  Steinlé-
Feurbach notes in her commentary that this case should allay the fears (at least 
momentarily) of drug producers.485  The judgement held that 
Qu'en déduisant le caractère défectueux du vaccin litigieux de ces seules 
constatations, la cour d'appel a violé les dispositions susvisées.  
 
So it is important to note then that if there is an omission of side effects on a patient 
information notice on a drug, this could render a product defective.  Causation could 
then be established on the basis of causal presumptions as described in the cases 
above. It would not be enough that the side effects are mere co-incidences.  The 
previous state of health of the victim is also an important factor to take into 
consideration.   
 
Without commenting on the procedural aspects of these three cases, what strikes me 
immediately is the Cour de cassation's concentration on expert reports, temporal 
considerations between drug administration and onset of disease, previous state of 
health of the victim and warnings, if any, that were given to patients as to the side-
effects of certain drugs.  It is interesting that even though the Cour de cassation does 
state that the causal link between the taking of the drug and the appearance of the 
disease must be “direct and certain”,486 the way of establishing directness and 
certainty are anything but that.  Directness and certainty are arrived at, for example, 
by considering whether there is enough evidence to establish prima facie 
presumptions which are graves, précises and concordantes putting a plaintiff at a 
significant procedural advantage. This is not because he has established causation 
with any scientific certainty: rather procedural manoeuvres are used to create this 
legal fiction. France is able to use procedure to allow for presumptions in establishing 
legal causation when scientific causation cannot be established with any great deal of 
certainty.  There is a clear separation of law and science in France when it comes to 
stating a causal link.  Indeed Radé is quite forthright in his views that ideas of 
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causation in defective products should be decided on in law and not in science.487 He 
notes that notions of law and science should work together where they can but in law 
there are other norms to be satisfied such as the legitimate expectation of the 
consumer and notions of vice and danger.488 
 
With regard to the uncertainty of the causal link between the hepatitis B vaccination 
and the development of multiple sclerosis, there are three judgements which would 
allow for the possibility of recovering against laboratories.  The important cases here 
are of 28 May 2008. 489  Even though courts had tried to favour victims who 
developed multiple sclerosis following their vaccination,490 the Cour de Cassation had 
quashed those decisions on 23 September 2003491 stating it was impossible to prove a 
causal link between vaccination and disease.  These three cases changed that.   
 
In the first case of that date492 the victim, MB, a health employee, developed multiple 
sclerosis shortly after receiving a vaccination against hepatitis B and was initially 
refused damages on the grounds that scientific proof of a causal link between the 
damage and the defective product was impossible to prove as no-one could know 
how the vaccination itself could provoke multiple sclerosis 
l'arrêt retient que la preuve scientifique absolue est impossible puisque l'étiologie de 
la sclérose en plaque n'est pas connue...  
 
The Cour de cassation held that statistical evidence could be used (even in the 
absence of scientific evidence) to show presumptions if they were sufficiently graves, 
précise et concordantes.  The Cour de cassation quashed the decision of the Cour d'appel 
as they had not given a legal basis to their decision.  The Cour de cassation 
interpreted this decision in the light of articles 1382, 1383 and the Product Directive.   
The Cour de cassation in particular criticised the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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approche probabiliste [of the Cour d’appel] déduite exclusivement de l'absence de 
lien scientifique et statistique entre vaccination et développement de la maladie, sans 
rechercher si les éléments de preuve qui lui étaient soumis constituaient ou non, des 
préseumptions graves, précises et concordonates.  
 
In a second case, it was held that a laboratory was not liable for putting a vaccination 
against hepatitis B on the market without having mentioned at all any reference to 
multiple sclerosis.493 There was no epidemiological research showing any causal 
relationship between the vaccination and multiple sclerosis.  The Cour de cassation 
referred to the Vidal dictionary 1994494 which stated that multiple sclerosis could be 
an exceptional side-effect of the vaccination and consequently the Cour d'appel did 
not properly appreciate the causal relation between the vaccination and multiple 
sclerosis.495 
 
In the third case,496 it was found that if there were again certain facts that allowed for 
presumptions to be found that were sufficiently graves, précises and concordantes then 
such presumptions could form a proof overcoming in the strict sense the need for 
causation.  In this case, facts that were considered were the victim's previous state of 
good health and the victim’s contracting multiple sclerosis only some months after 
the vaccination.   
 
The Cour de cassation was probably encouraged to take such positions on causation 
in 2008 by the decision of the Conseil d'Etat in 2007 where it was held that a nurse 
who developed multiple sclerosis following an obligatory vaccination could obtain 
damages notwithstanding the fact that there was no scientific causal link.497 It held 
inter alia that 
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495 again reference was made to articles 1382 Civil Code and the Product Directive 
496 CC 1 22 May 2008, Bull n° 149 
497 CE 9 March 2007 D 2007, p2004, note L NEYRET 
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dès lors que les rapports d'expertise s'ils ne l'ont pas affirmé n'ont pas exclu l'existence 
d'un tel lien de causalité, l'imputabilité au service de la SEP498 de Mme A doit être 
regardée comme établie [due to certain factors such as the] bref délai ayant separé 
l'injection de l’apparition du premier symptôme cliniquement constaté de la SEP 
[and] bonne santé de l'intéressé et absence chez elle de tous antécédents de cette 
pathologie. 
 
The Cour de cassation was probably also aware of the right of resort to the national 
solidarity fund further to article L 3111-9 CSP which fully compensates those who 
have suffered prejudice from a compulsory vaccination.  This was brought in by the 
law of 17 December 2008.499 
 
Medical studies do not support at the time of writing a causal link between the 
administration of the hepatitis B vaccine and the onset of multiple sclerosis.500  
Recent case law seems to follow the patterns set down by the cases above whereby 
even though there might not be scientific proof on the causal link between the 
hepatitis B injection and multiple sclerosis, courts will consider facts before them on a 
case by case basis taking into account the time between the injection and its onset,501 
family history, ethnic origin,502and the number of injections taken by the patient.   
Co-incidence or correlation is not scientific causation. If it were shown scientifically 
that the vaccine did not cause multiple sclerosis, then, of course, the courts would 
have to respond to this.  For the moment, however, courts have taken this policy 
decision to decide in a plaintiff-friendly way.  I do not believe such would be the 
approach of British or German courts.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
498 sclérose en plaques, multiple sclerosis  
499 loi 2008-1330 
500 see the Australian National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance Factsheet at 
http://www.ncirs.edu.au/immunisation/fact-sheets/hepb-vaccine-ms-fact-sheet.pdf ; It states the 
following answer: “Does hepatitis B vaccine cause multiple sclerosis? No, the weight of all the 
currently available scientific evidence shows no association between hepatitis B vaccine and 
multiple sclerosis.”  However, D Le HOUEZEC has suggested in an article in 2015 that the 
correlation between hepatitis B vaccine and multiple sclerosis may indeed be causal.  He suggests 
further studies; see D Le HOUEZEC, “Evolution of Multiple Sclerosis in France since the 
beginning of the Hepatitis B Vaccination”, (2015) 60 Immunologic Research 219.   
501 see in particular CC 10 July 2013, Bull n° 157 which stated that a delay of 6 years should have 
been enough to “exclure tout lien entre le vaccin et cette pathologie”.  
502 Ibid, where epidemiological evidence was brought to show that the frequency of those suffering 
from multiple sclerosis in Senegal was lower than that in Western Europe 
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4.8.3 Conclusion  
In these French cases about multiple sclerosis, scientific causation is actually replaced 
by presumptions.  Neither the Conseil d'Etat nor the Cour de cassation is hiding the 
fact.  What is interesting about this is how these presumptions are formed. The courts 
find that multiple sclerosis may have been brought about in certain cases by a victim's 
personal disposition or, indeed, even due to an exceptional side effect. This allows us 
to cross the bridge of causation and hold that, legally in any case, a causal link 
between the vaccination and multiple sclerosis exists.  There is legally a causal link 
between the hepatitis B vaccination and multiple sclerosis if certain presumptions are 
established and the laboratories in question are unable rebut these presumptions.  
This is not necessarily how causation might be thought of by the man in the street.  
France has clearly made certain policy decisions in this regard.  It shows also how 
divided opinion is on causation.  Scientific causation is different from legal causation.   
While I would not go as far as Mislawski, however, where he states 
A quoi sert, dans certains cas, la vérité factuelle si elle ne satisfait pas le sens de la 
justice, voire si elle y fait obstacle.503  
 
,there does indeed appear to have been a rejection of scientific acribia to prove legal 
truth in France. This certainly in the opinion of Radé and it appears to be true.504 
Judges must be concerned with the search of presumptions that are graves, précises and 
concordantes.  Radé is particularly critical of courts insisting that they use their own 
“logique” when setting out “notions” of causation and that the right to do this 
belongs to the courts and not experts whomsoever.  He does not deny mutual-
reliance. 505  The absence of scientific certainty or near-certainty then does not 
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503 R MISLAWSKI “Vaccin contre l'hepatite B et sclérose en plaques: retour sur la causalité”, 
(2010) Médecin et droit 105-109 at 108 
504 C RADE “Vaccination anti-hépatite B et sclérose en plaques: le tournant” (July-August 2008) 
Responsabilité civile et assurance 8 at 9  
505 at p10; unfortunately he then goes on to compare the notion of products with defects with 
consumer products when he says “C'est également pour cette même raison que la notion de 
produit défectueux fait plus référence aux attentes légitimes du comsommateur qu'à la notion de 
vice ou de danger, et que des données subjectives peuvent parfaitement prendre l'ascendant sur des 
considérations purement objectives.”; while recognising that cases are brought under the  Product 
Directive, I am uncertain that such language should be used for defective medical products.  When 
I buy a consumer good, for example, a washing machine, I know what its purpose is; when I buy a 
medicine, is it fair to say my subjective expectation should trump what the drug can actually do? I 
suggest not.  
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constitute in itself an obstacle to the establishment of such presumptions.506 Courts 
will assess the plaintiff’s whole background asking questions like: was the person at 
risk? What was his lifestyle?   
 
In any case, the point to all of this case law is that it is here where I find there would 
be a significant difference from a functionalist point of view with the United 
Kingdom.  Not to have any scientific evidence and to rely only on the evidence I set 
out above in showing causal connections, I think would be unwise for a plaintiff in a 
British court.  There must be at least some kind of expert report that shows a causal 
link scientifically unless there is some kind of exceptional circumstantial evidence.  
Currently there is no such scientific report.  I submit such French decisions underline 
how differently the two jurisdictions treat causation.   
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506 CC 1 24 Jan 2006, Bull n° 35 
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4.9 Experts and their Reports 
A judge in France may order one or several expert reports in his search for the 
truth.507 The expertise, as the report is known, is there to evaluate the evidence that has 
been brought by the party that seeks reparation.508 In his report, the expert must only 
respond to questions that have been put to him by the court.  On any other aspect, 
he must keep maintain a silence.509 Courts in France, unlike the procedure in the 
United Kingdom, will tend to rely on a court-ordered report.  Vayre, Palquelle and 
Fabre in their article on reports suggested that “seul l'expert peut se prononcer sur 
l'imputabilité pour que le juge constate le lien de causalité.”510   
 
I am not entirely sure this is accurate.  The imputabilité is not really for the expert to 
decide.  This is essentially a legal question.  An expert's report should simply aver on 
causal likelihood and this should be reflected in words that import notions of 
probability via certain presumptions.511 All that need happen in some cases is that 
certain facts be established.512 I tend to prefer the attitude of Penneau who states that 
as far as experts are concerned 
On mélange autrement le fait et le droit.  Il faut entendre que sur le terrain 
particulier du fait technique, où il est en règle générale radicalement incompétent, la 
compétence de l'expert s'impose au juge.  Mais sur le terrain du droit, la compétence 
du juge reprend toute sa plénitude, et le rapport d'expertise ne devient qu'un élément 
particulier de l'ensemble sur lequel le juge fondera sa décision.513  
 
This would lead one to believe then that there are other considerations which must 
clearly be put into the scales before arriving at any decision.  These may well be 
social, economic and risk-based considerations to be taken into account.   We have !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
507 Art 263 et seqq, French Code of Civil Procedure 
508 G VOGEL and E RUDLOFF, Lexique de droit medical et hospitalier (Luxembourg, Promoculture, 
2009), 377 
509 ibid, 380 
510  P VAYRE, D PLANQUELLE and H FABRE, “Le lien de causalité en matière de 
responsabilité médicale”, (2005) Médecine et Droit 72 at 78  
511 ibid, at 79 
512 For example, that the plaintiff contracted a disease 30 days after having been discharged from 
hospital 
513 J PENNEAU, Faute et erreur, 99 
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seen already that France is willing to do this.  In the event that there is a difference of 
opinion on causation in experts' opinions then in France it would appear that the 
court can decide on which to prefer.514  
 
There are, however, certain criteria that ought to be commented on in any expert 
report to allow a judge to establish causation.  The Vayre, Planquelle and Fabre 
article does state these and there would not appear to be anything controversial in 
them.515 First of all, a description of the damage is required.  Second, the scientific 
aetiological probability must be commented on.  It might also be interesting for a 
judge to note the delay between the medical intervention and the taking of a drug (for 
example) and the appearance of the symptom or damage-causing illness. Patients' 
pre-disposition to a particular illness may also be noted.  If the expert believes that 
there is partial medical causation then Vayre, Planquelle and Fabre say that the 
expert ought then to ask himself three questions, viz 
(I)quelle aurait été l'volution du traumatisme sans l'état antérieur ou sans les 
prédispositions?; 
(II)quelle aurait été l'évolution de l'état antérieur ou des prédispositions sans le 
traumatisme?; 
(III)quelle a été l'évolution du complexe “état antérieur-accident”? 
 
They then go on to state that after having answered such questions that an expert 
should be able to state that causation played a rôle déclanchant, accélérant or aggravant.  
Unfortunately, I do not believe the answering of such causal questions is that simple.  
Strictly, had the Fairchild scenario followed recommendations in the drafting of 
experts’ reports, how could the experts possibly have determined that on the basis of 
time working at one of the negligent employers, one of these adjectives is suitable? 
Science worked on the basis that it was simply one “guilty” fibre that entered the 
lungs to cause mesothelioma. There would be uncertainty in legal causation.  It is 
submitted here that France may have resort to the theory of the création fautive d'un 
risque or increase of risk.516 Theories of equivalence and adequacy must also be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
514 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p64; J PENNEAU, Faute et erreur 54-55 
515  P VAYRE, D PLANQUELLE and H FABRE, “Le lien de causalité en matière de 
responsabilité médicale”, (2005) Médecine et Droit 78 at 79; they give suggestions as to what the 
expert should write on his report according to his findings.  
516 CC 1 5 Feb 1991, D 1991.som 358, note anon 
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reported.  A medical expert should preferably also have some knowledge of legal 
causation.  In one case a victim was left with disabilities resulting from a road 
accident in 1971.517  There was then a fire ten years later in 1981 and he died from 
burns as he could not run from his bed to escape the fire.  His death was held not to 
have been caused by the first road accident, ie there was no imputation and the 
causation was indirect.  This is an example of how time-lapse is important in 
answering such questions. Two further examples are given in the Vayre, Planquelle 
and Fabre article but I shall cite one only. 
 
Example 1 
A patient commits suicide after he has been told that one of his legs will have to be 
amputated four years after a motorcycle accident which caused a complicated 
fracture.   This fracture became infected and there were numerous negligent 
treatments which were incapable of eradicating the infection.518  
 
The authors say here that the wrongdoers should be liable in solidum and that the 
tortfeasor would have a right of recourse against the negligent medical practitioners 
in as much as they had aggravated the damage.519 It would appear prima facie that 
what is being said (although the authors do not explicitly state it) is that both the 
driver and the doctors legally caused the suicide.  The patient's family would have a 
right of recourse against the doctors.  So where the man's life is valued at (say) EUR 
100,000, the victim's family can claim all against the driver. The court would be 
saying to the victim's family that the driver caused the death of the man fully.  He 
was fully responsible.  Yet on the other hand, by providing this right of recourse, it 
may turn out that the driver only caused say 20% of the suicide.  So by this 
procedural manoeuvre, the court is saying two different things at once.  Yet it must 
surely be a paradox with which we can live.  It is right that the victim’s family should 
not have to go to the trouble of dealing with multiple tortfeasors and the risk must lie 
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517 CC 8 Feb 21989, JCP 90-21544 
518  P VAYRE, D PLANQUELLE and H FABRE, “Le lien de causalité en matière de 
responsabilité médicale”, (2005) Médecine et Droit 72 at 83 
519 ibid 
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with the joint tortfeasors.520 It is perhaps inconsistent to say that the driver caused the 
patient's suicide legally but then provide a right of recourse: but this is a policy 
decision and is the essence of joint and several liability with which courts deal on a 
daily basis.   
 
From my own experience in preparing for medical negligence cases for trial, such 
reports are typical in the sense that independent consultants when presented with a 
file do not often wish (or they cannot) to state anything definitively.  It is often 
impossible for them to comment categorically on causation.  This does, however, 
leave the plaintiff with a problem. The seriousness of the fault in itself does not justify 
a reversal of the burden of proof.521 However, as we have seen, France has been 
ready to allow either a reversal of the burden of proof or causal presumptions in 
many cases.  Also in France there is recourse to the “loss of chance” doctrine even if 
this loss can be difficult to quantify.522 
 
In France then, it is the report that can contribute to whether certain presumptions 
have been established provided they are sufficiently graves, précis and concordantes 
further to article 1353 of the Civil Code.  The expert's report is of the essence in such 
cases and it is essential that it be written in clear language to enable a decision-maker 
to decide in an informed way.   Experts should try to use percentages as much as 
possible and avoid language like “probable” or “possible” or “likely” as that leaves 
the judge with an unenviable task at best or too much discretion at worst.   I shall 
consider reports further in the final chapter and it is the only area under 
consideration in this paper where I shall make a recommendation.  
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520 indeed the French draft of the Civil Code states at article 1378 that “Tous les responsables d’un 
meme dommage sont tenus solidairement à reparation.  Si tous les co-auteurs ont vu leur 
responabilité retenue pour faute prouvée, leur contribution se fait en proportion à la gravité de 
leurs fautes respectives…”  
521 S GALAND-CARVAL, Cases on Medical Malpractice, p115 
522 CC 1 8 July 1997, JCP II 1997, 22921, rapport P SARGOS 
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4.10 Conclusion  
France then has a number of headings in medical causation which should interest the 
comparative tort scholar.  In general, France is a victim-friendly jurisdiction.  The 
case law shows this.  What stands out immediately in any comparison with the 
United Kingdom and Germany is the use made France of presumptions and 
sanctioning recovery for loss of chance.  France also allows reparation for medical 
accidents or hazards, in a way that has no counterpart in either the United Kingdom 
or Germany. In these jurisdictions, a patient must assume the as yet unknown risks of 
an operation assuming he has been made aware of the disclosable ones. France’s 
obligation de securité exists along side a hospital’s other obligations. This helps a plaintiff 
who wants to recover for a nosocomial infection.  This does not exist in the United 
Kingdom though it does in Germany.  I am particularly interested in these solutions 
for the purposes of this paper as that given it is often suggested that causation’s 
answers should lie in “common sense”  - I suggest there is none.  From the universal 
functionalist approach, solutions are not the same and this creates problems for those 
who wish to codify or deduce common principles from case law. I think this in itself 
advances my proposition that there can be no common idea of causation in medical 
liability (and I do not think the man on the Clapham omnibus is so different in his 
outlook from the man on the Paris metro).   I shall keep a fuller consideration of this 
for the final comparative chapter.  
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Chapter 5: Causation in Germany  
5.1 Introduction 
Many of the problems encountered in the area of medical causation in Germany 
are similar to those found in the other jurisdictions.  As in France where the 
analysis is nominally contractual, so too in Germany; and, as in France also, many 
notions of tort law have been retained in the German approach.  The essence is 
that the patient must prove that the treatment caused his damage and not that it 
came about adventitiously. The German system remains fundamentally fault-
based. The Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechte von Patientinnen und Patienten 2013 (the 
“Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013”) in some way codifies the 
contract that is entered into between the doctor and patient.   
 
Germany makes use of procedural devices that can effect causation.  For example, 
the burden of proof is reversed completely when a doctor has been “grossly 
negligent” or where he has breached an obligation of which he is expected to have 
“full mastery”.  What exactly is meant by these concepts shall be considered 
herein.  As ever, I have found that the delineation between substantive and 
procedural law is often blurred. On procedure, I think it is germane to note that 
one of the most striking differences between the United Kingdom and Germany is 
that the burden of proof in Germany in civil cases is prima facie much higher than 
in the United Kingdom. Although §286 of the Zivilprozessordnung (“ZPO”), the 
German Code of Civil Procedure, states that the court should freely interpret the 
evidence, case law has held that the court must be “overwhelmingly convinced” of 
its facts (Überzeugung des Richters).523 Perhaps this might be expected because of the 
inquisitorial approach that Germany adopts in contrast to the adversarial 
approach of the United Kingdom.524 This also would lead to, at least in theory, 
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523  §286 Z PO  “(1) Das Gericht hat unter Berücksichtigung des gesamten Inhalts der 
Verhandlungen und des Ergebnisses einer etwaigen Beweisaufnahme nach freier Überzeugung zu 
entscheiden, ob eine tatsächliche Behauptung für wahr oder für nicht wahr zu erachten sei. In dem 
Urteil sind die Gründe anzugeben, die für die richterliche Überzeugung leitend gewesen sind”; see 
BGH, 17 February 1970, BGHZ 53, 245 (256) also quoted in M STAUCH, The Law of Medical 
Negligence, p65 
524 ibid, M STAUCH 
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more cases' being not proven in Germany than in the United Kingdom.525 Yet I 
would add a word of caution here.  This standard of proof is not fixed in stone.  A 
canny lawyer will look to a stratagem involving either the lessening to total 
reversal of the burden of proof.  Such tactics are not insignificant for a plaintiff 
and I suggest it will often play a pivotal rôle in medical cases where causation is 
the only or one of the issues at stake.   Anscheinbeweis or prima facie proof, for 
example, is one way in which a lawyer may attempt to have the burden of proof 
placed temporarily on the defendant requiring the defendant to explain 
conditions that would not normally occur in the absence of negligence.  This shall 
be considered further herein together with the abundant case law relative thereto. 
 
I shall consider the essence of German causation from a medical perspective.  This 
will include theory, case law and procedure.  First, I shall outline a brief 
introduction to the German theory of torts.  
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525 ibid, though Stauch does not appear to have any data for this 
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5.2 Introduction to German Tort Law  
It has been said that German tort law is a kind of halfway between French tort law 
and English tort law in that the French system of general rules and the English system 
of specific rules can be found in §§823 I, 823 II and 826 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(“BGB”), the German Civil Code.526 I think this description is reasonably accurate 
and a certain “ticking of boxes” is required at each stage of German tort law before 
moving to the next box.  There are five requirements for liability.  These are (a) 
breach of a normative rule (Tatbestandwidrigkeit); (b) unlawfulness (Rechtswidrigkeit); (c) 
fault (Verschulden); (d) causation (Kausalität); and (e) damage (Schaden).527 
 
Without entering into any of these more than is necessary, German tort law shows 
that it is not possible to bring a claim based solely on negligence.  It is necessary to 
show a breach of one of the norms (Tatbestand) set out in the BGB.528  This is clearly 
different from the French Civil Code’s article 1382 which sets out simply that any 
damage caused to another requires the one who caused it to make it good.  If there 
has been a breach of one of the norms, then there is prima facie unlawfulness 
(Rechtswidrigkeit).  As in English law, this can be justified by a defence such as self-
defence.529 
 
German law provides a definition of negligence (Fahrlässigkeit) but has left it to the 
courts to the courts to define intention.  §276 II BGB states that negligent conduct is 
such conduct that does not live up to what society would expect.  Negligence cannot 
be established if it would have been impossible to recognise and avert the risk.530 A 
court will pay no account of any lack of knowledge, ability, tiredness or dejection that 
could be imputed to the defendant when coming to its decision.531 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
526 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p79 
527 ibid 
528 ibid; §823 I relates to the protection of rights relating to life, body, freedom and property; §823 
II relates to the violation of statutory rules and §826 relates to intentional unethical conduct.  §253 
II now allows for recovery for non-pecuniary loss in contract cases following the 2002 reform. 
Non-pecuniary loss can now be recovered in medical negligence cases.  
529 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p80 
530 ibid, p232 
531 ibid 
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Sections 249-254 BGB establish general rules for the payment of damages 
regardless of the legal foundation and sections 842-845 BGB contain provisions 
specifically applicable to tort law.   
 
With regard to damages, §249 BGB provides for restitution in kind or 
Naturalrestitution as a first principle; if this is not possible, §249 II provides for 
restitution in money where damage has been recognised.  In principle there is no 
recovery for non-pecuniary loss532 unless statute so provides save for loss relating 
to a breach of the plaintiff’s bodily integrity, freedom, health or sexual 
determination. 533   The reform of 2002 now means that damages for non-
pecuniary loss can be claimed for breach of contract in medical negligence 
cases.534  Although the relationship between patient and doctor is strictly in 
contract, most of the notions of causation, as in France, have been imported from 
delict.  It is these I shall consider presently.     
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532 They read “Section 249  : Nature and extent of damages: (1) A person who is liable in 
damages must restore the position that would exist if the circumstance obliging him to pay 
damages had not occurred.(2) Where damages are payable for injury to a person or damage to a 
thing, the obligee may demand the required monetary amount in lieu of restoration. When a thing 
is damaged, the monetary amount required under sentence 1 only includes value-added tax if and 
to the extent that it is actually incurred.” 
The German Justice Ministry has helpfully translated the provisions of the BGB (among other 
pieces of legislation) into English; see http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p0745  
533 §253 I BGB 
534 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p356 
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5.3 Causal Theories in German Law 
In German law, there is an analysis similar to that in the United Kingdom: factual 
causation and then legal causation.  Both of these are based on theories that I have 
already explained.  Separately (and what would probably be considered as legal 
causation in the United Kingdom) there are policy tests to be considered if these do 
not provide a satisfying result.  I shall consider each in turn. Traditionally causation is 
determined by virtue of the hinwegdenken approach.  This means literally “to think 
away”.  To cite fully Hart and Honoré's translation of Glaser 
If one attempts wholly to eliminate in thought the alleged author (of the act) from the 
sum of the events in question and it then appears that nevertheless the sequence of 
intermediate causes remains the same, it is clear that the act and its consequences 
cannot be referred to him...but if it appears that, once the person in question is 
eliminated in thought from the scene, the consequences cannot come about, or that 
they can come about only in a completely different way, then one is fully justified in 
attributing the consequences to him and explaining it as the effect of his activity.535 
 
I shall consider first factual causation in German law.   
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535 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p443, where they cite Glaser’s Abhandlungen 
aus dem österreichen Strafrechte I, 298; see supra for the original German 
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5.4 Factual Causation 
As has been noted, the first test that German courts purport to apply in cases where 
causation is an issue is that of ascertaining whether, through their performing the 
exercise of hinwegdenken, the result or conclusion of the defendant's act will remain the 
same.  After this exercise has been performed, there is a further dichotomy to be 
made in the area of factual causation itself; this is between haftungsberündende Kausalität 
and haftungsausfüllende Kausalität.  The former “geht es um die Ursächlichkeit der 
schädigenden Handlung für die Rechtsgutverletzung” while the latter “betrifft den 
Kausalzusammenhang zwischen der Rechtsgutverletzung und dem eingetretenen 
Schaden.”536 Klunzinger gives the example of a punch (Faustschlag) causing a broken 
nose.537  Here we can see the haftungsbegründende Kausalität or, as Stauch calls it, 
“liability-grounding causation”.538 This cardinal inceptive test establishes the link 
from the act to the breach of the protected right under §823 BGB.  The protected 
right in this case would be the §823 I BGB right to bodily integrity and its breach 
would be the punch itself.  From there, the link must be made to other damage 
resulting therefrom, for example, medical costs and loss of earnings.  Klunzinger says 
such a causal link can be made by way of haftungsausfüllende Kausalität or “liability-
completing causation” as Stauch calls it.539 More or less the same definition is found 
with Larenz and Canaris who note that there must be a particular causal link 
between a given act and the result.  For example, 
...einer Handlung des Ersatzpflichtigen under der Verletzung des Körpers oder der 
Beschädigung einer Sache des Verletzten.  Dieser, zum Tatbestand die Haftpflicht 
begründenden Norm gehörendelenden ist der “haftungbegründende”.540 
 
With haftungsausfüllende causation, it is necessary theoretically to look further along the 
causal chain.  I think it is analogous to ideas of remoteness of damage in the common 
law.  As Lorenz by contrast, further notes, for haftungsausfüllende causation to be 
established it is necessary to find the causal nexus between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
536 E KLUNZINGER, Einführung in das Bürgerliche Recht, (Munich, Vahlen, 2007) p232 
537 ibid 
538 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p50 
539  E KLUNZINGER, Einführung in das Bürgerliche Recht, (Munich, Vahlen, 2007) p232; M 
STAUCH, ibid 
540 K LARENZ and CW CANARIS, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts (Munich, CH Beck, 1994), p432 
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...der Verletzung des Körpers oder der Beschädigung der Sache und den daraus 
weiter enstehenden Schadensfolgen...541 
 
Magnus has written that the difference between haftungsbegründende and 
haftungsausfüllende Kausalität is not a far-reaching one and does not concern the basic 
notion of causation.542 Stauch too shies away from overly insisting on the doctrine.543 
I have also found this division to be merely of theoretical or philosophical interest. It 
has not fallen into desuetude as cases today refer to it still. Yet as Stauch has noted 
with regard to treatment malpractice, the distinction is important for purposes of 
proof and therefore procedure.  Once haftungsbegründende Kausalität has been 
established to “effective certainty”, 544  haftungsausfüllende Kausalität need only be 
established to the lower standard of proof of §287 ZPO, more or less the balance of 
probabilities.  
 
This procedural separation was confirmed in a recent case.545  This makes explicit 
reference to “Primärschaden...im Sinne haftungsbegründender Kausalität...”.  In this 
case, a doctor omitted to immobilise a finger further to an X-Ray he took on 14 
October 2002 following the patient's hitting his finger with a hammer the previous 
day.  The court held that 
Welche weiteren Schäden sich hieraus entwickelt haben, ist eine Frage der 
haftungsausfüllenden Kausalität. 
 
And this secondary harm can only be taken into account “wenn [der] eine typische 
Folge der primärverletzung ist.”  This would then be a question for experts to 
comment on. 
 
So as can be seen, Germany uses the conditio sine qua non test in theory at the first 
step but then it is broken down into two sub-tests: that of haftungsbegründende and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
541 ibid 
542 U MAGNUS, “Causation in German Tort Law”, in J SPEIR (ed), Unification of Tort Law: 
Causation, (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000), p64 at p65  
543 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p51 
544 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p312 
545 BGH NJW 2008, 1382 
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haftungsausfüllende Kausalität.  Neither of the other jurisdictions in question has this 
theoretic division. It is also unknown to the European projects and the ECJ when 
considering causation.  So there is a conceptual difference here.  This does not 
necessarily mean there is a difference in outcome but it might play a role in any 
difference.  What shall be considered next is how Germany deals with the question of 
legal causation.   
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5.5 Legal Causation 
Similar to the United Kingdom which recognises the distinction between factual and 
legal causation, and similar to France which uses (in principle) adequacy theory, 
Germany has also adopted the notion whereby the damage must have been caused in 
a legal sense.546  As Medicus and Lorenz point out 
die Theorie der äquivalenten Verursachung können zu einer unerträglich weiten 
Schadenszurechnung führen.547 
 
One of the problems with relying solely on the equivalence theory is that it would 
lead to an almost infinite number of causes making the identification of a relevant 
cause impossible.  This is why then it must be checked to a certain extent by 
adequacy theory.   
 
The adequacy theory, as has been discussed above, holds that causation exists 
wenn das Ereignis im allegemein und nicht nur unter besonders eignenartigen, 
unwahrscheinlichen und nach dem gewöhnlichen Verlauf der dinge ausser Bertracht 
zu lassenden Umständen geeignet ist, einen Erfolg dieser Art herbeizuführen.548 
 
Interestingly in this case adequacy was referred to as the “Filter der Adäquanz”. 
These calculations of probability and chance eventually led to the notion of the 
“optimal observer” or “optimal Beobachter”.549  There has been some dispute as to 
whether the rule of the optimal observer should actually be used. Markesinis and 
Unberath, quoting Lorenz, question how much knowledge should be imputed to this 
optimal observer.  They note the case of a plaintiff who is slightly injured by the 
defendant but who dies as a result of a heart condition from which he is already 
suffering.  I quote 
For the “optimal observer” described by the Bundesgerichthof, almost nothing is 
secret; he is practically omniscient.  For the omniscient, the actual course of events is 
always foreseeable, however abnormal it may have been.  If one takes the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
546 B MARKESINIS and H UNBERATH, The German Law of Torts: a Comparative Treatise (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2002), p106 
547 HC MEDICUS and S LORENZ, Schuldrecht I, (Munich, Beck, 2008) 637 
548 BGH NJW 1995, 126 (127); BGHZ 7 198 (204) 
549 HC MEDICUS and S LORENZ, Schuldrecht I, 638 
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Bundesgerichthof's standard of the optimal observer seriously, then the criterion of 
adequacy loses most of its ability to limit the area of responsibility of the person 
liable.550 
 
As Stauch would appear justifiably to report, adequacy theory would never seem to 
exclude liability in its own right.551 It would indeed seem that the optimal observer 
test will always be satisfied given such an observer's omniscience.  This test has been 
much criticised.552  
 
The adequacy theory is indeed a value judgement. Yet ideas of frequency and 
probability are still referred to in case law.  Arguably therefore, the idea of the 
omniscient observer is quite unrealistic and impractical. A defendant would always 
be held liable.  I would tend to agree with those writers referred to above who state 
that there would ultimately be no limitation on liability.  German case law has also 
recognised this in that  
One must not forget the starting point of the inquiry: namely the search for a 
corrective that restricts the scope of the purely logical consequences, in order to 
produce an equitable result to the imputable consequences….it is a question here not 
really of causation but of the fixing of the limits within which the originator of a 
condition can equitably be presumed liable for its consequences, and therefore of 
establishing in reality a positive condition of liability.553 
 
This is quite a frank and honest comment on theory.  The court is even shying away 
from causation to equity, and, ultimately, policy – another corrective on causation.  It 
falls now to consider some of the cases in medical negligence which have dealt with 
adequacy theory.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
550 B MARKESINIS and H UNBERATH, The German Law of Torts: a Comparative Treatise (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2002), p108; see also K LARENZ, Lehrbuch des Schuldrecht, 354 et seqq translated 
by A von MEHREN in A VON MEHREN and J GORDLEY, The Civil Law System (2nd ed, 
Boston, Brown and Co, 1977), p585 where Larenz speaks that it is only accidents where a 
defendant will not be responsible: “The burden of such wholly unusual consequences ought not to 
fall on the defendant but ought to be borne by the person on whom they fall as accidental losses.” 
551 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p55 
552 U MAGNUS, Unification of Tort Law, p65 
553 BGHZ 3, 261 
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5.5.1 Case Law 
One case where there is a detailed consideration of the adequacy theory dates from 
1953.554  In this case, orphan plaintiffs sought damages from a doctor for injury they 
suffered from their mother's death as a consequence of an abortion that the 
defendant doctor had carried out.  The doctor misunderstood the structure of the 
womb and left afterbirth inside the womb.  Following the doctor's departure from the 
home, the mother complained of severe abdominal pains.  The doctor came back to 
the mother's house one hour later but her condition had worsened.  A gynaecologist 
was called who arranged for immediate transfer to hospital.  He noticed a large tear 
in the womb and also that the artery had been severed.  The plaintiffs sought 
damages in contract and delict for medical expenses together with an annuity 
payment and a declaration that they had a right to all further damage.   
 
It was held by the court of appeal that the defendant doctor had caused the death of 
the mother but that he was not at fault as such in causing the injury.  The reason for 
this was that it was shown that even the most conscientious and experienced medical 
man could have inflicted these injuries.  Such an injury could have but need not have 
come about from the incorrect use of instruments. 
 
The court of appeal, however, found that the doctor was at fault in neglectful 
conduct after the operation.  He should have sent the patient to a hospital and his 
not doing so, according to the experts, was “unintelligible”.555  However, no liability 
was inferred as causation had been denied. It held that death might have occurred 
even if the mother had gone to hospital immediately and that it could not 
mit einer an Sicherheit grenzenden Wahrscheinlichkeit feststellen, dass der Bekl 
durch pflichtgemasses Verhalten gleich nach dem Eingriff oder gar noch auf Grund 
der ihm von Sp überbrachten Nachricht, dass sich bei der Patientin Schmerzen 
bemerkbar machten, das Leben der Frau S erhalten hätte. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
554 BGH NJW 1953, 700 
555 “unverständlich” 
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The BGH then criticised the court of appeal for an errant application of §287 
ZPO.556  The BGH said that the court of appeal would not have been prevented 
from finding an adequate causal connection even if there was a reasonable doubt 
that the damage could have occurred without the defendant's fault. 557  The 
question the court of appeal ought to have asked itself, as far as adequate 
causation was concerned was  
ob diese Unterlassung im allgemeinen und nicht nur unter besonders 
eigenartigen, ganz unwahrscheinlichen und nach dem regelmässigen Verlauf der 
Dinge ausser Betracht zu lassenden Umständen zur Herbeiführung eines Erfolges 
geeignet war.  
 
Such a result, that is death, was to be contemplated in the ordinary course of 
things.558  The BGH underlined this point in its judgement when it held that as soon 
as the mother was faced with a danger to life then no “unwahrscheinlicher 
Umstände” were required to lead to death; on the contrary, it states, medical skill was 
required to counteract the danger.  In short 
ob die Aussichten für den Erfolg dieser Rettungsversuche mehr oder weniger gross 
waren, kann nichts daran ändern, dass ein Misserfolg die adäquate Folge der 
eingetretenen Lebensgefahr ist. 
 
So I think it would be safe to say that in the case of an omission, and one that is at 
least “incomprehensible”, the BGH will be quick to find that any damages that have 
come about following from such omission will be held to have been caused by the 
omission even if it cannot be said without reasonable doubt that the damage would 
have occurred without the tortfeasor's omission.  I think the focus of the BGH in this 
case on procedure, ie its reference to §287 ZPO highlights once again how causation 
is, and must remain, an autonomous legal concept.  Certainly there is a causal 
question in the factual (or natural) sense in that it is not entirely certain that the 
damage would have occurred without the tortfeasor's omission but legally, the court !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
556 as referred to already above, this relates to the burden of proof 
557 “Das Gericht ist im Rahmen des §287 ZPO nicht gehindert, die freie Überzeugung von einem 
adäquaten Ursachenzusammenhang auch dann aus dem Ergebnis der Beweisaufnahme und den 
Umständen zu gewinnen, wenn nicht mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit die 
Mögglichkeit ausgeschlossen werden kann, dass der Schaden ohne das schuldhafte Verhalten des 
Täters hätte eintreten können.” 
558 it will be remembered this is how France has interpreted adequacy theory also. 
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of appeal erred by permitting such doubt to affect the causal chain. The BGH pays 
lip-service to adequate causation in as much as it notes that there were no 
“unwahrscheinlicher Umstände” (note the language of probability) but as a matter of 
policy, or equity, could the court have found otherwise? Yet for all the theoretical 
bases mentioned above, I did not read in this law report any mention of natural 
causation or haftungsbegründende or haftungausfüllende causation. Here the court simply 
treated the omission and the consequent damage as a question of adequacy.  What 
would be haftungsbegründende causation in this case? Would it be the omission to send 
the mother to hospital? If so, this brings us back to the problem of “total substitution” 
in the case of omissions.   The BGH is replacing the defendant doctor's behaviour 
with proper behaviour by assuming that another doctor would have transferred the 
mother to hospital.  The expert described the defendant's not doing this as 
“unintelligible”.  Yet it cannot be said with certainty that even if we have this total 
substitution that the mother would have been saved.  This was recognised in the 
court of appeal's decision but this was, as we have seen, criticised by the BGH.  The 
mother's death was a result that was to be contemplated in the ordinary course of 
things and, I suggest, certainly one which an “optimal Beobachter” would have 
contemplated. I assume rather in this case that all elements of causation were 
considered together.  It does somewhat appear to go against case law which has held 
that there can only be liability in omission cases where there has been a duty to act 
and that acting in accordance with that duty would have prevented with certainty 
the occurrence of the harm.559  Simply there was a question of legal causation and it 
had to be decided on; did the doctor's omission legally (as is always the case) cause 
the mother's death? The answer, simply, was yes.     
 
Another case from 1955 shows the reach of adequacy theory in Germany.560  In this 
case a husband and father underwent a typhus inoculation in 1946. He had three 
inoculations in all.  He then suffered illness and malignant swelling developed. On 27 
February 1948 he died. The plaintiffs claimed compensation from the state for 
breach of official duty and loss of their right to support from the father. The lower 
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559 as translated by H KOZIOL in H KOZIOL “Natural and Legal Causation” in Causation in Law 
L TICHY (ed), Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) p53 at p57 referring to case BGHZ 34, 206 
560 BGHZ 18, 286 
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courts held the claim justified in principle but otherwise dismissed the action. The 
defendant's application for review failed. Causation was challenged in that the typhus 
inoculation caused the death in a scientific and legal sense.  No dispute was made to 
the facts that following the inoculation itself, a staphylococcus suppuration appeared.  
Within two years of its appearance, death resulted. 
 
The BGH held that the development to a fatal sarcoma was, although rare, not 
unknown to all medical experience.  It could therefore be described as an adequate 
cause.  Interestingly the court noted that adequacy is not just about statistics but 
rather it is a value-judgement to which liability for the consequences of a condition 
can be equitably imputed to its originator.  As death did not lie beyond the bounds of 
experience, there was therefore an adequate connection.  This shows how the court 
truly applied the notion of the “optimal observer”.  Even though the result was 
extremely rare, it was not unheard of, and therefore the state was liable.  
 
Another area where the issue of adequate causation in medical negligence can be 
seen is in the area of pre-natal injuries with regard to an in utero foetus.  The question 
is whether the actions of a third party, although they may have caused injury to the 
mother, will be sufficient to recognise causation to the child's injury. 
 
In one case of these cases, as translated by Markesinis and Unberath, a child was 
born a spastic following a car crash when the child was in utero.561  The child sued but 
it was disputed whether the car crash caused the injuries to the mother.  After 
spending some time on whether the child could actually sue as he had not yet been 
born when the alleged damages had been sustained,562 the court addressed the causal 
question.  It is worth quoting the dictum in full here. The BGH held that 
It cannot be doubted that these consequences are connected by a link of adequate 
causation with the accident for which the defendant is to blame....the defendant's 
negligence extended not only to the injuries suffered by the mother but also to those 
of the embryo and therefore of the child.  This does not follow simply because the 
defendant is to blame for having injured the mother and is therefore liable for all 
consequential damage suffered by her.  However, the child need not prove that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
561 NJW 1972, 1126; B MARKESINIS and H UNBERATH, The German Law of Torts, p144 et seqq 
562 the court allowed him to sue 
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defendant could foresee the possibility of injuring a pregnant woman or embryo as 
such...it need not be foreseeable what form the damage would take in detail and 
what damage might occur.  
 
Adequacy holds that if one causes physical injury to a pregnant woman then one is 
likely to injure the embryo also. It can be seen here then that although the defendant 
could not necessarily foresee damage to the embryo, he is held liable therefor.  This is 
a species of the eggshell skull rule and it shows us how the courts are willing to use 
doctrines of causation to justify, what is in essence, a decision of policy.   Similarly, 
this goes to the heart of foreseeability of damages.  If the form of damage or its 
precise nature is not to be second-guessed but only some damage is foreseeable then 
the scope of liability in Germany is potentially quite wide. 
 
In a similar case from the 1950's a doctor had infected a mother (and ultimately the 
unborn child) with syphilis as he had not followed the guidelines of the then 
Reichsminister in 1940.  Here the defendant hospital argued that it was not liable for 
syphilis contracted by a child following a blood transfusion given to a mother.  The 
blood was infected with syphilis.  The defendant hospital argued that the infection of 
the child was indirect and therefore, it was not liable.  The BGH disagreed and held, 
referring explicitly to adequate theory.  The court held that if the act causing the 
damages violates directly or indirectly one of the protected interests or absolute rights 
set out in § 823 I BGB then the defendant will be liable provided only that a 
causal nexus exists in the meaning of the theory of adequate causation 
between the act creating the damage and the resulting violation of the 
protected interest.  And, indeed, 
...it is common experience that an infection of a married woman with syphilis is likely 
to transmit this illness later on to a child conceived by her.563 
 
So as can be seen the charges against the adequacy theory as it has been adopted in 
Germany are several.  First, that it does not act as a limit or “filter” to causation 
proper as for the optimal onlooker, everything is foreseeable.  The idea of limiting 
casual consequences is not readily combined with this theory.  Certain cases may !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
563 BGH NJW 1953, 417 as translated by Professor MARKESINIS and to be found online in 
English at The University of Texas Foreign Law Translations website:  
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/german/case.php?id=676  
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seem just such as the one about syphilis but what about having to warn patients of 
side-effects of a vaccination that only rarely occur? Might this not instil some kind of 
unnecessary fear and dread into an already nervous patient? Second that there is 
always a value-judgement to be made and that resort can rarely be had to statistics in 
themselves.  I submit case law shows that it is uncertain how adequacy theory will be 
applied.  Will it be based on statistics or a value-judgement or both? In some cases, as 
we have seen, mention is made only of the adequacy theory and none of 
haftungsbegründende or haftungausfüllende causation.  I have to say that given my initial 
reading of the German jurisprudence referred to above, only a few cases referred to 
the haftungsbegründende or haftungausfüllende causal dichotomy before then moving on to 
adequate causation.  Yet the distinction is made clear in every German introductory 
textbook to tort law that I consulted. So because of the limiting shortcomings of the 
adequacy theory, resort has often been had to other theories that are able to limit 
liability, that of the doctrine of protective purpose (Schutzzwecklehre) if not to the open 
application of policy considerations themselves (wertende Überlegungen) which shall now 
be considered.  There are a number of decisions here of interest for this paper.    
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5.6 Schutzzwecklehre and wertende Überlegungen 
It is often said that Schutzzwecklehre or Schutzbereich der Norm was first expounded by 
Rabel in relation to contract. 564   The essence of it is this 
dass jede gesetzliche Pflicht oder Vertragspflicht bestimmten Interressen dient und 
dass nur der Schaden, der diesen geschützten Interessen zugefügt wird, dem 
Schuldner zugerechnet werden soll.565 
 
It is now also applied in tort.  So the mischief or aim the norm or statute was 
designed to protect against should be sought.  It is the same for acts and omissions.566  
If discovered, causation can then be established against the background of the 
purpose of the norm.  This can be quite easy where a statute forbids certain 
behaviours but as far as the Schutzzweck test in medical negligence is concerned, I 
suggest this would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.567 What is the 
purpose of the treatment? I would not necessarily agree with Stauch who says it may 
always be seen broadly as “the protection of the patient's health”.568  For example, if 
a patient enters hospital for (say) the closure of an atrial septal defect (hole in the 
heart), then I would suggest that the surgeon's duties be limited to such closure and 
the prevention of nosocomial infections.  Can we really say that the hospital should 
detect a hitherto undiagnosed liver infection?  Plaintiff's argument would be 
expanded to the hospital's being negligent by not diagnosing the liver infection as the 
“protection of the patient's health” is the general Schutzzweck as Stauch suggests.569  
Defendant should argue then that liver infection was not to be diagnosed and not 
within the Schutzzweck – only the closure of the hole in the heart was. 
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564 E RABEL, Das Recht des Warenkaufs Bd 1, p 497 (Berlin and Leipzig, de Gruyter, 1936); note he 
mentions here that it was the common law lawyers who paved the way for this theory, “Soweit also 
bietet die angelsächsliche Vertragslehre eine sehr brauchbare Grundlage, von der wir allgemein 
zivilistischen Erkenntnissen gelangen könnten” 
565 ibid 
566 D MEDICUS and S LORENZ, Schuldrecht I, p312; H KÖTZ and G WAGNER, Deliktsrecht 
(Munich, Franz Vahlen, 2010), 215 
567 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p56 
568 ibid 
569 ibid 
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A number of real cases illustrate the point. Courts have used the Schutzzweck der Norm 
theory when considering wrongful conception cases.  The court considers whether 
the purpose of a sterilisation is to avoid a risk (such as a disability) associated with a 
given pregnancy or whether it was for general family planning purposes.  If either of 
the risks materialises then generally courts will allow recovery.570  In the leading case 
in this regard of 18 March 1980, the BGB held for the plaintiff.  Here there was a 
failed sterilisation and the mother went on to have twins.  The mother applied for 
damages of maintenance costs for bringing up the children.    Interestingly the 
defendants used the arguments that such costs were not recoverable and that having 
such a child was a “Wertverwirklichung”.  The court disagreed and held that the 
unwanted child was, from a family planning point of view, unwanted. 
…daß hier die Familienplanung gestört wurde, ist schon bei objektiver Betrachtung 
sehr naheliegend.571 
 
In another case, a mother contacted a doctor for a rash she had developed and then 
purported to sue the doctor when her child was born severely disabled as the doctor 
had failed to diagnose rubella.572  She had mentioned the pregnancy but this was not 
sufficient to hold the doctor liable.  She said that had she known about the risk of 
having a disabled child, then she would have aborted.  The court held that 
hatten nach allem die Behandlungsverträge mit dem Bekl nicht den Zweck, die Kl 
vor den folgen einer Unterhaltsbelastung zu bewahren, so hätte sich eine Beratung 
der Kl über die Möglichkeit eines Schwangerschaftsabbruchs allenfalls als Reflex 
und zudem nach der Beurteilung des gerichtlichen Sachverständigen nur bei einer 
maximalen hausärztlichen Versorgung der Kl ergeben. 
 
So it can be seen then that the court will consider the point and goal of the contract 
between the doctor and the patient before allowing causation to be established for 
economic loss.  Certainly in the second of these cases, the doctor's failure to diagnose 
certainly caused the economic loss in the sense it was a condition; it was a conditio 
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570 BGH NJW 2000, 1782; BGH NJW 1980, 1450 
571 in total contrast with the British decision of  MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board (Scotland)  [1999] 
UKHL 50; here it was held that having a child was a blessing; indeed it was a “priceless joy” as per 
Lord Millet 
572 BGH NJW 2005, 891 
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sine qua non and a cause in the natural or scientific sense.  However, the Schutzzweck 
causal notion was applied as a filter and recovery was disallowed.  
 
If adequacy cannot be used, then perhaps resort might be had to Schutzzweck to 
permit recovery. With medical negligence, it may be difficult to pin down exactly 
what the protective purpose is – even for the reasonable person. The protective 
purpose will have to be proven and there might be legal debate as to what this is in 
any civil proof.  Consequently, care should be taken in a particular case before using 
this doctrine to establish causation.   
 
It is an interesting adaptation of traditional causal theories.  The United Kingdom 
does not openly endorse this solution and in France it has been rejected.  I believe 
this contributes yet more to my argument that there is not one European idea of how 
causation should be understood legally.  
 
  
! ! ! ! !! 167!
5.7 Disclosure Malpractice 
The Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013 sets out in general and specific terms 
the physician’s obligations of information to be provided to the patient with regard to 
a procedure to which the latter is about to submit.   This Act amended the BGB so 
that now, in a general sense, at §630c BGB 
 (2) The treating party is obliged to explain to the patient in a comprehensible 
manner at the beginning of the treatment, and where necessary during the same, 
all and any circumstances that are relevant to the treatment, in particular the 
diagnosis, the anticipated health development, the therapy and the measures to 
be taken on the occasion of and subsequent to the therapy. 
 
And at §630e BGB 
(1) The treating party is obliged to inform the patient of all and any circumstances 
which are relevant to consent. This includes in particular the nature, extent, 
implementation, anticipated consequences and risks involved in the measure, as 
well as its necessity, urgency, suitability and prospects for success with regard to 
the diagnosis or the therapy. 
 
It would appear that this must be appreciated in concreto as the physician must take 
account of the patient’s understanding.573 
 
In a specific sense, it can be seen that the Act has adopted what case law had 
provided thusfar in that the physician must inform the patient of alternative 
treatments usually between non-invasive treatment with limited benefits and invasive 
surgical treatment with a higher risk but with greater benefits in the longer term.574 
These obligations incumbent on a German doctor are important from a causal 
perspective as the question arises what would the plaintiff have done had she known 
of all the disclosable risks.   
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573 §630e, (5); interestingly Shaw notes that it could be argued that the doctor’s duty of disclosure 
comes from the constitutionally protected right of a person’s personality under the Grundgesetz of 
1948 where article 2(1) states that “everyone has the right to the free development of his 
personality”.  She notes that this could be said to be the most accurate manifestation with the law 
of tort of the fundamental right of self-determination: J SHAW, “Informed Consent: A German 
Lesson”, (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 864 at 873 
574 the doctor must also inform the patient on the cost of the procedure together with an obligation 
in the event of a “therapeutic fault”. This need not detain us further for the purposes of causation.   
! ! ! ! !! 168!
Generally, a patient need not be informed of certain risks that he can be assumed to 
know: for example, like dying under anaesthetic.  Moreover, the physician need 
generally only tell the patient “in general terms” (im Großen und Ganzen) with regard to 
each risk attaching to treatment.575  What the eventuating would mean for that 
patient in particular is important.  With disclosure malpractice generally, the patient 
is alleging some iatrogenic injury because he was not informed fully of the risks.576   
 
From a causal point of view, the defence of hypothetical consent (hypothetische 
Einwilligung) or lawful alternative conduct (rechtmäßiges Alternativverhalten) is relevant 
here.  This is difficult to show.  With such a defence, a doctor tries to show that even 
if the patient knew about the risks, he would still have gone ahead with the operation.  
The doctor has the burden of proof in showing that the patient would have made the 
decision to go ahead with the procedure even if he knew about the risks.577  Such 
claims, it has been stated, must be examined very critically when the procedure in 
question is not urgently necessary and especially when the patient states that he has  
real trouble in reaching a decision.578 The dangers in allowing such a rule are that to 
a certain extent it makes the court a party to depriving the patient of his 
autonomy.579 A patient must have time to consider the consequences of her actions 
and simply signing a consent form before an operation would not be sufficient.580 
However, as Katzenmeier writes, the court will consider the behaviour and 
necessities of the patient in concreto.581 However, although Katzenmeier makes it clear 
that the plea of “Einwand rechtmäßigen Alternativverhaltens” is not excluded, the 
problem is often seen 
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575 BGH NJW 1986, 780 
576 interestingly, it has been held that even if the treatment was successfully performed, if there is 
lack of consent, this may allow for an action in damages: BGH NJW 1987, 1481 
577 BGH NJW 1996, 3074 and BGH NJW 1994, 2414 
578 OLG Koblenz NJW-RR 2002 816 (818) and BGH MedR 1991, 200 and generally M 
PARZELLER, M WENK, B ZEDLER and M ROTHSCHILD, “Patient Information and 
Informed Consent before and after Medical Intervention” 
http://data.aerzteblatt.org/pdf/DI/104/9/a576e.pdf , p10 
579C KATZENMEIER, Arzthaftung, p348  
580 BGH NJW 1994, 3009 
581 C KATZENMEIER, Arzthaftung, p369 
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durch Zuweisung der Beweislast an den Arzt und strenge Anforderungen an den von 
ihm zu erbringenden Nachweis, daß der Patient eingewilligt hätte, den dieser durch 
die plausible Darlegung eines Entscheidungskonfliktes widerlegen kann.582 
 
This is not an easy task for the doctor and indeed as the same author noted in his last 
paragraph of his commentary on the subject 
Die Literaturansicht fördert demgegenüber die Tendenz, Schicksalsschläge mit der 
Rüge mangelhafter Aufklärung auf den Arzt abzuwälen.583 
 
The defence is one that the doctor must raise and the court cannot enquire ex proprio 
motu.  It is sufficient for the patient to show that he would have faced a significant 
dilemma (ernsthafter Entscheidungkonflikt).  The BGH stated in a case from 1990 
Zu Unrecht vermißt das BerGer584 genaue Angaben des Kl darüber, wie er sich 
tatsächlich entscheiden hätte.  Das ist von ihm nicht zu verlangen und würde einen 
Patienten auch überfordern, weil auch er kaum anders als sein Arzt die Situation in 
der er sich seinerzeit befunden hat, schwerlich so rekonstruieren kann, daß er stets 
präzise Antwort darauf geben könnte, wie er sich wirklich verhalten hätte.  Einsichtig 
machen kann und soll er nur, daß ihn die vollständige Aufklärung über das Für und 
Wider des arztlichen Eingriffes ernsthaft vor die Frage gestellt hätte, ob er 
zustimmen solle oder nicht.585 
 
In this particular case, it was held that had the patient known of the risk of 
contracting hepatitis then he would have hesitated with the operation to have his 
hand amputated.  This was enough to hold the defence of hypothetical causation 
established.  Yet where there appears to be no basis at all for the dilemma, then it 
would be for the patient to come up with reasons as to why he would not have 
consented had he been properly informed.586 
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In another case, a colonoscopy was carried out on a patient but it was argued that he 
had not effectively agreed to it.587  In the course of it he suffered a perforated sigmoid 
colon. He argued that he was not informed of risks. The doctors stated that it was not 
necessary to inform him of the risk of the tear of the colon as it occurred only 
extremely rarely.  Although holding that, the patient's consent had not indeed been 
given as he had not been told about the disagreeable effects, it did not follow that the 
doctors were liable for the injuries.  The causal question that had to be considered 
was that if the patient had been adequately informed, would he have gone ahead 
with the procedure?  It was held in evidence here that he was not hypersensitive and 
so his allegation that he would not have undergone the procedure would not be 
accepted. As is to be expected, following the principle of “real behaviour”, the court 
concentrated on the character and disposition of the plaintiff. 
Das ist weniger selbstverständlich [that the plaintiff had repudiated causation], wenn 
es sich um einen sonst nicht wehleidigen Patient handelt.  Hier hat sich der Kl im 
Prozeß selbst als einen nicht gerade zimperlichen Mann bezeichnet... 
 
So there is an application of the hypothetical real patient here in the court's analysis 
of the plaintiff's traits by its using the words “wehleidigen” and “zimperlichen”.   Also 
the court will consider the plaintiff's behaviour with regard to similar treatments in 
the past.  For example, as was the case here, the plaintiff had undergone a prodigious 
number of similar diagnostic procedures within the last three years. The court was 
then slow to believe that he would in reality not have undergone this one.   In 
another case, it was held that where treatment was not urgent, risks of one in 10,000-
20,000 need be disclosed to the patient if their eventuation would result in grave 
consequences for the patient.588  Also, in a case noted by Stauch, it was held that 
even where a particular form of radiotherapy offered the only way of curing the 
patient from cancer, a risk of 0.15 had to be disclosed.589  Similarly, it has been held 
that the risks of general anaesthetic may have to be disclosed to a patient where the 
consequences of “heart failure” would be serious for that patient.590 Here account !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
587 ibid, p126 
588 BGH NJW 1984, 1397 
589 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p109 
590 OLG Karlsruhe [1985] MedR 79 at 81 “Das Wissen um das Erfordernis einer Betäubung ist 
aber jedenfalls bei einfacheren Bevölkerungsschichten, zu denen auch die Mutter des MG gehört, 
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was taken of the woman’s social status and what people at that particular level of 
education are expected to know… 
 
§630h(2) BGB sets out that the doctor must show that the patient “would have 
consented” if he had been given more information. If the patient convinces the court 
that he would have had simply internal conflict as to how he would have decided 
then the onus is on the doctor to disprove it.591  Moreover, I think the evidential 
requirement of only having to prove a dilemma is not so arduous and demanding as 
bringing evidence as to what a patient would actually have done.  
 
The causal question that arises then is if the patient had known about these risks, 
would she have still gone ahead? We can see from German jurisprudence that it is for 
the doctor to show that the patient would still have gone ahead and the court would 
appear to put formidable hurdles in the doctor's path.  It is sufficient in general that 
patient would hesitate.  Any exercise which a court embarks on to ascertain the true 
behaviour of a patient in a counterfactual world must surely be speculative at best; it 
can never be known with certainty and there is ample room for evidential distortion 
and here the German approach differs from the British.  As Stauch notes this 
subjective requirement of disclosure in Germany creates uncertainty and doctors are 
not confident as to the level of disclosure to which they will retrospectively be held. 
He notes this approaches a strict liability rather than fault.592  Standards therefore in 
the different jurisdictions vary.  Standards vary because in Germany the risks which 
must be disclosed are higher than in France or the United Kingdom.  Therefore if 
more risks must be disclosed then the potential for disclosure malpractice and causal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!
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death from general anaesthetic in general: Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors [1985] 1 All ER 
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inquiry is also greater.  It could be mooted then that because of this emphasis of 
patient autonomy in Germany, that a victim may find a more sympathetic and 
understanding forum in Germany given its history and policy development on this 
issue. Causal questions concerning disclosure then would necessarily have diverging 
outcomes when considered under the laws of the various jurisdictions here.   
Consequently with regard to universal functionalism, there can be no “common 
sense” as there is no “common sense” solution with regard to the foundation on 
which disclosure malpractice and hypothetical causation is built.  
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5.8 Burden of Proof 
In Germany, haftungsbegründenden Kausalität needs to be proved to the standard of § 286 
ZPO.  As we have seen, this has been held to be something approaching a “full 
judicial conviction” or the court must be “overwhelmingly convinced” of its facts.593  
In one case, cited by Stauch, the plaintiff was denied recovery in a mis-diagnosis case 
even though experts spoke to the fact that there was a 70% chance that had there 
been prompt treatment, then this would have prevented the injury.594!While liability 
must be established to a particularly high proof, this does not mean that all doubts 
need be eliminated.595 
 
Müller also confirmed this when he noted 
Allerdings verlangt auch diese Beweisführung keine unumstößliche Gewißheit im 
Sinn eines naturwissenschaftlichen Nachweises, sondern nur einen “für das 
praktische Leben brauchbaren Grad von Gewißheit, der Zweifeln Schweigen 
gebietet, ohne sie völlig auszuschließen.”596 
 
So it can be seen then that the plaintiff must prove liability-grounding causation (ie 
the primary damage) to a particularly high level of proof.  This level of proof is, on 
the face of it, much higher than that of the United Kingdom in that plaintiff need 
only prove his case on the balance of probabilities.   It will be seen, however, that 
there exists in Germany many instances where the court is willing either to lighten 
the burden of proof or to reverse the burden of proof altogether so that it is for the 
defendant doctor to prove that he did not commit a fault. 
 
The lower standard of proof is used for haftungsausfüllende Kausalität or liability-
completing causation and is based on § 287 ZPO.  This provides for proof based on 
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the balance of probabilities.597 Schiemann has even gone so far as to say that the 
“mere possibility” [sic] would be sufficient but I doubt how accurate this is.598  So for 
the two species of causation, there are two levels of proof: one higher and one lower.  
The plaintiff, in general, must prove that his protected right was invaded to a high 
standard but remoteness of damages need only be proven to the lower standard of 
probability. 
 
A kind of “equality of arms” has been assured by the Federal Constitutional Court 
since 1979 where Article 103 I of the Grundgesetz was referred to in case law to ensure 
natural justice.599 Here the notion that a patient should receive a general reversal of 
the burden of proof in his favour was rejected.600  It had been stated also in an earlier 
case that a doctor also had proof difficulties and that although harm may occur as a 
result of negligence, it may also occur as a result of the vagaries of the human 
organism.601     
Anderseits steht der Arzt von der Schwerigkeit, daß Zwischenfälle, die in der Regel 
auf ärztliches Fehverhalten hindeuten, in vielen Bereichen infolge der 
Unberechenbarkeit des lebenden Organismus ausnahmsweise auch schiksalhaft 
eintreten können.  
 
The court went on to say that the basic principle was equality of arms 
(Waffengleichheit).  In certain circumstances, however, the German Constitutional 
Court has held that where the circumstances demand then the burden of proof 
should be shifted.  Katzenmeier has said that 
In vielen Fällen wird der Kläger nicht mehr tun können, als auf den zeitlichen 
Zusammenhang zwischen einer ärztlichen Behandlung und einer eingetretenen 
Gesundheitsbeschädigung hinzuweisen, die generelle Behauptung aufzustellen, diese 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
597 C JANDA, Medizinrecht, (Konstanz, 2010, UVK), p317 “überwiegender Wahrscheinlichkeit 
nachzuweisen...” 
598 G SCHIEMANN, “Problems of Causation in the Liability for Medical Malpractice in German 
Law” in L TICHY (ed) Causation in Law (Prague, Rozkotova, 2007) p187 at p190 
599 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p66; Art 103 I states that “(1) Vor Gericht hat 
jedermann Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör.” 
600 BverG NJW 1979, 1925 
601 BGH NJW 1979, 1925 
! ! ! ! !! 175!
beiden Sachverhalte stünden in enem ursächlichen Zusammenhang und die 
Behandlung müsse Fehler gewesen sein.602 
 
It may indeed come down to this.  The plaintiff might not be able to do other than 
point to the fact that he was treated by a doctor on a Monday and developed a health 
problem on a Tuesday.  If this is the case, then it would seem that, given the high 
level of proof for liability-grounding causation that many of the cases that might 
otherwise be held proven in the common law, may be dismissed in Germany.  
 
Yet what would appear to be a hard and fast rule of proof in Germany is often 
tempered by a number of special rules that have been developed over the years.  
These include Anscheinbeweis or prima facie proof, a reversal of proof when documents 
are missing, when there has been gross negligence or where what are considered the 
doctor’s “fully-masterable risks” have been breached.  These shall be considered 
presently. 
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5.9 Anscheinbeweis 
Often in cases the full “Überzeugung des Gerichts” cannot be achieved.  It is after all 
quite a high standard of proof. The idea of Anscheinsbeweis or prima facie Beweis is 
especially important in the area of causation as it can often help a patient establish 
the essential causal connection between the fault and the damages sustained.603 
Importantly, Anscheinsbeweis does not mean a reversal of the burden of proof but 
rather a lightening of the burden (something like prima facie evidence) and it will 
depend on each case.604 It has been described as one of the most contentious and 
controversial ideas in the civil law procedure and at the same time as “die wichtigste 
Beweiserleichterung” that a plaintiff has.605 Franzki said that 
Der Beweis des ersten Anscheins greift ein bei typischen Geschensabläufen, d.h. in 
den Fällen, in denen ein bestimmter Tatbestand feststeht, der nach der 
Lebenserfahrung auf eine bestimmte Ursache als maßgeblich für den Eintritt eines 
betsimmten Erfolges hinweist.606 
 
So what is being looked for here is something atypical, something aberrant or 
freakish that cannot be explained according to normal life experience and that would 
tend to indicate negligence; it is a set of circumstances that calls for an explanation.  
The court may then consider an Anscheinbeweis. 
 
This idea of prima facie evidence is based on factual experience.  Does one fact 
generally lead to another? For example, if a patient suffers a sepsis following an intra-
artery injection then it has been held as prima facie proof that the injection was 
administered erroneously.607 It would appear that even the leaving of a foreign body 
in a patient would not in itself constitute the raising of the prima facie proof: it 
depends on the circumstances.608  For example, the leaving of a cotton wool bud, a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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gauze tissue or a tampon in a wound does not go far enough for the courts in what is 
otherwise a complicated and difficult operation.609 Yet this prima facie proof can be 
rebutted with greater ease than a total reversal of proof.  The doctor need just point 
to facts that state that there is another potential cause that need be considered. 
 
It is always for the doctor to challenge - not rebut, as there is no reversal of proof - 
any Anscheinsbeweis by showing that the circumstances were atypical of fault; for 
example that an unexpected haemorrhaging would not be typical of doctor's fault.610 
Anscheinsbeweis has played a role in three important areas according to Deutsch and 
Spickoff: infections, risks in anaesthesia and sterilisation.  I shall consider only the 
area of infections and nosocomial infections together as it provides fertile ground to 
compare with infections with France.   
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5.9.1 Infections 
The problem with proving causation with infections is that they can occur just as part 
of the natural course of things or, potentially, they can occur because of the fault of a 
care-provider.   Like France, there is special legislation that may help a patient in 
Germany.  Case law must be considered to help us gage when Anscheinbeweis may 
come to the aid of the patient.  This is §2 of the Infektionasshutzgesetz which defines a 
nosocomial infection as  
eine Infektion mit lokalen oder systemischen Infektionszeichen als Reaktion auf das 
Vorhandensein von Erregern oder ihrer Toxine, die im zeitlichen Zusammenhang 
mit einer stationären oder einer ambulanten medizinischen Maßnahme steht, soweit 
die Infektion nicht bereits vorher bestand 
 
As noted by Oliver Berg in his summary paper before Groupe de Recherche Européen sur 
la Responsabilité Civile et l'Assurance (GRERCA), 611 the law modifying the 
Infektionsschutzgesetz has introduced an additional way in which the burden of proof 
can be reversed. 612   I quote this before the rest of this section as hospitals’ 
responsibility can still be found in case law. Nosocomial infections have for a long 
time succumbed to a reversal of the burden of proof in Germany given that hospital 
environments are to be regarded as voll beherrschbares Risiko, which I shall consider in 
more detail later.613  Endogenous infections, as I shall show below, lead to a reversal 
of the burden of proof.614  
 
The case law then gives us some idea of what could raise an Anscheinbeweis and what is 
less likely to effect a shift in the tactical burden of proof.  Theses could be matters 
such as dysfunctional medical material,615negligence in sterilisation616 or in the 
cleanliness of the products,617and even infections coming from medical personnel or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
611 GRERCA conference of 14 and 15 December 2012, paper “Les infections nosocomiales en 
droit allemand”, held at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.  
612 see infra 
613 BGH NJW 1991, 2960 
614 BGH NJW 2007, 1683 
615 BGH NJW 1991, 983 
616 BGH NJW, 1982, 699 
617 BGH NJW 2007, 1683 
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other patients.618  It is, of course, for the plaintiff to show that the risk was “fully 
masterable”. 
 
The hospital can show, however, that the breach is not “responsible” for the 
damage.619 This it can demonstrate by showing that it took all organisational and 
technical measures to prevent it.620 The courts admit that patients must take some 
kind of risk.621 If all precautions are not taken then the presumption will not be 
rebutted.  Berg quotes the case of a nursing auxiliary with hay fever giving an 
injection to a patient.622 
 
The Gesetz zur Verhütung und Bekämpfung von Infektionskrankheiten beim menschen 
(Infektionsscheutzgesetz – IfSG) of 28 July 2011, modifying the law of 20 July 2000 
introduces one way in which establishments can rebut the presumption.  It holds that 
Die Einhaltung des Standes der medizinischen Wissenschaft auf diesem Gebiet wird 
vermutet, wenn jeweils die veröffentlichten Empfehlungen der Kommission für 
Krankenhaushygiene und Infektionsprävention beim Robert-Koch-Institut und der 
Kommission Antiinfektiva, Resistenz und Therapie beim Robert Koch-Institut 
beachtet worden sind.623  
 
The Robert-Koch institute is the central federal institution responsible for disease 
control and prevention.  In this regard, it issues recommendations to hospitals from 
time to time.624 
 
So it can be seen then that in Germany, the victim does have an advantage when he 
alleges a nosocomial infection.  Provided he can show that there was a “fully !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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620 BGH NJW 2007, 1684 
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manageable risk”625 (that is a risk arising out of the treatment environment626) then 
the hospital must really show that it has acted in conformity with the Robert-Koch 
and Anti-Infection Commission.  The burden of proof is reversed (and I shall 
consider this in more detail below).  This is more than an Anscheinbeweis.  So 
causation in this area is different from what it is in the United Kingdom and in 
France.  I shall comment further on this in the comparative chapter.  
 
5.9.2 Anscheinbeweis and Infections: Case Law 
If the patient cannot show that there has been a breach of a “fully masterable risk” 
and thus benefit from a reversal in the burden of proof then it might be the case that 
the patient could benefit from an Anscheinbeweis.  I shall consider some of the case law 
presently.    
 
Hepatitis B contracted in a children's clinic would not raise Anscheinsbeweis as this can 
be contracted in a number of ways.627 If a patient contracts a wound infection during 
an operation then the Anscheinsbeweis will only operate if the patient shows that it was 
likely to happen in the circumstances.  Further, he must also show that the infection 
was caused by a lack of adherence to hygiene standards.628 There is no prima facie 
Beweis when a number of patients have developed Hepatitis B following novocaine 
injections or acupuncture even when these were in the same doctor’s surgery.629 In 
one case, many people between July 1978 and March 1979 had gone to see a dentist 
and they had all contracted hepatitis B.  It turned out that, following a blood test, the 
dentist himself was infected with hepatitis B.  It was shown also this particular dentist 
was working with unprotected chapped hands (“rissige Hände”).  It was established 
that 
Da unstretig eine Vielzahl von Patienten des Bekl zu 1 in der Zeit von Juli 1978 bis 
Mitte 1979 an Hepatitis B erkrankten, kann nach den Grundsätzen des 
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Anscheinbeweises als beweisen, angesehen werden, daß auch Kl von ihm angesteckt 
wurde, zumal eine andere Infektionsquelle nicht ersichtlich ist...630 
 
Interestingly the court said here that it is within the general knowledge of a dentist 
that if he has such hand injuries then infections can pass to the patient.  Further the 
court also held that it was no defence for a dentist to say that more was known about 
the transmission of hepatitis B today (1985) than was before.631 The fact that many 
people contracted hepatitis B between two dates was something that needed 
explaining and it was for the dentist to do it the more so as he had the infection 
himself. I also had the impression that, although the court was indeed referring to 
Anscheinbeweis, it was also looking at protective purpose rule - perhaps indirectly.  It 
criticised the dentist for working without protecting his hands and there seemed to be 
a causative protective purpose coming through in this judgement.  So perhaps in 
Germany then both Anscheinbeweis and protective purpose can be combined.632 
Katzenmeier also noted that 
Aufgrund der Anscheinsregeln kann also nicht nur von einem festehenden Ereignis 
auf den Zusammenhang mit dem eingetretenen Erfolg, sondern auch umgekehrt von 
einem eingetretenen Erfolg auf ein bestimmtes Ereignis also Ursache geschlossen 
werden.633   
 
So what he is saying here is that the courts have favoured a consequential analysis of 
the situation and considered the event preceding the result to imply causation.  For 
example, there was one case where a patient was accommodated in a scarlatina ward 
and the patient subsequently contracted scarlatina; here it could be implied via 
Anscheinsbeweis that placing the patient in such a ward was the cause of the 
scarlatina.634 The same has also been used for facial erysipelas.635 Anscheinbeweis was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
630 23 OLG Cologne, NJW 1985, 1402 
631 reference was made to literature in English  
632 “Eine besondere Anstekungsgefahr ging vom Bekl. Zu 1 zusätzlich deshalb aus, weil er nach 
eigenem Zugeständnis ständig ‘rissige Hände’ hatte und jedenfalls zeitweise mit ungeschützten 
Händen arbeitete.” ibid 
633 C KATZENMEIER, Arzthaftung, p434 
634 RGZ 165, 336 (339) 
635 an acute infection typically accompanied with skin rash; RG SeuffA 86, Nr 122 
! ! ! ! !! 182!
also used for a teenager who contracted tuberculosis after being in the same room as 
a patient who had it. 636  Other examples in the case law (and also cited by 
Katzenmeier and others) include pain and paralysis following an injection, the cause 
of the pain and paralysis being attributed to the injection.637 In this last case, the 
deceased went to his doctor complaining of a pain in his right shoulder joint.  The 
pain had not gone away one week later so he went to see an orthopaedic surgeon.  X-
Rays showed nothing and the patient was given an injection of cortisone and put in a 
“Collar and Cuff”.  The condition of the patient began to worsen and he developed 
fever and pain.  After further tests, it was shown that the patient had a septic fever 
and he later died from multiple lung abscesses.   The BGH held in its causal analysis 
here that 
Es entspricht ständiger Rechtsprechung, daß grundsätzlich auch der 
Ursachenzusammenhang zwischen einem ärztlichen Eingriff und dem Eintritt einer 
Komplikation im Wege des Anscheinsbeweises festgestellt werden kann.  Das 
BerGer 638  hat dessen Voraussetzungen nicht verkannt.  Es stellt fest, das 
Auftreten eines Gelenkempyems wie bei dem Patienten sei eine typische 
Komplikation der intraartikulären Injektion. Hinreichende 
Anhaltspunkte für eine andere Ursache des Empyems und der darauf 
beruhenden Aeptikämie fehlten im Streitfall. 
 
So here we see the BGH criticising the lower court for not recognising the fact that 
the mere intervention and subsequent occurrence of a complication can lead to 
Anscheinbeweis.  
 
A blood transfusion has also been held to cause syphilis where the receiver of the 
blood transfusion developed the disease following the transfusion.639 Also interesting 
is the case of a patient who was never in any high-risk group of contracting HIV nor 
did the way he led his life expose him to any risk.  He subsequently developed HIV 
following a blood transfusion.  It was prima face evidence that the blood transfusion 
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caused the HIV.640 This is comparable to the case in France.  In one case, it was 
denied where a palsy of vocal cords developed after a thyroid operation.641 The court 
noted that such an experience occurs seldom.   
 
Indeed Katzenmeier sounds a note of caution.  He notes that given the 
unpredictability of the human condition and its reaction to particular stimuli, it can 
be difficult to ascertain what can be found from general life experience.642 The court 
should not be there, even from reasons of equity, simply to help the patient.643 
Similarly, where an injection in a joint resulted in an infection, there was held to be 
no reversal of the burden of proof as a number of patients may develop infections 
following such injections.644  
 
A successful submission of Anscheinbeweis is not common in Germany.645 Perhaps not 
unsurprisingly, Anscheinbeweis is always allowed for HIV infections from an AIDS-
infected blood donor.646 If a patient undergoes a simple operation, however, then it is 
likely to be denied.647 Perhaps of more relevance is the grobe Behandlungsfehler. 
 
So Anscheinbeweis is something similar then to prima facie proof in the United 
Kingdom. It may be similar to the kinds of presumptions that can be drawn in 
France but the way the French courts approach this is different.648 So although there 
is a high standard of proof in Germany, Anscheinbeweis can help a patient.  Its 
success appears, however, to be low.  I shall leave consideration of this idea to the 
comparative chapter.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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5.10 Gross Treatment Error 
In certain cases in Germany, the burden of proof can be reversed.  It means the care-
provider must show he did nothing negligent.  This, of course, helps the plaintiff who 
must establish causation.  In medical negligence law, this is typically where a “gross” 
treatment error has been made.  Stauch has said that this constitutes one of the most 
“original and defining features of German medical practice overall” and that this is 
one way where “The courts have...evolved rules to shift the risk of inability to prove 
causation from the patient to the doctor.”649 Schiemann considers that the “grobe 
Behandlungsfeheler” as the most important basis for the easing of the burden of 
proof.650 As he says, it differs from other areas of law.651 In this area of German 
medical malpractice law, there is an assumption of causation.  Deutsch and Spickoff 
say that the reason for this causal presumption is to be found in equity. 
...der Arzt kann sich nicht beschweren, wenn ihm mögliche Konsequenzen seines 
elementeraren Fehlers auf der Ebene des Beweises zugeschoben werden.652 
 
By increasing the danger or risk to the patient, through his gross negligence even 
minimally,653 the doctor has breached certain standards and therefore should not 
benefit from the norm that it is for the plaintiff to prove causation in such cases.654  If 
the plaintiff can show “gross fault” then the burden of proof would be on the doctor 
to show that the damage was not a cause of the gross negligence.   
 
A gross treatment error is simply that: something that is so fundamental that it went 
again the norms of medical practice.  These a doctor is deemed to know.  Such an 
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error has been held to be one that doctors just simply ought not to make.  To quote 
in its context 
Es muß vielmehr ein Fehlverhalten vorliegen, das zwar nicht notwendig aus 
subjecktiven, in der Person des Arztes liegenden Gründen, aber aus objektiver 
ärztlicher Sicht bei Anlegung des für einen Arzt geltenden Ausbildungs-und 
Wissenmaßstabes nicht mehr versädlich und verantwortbar erscheint, weil ein 
solcher Fehler dem behandelnden Arzt aus dieser Sicht “schlechterdings nicht 
unterlaufen darf”.655 
 
The court then noted that, for example, the making of a clear diagnosis not 
according to standard methods could constitute a gross treatment error.   
Katzenmeier also refers to this case when attempting a definition of gross treatment 
error. 656   It can be seen then that causation in medical negligence can be 
manipulated depending on what is defined as a “groben Fehler”.  Other examples 
include the withholding of an essential drug from a patient after an operation,657 the 
non-correction of a baby's undescended testicle during a hernia operation658 or the 
leaving of a drill-bit in a patient following an operation.659 In another example, 
where a mother had lost one of her twins following a delay, it was held that the CTG-
monitoring of the pregnant patient by an ordinary staff nurse was grossly negligent 
and that consequently the onus was on the hospital to prove that an earlier delivery 
would not have saved the child.660  Although the doctrine has been part of German 
law for many years, it remains nonetheless controversial. 661  Whether a 
Behandlungsfehler is grob or not is a value judgement (eine juristische Wertung)662 
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...die dem Tatrichter obliegt, der sich dabei mangels Fachkentnisse der Hilfe eines 
medizinischen Sachverständigen zu bedienen hat.663 
 
What we have here then is at least lip-service to the fact that what constitutes gross 
negligence is a legal judgement not a medical one.  Notwithstanding this principle, 
however, there is recognition that the help of medical experts is ineluctable.664  Yet 
although experts are important, the establishment of grobe Behandlungsfehler is for the 
judge.665  The judge is not bound by an expert's report but he should give adequate 
and written reasons as to why he is not following it.   
 
The doctrine has also been criticised on the grounds that the judiciary are 
encroaching on parliament's jurisdiction.666 
 
As Stauch notes, in addition to a finding of “gross” error there are two additional 
conditions that must be satisfied before a court will reverse the burden of proof.  First, 
the error must be one that is known to “create a non-negligible risk of the injury in 
suit.”667 In one case then where a claimant was born severely premature due to a 
doctor's failure to give drugs, the likelihood was that even if the drugs had been 
administered there would have been no appreciable difference in his disabilities.668 
So here the hospital was able to confute the causal presumption. 
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664 the same case also noted how experts should draft their reports.  It advised that “Das 
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The second requirement is that regard must be had to the protective purpose of a 
rule to ascertain whether the doctor's behaviour was grossly negligent.669 It has been 
held that where a patient was discharged early from hospital following a heart-
examination with a catheter and then died of septicaemia, there was no reversal of 
the burden of proof.670 The risk of septicaemia was too remote although the patient's 
discharge had been grossly negligent.   This is fascinating and reminds me of the 
earlier questions with respect to the Schutzzweck analysis. This discharge was in itself 
grossly negligent in that the patient was discharged after 24-hours whereas a longer 
period of observation was required to guard against arrhythmias, blood and general 
circulation complications.  The court noted that contracting septicaemia was rare 
and that this could not be “beherrschbar”.  Consequently, the doctor's behaviour 
with regard to the eventuation of septicaemia was not a “...schwerer Verstoß gegen die 
ärztliche Sorgfaltspflich...”.671   
 
So I think then, as far as gross treatment error in Germany is concerned, we must 
look at whether the risk that eventuated could be within the sphere, orbit or range of 
the risks which it is fair to allocate to doctor before we can state with certainty 
whether certain acts or omissions can be classified as grossly negligent.   
 
The BGB has now codified its provisions on gross malpractice.  §630h (5) states 
If gross malpractice has committed, and if this is susceptible as a matter of 
principle to cause an injury to life, limb or health of the nature which in fact took 
place, it is to be presumed that the malpractice was the cause of this injury. This 
is also to apply if the treating party omitted to take or record a medically-
necessary finding in good time where the finding would with sufficient certainty 
have led to a result which would have given rise to further measures, and if failure 
to carry out such measures would have constituted gross malpractice.672 
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670 BGH NJW 1981, 2513 
671 BGH NJW 1981, 2513 (2514) 
672 I refer to this also further below with regard to missing records 
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Reversal of burden of proof will only be employed with regard to the “primary” 
harm and not the “secondary” harm.673  In the case where a disinfectant caused a 
skin reaction on a patient and this led also to inter alia kidney failure, the kidney 
failure and other disabilities remained for the patient to prove up to the lower 
standard of the balance of probabilities under §287 ZPO.  
 
So again it can be seen that the doctrine of grobe Behandlungsfehler is an 
accommodation or a compromise between the conflicting interests on the one hand 
of the proof difficulties that a patient has and those interests which are worthy of 
protection as far as a doctor is concerned.  It has also been suggested that the reversal 
of the burden of proof should depend to what extent the doctor has made the finding 
of a causal link more difficult (for example, by not taking adequate notes).674 
 
So Germany is the only jurisdiction under consideration here actually to reverse the 
burden of proof in certain cases.  Neither the United Kingdom nor France does that 
though France may come close with allowing presumptions that can only be rebutted 
with evidence close to certainty.  So again as far as procedure is concerned, and I 
believe that procedure plays a pivotal role in the establishment of causation, 
Germany stands out here among the jurisdictions in examination in this paper.   
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5.11 Fully Masterable Risks and überzogene Verkehrspflichten 
It does not translate exactly but Verkehrssicherungspflichten is an idea that has been 
developed by the German courts.675  It generally means that anyone who by his 
activity in everyday life creates a potential danger that could affect or harm another 
should ensure the protection of that person.676  As we shall see, the idea plays an 
important role in the area of medical causation.  With regard to medical liability, it 
can be seen as somewhat akin to an obligation de securité.   Without entering too much 
into theory, Katzenmeier has  described it 
...als Verwirklichung einer typischen Gefahr erscheint, die dem von dem Beklagten 
beherrschten Verantwortungs - , Einstands oder Risikobereich enstammt, dies 
aber das Zurechnungsprinzip der Gefährdungshaftung ist.677 
 
Where there is an aspect of the treatment process that is under the full control of the 
doctor and the doctor commits a fault in this regard then there will be a reversal of 
proof. Two areas that this affects particularly are the areas of organisation and 
technical apparatus.678  This is considered as a breach of a subsidiary obligation 
under § 280 I 2 BGB and is a breach of his subsidiary obligation to provide a safe 
treatment environment.  The burden of proof and hence causation is then on the 
doctor to show that he is not responsible.  For example then, it would be for the 
doctor to take such measures as were necessary to ensure the safety of a patient on 
the operating table.679 This would include, for example, the provision of a properly 
working oxygen machine while a patient is under anaesthesia.  The provision of 
secure medical equipment is a subsidiary obligation, which should be guaranteed.680 
Another example could be where a patient is placed in a bed in an ambulance. Here !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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that patient may take advantage of the “fully-masterable risks” doctrine. It would, 
however, be otherwise where the damage can be ascribed to a particular corporeal 
anomaly or peculiarity in the patient.681  
 
Geiß and Greiner state that the easing of the causal burden will be an exception to 
the general rule that it is for the plaintiff to prove his case and that this will only be 
seen with “groben Behandlungs – oder Organisationsfehlern.”682 They cite one case 
where there was an infection in a hospital nursery and the burden of proof was 
reversed.  It was for the hospital to prove it was not negligent.683 Spickoff gives a non-
exclusive list of “voll beherrschbaren Risikos” that relate to the above case.  These 
are 
(a) hygiene standards; 
(b) apparatus standards; 
(c) standards of the medicine itself;684 
(d) standard of personnel; and 
(e) internal organisation according to various guidelines and directives.685  
 
These “fully masterable” areas for the hospital essentially admits of few excuses, for 
example, showing that all relevant precautions had been taking further to the Robert-
Koch Institute guidance.  For example, the condition of a lens tube, the purity of 
disinfectant, the leaving of a swab in a patient's body in a simple operation, falling 
from a shower-chair or an examination couch or an error with the provision of 
medication can be seen as fully masterable risks. 
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The most famous case in this area dates from 1977.  It is mentioned by both Stauch 
and Katzenmeier.686  In this case, a patient sustained damage to the brain while 
under general anaesthetic.  There was a complication with the supply of oxygen.  We 
see the court stating the ratio as 
Aus diesem Vertrag ergab sich für den Krankenhausträger u a die Pflicht, für die 
Operation ein funktionshähiges Narkosegerät zur Verfügung zu stellen.  Diese Pflicht 
wurde objektiv verletzt, und das hat zu dem geltend gemachten Sachaden 
geführt....Dieser Grundsatz [that a doctor will not be held liable for a given outcome] 
kann jedoch auf die Erfüllung voll beherrschbarer Nebenpflichten, insbesondere die 
Gewährleistung technischer Voraussetzungen für eine sachgemäße und gefahrlose 
Behandlung, keine Anwendung finden. 
 
The court pronounces here in clear terms that as far as ancillary obligations are 
concerned, such as the security of a patient in the hospital, then there is almost strict 
liability.  From a causal point of view, this aids the patient significantly.   
 
As far as any defence with regard to faulty apparatus is concerned, the doctor must 
show that the bad condition of the apparatus cannot be imputed to either him or to 
one of his staff.   This is not an easy defence for the doctor to fulfil.  He must show 
that he used the apparatus correctly, that he was up to date with the latest medical 
knowledge in that area, that he was trained, that he followed the operating 
instructions of the apparatus.  He must also prove that he oversaw the proper 
functioning of the apparatus.687 Yet, the doctor is not liable for guaranteeing the 
perfect functioning of a machine.688  He is not an insurer for any construction defects.  
This lies with the manufacturer of the machine.689 
 
This “fully-masterable risk” idea not only covers the actual organisation and planning 
of the hospital but also such things as the purity of the disinfectant that is being used, 
ensuring that intravenous drips are sterile and generally a guarantee of hygiene.  
What is interesting here is that there will be a presumption against the doctor or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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hospital in an operation if a patient contracts an infection if such an infection is 
typical when there is a lack of hygiene and that it was avoidable.690  What happened 
in this case was that there was an allegation that following an operation on 1 
September 1986 an infection was caused by substandard hygienic conditions in 
theatre.  Furthermore it was alleged that the patient was not warned of such risks and 
damages were claimed from the hospital.  Judgement for the plaintiff was denied at 
first instance.  This was confirmed by the Oberlandesgericht, the State Appellate Court, 
on appeal.  The BGH upheld the OLG's decision. 
 
Going through this judgement, there are a number of points that are interesting from 
a causal point of view.   First, the court recognised that all germs cannot be 
eliminated and that it was not necessary that a patient be informed of this as it is 
“geläufig” (familiar).   
 
The BGH also referred to the reports on which it was basing its judgement.  The 
words are pertinent for the theorist in assessing functionality.  The medical treatment 
report stated (and the BGH referred to it) that the transmission of the infectious 
pathogen clearly came from human beings.691 Further oral testimony showed such 
an infection was “typisch für eine operativ gesetzte”; the same doctor also testified 
that the spread of the infection from people was “die naheliegendste(most obvious, 
self-evident) Ursache” and it was noted that the mouth and nose of the operators are 
often the “haufigste (most frequent) Gefahrenquelle” and that “am 
wahrscheinlichsten” (most probable) the infection was breathed in.  I have 
highlighted the words I thought important here as I think it shows what kinds of 
words scholars and lawyers should look for when considering a medical report and 
causation.692 Adjectives of probability are fundamental to a legal understanding of 
the subject and they show how courts rely on them when coming to a decision.  This 
is relevant for my comments on experts’ reports later.  
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The BGH also commented that it was impossible to have complete sterilisation in 
theatre – the transmission of germs in this case was “nicht beherrschbaren”.  
However, it is for the hospital to show 
...daß alle organisatorischen und technischen Vorkehrungen gegen von dem 
Operationspersonal ausgehende vermeidbare Keimübertragungen getroffen waren. 
 
Here we see then that the hospital has the burden of proof to show that it has 
discharged this duty. Why? Because “Sie ereignet sich gegebenfalls in der Sphäre des 
Krankenhausträgers.” However, in this case, the hospital benefited from the 
uncertainty that existed.  The court noted that the conclusion that there could still be 
an infection even if all hygiene standards were reached was not fully established. It 
left open the question whether or not this “germ transfer” was avoidable or not.  In 
such cases, uncertainty benefitted the hospital.  
 
Where an unruly patient has been placed in a wheelchair that is not stable then a 
doctor could further find himself subject to this doctrine.693 Deutsch and Spickoff 
note that this doctrine 
...greifen ferner dann, wenn einem Patienten aus nicht zu klärenden Gründen eine 
überhöhte Röntgendosis verabrecht wird.694 
 
So where a duty can be classed as a fully-masterable risk or one that comes within a 
doctor's fully-masterable area then in the event the patient suffers damage, a doctor 
could be liable.  This doctrine has no counterpart in the common law but, as 
mentioned, it does resemble somewhat the French obligation de securité.  It is interesting 
in that German courts have increased the scope of doctor's duties here.695  Many of 
the textbooks on the subject cite case law from newly qualified doctors, security (eg 
falls from stools), machinery, storage and hygiene.   Of course, it always remains open 
for the defendant to show that the given the circumstances of the case, the risk does 
not lie with them.696   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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696 ibid 
! ! ! ! !! 194!
 
Organisation is a broad term as case law above shows. What we can also note is that 
in expert reports, courts are evaluating causation by considering certain ideas of 
probability: what is to be expected in such a situation? What is the most common 
outcome? What is typical? This is the kernel of establishing causation.  Yet this idea 
of probability was also mixed up with ideas of “sphere of risk”.  The germs, so to 
speak, in the above case, were in the sphere of the hospital.  The courts recognised 
that not all germs can be eliminated and that people, in general, are aware of this.  
So does this mean that if an infection is contracted in a hospital in Germany (or even 
a certain number of days after a treatment in a hospital?) that there may be 
causation? The answer has to be no – but a qualified one.  It must be remembered 
that although a plaintiff may have some procedural advantages (inasmuch as it might 
be for the hospital to prove that it conformed with all required health guidelines), 
courts will be mindful that perfection cannot be achieved – as was seen in the above 
case.  Their attitude seems to be that everyone knows that some hygiene risks – in 
particular germs - are unavoidable.  Hospitals do, however, have high standards to 
maintain.  It will depend on the circumstances and on the quality of the report in any 
given case.  It is submitted then that lawyers do a certain amount of research 
themselves and ask specific questions related to frequency, probability and possibility 
without leading too much an expert witness (where, of course, they have instructed 
their own experts).   As I shall discuss later, this is why I think it is imperative that all 
reports must be questioned.   
 
Finally in this area, and under the heading of fully masterable risks and organisation 
more generally, there is the question of newly qualified doctors.  Newly qualified 
doctors are, of course, essential to the continuance of the profession. As is to be 
expected, however, newly qualified doctors, if not properly supervised, can easily 
make errors that can have severe consequences for patients.  It is for this reason that 
more senior doctors must ensure the proper supervision of trainees.  Katzenmeier 
notes 
Erleidet ein Patient bei der Behandlung durch einen (noch) nicht hinreichend 
qualifizierten Arzt Gesundheitsschäden, dann greifen Beweiserleichterungen für die 
Frage der Kausalität.697 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In such a case, the hospital must show that the damage did not come about from a 
lack of supervision or experience.  The BGH has already held that in such situations 
die Gefahr der Unaufklärbarkeit der Kausalität der vorwerfbar geschaffenen 
Risikoerhöhung für den eingetretetenen Schaden tragen.698 
 
If fully controllable by the doctor then he has the burden of proof to show he did 
nothing wrong.  However, if a patient displays an anatomical anomaly then the 
burden of proof goes back to the patient 
Das zeigt sich besonders deutlich an einem Ausnahmefall: tritt nähmlich bei 
operationsbedingter Lagerung dei Schädigung durch eine anatopmische Anomalie 
des Patienten ein, die zuvor nicht erkennbar war, greift wieder die Beweislast des 
Patienten ein.699 
 
So where does the fully-masterable risk doctrine lead as far causation is concerned? It 
could be an argument in negligence itself but courts recognise it is a stand-alone 
doctrine.  When we consider this theory, we must look to the doctors' or hospitals' 
organisational obligations and not to the curative obligations of a physician.  Yet this 
idea of “organisation” as we have seen, is broad and extensive and it incorporates 
much more than the administrative.  It puts responsibility on hospitals and doctors to 
ensure the hygiene of the hospital – surely a good thing.  Doctors also have a 
responsibility generally to ensure that they leave no foreign bodies in a human post-
operation700 and there is also an obligation to ensure that newly qualified doctors are 
properly supervised.  Yet the commonality between these scenarios is that the risks 
are not subject to the vagaries of the human body but rather they are fully-masterable 
by the doctors in question.  There is nothing similar in the common law and a 
French approach is notably different.    
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5.12 Missing Records 
Doctors in Germany have a duty to keep proper medical records of their patients as 
set out in the Improvement of Patients Rights Act 2013.701 Since 1978, it has been 
imperative that they be kept and they are not just an aide-memoire.702 
 
The duty to keep records is part of the Schutzzweck.703 From the diagnosis, medical 
directions on care, warnings that have been given to a patient before a procedure, 
and after treatment are but some of the areas that must be covered in good record 
keeping.  Further analysis of the contents of the records is outside the scope of this 
work and reference is made to Katzenmeier.704 What is interesting from a causal 
point of view is what inadequate record keeping actually means from a procedural 
point of view.  If there is a breach of this duty, there is a procedural sanction.705  As 
Janda states 
So wird vermutet, dass eine nicht dokumentierte Maßnahme vom Arzt nicht 
ergriffen worden ist.  Ferner wird vermutet, dass sich ein nicht dokumentierte 
Umstand so ereignet hat, wie ihn der Patient glaubhaft schildert.706 
 
Omitting to take proper records is a mistake in treatment.  It is ancillary to the more 
general duty to provide proper treatment.  If something is not documented, then it is 
assumed that a measure was not carried out unless the physician can prove that it 
was.707  This does not give rise to a sui generis claim but only if there was some kind 
of serious mistake in treatment.708 The test to be applied in ascertaining whether 
there has been a gap in treatment is whether the notes comprehensible to another 
doctor.709 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Causal problems arise when there have been omissions to keep proper records with 
regards to diagnostic tests.710 This will be seen as a breach of a subsidiary duty of care 
(Verletzung der Befundsicherungspflich).  The court must then enter into areas of 
hypotheses.  What would such a test have shown and would any therapy have cured 
the patient?711 In cases where a doctor has omitted to preserve proper records of a 
diagnostic, then German courts have been willing to relax proof by presuming that it 
appears “sufficiently likely” that misplaced test results would have revealed an 
ailment to which the doctor ought to have reacted.  
 
Janda gives the following example. Patient P had to undergo an operation to take out 
a gallstone.  During aftercare and further to an X-ray, it was noticed that some of the 
gallstone remained.  This necessitated a further operation to have the remainder 
removed.  Also the pancreas of the patient had become inflamed. During the trial, 
the X-rays were lost.  It was not a matter of dispute that an X-ray was actually taken.  
In favour of the patient it will be presumed that the remainder of the gallstone was 
detectable.712 
 
A problem that is encountered with the breach of this duty is that further questions 
with regard to causation may be difficult to establish.  Situations arise both where 
there have been misplaced results and where there has been a total failure to carry 
out a test.  
 
In 1987, a doctor omitted to perform a lung X-ray on a patient whom he had 
diagnosed as having bronchial-pneumonia but he actually had tuberculosis.713 The 
court set itself two questions as far as causation was concerned: 
i. if the doctor had taken the X-ray, would it probably have shown up 
something to which the doctor should have reacted?; 
ii. would such reaction probably have helped the patient? !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
710 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p69 
711 ibid 
712 C JANDA, Medizinrecht, p333 
713 BGH NJW 1987, 1482, as also noted by M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p86 
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Each case was to be judged on its merits.714  Yet since 1996, the BGH has rejected 
this approach.  The reason for this is that a patient who never had a test done or 
where test results were lost should not be in a worse position than a patient who does 
have the results but the physician then acted negligently.  So now, there is just a 
presumption that the test would have shown something to which the doctor should 
have responded, not that such response would have helped the patient.715 The 
burden of proof is then on the patient in accordance with §286 ZPO. However, the 
interesting exception to this is that where this failure to react to a test amounts to 
gross negligence then it will be for the doctor to show that a suitable response would 
not have helped the patient – a typical “he would have died anyway” scenario.  This 
actually happened in one case where a doctor failed to carry out a blood test on a 
patient following a road traffic accident.716  The patient then died of kidney failure.  
The doctor then had the burden of proof to show that such treatment would not have 
prevented the outcome.  Stauch has translated this to English but I shall quote the 
original from the case report.717 It reads 
Nach der neueren Rechtspruchung des Senats läßt ein Verstoß des Arztes gegen die 
Pflicht zur Erhebung und Sicherung medizinischer Befunde im Wege der 
Beweiserleichterung für den Patienten zwar zunächst nur auf ein reaktionspflichtiges 
positives Befundergebnis schließen, wenn ein solches hinreichend wahrscheinlich 
war.  Ein solcher Verstoß kann aber darüber hinaus auch für die Kausalitätsfrage 
beweisleisgternd Bedeutung gewinnen, nämlich dann, wenn im Einzelfall zugleich 
auf einen groben Behandlungsfehler zu schließen ist, weil sich bei der unterlassenen 
Abklärung mit hinreichender Wahrscheinlichkeit ein so deutlicher und gravierender 
Befund ergeben hätte, daß sich dessen Verkennung als fundamental fehlerhaft 
darstellen müßte. 
 
This is a curious state of affairs.   What this means is that there is a basic presumption 
that any test would require a reaction on behalf of the doctor.   This idea will then be 
mixed with the causal presumption of “gross treatment error” and if it can be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
714 ibid, M STAUCH 
715 BGH NJW, 1996, 1589 
716 BGH NJW 1999, 860 
717 BGH NJW 1999, 860 (861); M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p87 
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regarded as such then the patient will benefit from a causal presumption.  Yet what 
the case law is saying is that if the test would have shown a “deutlicher und 
gravierender Befund” then the doctor's failure to recognise this – ie his failure to 
react which has already been established – amounts in itself to a fundamental error! 
Is it fair then that from the mere omission of a test  - being simply negligent in itself – 
that this can mushroom in the hypothetical to gross negligence? The alternative, it 
seems, is to let the patient bear the burden. I would submit that if a doctor has been 
negligent here then he must bear such consequences.  The taking of proper notes and 
the maintaining of proper records are in the doctor’s risk sphere and the burden of 
proof must lie with him where appropriate. 
 
The codified answer now provided by the BGB at 630h (5) is 
[the provisions on gross malpractice] [are] also to apply if the treating party 
omitted to take or record a medically-necessary finding in good time where the 
finding would with sufficient certainty have led to a result which would have 
given rise to further measures, and if failure to carry out such measures would 
have constituted gross malpractice. 
 
So again, failing to record accurately or omitting to record totally could ultimately 
result in a reversal of the burden of proof for the defendant doctor.  
 
It can be seen then that the failure to take proper notes by a doctor in Germany has 
causal repercussions in procedure that do not exist in the other jurisdictions under 
consideration here.  
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5.13 Special Systems 
Germany has a number of special systems in existence that help to show how, in 
certain circumstances, ideas of causation have been attenuated or modified.  
These laws necessarily reflect societal values and I shall consider two in Germany: 
the Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976 and the HIV-Hilfgesetz. 
 
5.13.1 The Pharmaceutical Products Act   1976 
The Arzneimittelgesetz 1976 (the “Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976”) is the only 
special regime to exist in Europe existing before the Product Directive.  It can 
therefore continue to exist.  It is important for causation as I shall show below.  The 
Act was passed following the 1960’s thalidomide scandal.  Section 84 of the 
Pharmaceutical Products Act is headed “Absolute Liability”.  It provides that  
(1) If, as a result of the administration of a medicinal product intended for human 
use, which was distributed to the consumer within the purview of the present Act and 
which is subject to compulsory marketing authorisation or is exempted by ordinance 
from the need for a marketing authorisation, a person is killed, or the body or the 
health of a person is substantially damaged, the pharmaceutical entrepreneur who 
placed the medicinal product on the market within the purview of the present Act 
shall be obliged to compensate the injured party for the damage caused. The liability 
to compensate shall only exist if 
 
1.  when used in accordance with its intended purpose, the medicinal product has 
harmful effects which exceed the limits considered tolerable in the light of current 
medical knowledge, or 
2.  the damage has occurred as a result of labelling, expert information or 
instructions for use which do not comply with current medical knowledge. 
 
So here there is reference to the “pharmaceutical enterprise” which places the 
product on the market.  We also see here the adoption of a risk / benefit analysis in 
the circumstances.  It is not sufficient that doctors warn the patient of the risks.  They 
must be indicated on the medicinal product.718  Lenze notes that it is problematic for 
the patient to show that he would not have taken the drugs if the warnings had been !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
718  S LENZE “German Product Liability Law: between European Directives, American 
Restatements and Common Sense” at p 120 in D FAIRGRIEVE (ed) Product Liability in Comparative 
Perspective, (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
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there if the prescribing doctor knew about the risks.719  So again there is the problem 
of proof by virtue of the counterfactual.  Even if the patient knew of the risks, how 
would he establish he would not have taken the drugs? I imagine this would have to 
be judged on a case-by-case basis considering inter alia how far it was necessary for 
that patient to take the medication and the availability and efficacy of other 
treatments in a similar way to operation risk.  
 
The Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976 is also interesting for the criteria it provides 
on causation in Article 84(2).  The Act presumes causation if the drug in question is 
capable of causing the injury.  It reads 
The capability [of the drug causing the damage] in the individual case will be 
determined according to the composition and the dosage of the administered 
medicinal product, the manner and duration of its administration when used as 
intended, the temporal relationship to the occurrence of the damage, the damage 
symptoms and the person's state of health at the time of the administration as well as 
all other circumstances which, in the individual case, speak for or against the 
causation of damage. The presumption shall not apply if, in the light of the 
circumstances pertaining to the individual case, another fact is capable of causing the 
damage. However, the administration of additional medicinal products which, in the 
circumstances pertaining to the individual case, are capable of causing the damage 
shall not be considered as another fact unless, owing to the administration of these 
medicinal products, claims for reasons other than the lack of causality for the 
damage, do not exist under this provision.  
 
This is interesting in that it sets out criteria which determine “capability” and thus 
causation.  These are interesting in that criteria similar to those in the multiple 
sclerosis / hepatitis B cases in France seem to be adopted.  It appears here that 
generalizing scientific proof is relegated to second place.  Reference is made to “the 
individual case” here.  So, for example, if a patient takes an anti-psychotic for 
depression, which has a potential side effect of causing seizures in certain patients, 
then a court could hold the manufacturer of that drug liable if such seizures are 
deemed to exceed a tolerable level given the illness for which the patient is being 
treated.  There would also be a presumption that the particular anti-psychotic caused !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
719 ibid 
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the seizure.  If, however, the patient decided to go out partying late into the night, 
imbibing lots of alcohol and having very little sleep before starting work the next day, 
then this would certainly be another fact in the individual case capable of causing any 
damage resulting from the seizure.    
 
In another case under this Act, the plaintiff had certain pains dating from 1993 that 
were treated with painkillers.720   From February 2001, the plaintiff began taking 
painkiller VIOXX.   In the middle of January 2002, the 73-year old suffered from a 
heart attack but he still continued to take VIOXX.   Two years later, in May 2004, 
the plaintiff was admitted to hospital with angina pectoris.  The plaintiff claimed 
from the defendant that the VIOXX caused his damage from 2002.  The plaintiff 
failed in his claim.  I shall concentrate on the causal reasons here only.  The plaintiff 
was not afforded any Anscheinbeweis or reversal of the burden of proof, as this would 
only be allowed 
...wenn das Schadenereignis nach allgemeiner Lebenserfahrung eine typische Folde 
der Pflichtverlezung darstelle. 
 
and this was not the case here.  Such damage would be typical, for example, where a 
patient became infected with HIV following a blood transfusion and such patient did 
not belong to the HIV risk groups. In such a case, there would be a presumption or a 
lightening of the burden of proof in his favour.   In the case at hand, however, the 
plaintiff also had “signifikante Risikofaktoren” which had to be taken into account. 
The risk factors could also have caused, or contributed to, the heart attack.  They 
were his age, his blood pressure and the fact that he had been ski-ing.  What I think 
can be gleaned from this case then is that it is particularly difficult to go from the 
general to the individual and more and more medical law cases show this. 
 
I find this Pharmaceutical Products Act unique in that it sets out, in legislation, 
factors to be taken into account when considering causation.  It is suitable for a 
particular area where causation may prove difficult: drugs.  Notwithstanding all the 
factors that it lists, it remains particularly vague.  As well as the factors to be taken 
into account that are listed, what also must be considered are “other circumstances !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
720 BGH 6 Zivilsenat, judgement from 16 March 2010 – VI ZR 64/09  
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which, in the individual case, speak for or against the causation of damage”.  I 
question therefore in reality whether this clause on causation was necessary.  Perhaps 
it was to act as a gently reminder to the judiciary as to what they must take into 
account.   What does seem necessary is the causal provision that “the administration 
of additional medicinal products which, in the circumstances pertaining to the 
individual case, are capable of causing the damage shall not be considered as another 
fact unless…”, Germany has adopted this policy approach and it is suitable for that 
jurisdiction.  Yet it would be foolhardy to divorce consideration of such criteria more 
globally from the standard of proof and it is this which I shall consider in the 
comparative chapter.   
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5.13.2 HIV-Hilfgesetz 
The HIV-Hilfgesetz was passed in 1995 to allow patients who had been infected by 
HIV following a blood transfusion to be compensated.  This sets up an endowment 
whereby those who were infected with HIV, or with AIDS following on HIV from 
contaminated blood, can receive no-fault compensation.721  It must be shown, 
however, by medical evidence that the HIV / AIDS has arisen as a result of a blood 
transfusion.  Causality would seem to speak only to the possibility of infection 
Zum Nachweis der Ursächlichkeit genügt es, daß im Verlauf einer Behandlung ein 
Blutprodukt verwendet worden ist, das eine HIV-Infektion verursacht haben 
kann.722 
 
Those who are not haemophiliacs must bring evidence of when the transfusion took 
place.723 Where a spouse or partner seeks to recover, more guidance on the causal 
requirement is given.  The law states 
Im Falle des Absatzes 2 ist durch ärztliche Bescheinigung nachzuweisen, daß eine 
HIV-Infektion oder AIDS-Erkrankung vorliegt und die Infektion mit großer 
Wahrscheinlichkeit durch den Ehepartner, Verlobten oder Lebenspartner 
übertragen worden ist. 
 
So at least here we have the indication of “great probability” – another adjective in 
causal description.   
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
721 §15(1) 
722 §15(5) 
723  ibid; “Im Falle des Absatzes 1 sind die Voraussetzungen nach Satz 1 durch ärztliche 
Bescheinigung nachzuweisen, aus der die Ursächlichkeit des verabreichten Blutproduktes für die 
vorliegende HIV-Infektion oder die dadurch bedingte AIDS-Erkrankung hervorgehen muß. Zum 
Nachweis der Ursächlichkeit genügt es, daß im Verlauf einer Behandlung ein Blutprodukt 
verwendet worden ist, das eine HIV-Infektion verursacht haben kann. Antragstellende Personen, 
die nicht Bluter sind, müssen darüber hinaus durch eine Bescheinigung der mit dem Blutprodukt 
behandelnden Einrichtung nachweisen, wann diese ihnen das Blutprodukt verabreicht hat. 
Anfallende Kosten für die Ausstellung der Bescheinigungen werden nicht erstattet.” 
! ! ! ! !! 205!
5.15 Conclusions 
Stauch suggests that the chances of obtaining redress in general for a patient in 
Germany are higher than in England.724 He cites however, in footnote, that there is 
no data on the subject but it may well follow as a result of the favourable substantive 
and procedural law rules in Germany notwithstanding a prima facie higher burden of 
proof.  Perhaps this is because in judges' minds the direct link between costs and 
resources is less explicit.  In Germany, it is insurers who bear the cost.  In the United 
Kingdom, it is justified by direct taxation and although ultimately the cost will fall on 
the insured in Germany, it may take longer so to do.  
 
What I noticed in Germany first of all was how much the substantive law was 
actually affected by procedural devices.  Procedural law inherently shaped 
substantive law.   As a consequence, this naturally had an influence on causation.  
The study of procedural law in Germany is therefore imperative if a true 
understanding of the intricacies of causation in medical liability is required.  It is true 
also that the level or the standard of proof is higher in Germany than in the United 
Kingdom.  This would make one think intuitively that cases would be more difficult 
to prove in Germany than in the United Kingdom.  However, such are the German 
plaintiff-friendly procedures that a plaintiff's lawyer should assess the case to ascertain 
whether the plaintiff could take advantage of a reversal of a burden of proof, a 
lightening of the burden of proof, or whether the situation involves certain risks of 
which the care-provider was the “full master” or whether there has been malpractice 
with regard to the keeping of proper documentation. 
 
In Germany then, causal analysis very much starts from what it considers to be first 
principles.  This is similar to other jurisdictions concerned.  Case law has admitted 
the conditio sine qua non test and then a further test of adequate causation is applied.  
Such tests, however, have not totally satisfied the court and, as we have seen, even 
when causation is an issue, sometimes the courts do not mention these tests at all. 
This leads me to believe then that, as far as medical negligence is concerned, these 
traditional theories are not sufficient.  Indeed, when justice is required, resort is had 
to the Schutzzweck rule and no mention is made of the traditional causal analyses.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
724 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p158 
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What should be made of the reversals or the lightening of the burden of proof in 
Germany with regard to causation? Undoubtedly such rules help the plaintiff but 
their justification or otherwise is not for consideration in this paper.  What is to be 
considered here is how they differ from the other jurisdictions.  Just to consider again 
briefly the case with the dentist; it may be considered that to leave the burden of 
proof on the patient when a dentist should know that working with chapped hands 
could create a risk is not fair or just.  Germany would then apply either a lightening 
of the burden of proof or a total reversal of it.  This is a solution that would not 
necessarily be followed in the United Kingdom.   
 
Perhaps the one area where German law is causally distinctive is with regard to the 
disclosable risks inherent in a given procedure.  There is certainly, as we have seen, 
basic information that has to be provided; but even here it is subject to certain 
conditions.  What we have in Germany is the situation that the doctor must inform 
the patient of even the minutest risk if its eventuation could have a serious effect on 
the patient's life: and the case law suggests how far a doctor should go in this regard.  
Even risks of one in 20,000 have had to be disclosed.  A doctor would also do well 
then to record that he has done this.  This area of risk also relates to hypothetical 
causation.  The question arises would the patient have gone ahead with the 
procedure even if he knew about the risk.  There is no loss of chance recovery 
permissible as in France.  Again the law favours the patient here in that even if there 
has been a mistake in the treatment given or not, the law will hold a doctor liable for 
all injuries following from any damage.   
 
I also considered the German Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976. Compensation can 
be obtained here if an injury generally exceeds an accepted tolerable limit resulting 
from a defect in production or administration of a drug.725  Giesen and Stauch would 
appear to disagree on whether liability under the act is strict or not.  Giesen says that 
it is726 and Stauch that it is not strictly in that there is a cost-benefit analysis to be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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made first.727  I would agree with Stauch in that it must first be ascertained what an 
acceptably tolerable limit is and this surely must be the result of epidemiological 
evidence to be presented in court.  
 
Given Stauch has said that a plaintiff would more likely (in general) be successful in a 
claim in Germany than in England, I suggest, goes someway to establishing my 
argument that it is pointless to attempt to deduce causal generalities.  To contrast 
with France, there is no loss of chance and a patient cannot generally recover for a 
“medical accident”.  As I shall mention in the comparative chapter, all jurisdictions 
are particularly different, especially when it comes to causal approaches, risk 
disclosure, criteria for liability with drugs and procedure.   This necessarily affects 
how legal causation is understood and applied.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter 6: Comparative Chapter  
6.1 Introduction  
This paper has sought thusfar to introduce the reader to the essential elements of 
causation in medical responsibility in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and 
Luxembourg.   The purpose of doing this is to show through research that there is no 
common idea of causation that can be gleaned from either case law or academic 
writing. Even in “easy cases” causation can be said to be an issue.  I believe it is in 
analysing these cases from a functionalist comparative lawyer’s viewpoint that I can 
come to the conclusion that there is no common concept of causation and this can be 
shown with regard to research done here in the medical sphere.  I have attempted to 
show this through an analysis of academic writing and of case law in this regard.  I 
considered in Chapter 1 causation as a philosophical and a logical concept; what we 
mean when we talk about legal causation and how that differs from other notions of 
causation, be it in science or in life more generally.  I also considered ideas of 
conditions and common sense.  I later developed in the same chapter certain essential 
causal approaches as equivalence theory, adequacy theory and purpose-of-the-rule 
violated theory.  While some people might eschew discussing philosophy, logic or set 
theory in tort law, this is not my approach.  I find it essential that to have a full 
understanding of a subject as vast as causation, a certain overview of these areas is 
crucial.  It would have been remiss if I had discussed equivalence or adequacy theory 
without at least touching on the philosophy from which it comes.  Further, in the 
area of logic, we have seen such problems as a disease following on from a certain 
act.  “I had a vaccination for hepatitis B and then I developed multiple sclerosis” 
could be a logically accurate statement but it tells us absolutely nothing of causality.   
We need to know more about inter alia the time-reference. We need to know as 
much as we can while excluding conditions.  Also, counterfactuals are the lifeblood of 
philosophical causal problems.  They are not just annoyances irrelevant to the 
practice of tort in the courts. As I showed in the case of Chester v Afshar, courts embark 
on a philosophical counterfactual enquiry to establish what a patient would have 
done had she known of the risks.  The courts in all of the jurisdictions may not frame 
it in this way but counterfactuals are the essence of the sine qua non theory.  I also 
had to discuss probability and statistics as probability is central to adequacy theory 
Statistics are central to a court case where they can often form evidence for or against 
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the plaintiff.  Statistics can also affect the burden of proof.  I also made it clear in this 
Chapter that causation is not just a matter of agreeing on rules, principles or 
guidelines and then applying them.  Procedure in each jurisdiction is also important.  
The standards of proof must be considered, as well as how courts deal with expert 
evidence.  This shows that proving causation in the law is inherently entwined with 
local procedure.  I then considered what I found the most important themes in 
medical causation in the United Kingdom, Germany and France in order to show 
how widely the systems differ in their methodologies.     
 
In the United Kingdom chapter, as in all the chapters, I gave the briefest of 
overviews of the tort system in question. In the United Kingdom, there must be a 
causal link between the fault alleged and the damage caused to find liability.  There is 
no codification in the United Kingdom and reference must be made to the common 
law. I then introduced the legal dichotomy of conditio sine qua non diluted for legal 
causation (causa causans).  I also showed in some cases how legal policy could show 
causation.  This was done in the most part by an exposé of case law showing how 
these ideas had developed.  I presented also how procedure plays an important role 
in the United Kingdom which, has resulted in part, to the rejection of the loss of 
chance doctrine in medical tort cases. It is this “balance of probabilities” test which 
led me in this chapter in particular to consider the use of statistics in courts and how 
they play a part in establishing a causal link. 
 
By considering Germany, my wish was to show its more philosophical approach to 
causation, at least in its foundation, and how it has influenced the other jurisdictions 
considered here.  I examined how its basic approach was similar to the United 
Kingdom in that it used equivalence theory tempered with adequacy theory.  From 
time to time, however, public policy would dominate.  Yet it is in procedure perhaps 
that one notices the contrast with the United Kingdom.  I then studied disclosure 
malpractice in Germany where the doctor has a heavy duty on him to show that even 
the smallest risks be disclosed.  Recent legislation, in particular with regard to the 
Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013 (and its amendment of the BGB) was also 
considered. 
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With France and Luxembourg, I wanted to demonstrate how much more practical 
these two countries seem to be when tackling their cases on medical liability where 
cause is an issue.  The last two countries do not seem to become tied up with the 
dogmatic pursuit of one particular road as opposed to another.  Unlike the other two 
jurisdictions in question in this paper, France does not “start out” with equivalence or 
adequacy theory in principle.  It has not as yet made a choice as to which one it 
prefers and I doubt the courts are in any hurry to choose.  Indeed why should they? I 
also deduced through my research that France appears to be much more victim-
friendly than perhaps Germany or the United Kingdom, in large measure no doubt, 
to its recognition of loss of chance in medical negligence cases.  I considered loss of 
chance and this was also examined along side French procedural law.  I then wrote 
about nosocomial infections and medical hazards, recovery for the latter being in 
particular a very French idea.  I briefly looked also at the disclosure obligation 
incumbent upon a doctor in France.   One disadvantage of French case law, 
however, was its brevity.   
 
Even with a consideration of these four jurisdictions, what is interesting is that ideas 
of causation always change to suit the particular case.  This is clear from the case law 
I have exposed.   Therefore I wanted to be able to show that, at least within the 
framework of medical liability, due to the mercurial nature of causation, that it is 
impossible to derive any workable notions of causation that can be relied on again 
and again by those who seek to harmonise tort law in Europe in any meaningful way.  
As we have seen, problems in medical causation are often the same across the 
jurisdictions.  This has resulted in one jurisdiction’s allowing recovery in certain areas 
where another jurisdiction would not – loss of chance being the example that perhaps 
stands out the most.   There are also questions of proof which divide the jurisdictions: 
perhaps most significantly we see in the United Kingdom that the plaintiff must 
prove his case on the balance of probabilities whereas in France and Luxembourg, 
there is a high level of proof in that the judge must intimately believe the plaintiff’s 
case.  In Germany, the standard of proof is also prima facie higher than in the United 
Kingdom.  
 
My plan in this final chapter is as follows.  I wish first to consider the essential 
similarities and differences among each of the jurisdictions that I have expounded 
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herein – the classic comparative lawyer approach.  I do not wish to consider which is 
the “best” law but rather simply to arrive at an understanding of how the 
jurisdictions differ.  From this accounting of differences, I wish then to show that 
there can be no common understanding of causation.  I believe this should be a most 
stimulating task from an equivalence functionalist viewpoint.  I shall do this in three 
stages focussing on France/United Kingdom, Germany/United Kingdom and then 
France/Germany.   
 
Then, to underline my argument in this paper, I shall show that there can be no 
understanding of what factual causation or legal causation actually is. There can 
therefore be no one concept of causation.  There is no need then to attempt to 
elucidate, clarify or define it as some do in draft projects of harmonisation of 
European tort law.  
 
I shall then reflect on the PETL and the DCFR, and in particular their references to 
causation.  I do this to show that given the decisions and academic writing that we 
have that it is impossible to extract any workable principles as far as causation is 
concerned that could be applied consistently.   It follows therefore that the PETL and 
the DCFR as projects must change their present understanding of causation.  If there 
cannot be any agreement on causation (as the approaches in the jurisdictions differ so 
widely) and causation is an inherent and central part of liability in tort law, then it is 
my contention that both these projects must change.   
 
Whether we like it or not, however, it appears that causation in the law at a 
European level is here to stay.  The ECJ has been asked to pronounce on non-
contractual obligations.  Causation is necessarily part of this.  I must consider 
causation in this regard.  I suggest how the ECJ might wish or might develop 
causation.  What is different at the level of the TFEU, however, is that causation is 
nowhere defined.  It is left to ECJ case law to interpret it.  This is more realistic than 
attempting to define it in draft documents that purport to harmonise European tort 
law.  I imagine, however, that the situations arising concerning medical causation at 
this level may be few and far between.  It would be remiss of me, however, not to 
consider the application of causal notions in the highest court in Europe.  As part of 
my consideration of European causation more generally, I shall consider the Product 
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Directive, the Environmental Liability Directive and how these ideas of cause might 
be implemented given our understanding of how courts in three major legal systems 
have come to interpret the idea.  
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6.2 France and the United Kingdom 
6.2.1 Overview 
Both France and the United Kingdom are essentially fault-based systems in tort.  For 
the United Kingdom, finding causation is part of the deductive reasoning that any 
student follows when assessing whether there has been a breach of a duty of care 
(evidencing negligence) and whether damages should be awarded in any given case.  
In France, the notion of fault is based on the simple recitation of Article 1382 Civil 
Code stating that anyone who causes damage through his fault has an obligation to 
make it good.728   No duty of care need be shown and it is not necessary that the 
damage need be reasonably foreseeable, although the latter is sometimes referred to. 
Khoury notes here that courts sometimes rely on the prévision raisonnable des consequences 
(reasonable foreseeability). 729  Damages are what have been caused as a direct 
consequence in France and there is much case law.  In neither jurisdiction is the idea 
of causation defined.   
 
As far as causation itself is concerned, there is an immediate difference as soon as we 
are confronted with the notion in both jurisdictions.  Quézel-Ambrunaz notes 
Le droit français ne connaît pas formellement l’opposition entre la cause in fact et la 
cause in law…comme cela semble être le cas dans nombre d’autres systèmes 
juridiques.730  
 
He is right. In the United Kingdom, a theoretical dichotomy is made between cause-
in-fact and a cause-in-law.   This is not to say that the French do not use the term 
conditio sine qua non; on the contrary, its academic writing is full of its use,731 by 
contrast, however, systematic reasoning, as we like to think we have in the United 
Kingdom, is not followed.  Sometimes I thought the French had cast off any attempt 
to discover the most dominant theory in their law in preference for pithy comments !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
728 as noted, the doctor / patient relationship in France is usually in contract.  Causal notions, 
however, are often made to tort in French law even in this area.  
729 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p28; G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, J GHESTIN (dir) Traité 
de droit civil : Les conditions de la responsabilité, (2nd edn, Paris, LGDJ, 1998), 346 
730 C QUEZEL-AMBRUNAZ in “Definition de la causalité en droit français” in Le droit français de 
la responsabilité civile confronté aux projets européens d’harmonisation, p355 
731 though I have not come across “cause légale” yet 
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that causation is a “redoubtable mystère” 732  or simply that it was “toujours 
irritante”.733  Some French authors, as Quézel-Ambrunaz notes, have even suggested 
that judges abstain from analysing causation, that causation be replaced by an idea of 
remoteness or that it be absorbed in the idea of damage.734  We even see some similar 
ideas such as common sense and equity appear in both the French and common law 
traditions.735  What I did not see in the common law tradition was any reference that 
causal problems could be solved by “feeling” or sentiment.736 
 
6.2.2 Starting Points 
I think it would be wrong to say that the starting points for any given causal problem 
in France and the United Kingdom are the same. There may well ultimately be a 
rejection of causal theories in France.  That said all of them, with the exceptions of 
the causa proxima and the Schutzzweck der Norm, have been used in decision-making.  In 
solving a causal problem, a court could rely on equivalence of conditions or the 
adequacy theory.  France has used both and has relied also on counterfactual 
analyses.  I noted that French writers and cases often referred to the following  
La cause est une condition qui était objectivement de nature à produire le type de 
dommage qui est survenu..737 
 
In British jurisprudence, I have seen no outright mention of adequate cause though I 
think notions such as reasonable foreseeability in damages come close to it (though 
perhaps not to the German understanding of adequacy). In France, as I mentioned, 
there is direct causation – where the plaintiff necessarily recovers – and then there is 
indirect causation – where the plaintiff will necessarily not recover.  Adequate 
causation seeks to eliminate the mere circumstances of the damage and isolate its 
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immediate cause(s), namely those event(s) of a nature to have caused the damage in a 
normal state of affairs (dans le cours habituel des choses).738 
 
6.2.3 Conditio sine qua non 
Every law student in the United Kingdom is introduced to the case of Barnett v Chelsea 
and Kensington Hospital739 when studying causation from first principles.  It will be 
remembered that this case concerned a doctor who did not treat a man who had 
previously been poisoned by arsenic.  He was doomed to die in any case.  The doctor 
may have breached his duty of care towards his patient by not treating him but 
causation could not be shown and the plaintiff’s claim was rejected.  This is seen as 
one of the “easy” cases when introducing conditio sine qua non theory.  Yet I am not 
certain it would have been decided the same way in France.  France is more victim-
friendly and I believe France might have considered the fault (breach of duty of care) 
and allowed causation for public policy reasons.  I cannot be certain, of course.  
Similarly in Bolitho, I am not certain whether it would have been decided in the 
United Kingdom and in France in the same way.  This was the case where a doctor 
had decided not to intubate a child and this was held to be acceptable as long as 
there was medical opinion to back this up.  As Lord Browne-Wilkinson opined 
In all cases the primary question is one of fact: did the wrongful act cause the injury? 
But in cases where the breach of duty consists of an omission to do an act which 
ought to be done (eg the failure by a doctor to attend) that factual inquiry is by 
definition in the realms of hypothesis.740   
 
He continued 
However in the present case the answer to the question “what would have 
happened?” is not determinative of the issue of causation.741 
 
The defendants admitted that if the professional standard of care required any 
doctor who attended to intubate the plaintiff then his claim must succeed.  Yet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
738 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p27 
739 [1968] 2 WLR 422 
740 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1997] UKHL 46; Bailli, p5/9 
741 ibid 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson goes further in analysing why this is the case.  He 
adopted the analysis of another judge.  I have quoted it before but I quote it here 
for ease of reference 
‘…a plaintiff can discharge the burden of proof on causation by satisfying the 
court either that the relevant person would in fact have taken the requisite action 
(although she would not have been at fault if she had not) or that the proper 
discharge of the relevant person’s duty towards the plaintiff required that she take 
that action.  The former alternative calls for no explanation since it is simply the 
factual proof of the causative effect of the original fault.   The latter is slightly 
more sophisticated: it involves the factual situation that the original fault did not 
itself cause the injury but that this was because there would have been some 
further fault on the part of the defendants; the plaintiff proves his case by proving 
that his injuries would have been avoided if proper care had continued to be 
taken.’742    
 
This is interesting for a number of reasons.  First, we have the admission that a 
counterfactual analysis is not always determinative of the answer sine qua non – 
notably in the case of omissions.  What kind of behaviour do we supplant? As 
Quézel-Ambrunaz notes 
La jurisprudence tend à toujours exiger que soit demontrée la violation d’une 
obligation743    
  
and therefore some “legitimate alternative” would be sought in France.744  So I 
suggest therefore that if there had been a breach of a similar obligation as there was 
here in Bolitho, and a French judge had two sets of experts’ reports, then I suggest on 
balance, it would come down in favour of the plaintiff who had created the risk.   Yet 
the problem here is exactly this:  expert opinion differed.  One expert said there was 
a duty to intubate, one that there was not.  Again procedure is mixed with 
substantive law.  In France, the scenario may not have arisen in that there would 
probably only have been one expert report and the judge would have followed this.   
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Yet I cannot say which experts’ report.  If there had been two experts’ reports, one 
saying there was negligence and one saying there was not then it is unclear to me 
how France would have resolved this difficulty – probably in favour of the victim 
given that the doctor had created the risk, but I cannot be sure.  Certainly the judge 
could not make any scientific pronouncements and he would have to take other 
societal values into account.  It is a question of law and a judge cannot supplant his 
lay medical expertise, or at least, he would be courageous so to do. In the United 
Kingdom, the position is different.  If there is one body of medical opinion which 
finds there to be no negligence then there will have been no negligence save as has 
now been modified in Montgomery.  So even just by considering this case in detail 
shows how causation would be treated differently in this case.   
 
So it is my assertion that even where we seem to have “easy” cases (Barnett) and a case 
where similar outcomes might be expected, I would be hesitant to rush to such a 
conclusion. How jurisdictions treat procedure, evidence and expert reports must be 
considered.  
 
6.2.3.1 Difficulties in using the conditio sine qua non approach in France 
and the United Kingdom 
Using the conditio sine qua non test itself alone can often result in unfairness.  
Alternatives to the sine qua non test have often become necessary when it has 
become clear that to leave the plaintiff with nothing would result in injustice.   As we 
have seen in Wardlaw and McGhee, the ratios of “material contribution to the injury” 
and “material increase in the risk of injury” were introduced as it could not be shown 
that but for the defendants’ negligence, the plaintiffs would not have suffered the 
injury that they did.   In France, I am certain that the result, though perhaps not 
necessarily the reasoning would have been the same, ie recovery would have been 
allowed for the plaintiff.  Cause-in-fact would be jettisoned perhaps for causal 
adequacy.  With McGhee, perhaps a deeper analysis of probability would have been 
gone into before finding for the plaintiff.  The idea of increase of risk or creation of a 
danger could also be used in France save that  
The conceptual objection to the effect that increase of risk is an element of fault, not 
causation, applies equally to…France…the notions of danger and risk are usually 
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part of the assessment of the fault requirement have been of use to the courts mainly 
in the assessment of the objective potential of damage arising from an activity.745 
 
That said, France did hold Bouygues Telecom liable on the basis of the precautionary 
principle though this was not a medical liability case.746 !
6.2.3.1.2 Different Agents  
One example where French and British law could well differ, however, is in the area 
where there are different agents which contribute to or cause a loss.   Fairchild 
established this doctrine.   
 
With Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services, 747  where the plaintiff had developed 
mesothelioma as a result of over-exposure to asbestos, it was not certain which of his 
employers was responsible. One of the judges748in this case even noted that France 
would provide a remedy but based on different legal principles.  Citing van Gerven, 
Lever and Larouche’s Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International 
Tort law749he noted that 
Furthermore, it must be noted that some French legal writers are advocating that 
French law moves away from perte d’une chance towards a reversal of the burden of 
proof on the basis of the negligent creation of risk.   
 
I admit the solution would be the same here.  I highlight simply how difficult the 
theory is to identify and this makes codification, in my opinion, without much value.   
The United Kingdom has had in the past its opportunities to introduce reversals of 
the burden of proof but has rejected them.  The balance of probabilities requirement 
remains engrained in British civil law.   Whether or not France would actually 
reverse the burden of proof, I am not certain.  I have not seen this in case law. 
Fairchild is certainly the kind of case, if it came to be litigated in France, which might !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
745 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p220  
746 see supra  
747 [2002] UKHL 22 
748 Lord Bingham 
749 [2002] UKHL 22, at para 24    
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well result in the raising of presumptions provided that they are certaine, précises and 
concordantes.    
 
By contrast, if we remember the case of Wilsher v Essex Health Authority750 where the 
defendant hospital inserted a catheter negligently into the heart instead of the aorta 
resulting in the provision of excess oxygen.  There were, however, five other agents 
here which could have caused the retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) as suffered by the 
plaintiff.  Oxygen was just one of them.  Although Jourdain notes that  
Le droit français traite les situations de causalité multiple en envisageant chaque 
cause isolément.  S’il apparaît que plusieurs faits peuvent se voir attribuer la qualité 
de cause juridique du dommage, tous seront considérés comme ayant cause 
l’intégralité de celui-ci, peu importe que ces faits soient concomitants ou successifs.751 
 
No-one could say whether the excess oxygen did or did not cause or contribute to the 
RLF suffered by the plaintiff.  It was not proven.  It was admitted that this was a hard 
case but a right one. Yet in the United Kingdom there was interplay between what 
seemed to be burden of proof and causation.  Lord Bridge expressed sympathy with 
victim and the fact that British system offered only an “all or nothing” recovery so we 
must remember that burden of proof is important in the United Kingdom.  Again I 
am near certain that recovery would have been allowed for this case in France. 
Conditio sine qua non could not have been used as the counterfactual question 
would not make sense in this context.  Causal adequacy may have been used.  I think 
simply that France would have followed Jourdain perhaps not as quoted above but 
rather as there was no proof that oxygen caused the damage, it may have used its 
“creation of a danger” doctrine to establish causation. There was a fault and there 
was a creation of a danger.752  French law would focus on fault, moving the balance 
towards probable causation.  This could also be combined with negligently created 
causal uncertainty.  This is not a stand-alone doctrine in causation in medical law but 
rather could be adjoined to a useable causal theory.  As Khoury notes 
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In France, the doctrine has argued that the law should take into account the 
inequalities of the parties vis-à-vis the evidence and the fact that one party has the 
best ability to adduce evidence.  But the French writings also make no claim that this 
factor should be an autonomous and sufficient criterion.753  
 
So then, another area where there would be causal divergence is this sub-category of 
conditio sine qua non theory where there are different agents causing the damage.  I 
suggest France would be more victim-friendly by, for example, allowing recovery in 
cases like Wilsher, where the United Kingdom did not, although there was one 
dissenting judge in this case at the Court of Appeal.754 He argued that if tortious 
behaviour adds materially to the creation of a risk then the defendant is assumed to 
have caused the injury even though the existence and the contribution of the breach 
of duty cannot be determined.755 !
6.2.4 Loss of Chance  
As noted by Lord Bingham above in Fairchild, the United Kingdom does not allow 
recovery for loss of chance in medical negligence whereas France does.756  French 
courts have tried to be careful to award this as a separate head of damages when 
there are serious, precise and concordant presumptions that show the fault is directly 
related to the damage.757 However, if loss of chance is to be recognised as a separate 
head of damage, then an equation involving the full damages is not necessarily 
appropriate.758 Yet as noted above, courts do not believe that they are partially 
compensating the plaintiff’s damage.759  
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Since 1965, French courts have been ready to award damages for loss of chance.760 
In this case, analogous to Hotson, the Cour de cassation found that there were serious, 
précises and concordant presumptions that linked the boy’s damage to the 
defendant’s fault.  It also held that the defendant had caused the boy a loss of chance 
for recovery.  The court valued this and awarded the plaintiff damages.   
 
The French case already referred to of 17 November 1982, I think can be compared 
readily with Wilsher.761  If we remember in Wilsher, there were five possible causes 
that could have resulted in the child’s RLF but it was never proven whether in fact 
oxygen could actually have caused the RLF.  Similarly in the French case, the air in 
the blood could have been caused either by air in the syringe or air already existing 
in the sinus.  The Cour de cassation overturned the Cour d’appel by denying 
compensation for the plaintiff on the basis of lost chance of avoiding the embolism 
stating that lost chance could only be used to assess damages.  As Khoury concludes 
by saying, loss of chance cannot be used when there are alternative causes of the 
damage.  Yet notwithstanding this French courts still make use of loss of chance even 
where there is doubt between the fault and the final damage.762 
 
Another further case where I think we can see a different approach and outcome 
would be in that of Gregg v Scott.763  Here we saw recovery being denied when the 
plaintiff who visited his doctor complaining about a lump was told it was nothing to 
worry about.  After nine months, the lump was still there and eventually he was 
referred to a specialist.  Statistics showed that out of 100 people, 17 could be cured if 
they had had prompt treatment but not if treatment was delayed for one year; 25 
people would be cured if delayed by one year and 58 people would not be cured at 
all.  The claimant argued that he had originally had a 42% chance of recovery 
(adding the 17 and the 25 together) and that by delaying his treatment the first doctor 
had caused him to lose a chance.  The House of Lords held that this could not form 
the basis of a claim in medical negligence.  In France, however, there is no notion of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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balance of probabilities.  Recovery, I am near certain, would have been allowed.  
The courts there would have not sent a claimant away without a remedy in what 
would otherwise be such a hard case.  They would have allowed loss of chance. 
 
So again, I believe that such great differences with regard to approach and solution 
do exist.  I do not believe they can be glossed over by saying that in essence the result 
is the same.  We see in the “easy” and the “hard” cases that –– the result would 
probably not be the same.  This differing approach in the area of loss of chance I 
believe strengthens my case to show that the gleaning of common principles in 
medical causation is a fruitless task.   
 
6.2.5 Burden of Proof  
In both jurisdictions, there is a standard of proof to be met by the claimant.  In the 
United Kingdom, this is on the balance of probabilities.  In France it is the intime 
conviction of the judge.  The former is traditionally described and understood as the 
judge’s accepting one version of events as more likely than another version of events.  
This is not calculated mathematically but based on preponderance of evidence.  If we 
use quantitative probability within 0 and 1, then for the plaintiff to win her case, she 
would have to prove it to a value of 0.51.  There are also evidential rules in the 
United Kingdom.  In contrast, in France, as Taruffo notes 
The principle of intime conviction…[does] not by [itself] entail the adoption of any 
specific standard of proof, let alone the standard of proof beyond reasonable 
doubt.764  
 
He writes that this standard also has a negative aspect in that there is no application 
of legal proof.  To give us an idea of what “intimate” actually means, he goes on 
Roughly speaking, it does not matter whether the judge has especially strong rational 
and evidentiary bases (in terms of probability) to believe what she believes.  Her deep 
individual conviction has to be well-rooted in her feelings, in order to produce a 
“moral certainty” or prevue morale about the facts of the case. This does not mean 
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reliance upon a clear standard of proof: it means to rely just upon the personal 
conscience of the judge.765    
 
Khoury says that in practice, a very high probability will suffice.766 There is no law of 
evidence in France as such and unfortunately a detailed appreciation of 
epidemiological reports and statistical evidence is lacking compared to those decisions 
in the United Kingdom. French decisions are much shorter compared to the 
minutiae considered by the British justiciary.  Taruffo’s description above is perhaps 
to be expected, however, from a system that does not place too much reliance on 
precedent. 
  
Another contrast between the two systems is that there is less room afforded to the 
plaintiff in the British system for the burden of proof to change.  So, for example, 
while in the French system the plaintiff must prove fault, causation and harm, the 
burden of proof can shift to the defendant on causation, where for example, the 
defendant was responsible generally as a gardien de la chose or in medical liability, 
where defective equipment was involved in the tort.767 Causal presumptions will also 
be raised in France when the evidence is certain, precise and concordant. Although 
in the United Kingdom, there is not as much doctrine on the subject of 
presumptions, it is typical of British courts to refer to this as rather a “robust, 
common sense approach” rather than necessarily referring to presumptions.  Lord 
Toulson LJ held in Drake v Harbour that 
…when a man who has not previously suffered from a disease contracts that diseases 
after being subjected to conditions likely to cause it, and when he shows that it starts 
in a way typical of disease caused by such conditions, he establishes a prima facie 
presumption that his disease was caused by those conditions…That presumption 
could be displaced in many ways.  The respondents sought to show, first, that it is 
negative by the subsequent course of the disease and, secondly, by suggesting 
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[another condition] as an equally probable cause of its origins.768 
 
Presumptions then are much like the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur . I am rather fond of 
Lord Denning’s language when he says “While I was in your hands something has 
been done to me which has wrecked my life.  Please explain how it came to 
pass…”769 Yet I would not argue that this shows the similarity of the French and the 
British systems.  Where the doctrine of “British presumption” or res might apply is 
where a patient enters a hospital to have the left leg amputated and exits with the 
right leg amputated – this would be something which has “wrecked the patient’s life”.  
Yet I submit British courts would shy away from the use of a presumption for (say) 
nosocomial infections and the burden of proof remains firmly on the plaintiff to show 
the hospital’s negligence by not conforming to certain standards.  
 
In addition to the standard of proof level in itself, I have also cited a case where, I 
submit, the outcome would not necessarily have been the same because it was based 
on a judge’s acceptance of one expert witness’s report as opposed to another.770  The 
principle in France is one expert’s report suffices though two are possible. 771  
Certainly more than one expert’s report could be demanded in France772 but then 
the judge would have to choose one over the other and how would he do this? 
Penneau is right to warn a judge not to supplant “...sa pseudo-connaissance 
livresque”.773  I suggest later that only a cross-examination of reports and witnesses 
can focus minds.  It is therefore my contention that procedural law here could result 
in a different outcome for a plaintiff in France.   
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6.2.6 Conclusion 
It can be seen then that many of the causal problems in medical causation that are 
found in France are found also in the United Kingdom.  I submit, however, that 
France does take a particularly victim-friendly attitude to resolving causal quandaries 
especially when their approach is compared to the United Kingdom.  This can most 
particularly be seen with the use of loss of chance where there is only one potential 
cause of damage.  Here the court is simply allowing a head of damages that is just not 
recognised as yet in the other jurisdictions.   It is not a get-out or a fiction to help the 
victim but a discrete and definite head of damages.  What is more is that a causal link 
must still be proven between the loss of chance and the final fault. Khoury supports 
Viney and Jourdain's theory that it might be more appropriate to allow for 
presumptions of causation when there has been fault and this is a matter that might 
be developed in France in the future.  
 
I have tried to highlight above some of the important differences between the British 
approach to causation and the French approach. I have attempted to show how some 
of the cases in Britain would probably be decided differently in France and vice-
versa.  What is important here, from a functionalist point of view, are not only the 
methods adopted by the two jurisdictions, but also the final result.  
 
At first sight, the methodologies of both jurisdictions might lead one to suspect that 
outcomes would differ. The initial approach to causation diverges somewhat. In 
France, philosophy, especially German, has influenced doctrine and how causation 
should be tackled. There, problems are usually confronted using one of either the 
equivalence theory or the adequacy theory.  Writers differ as to which one is the 
more used. In the United Kingdom, there is the conditio sine qua non tempered with 
policy: the factual causation and legal causation dichotomy.  Adequacy theory so-
called has not been received in the United Kingdom.  Yet, although at times, France 
and the United Kingdom may reach the same result on the same facts, there exist 
deep chasms between the two jurisdictions’ approaches as I have shown in this 
comparative section which takes from the research in the main body of this paper.  
Perhaps most significantly, the United Kingdom does not accept loss of chance in 
medical causation.  This would lead to different result in highly significant cases like 
Wilsher and Gregg.  There is also no special recovery allowed in the United Kingdom 
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for medical hazards (aléas thérapeutiques): a patient must take his chances.  Policy in the 
United Kingdom is different in this regard.  There is also no private / public hospital 
dichotomy as such in the United Kingdom.  When courts are faced with hard cases, 
resort will often be had to “policy” or “common sense” and as I hope to show, I do 
not believe that common sense exists for causation in medical negligence.  Such ideas 
must depend on the particular preferences of the judge or judges in question.  
 
Procedure also differs.  On the one hand, we have one jurisdiction that requires 
proof to the balance of probabilities and on the other, we have a jurisdiction that 
requires an intime conviction of the judge.  We have seen above that this can depend 
on the “personal conscience” of the judge and be subject to a very high degree of 
probability.  On the point of causal presumptions, I think France does a great 
service to victims when allowing these.  It does not simply allow them to prefer 
victims to defendants but it is suggested because this France has decided where the 
risk should fall.  In cases of blood transfusions, for example, it would be extremely 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove (absent these presumptions) that his contamination 
came from one of the blood samples. Defendants are in a better position to 
examine and trace the samples and contact the donors if necessary. This should 
encourage better record keeping and administration within such institutions.  The 
institutions also can advance facts about the plaintiff's lifestyle such that he is a 
drug-taker, is at risk from HIV or underwent acupuncture.  So the defendant 
rightly can suggest that the infection need not necessarily have come from their 
blood samples.  As we have seen, however, one of these risk factors is not 
sufficient.  Temporal considerations are also important. Similarly, in cases of 
nosocomial infections, the plaintiff has a great advantage that a plaintiff in the 
United Kingdom would not have. This is part of the justification of policy.   
 
I have also shown how cases on causation might be decided differently because of 
procedural rules.  There is generally one witness’s report in France whereas in the 
United Kingdom there are usually at least two.  There is not, in France, the cut-
and-thrust of examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, which 
would allow plaintiff and defendant to test each other’s reports.  If science conflicts 
in the United Kingdom then it is now for the judge to choose the report he prefers 
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but his reasoning should be set out.  In French courts, it may not even be known if 
there is a scientific conflict on the subject if only one expert is chosen.  
 
As we have seen, France's use of obligation de résultat and de moyens also plays an 
important role in establishing causation.  This is of particular note in the area of 
nosocomial infections as defined.  Here where a patient enters a hospital there is an 
accessory obligation de securité on the doctors to ensure that he succumbs to no 
extraneous or exogenous infection.  This is also protected under legislation, the CPS.   
No similar obligation de securité exists in the United Kingdom and there is no specific 
legislation protecting patients from nosocomial infections.   
 
As mentioned, there is protection from medical hazards or aléa thérapeutique at droit 
commun and also in the CSP if a particular degree of incapacity is met.  If this degree 
of incapacity is not met, then droit commun applies and we have a public / private 
dichotomy.  
 
As can be seen then from certain uses of burden of proof and procedure, be they 
obligations de résultat, moyens or for allowing certain presumptions, France does favour 
the victim when there is causal uncertainty in cases of medical negligence. This can 
be seen clearly from the cases cited and from my suggestion of the outcome of inter 
alia Wilsher in this chapter.  The difference with the United Kingdom is that France 
might have gone too far in allowing recovery for the eventuation of risks that we must 
expect as human beings.  Clean hospitals can be encouraged in other ways and not 
necessarily by allowing plaintiffs to sue.  The solidarity fund is a policy decision.  
Causation has been supplanted in statute by imputabilité and it is suggested recovery is 
made easier in such cases. 
 
So given these significant differences between France and the United Kingdom in the 
area of medical causation, loss of chance in particular, medical hazards and other 
special systems for recovery, I submit that no common thread of causation exists 
between these two jurisdictions.  Consequently, if there is no commonality, then there 
can be no purpose in trying to set out a framework in tort for causation that could be 
used Europe-wide, in particular with the PETL or the DCFR.  
  
! ! ! ! !! 228!
6.3 Germany and the United Kingdom 
6.3.1 Overview 
Tort law exists in Germany just as it does in the United Kingdom and in France. 
Causation between the damage and the fault is similarly required to show liability.  I 
have described the basics of tort law in Germany and the United Kingdom in the 
body of this paper above.  In German law, in contrast to the English and Scots law of 
tort and delict respectively, there are certain subjective rights that are protected. 
These are set out in delict at §823 BGB.  Strictly the relationship between a doctor 
and his patient is governed by contract, however, notions of causation are readily 
taken from delict.  Further, damages are now allowed for non-pecuniary loss in 
medical negligence for breach of contract.  Although not recognised in a code in the 
United Kingdom, these same invasions to the person are also recognised in British 
law774as have been developed under the common law. 
 
However, to consider this only and deduce an unreal commonality would be hasty.  
It is impossible to consider only this without an appreciation for procedure.  Burdens 
of proof in both jurisdictions are appreciably different.  There are numerous ways in 
Germany for attenuating the high standard of proof for a plaintiff, it is true, which 
are not found in the United Kingdom.  These range from Anscheinbewewis to a full 
reversal of the burden  of proof.   Procedure is inseparably linked with causation.   
 
6.3.2 Starting Points 
At first glance then, it would seem that Germany and the United Kingdom have 
more in common with one another at the outset as far as causation is concerned than 
would say Germany or the United Kingdom when compared to France.  This 
perhaps as there is a theoretical division between causation-in-fact and then 
causation-in-law.  Germany, being quite logical in its approach, insists that a cause- 
in-fact test is used to attribute the harm to the wrongful act using hinwegdenken in the 
first instance tempered with adequacy theory.  In the United Kingdom, as I have 
suggested, I think these matters just become quite confused and everything is piled 
onto a muddled legal heap and called “causation” as and when it suits but perhaps to 
a lesser extent than in France. In Germany, whether the conduct was indeed one of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
774 and even between Scotland and England there are differences in tort law though these need not 
detain us here.  
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the necessary conditions at work is perceived, apparently, as a neutral issue of fact.775  
The answer is either yes or no.  I do not think such neutrality exists.  In The German 
Law of Torts, Markesinis and Unberath, I think, sets out the problematic for 
comparisist.776  In some textbooks, remoteness of damage is treated as part of the 
duty of care, in others it is treated as part of causation, in others as part of reasonable 
foreseeability.   I think that all these ideas run into each other and  
The comparisist will have to learn to jump over these artificial hurdles of 
classification and, in so doing, reflect once again on how policy and not concepts or 
theories determine the ultimate result.777 [ 
   
Again this is a problem of classification.   How jurisdictions categorise their 
problems is important as we can then see how they analyse aspects that might 
limit damages.  Causation (not “factual”), remoteness of damages, duty of care are 
all ideas that do this and yet they can all be put in the Venn diagram of “legal 
causation”.    
 
I find that the process of causal analysis at this stage is essentially the same prima 
facie in both the United Kingdom and in Germany.  The process of hinwegdenken is 
found also in the United Kingdom (though not so called) and can be assimilated to 
the conditio sine qua non thought-process.  It is in the second stage of the process 
where approaches differ.  In the United Kingdom, reference is often made to the 
legal cause or the causa causans, which is generally understood to have more 
implications with policy.  Other factors such as the protective purpose of the rule 
violated, fairness and reasonableness, and proximity are also to be found in 
English case law.778  I appreciate Spier and Haazen’s comment when they write 
with regard to England that   
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775 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p47 
776 B MARKESINIS and H UNBERATH, The German Law of Torts, p113 
777 ibid 
778 As per J SPIER and O HAAZEN’s comparative conclusions on causation from J SPEIR (ed) 
Unification of Tort law: Causation, p31 
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…this multi-factor approach bears considerable resemblance to that of the theory of 
adequacy, as well as the openly flexible approach of reasonable imputation chosen 
for these principles of causation.779  
 
Adequacy, which is in my opinion, wholly connected with probability in the second-
stage test of German causal theory, is essential in any German causal enquiry.  Spier 
and Haazen expand on the notion of adequacy in the below quote which is more 
German in its interpretation.  There is no causation only if the plaintiff’s act results in 
a very unexpected, unforeseeable consequence that nobody ever had to reason to 
deal with before.  As Spier and Haazen cite 
The observer knows, for example, that a vaccination damage can happen even if the 
statistical probability lies under 0.01 per cent.  Only very rarely does he not foresee 
that damage could occur.780  
 
This is quite a different approach from that in the United Kingdom. An optimal 
observer in German law knows (nearly) everything and such a standard would not be 
placed on a British doctor.  In Germany, it would be virtually impossible for a doctor 
to escape liability.  Even in cases where statistics are used, following the case of 
McTear, courts insist on having the subject – in this case epidemiology – literally 
“taught” to them.  The plaintiff’s lawyers must explain epidemiology and all its 
relative reports, formulae and statistics to judges.  I am not surprised it is not within 
judicial knowledge! Again, to highlight the dissimilarity between the United 
Kingdom and Germany, the burden of proof in the United Kingdom is never 
reversed.  If a doctor has caused a patient to lose 42% chance of survival by mis-
diagnosis, this patient must still prove negligence.  First, it is essential that the 
“chance” or the “probability” be 51% or more and that the statistics, I submit, can 
be applied to the plaintiff in a particular, individual and meaningful way.   Loss of 
chance would be closed to a plaintiff in both jurisdictions in such a case.  If, however, 
it can be proved that the physician made a “gross treatment error” then in Germany, 
the burden of proof could be reversed.   This is where, for example, a German Gregg v 
Scott plaintiff could potentially recover whereas in the United Kingdom, he did not.   
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Another area where causation is important is where the victim has acted in a 
particular way.  In Germany, unwanted children following a failed sterilisation are 
not seen as a “blessing” as they are in the United Kingdom.  Essentially then in 
Germany , failed sterilisations do cause unwanted children legally and the United 
Kingdom they do not.  Here is a difference.  No-one is right.  It is just societal 
mores.781 
 
What is “unreasonable” or not in Germany and in the United Kingdom 
intertwines with policy considerations.  It can be difficult to pull them apart – even 
if one wanted to.  Policy considerations are a recognised “third step” of causation 
in Germany.  In the United Kingdom, policy considerations are more like part of 
causation – they sit parallel perhaps with conditio sine qua non and causa 
causans. 782   In Germany, this, as we have seen, has been expressed as the 
“protective purpose” of the rule so that Germany also has an effectively flexible 
approach where account can be taken of foreseeability, proximity, adequacy, 
policy and the protective purpose.783 I refer again to the above “kidney” case 
where the mother was able to recover for her economic loss and suffering.  Britain 
too, I suggest, has quite openly used policy to allow plaintiffs to recover where a 
doctor has been at fault as, where not allowing them to do so, would be unjust.784 
 
So then it can be seen that the starting points of causation in both countries are 
quite similar.  There are legal principles of causation which are applied and then 
these are diluted when the result would be unfair.  However, it is also notable that 
in Germany, there is a greater onus on doctors to show that they have disclosed 
certain risks that need not be disclosed in the United Kingdom.   If a doctor does 
not do this (and the burden of proof is on him to show that he has) then it could 
lead to a finding of battery against him.  I refer again to the statistics with regard 
to the risks inherent in vaccination procedures.  As I already mentioned above, to 
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781 see supra BGH NJW 2000, 1782; BGH NJW 1980, 1450 and MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board 
(Scotland) [1999] UKHL 50 
782 Chester v Afshar (2004) UKHL 41 
783 J SPIER and O HAAZEN, Unification of Tort Law: Causation, p134 
784 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 
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consider this without an examination of how this works in practice by way of 
procedure would be remiss.   
 
6.3.3 Procedure 
In Germany, the burden of proof is without any subjective or “intimate” standard in 
theory.  The court has the freedom to evaluate proofs.785 The court has to be “freely 
convinced” of a particular matter before it takes it as true or not. This truth that is 
required has been defined as a “high probability”. 786   These comparisons are 
important as they can show how, in theory at least, a plaintiff might have a harder 
time proving a case in Germany than in the United Kingdom. It would seem then 
that it is correct that the standard of proof in Germany can be quite exacting for a 
plaintiff at times.   There are, however, as we have seen, a number of relaxations of 
proof in Germany that can come to the aid of a victim in Germany.  
 
Haftungsbegründende causation is subject to the higher standard of proof than 
haftungsausfüllende causation which can be proven using §287 ZPO on the basis of the  
“balance of probabilities”.787  We have seen already the case law here with regard to 
a case in 1962.788  As a reminder, a patient here suffered an allergic reaction when 
she applied skin cream that was negligently prescribed.  She then contracted a bone 
marrow disorder, which resulted in her death.  The court found that causation 
between the application of the skin cream and the bone marrow disorder was a 
“secondary harm” which fell to be proved according to the lower standard of proof.  
So in Germany, even in the same civil case, the burdens of proof can vary.   In the 
United Kingdom, the same burden of proof applies throughout the case.   
 
As I mentioned above, there are a number of proof relaxations in Germany that can 
come to a patient’s aid.  I have already considered Anscheinbeweis.  It is not a reversal 
of proof but rather something untoward has occurred.  Something has happened that 
does not usually happen in the normal course of events.  It calls for explanation.  This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
785 §286 ZPO, see supra; M TARUFFO “Rethinking the Standards of Proof”, (Summer 2003) 51 
The American Journal of Comparative Law 659 at 667.  
786 ibid, “hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit” 
787 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p84 
788 BGH VersR 1963, 67 
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is similar to res ipsa loquitur  in the United Kingdom.  It is like a presumption of 
causation for both jurisdictions.  So in this respect, we can see a similarity in 
procedure with regard to the changing of the evidential burden of proof if these 
devices are taken in isolation.  
 
Another area where the burden of proof is inescapably linked to causation is the law 
with regard to gross malpractice (grobe Behandlungsfehler).  This is now codified in the 
Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013. 789   Where there has been gross 
malpractice then there is a presumption that this has caused the patient’s injury.  
This helps the patient enormously as far as causal difficulties are concerned. Perhaps 
if loss of chance were brought in, then I imagine, plaintiffs who now recover 100% 
taking advantage of this reversal of the burden of proof would then only be able to 
claim a percentage thereof.    
 
In the United Kingdom, the burden of proof in all civil cases remains the balance 
of probabilities.  The plaintiff must convince the decision-maker that his story is 
more likely than the defendant’s.  If a plaintiff can convince a judge that his story 
is 51% likely, then he must win.  There exist few tactical devices in British law for 
shifting the burden of proof.  Even if there has been what might be determined as 
“gross” negligence in Europe, it is still for the plaintiff to prove causation from that 
act of gross negligence to the damage.  It can be seen then that compared to the 
United Kingdom then, one would expect fewer cases to be successful in Germany 
given the quite high level of proof in Germany.  I have shown, however, that this 
is not always the case.  There is a “secondary harm” level of proof.  There is 
Anscheinbeweis and there is reversal of the burden of proof totally. Only one of these 
I would suggest has a parallel in the United Kingdom, namely Anscheinbeweis.  My 
conclusion here is that the burden of proof is higher in Germany and this must 
necessarily affect results in cases where causation is in issue.   
 
As far as expert witnesses are concerned, the European inquisitorial approach is 
followed.  It is the court which selects the experts to be appointed.790 It is, of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
789 §630h (5) BGB 
790 §404 ZPO: Section 404   Selection of the expert (1) The court hearing the case shall select 
the experts to be involved and shall determine their number. It may limit itself to appointing a 
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course, up to the court to appoint more than one but it is the court (ie the judge(s)) 
that shall determine his mission.791 Lawyers do have a right to question witnesses 
but this is generally perfunctory.  Objections to questions can be made by the 
opposing lawyer. 792   There is no cut-and-thrust of common law cross-
examination.   
 
6.3.4 Comparative Conclusion 
This comparison of English / German law has set out the fundamental differences of 
methodology and approach when courts in respective jurisdictions are faced with 
similar problems of medical causation.  The principles used in German law are those 
set out in §823 BGB are delictual notwithstanding the contractual nature of the 
physician / patient relationship.   
 
Even if we could say that the starting points of both jurisdictions are quite similar 
theoretically, I think it must be admitted that in practice, results could differ quite 
significantly. In Britain, the “but for” test exists at the first stage.  In Germany, it is 
called the equivalence theory.  In Germany, even equivalence theory is divided into 
two, each having a different standard of proof.  In Britain the courts then look to 
legal causation as a limitation.  In Germany, there is adequacy theory based on 
probability and with observers who are deemed omniscient but it acts as a filter to 
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single expert. It may appoint other experts to take the stead of the expert first appointed;  (2) 
Should experts have been publicly appointed for certain types of reports, other persons shall be 
selected only if particular circumstances so require;  (3) The court may ask the parties to the 
dispute to designate persons who are suited to be examined as experts;  (4) Should the parties to the 
dispute agree on certain persons to be appointed as experts, the court is to comply with what they 
have agreed; however, the court may limit the selection made by the parties to a certain number. 
791  §404a(1) ZPO: Section 404a   Directions by the court as regards the expert’s 
activities (1) The court is to direct the expert in terms of his activities and may issue instructions 
as concerns their nature and scope; (2) Insofar as the special aspects of the case require, the court is 
to hear the expert prior to wording the question regarding which evidence is to be taken; it is to 
familiarise the expert with his tasks; and is to explain to the expert the task it has allocated to him 
should he so request;  (3) Where the facts of a case are at issue, the court shall determine the facts 
on which the expert is to base his report;  (4) To the extent required, the court shall determine the 
scope in which the expert shall be authorised to elucidate the question regarding which evidence is 
to be taken, and it shall also determine whether or not he may contact the parties, and at which 
point he is to permit them to participate in his investigations; (5) Any instructions given to the 
expert shall be communicated to the parties. If a separate hearing is held at which the expert is 
familiarised with his tasks, the parties are to be allowed to attend. 
792 N FOSTER and S SULE, German Legal System and Laws (2003, Oxford, Oxford University Press), 
p132 
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adequacy.  Even then, if the courts are still presented with a result that insults justice 
and fairness, both jurisdictions have devices that enable (or should enable) the court 
to reach a reasoned result, in as much as policy can be reasoned.  For example, if a 
doctor was negligent (or even grossly negligent in Germany) by not attending on a 
patient, and that doctor can show that the patient would have died anyway because a 
poison had been added to his cup of tea, then the defendant doctor I submit may not 
be able to escape liability as easily as he would do in the United Kingdom.793 There is 
a presumption now under the Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013 that this 
gross negligence had caused the patient’s death.794  It was admitted in this British 
case that the doctor was negligent in sending the patient away in the first instance.  
He would have to show that the poisoning would have caused his death anyway, 
which of course, he may well be able to provided the misdiagnosis could be regarded 
as grossly negligent.  Germany may invoke policy in this case to obtain a satisfactory 
result but then again, so may the United Kingdom if the case were to come before a 
court there now.  I submit that Gregg v Scott could have been decided otherwise in 
Germany.  I suggest that the a mis-diagnosis resulting in the loss of a 42% chance 
would be seen as grossly negligent.  In Germany therefore, it would be the defendant 
who would have to trouble himself with interpreting the court’s expert report that the 
plaintiff would have fallen into that category of people who would die 
notwithstanding the mis-diagnosis.  Another completely contrasting decision we have 
seen is that of a child born as a result of a failed sterilisation.  In Germany, it is not 
seen as a “blessing” (recovery allowed) and in the United Kingdom, it is (recovery 
disallowed).  Policy is making causation with two totally differing results.795     
 
The Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013 has codified much in the BGB now 
with regard to where the burden of proof lies in the event of a treatment error.  I 
would suggest it is helpful but it certainly does not mean that solutions would be the 
same in both countries.  First, we see that where treatment was “fully manageable” 
(voll beherrschbar) for the doctor then an error is presumed to be committed by him if a 
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795 NJW 1980, 1450 and MacFarlane v Tayside Health Board (Scotland) [1999] UKHL 50 
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risk has eventuated which caused the patient damage.796 This is the kind of injury 
that occurs not because of the medical treatment itself but rather because of the 
treatment environment.797  This is almost approaching a kind of strict liability.  
Nothing of the sort exists in the United Kingdom and the burden of proof remains 
always on the patient to show that the hospital or physician breached his duty of care 
with regard to the treatment environment.   This does not exclude a plea of res ipsa 
loquitur  but nonetheless, the burden of proof always remains with the plaintiff.  
 
Similarly, even where “gross” negligence 798has been committed in the United 
Kingdom, there will be no reversal of the burden of proof.  This, again, is in contrast 
to the situation in Germany.  In Germany if there has been gross malpractice (grober 
Behandlungsfehler) causing damage to the patient then this is presumed to be the cause 
of the injury.799 Similarly where a doctor omits to take or record a finding where the 
finding would have with sufficient certainty have led to a result which would have 
given rise to further measures and the failure to carry out such measures constitutes 
gross negligence then there is the presumption that the malpractice also caused the 
injury.800 If the doctor cannot rebut the presumption then it becomes a case of 
misdiagnosis mixed with questions of hypothetical causation as to what the test would 
have revealed and what the doctor would have done.801  Again the United Kingdom 
knows of no such possibility to reverse the burden of proof.  
 
With regard to medical records, there is a presumption of causation in Germany that 
if it is not recorded, then it has not been carried out.802  Contrast that with the United 
Kingdom where there is no such presumption and the doctor will probably go into 
the witness stand and speak to procedure carried out.  In this regard, he can refer to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
796 §630h(1) BGB 
797 for example, the provision of a defective oxygen machine 
798 however that can be imagined in the United Kingdom as the United Kingdom has tended to 
shy away from differentiating between negligence and gross negligence, see Wilson v Brett (1843) 11 
M&W 113  
799 §630h(5) BGB 
800 §630h (5) BGB 
801 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p69 
802 §630h (3) BGB 
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his usual procedure and the courts will reach a conclusion. It may be thought that 
this amounts to the same thing.  I suggest not.  A court will consider the doctor’s 
creditability, his comportment in the witness stand and whether his evidence is 
corroborated and by whom. It will depend on the case.  There is no codified 
procedural measure in the United Kingdom to help the victim.  
 
Ensuring that a patient has sufficient information on which to base her decision on 
whether or not to progress with a medical intervention is of crucial importance in a 
causal inquiry. As I have pointed out, if this consent is vitiated, then the treatment is 
unlawful.803  
 
There is now a doctrine of “informed consent” in the United Kingdom following the 
decision of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board.804  The patient’s consent can no 
longer be trumped by a responsible body of medical opinion.  However, a court is 
unlikely just to believe any story advanced by the plaintiff that even if she had been 
told of all the risks then she would not have gone ahead with the procedure.  Similar 
to Germany, I think a court would be wary of a patient manipulating her evidence in 
order to recover damages, especially where there was no other alternative or where 
the intervention was urgent.  Even where the patient does not know what she would 
have done, recovery can still be allowed in the United Kingdom.805 This is policy 
trumping causation sensu stricto.  Following Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,806 
however, patients must now be informed of all material risks and any reasonable 
alternative or variant treatments which are available.807 Importantly, it was held that 
materiality of risk “cannot be reduced to percentages”; that a doctor should always 
engage in dialogue to “make an informed decision”; and finally that the therapeutic 
exception should not be abused.808  In Germany, courts are looking for a doctor to 
explain in “general terms” (im Großen und Ganzen) each particular risk in a given !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
803 having potentially criminal implications for the physician in Germany 
804 [2015] UKSC 11  
805 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 
806 [2015] UKSC 11 
807 ibid, Lords Kerr and Reed at para 87 
808 ibid, at paras 89-91 
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treatment but he need not go so far if he thought this might confuse the patient.  A 
patient can, of course, ask for more details where necessary.  Under the Improvement 
of Patients’ Rights Act 2013, the patient must be advised of inter alia risks, necessity, 
urgency and suitability of the measure.  Alternatives to the measure must also be 
suggested to the patient where this is appropriate.809 It is for the doctor in Germany 
to prove that the patient consented.810  If, however, it is shown that the information 
provided to the patient was not adequate, then all is not lost for the physician.  If he 
can prove that the patient would have consented to the measure had proper 
information been provided then he will not be found liable.811  Of course, this raises 
the question of how German courts would treat a situation where a patient says she 
does not know what she would do but that she would take further advice and think 
about it.812 This was a hard case in England where the Law Lords were divided 3:2.  
Perhaps in Germany they might use a Schutzzweck protection to allow recovery on the 
same basis as recovery was allowed in the United Kingdom.  German courts have 
decided that only a hesitation need be shown yet this is not what has been codified 
and Germany does not have stare decisis.  In Chester, there was no “hesitation” as 
such.  In my opinion, the German courts would probably find for a patient who had 
not been informed properly and in accordance with the 2013 Act even if a precise 
counterfactual could not be established.  I think this not just from how the courts 
have developed their law in this area but also the more “victim friendly” approach in 
Germany generally and also, and it cannot be forgotten, Germany’s history with 
medical experimentation under National Socialism.813  If British law lords can be 
divided 3:2 on issues of causation then it would not surprise me if Germany decided 
also differently.  Again I believe that causation should not be codified and that this is 
the essence of my thesis.   
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In general then, and to conclude this part of the paper with regard to Germany and 
the United Kingdom, I am not so convinced as Stauch when he writes 
Thus, it seems clear that the outcome of a claim based on the same underlying facts 
would often be the same in both countries.  It is only comparatively rarely, say, an 
injured patient would obtain damages in Germany, where in identical circumstances, 
he would fail in England. 814   
 
While I agree that where a case is a simple “but for” then of course, outcomes in 
Germany and in Britain are more likely to be the same.  The problem arises when 
the situation becomes a little more complicated.  Even more difficult cases like 
McGhee and Fairchild are likely to have the same result as in the United Kingdom.  
There is, after all, provision for joint tortfeasors in Germany.815 Yet what about cases 
like Wilsher where recovery was not permitted in the United Kingdom because it 
could not be said with certainty that oxygen caused or had materially contributed to 
the child’s blindness on the balance of probabilities?  A fortiori one might suppose the 
same result in Germany with its higher standard of proof.  Yet this could be a chance 
for a German court to invoke “gross malpractice” and reverse the burden of proof, 
leaving it for the defendant to exculpate himself in some way.  Again there is no 
reversal of the burden of proof in Britain regardless of how negligent a physician has 
been.  As just considered, what about cases where a doctor has not disclosed the risks 
of a procedure adequately? In Germany, there is the approach that “risks” should be 
made known to the patient even those to hundredeths of a percentage point. This is 
codified even.  In the United Kingdom, “informed consent” now exists as per 
Montgomery.   
 
There is a two-stage test in both jurisdictions as a matter of principle and both also 
reject recovery for loss of chance in medical causation.816 It is, however, not ruled out 
totally in the United Kingdom for the future.  The starting theory in both countries 
might be similar but from then on, I believe that there are significant differences 
between the two countries.  I will not deny that there are common elements in both !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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815 §830 BGB 
816 Germany rejects totally loss of chance 
! ! ! ! !! 240!
jurisdictions with regard to causation. However, I believe the differences to be 
significant enough that any kind of purported harmonisation between the two 
systems or together with the two systems must be unworkable.  Again this is not to 
say that Britain cannot learn from different arguments or approaches from Germany 
or vice-versa.  British courts have indeed started to do this and I commend this.  
What I attempt to argue rather, is that projects that seek to harmonise European 
Tort Law must adapt their wording with regard to causation.   
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6.4 Germany and France 
6.4.1 Overview 
I think it is quite clear by now how the two jurisdictions of France and Germany 
treat causation in their case law.  Both their civil codes insist on a defendant’s 
having “caused” harm but, this is not defined anywhere.   I do not think it 
necessary to consider or examine again the fundamentals of causation in both 
jurisdictions as these are set out in the main body of this paper and then 
recapitulated in the overviews above and I make reference thereto. 
 
I think the clearest difference between France and Germany is where the causal 
enquiry begins.  Germany quite clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously starts 
from a conditio sine qua non analysis.  It starts with equivalence theory, or 
hinwegdenken, and then applies adequacy if it considers appropriate.   It applies its 
reasoning and different stage tests to the problem in hand.  Germany then goes on 
to use policy filtration where necessary.  France, on the other hand, starts 
sometimes from equivalency and sometimes from adequacy.  France is not really 
sure yet of its causal starting point. There are disputes about which theory is the 
more used this but no count has been made and “…le bilan n’est pas decisif”.817  
France applies various theories and often it comes down to the policy of not 
sending a victim away empty-handed. Even where science is not certain of a 
causal link, often France will allow a causal link as a court is there not just for 
scientists but also to protect morals and society generally – and courts readily 
admit this. This does not, however, mean that same problems would result in the 
same outcomes in both France and Germany.  Sometimes they would, sometimes 
they would not.  Even in the jurisdictions themselves, the law can be divided.818 
Perhaps the biggest divergence comes with Germany’s not accepting loss of 
chance.   Other differences can be seen in the special systems for recovery of 
medical hazards that exist in France and not in Germany and in areas of the 
reversal of the burden of proof.   It is the last of these that I shall consider first.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
817 G VINEY and P JOURDAIN, Traité de droit civil, 342, even if “les points ont étés comptés”, ibid  
818 see the rather greater protection given to those in a public hospital and are subject to 
administrative law in France than those who would be subject to the Cour de cassation’s 
jurisdiction as far as medical hazards of less than 25% AIPP are concerned.  
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6.4.2 Burden of Proof 
Both France and Germany have high standards of proof.  There is free proof in 
Germany and intime conviction in France.  It is up to the judges to determine whether 
the case has been proved or not.  This is a high test in both jurisdictions819 but there 
are devices that come to the aid of a plaintiff who finds himself in evidential difficulty.   
 
In France, if a patient can show certain facts, provided such facts are precise, 
consistent and serious and are linked with the damage, then this could lead the judge 
to form a causal presumption, allowing the plaintiff a clear evidential advantage.  
There are similarities in a parallel procedural device in Germany.   
 
One way to consider this is to take an example (not from case law) and consider how 
it might be resolved in both jurisdictions. A patient must undergo a procedure to 
have an occluder fixed to close an atrial septal defect – a hole in the heart.  As is quite 
common in such situations (especially among young patients), the patient is 
asymptomatic.  However, after the operation, the patient begins to have palpitations 
and even notices a tachycardia from time to time.  During these spells of cardiac 
arrhythmia, the patient feels dizzy and sometimes has a little difficulty breathing.  
Damages may be framed in terms of fear or loss of enjoyment of life.  In France, 
there exists the possibility of a causal presumption if these three adjectives above 
could describe the factual situation if the judge sees so fit.  There might be no proof 
of negligence at this stage but from a tactical point of view, the presumption (and in 
my opinion, more or less, the burden of proof) may shift from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.  The judge may think happened shortly after the patient has come out 
hospital.  However, it should be remembered that these adjectives of “graves, précises 
and concordantes” are imperative.  A judge cannot just assume a présomption de fait 
unless these adjectives fit with the facts.  
 
In Germany, the idea of Anscheinbeweis exists. Here the plaintiff must show that 
something needs explaining rather than showing a link from a certain of 
circumstances, a, to a result, b.  Anscheinbeweis is generally not accepted to be a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
819 nominally higher than in the United Kingdom 
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reversal of the burden of proof.  However, these are certain presumptions that raise a 
prima facie case.  The tactical burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff to the 
defendant.   Palpitations and tachycardia generally do not occur after such operations 
so the question may arise what did the surgeon do that has resulted in this, if 
anything.  Of course, it may well be the case that the patient has an abnormal 
anatomy and the surgeon can lead proof to this effect but what is interesting here it 
would be for the surgeon to lead this proof if Anscheinbeweis is accepted. In Germany, 
a court will not use Anscheinsbeweis simply where a treatment has failed to obtain a 
desired outcome.  This has been held to be the case even where a second surgeon has 
performed an operation that a first surgeon unsuccessfully performed.820 The court 
will generally look to the merits of the plaintiff’s case to decide whether it is strong 
enough to deserve the strategical advantage of Anscheinsbeweis.  In truth, I find this 
example difficult.  It is doubtful that the surgeon acted negligently in this case simply 
from palpitations and occasional tachycardia.  Further there is the question whether 
palpitations or tachycardia is to be classed as an “injury”? They might well be 
annoying for the patient but injurious…? Yet if the patient was asymptomatic 
beforehand and now the patient has these symptoms, which (potentially) could have 
an effect on his quality of life, this is certainly something that calls for explanation – 
even perhaps valuation.  Even where the patient is not able to bring the loss he has 
suffered, or will suffer, under any kind of “fault”, in France, he may still be able to 
recover for an aléa thérapeutique.  Does not the advancement of cardiology, medicine in 
general and therefore society benefit from knowing about these post-operative 
consequences? The patient should not be left without reparation; such would be the 
French policy, in any case; not so the German.   
 
The question of disclosable risks is also relevant here.  Were such “risks” (are they 
risks, in fact?) disclosed to the patient? I suggest that they ought to have been, if there 
were known, especially if they have an effect on the patient’s life.  So we can see here 
then how the different jurisdictions might treat such an eventuality.  There are 
different kinds of presumptions from which the plaintiff can profit.   
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In the event that the patient is unable to prove either causal presumptions in France 
based on certain facts being “graves, précises et concordantes”, or the patient’s being 
unable to show an Anscheinsbeweis in Germany, then all is not lost. I find similarity 
with the French secondary obligation de securité and the German voll beherrschbare Risiken.  
These risks fall within the doctor’s “sphere” rather than that of the patient.  With the 
former, from the moment the patient enters the hospital, then the hospital in a way 
has a duty to protect the patient from harm, whether it be disease, infections or 
defective equipment.  Similarly, in Germany: this obligation, also classed as an 
ancillary obligation, is almost strict.821  So in both jurisdictions, there would be 
reversals of the burden of proof with regard to ancillary obligations in contract. 
However, in Germany, this cannot be used where the injury is related to the state of 
the patient.  
 
Much of the droit commun in France is now codified in the CPS.  If indeed the 
symptoms complained of above are an iatrogenic822complaint (affection iatrogène) then 
recovery could be permitted from the national solidarity fund.  If it is a medical 
hazard (accident medical) then the same statutory scheme applies.  However, if the 
required 25% injury is not attained then the droit commun applies and I have set this 
out already.  My submission is that recovery would depend first whether the patient 
was in a public or private hospital.  If he were in a public hospital then the patient 
would have more chance to recover based on Bianchi and the idea that aléa are more 
linked to a kind of obligation de securité.  He must of course show that (a) the risk was 
known; (b) there was no reason to think that the patient was exposed to such a risk; (c) 
that the condition of the patient has no relation with the initial state of the patient; 
and (d) that the character of the hazard is extremely serious.  If he is in a private 
hospital then generally the Cour de cassation has shied away from allowing recovery 
simply on the basis of aléa.  It has taken the view more or less that medicine involves 
risk.  It is not risk-free while maintaining a distinction with obligation de securité.  What 
can be deduced from this, I submit, is that it can be seen, even within one jurisdiction 
itself that causal solutions are uncertain and tentative.  I submit then that a common 
sense solution or “obvious” solution is impossible.   How then can we use causation as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
821 ibid, p46   
822 Art L1142-1 – I CPS 
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a notion and apply it to a greater European harmonisation project? I suggest that we 
cannot.   
 
There is no equivalent in Germany of medical hazards à la CSP or à la Bianchi. 
However, a canny plaintiff will usually try to make her facts fall under “fully 
masterable risks” to allow the total reversal of the burden of proof to operate. For 
example, in the event of a post-operative infection, if it can be shown that the 
infection was indeed “masterable”, only then will the burden of proof move to the 
defendant to show that he could have taken further precautions.823 The BGH has 
recognised that where a hospital has taken all hygienic measures then there must be 
some risk that still lies with the patient.824 
 
I submit therefore that there are not similarities in approach with France and 
Germany.  What is similar is a high level of proof, at least in theory.  What is also 
similar is that there exist ways, approaches and techniques to attenuate this high 
burden of proof.  There is prima facie case in Germany, not so in France.  There are 
présomptions de faits in France but not so in Germany as such.   There is “fully 
masterable risks” in Germany and there is a kind of similar obligation de securité 
together with aléa thérapeutique in France combined with the CPS.   The latter do not 
exist in Germany. I have found that courts seem to be the most adaptable in France, 
not sticking rigidly to any particular causal dogma, and even saying that the 
seriousness of the fault is a lien de rattachment.825 Yet it is not clear, however, when this 
would be used. So the garden of causal case law in France does need some pruning 
and tidying-up round the edges in order to make the paths through it more inviting.  
French case law is not as logical as German law and perhaps even less predicable. 
That said, I believe there is generally one over-arching principle – not to send a 
deserving victim away empty-handed.  Who is a deserving victim in France? I submit 
one where there was a 70 per cent chance according to expert reports that the doctor 
had caused damage due to a non-diagnosis – disallowed in Germany.826  Here loss of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
823 BGH NJW 1991, 1541 
824 ibid 
825 H MAZEAZD, L MAZEAUD and A TUNC, Traité, 1435 
826 BGH NJW 1999, 860 
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chance would have come to the victim’s aid in France.  In Germany there is no loss 
of chance but I suggest more generally counsel for the plaintiff could have pleaded 
“gross malpractice” to reverse the burden of proof.   Yet not all losses of chance 
constitute “gross” malpractice.  A misdiagnosis does not necessarily constitute “gross” 
malpractice so the reversal of the burden of proof may not always come to a victim’s 
aid in Germany.  So in conclusion, I suggest that given principles of causation are 
based on factors external to the law itself – ie whether the victim was in a private or 
public hospital – in France then the law is not coherent there. I hope I have shown 
with the comparison with Germany, that no common principles can be extracted 
from these two major legal systems in this important area in tort law.  Therefore if no 
common principles can be extracted then no principles common to the two systems 
exist.  I suggest therefore there is no need to expand on how people should 
understand causation in the law.     
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6.4.3 Comparative Overview 
So much then for the comparative overviews between the jurisdictions themselves.  I 
hope I have shown above that there are important differences between the 
jurisdictions when it comes to tackling causal issues.  I would just like here to marshal 
my findings with an “overview of the overviews”, standing back somewhat from the 
research and trying really to ascertain what makes causation in medicine so different 
in the jurisdictions under consideration here. It is my contention overall that given 
the substantial as well as procedural differences in civil law in this area that ideas of 
possible harmonisation in causation should be abandoned.  
 
In European Tort Law, Cees van Dam states that  
Generally, a distinction is made between establishing causation and limiting 
causation.  The first issue refers to the question of whether a causal connection can 
be established between the negligent conduct or the strict cause on the one hand, 
and the loss on the other.  In order to establish causation all jurisdictions apply the 
conditio sine qua non test.827   
 
I think this paragraph unnecessarily confuses.  It is confusing to use the words 
“establishing” and “limiting”.  The courts have “established” causation once they 
make a final judgement on the matter.  What he means to say, I think, is that there 
are generally two tests to establish causation: one is the conditio sine qua non test and 
one is legal causation where policy comes in.  Also, to say that “all jurisdictions apply 
the conditio sine qua non test” in his sense of “establishing causation” is also wrong.  
We have seen that France does only sometimes.     
 
In all jurisdictions, however, it is true to say that they have accepted the conditio sine 
qua non test as one test of a number of tests in establishing causation.  It can be the 
first test the jurisdictions apply before complementing it with a filter, be it adequacy, 
policy or limitation using a procedural device.  France, however, sometimes goes 
directly for adequacy theory.   In Germany, policy is important as we have seen and 
it has even been noted by the BGH that adequacy theory and the scope of the rule 
theory are “in fact not real causation theories but tools to establish the consequences 
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for which the defendant has to answer.”828  In the end, policy choices play a decisive 
role, particularly in borderline cases.  I have to agree.  
  
In the United Kingdom, there are a number of ways that can limit, what is ultimately 
a question of causation.  The British courts use such controlling devices as duty of 
care, foreseeability, remoteness and causation.  I find it more and more difficult to 
separate causation from these.   
 
France, for its part, insists that causation be certain and direct before it will permit a 
causal connection.  As we have seen, France uses both equivalence and the adequacy 
theory without really favouring one over the other.  This notion of probability 
inherent in the adequacy theory is, for me, akin to that of reasonable foreseeability.  
So here we do have two similar notions that can be compared and their function in 
both jurisdictions is to determine causation.  There is, in France, a reception of an 
“objective probability”.  But again, the difficulty lies really in separating ideas of 
probability, foreseeability and so on from causation in itself.  
 
In Germany also, notions of foreseeability are used with regard to the causal 
haftungsausfüllende Kausalität.  It could perhaps be argued that a “significant increased 
probability” test is one that is less vague than that of reasonable foreseeability but 
then again we have to remember that the adequacy theory itself proved inadequate, 
perhaps ironically, and a new scope of the rule theory developed.829 
 
Another notion that I also think confuses causation is that of contributory negligence.  
This is where the court is saying that the victim either in part or in whole contributed 
to his own injury.830  Contributory negligence is dealt with in the United Kingdom 
under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 Act.  In France, it is 
categorized as faute de la victime.  In Germany, contributory negligence is dealt with 
under §254 II BGB and like in the United Kingdom, it is similarly weighed by the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
828 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p316 referring to BGHZ 3 261 (267) VersR 152, 128 
DOUBLE CHECK 
829 BS MARKESINIS and U UNBERATH, The German Law of Torts, p108  
830 I think it would be easy to justify abolition of this doctrine and simply frame judgements in 
causal terms but that is for another day 
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judge.831  Lord Atkin stated in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd that he 
found it impossible to “divorce any theory of contributory negligence from the 
concept of causation.”832 I have sympathy with this.  
 
The burden of proof is a procedural matter yet it is tied up unquestionably with 
causation.  To what extent must the plaintiff show that there was a causal link 
between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s injury? If the plaintiff need only show 
that his version of events is possible, then he need not work very hard.  If he has to 
show that his version of events is likely, then he might have to work a bit harder.  If, 
on the other hand, the plaintiff has to show that his version of events is probable to 
51%, 60% or even 80% then he has to do a lot more.  How a jurisdiction treats its 
plaintiffs in this respect is important for the plaintiff’s chances of success.  As we have 
seen, however, even though a jurisdiction’s requirements in this matter might be 
quite high, it may provide for other procedural devices that allow the plaintiff to 
overcome what might seem initially insurmountable hurdles.   
 
In all the jurisdictions concerned, the starting principle is that it is for the plaintiff to 
prove his case.  In the United Kingdom, the plaintiff must prove his case on the 
balance of probabilities.  He must prove his case to 51%.  As we have seen this is 
never reduced.  I would like to underline that there are no presumptions and no 
reversals of proof from which the plaintiff can benefit.  That said, however, there are 
the ideas of prima facie proof and res ipsa loquitur which put the defendant in the 
position of having to explain a situation.    There is no dichotomy in causation 
between proof for an infringement of a right and ultimate damage as there is in 
Germany, where, for its part, it looks for effective certainty (“full judicial conviction”) 
for the causal link between the defendant’s act and the infringement of the claimant’s 
right under the BGB, on the one hand, and has a lower standard of proof for the 
ultimate damage on the other (“balance of probabilities”).   In Germany, there is 
Anscheinbeweis akin to prima facie proof or even the presumptions that exist in French 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
831 In Germany, the causal potency of a victim’s conduct in producing his damage will be 
important but not the unique factor to be taken into account; see BS MARKESINIS, The German 
Law of Torts, p104.  One example would be a victim’s failure to obtain medical treatment after an 
injury (RGZ 139, 131, 136) 
832 [1940] AC 152, 165 
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law.  I have shown the situations in which this can occur.  Anscheinbeweis has played an 
important role with infections as we have seen.  Reversal of the burden of proof never 
occurs in either British or French law with regard to “gross negligence” – nor for that 
natter, at all.  Now the plaintiff must still prove that there was “gross fault” but once 
proven in Germany, it is then for the physician to prove that the plaintiff’s damage 
did not occur from his gross fault.  Importantly, and even more to the plaintiff’s 
advantage, the gross fault could perhaps come from simply not attending on a patient 
and then whatever the agent that caused the patient’s injury or death was, it would 
be for the defendant to show the fault is not attributable to him.  Although Britain 
and France might treat such cases with res ipsa loquitur  or causal presumptions, there 
is no reversal of the burden of proof as such.   If the defendants cannot offer an 
explanation, then this might well amount to the same thing in causation in certain 
situations but it is an important boundary in the law of causation between German 
law and the other jurisdictions.    
 
French courts generally require the intime conviction of the judges before they are 
persuaded of the plaintiff’s case.  This, as we have seen, submits to various 
presumptions provided that they are précises, serieuses and concordantes.  These can 
significantly help the plaintiff.  Although these do not have to be justified by science, 
they cannot just exist in the air. We have seen that cases in France do not have to be 
justified by science (and I think particularly here of the hepatitis B vaccination / 
multiple sclerosis cases). This allows France to stand out when it comes to proof of 
causation.  I doubt that such decisions would be followed in Germany or in the 
United Kingdom.  There would at least need to be some hard science behind such a 
decision before a causal link were admitted.  I have already cited a case in Germany 
where causation was established to 70% yet the plaintiff failed to recover.833  As was 
stated in the hepatitis B decisions, there were policy reasons which allow for such a 
causal link to be determined.  Similarly, the same can be seen with the subsidiary 
“obligations of security” in contract that appear in France and Germany when one is 
staying in hospital.  In France and Germany, there can be a presumption against a 
hospital for the malfunctioning of machines and even for nosocomial infections but a 
doctor is not to be regarded as the insurer of such machines.  In the United !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
833 BGH NJW 1999, 860 
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Kingdom, this is not known.  In Britain, however, there is special statutory liability 
for mesothelioma that is not to be found on the Continent.  In Scotland there is 
statutory liability for pleural plaques.834  I have referred also to the special liability 
systems extant in each jurisdiction.  It is not the purpose of this paper to determine 
which law is better but rather to highlight such aspects of causation with respect to 
the jurisdictions under consideration and how it is impossible to group them together 
or even to extract principles from case law as some would have with regard to 
causation.   
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6.5 Conclusion 
I have not found with delictual liability from a comparative perspective, unlike Lando 
with contract that “…although the rules were different, the courts had or would have 
reached the same results.”835  What is more, with regard to causation, the differences 
even within jurisdictions are striking.  In the United Kingdom, we see that Law Lords 
in the Supreme Court differ in their own understanding and application of causation.  
France still has not really decided whether it favours an equivalence or adequate 
approach to causation and Germany is generally more inclined to a British approach 
(or vice-versa) from a different starting point but with significant procedural 
differences.   While I do not necessarily believe as per Legrand that one should 
Purposely privilege the identification of differences across the laws [compared] lest 
[I] fail to address singularity with authenticity.836  
 
, I do believe it is important to focus on these differences when faced with projects 
that, while not deliberately disregard them, perhaps pay less attention to them than is 
required when there may be the higher aim of codification in tort. I am 
understanding of Legrand’s view that any attempt at codification is “violence”837 and 
we must be honest about causation in medical law.  It is not a subject that is fit for 
any kind of codification.  Therefore we must be wary when we are presented with 
attempts to codify causation in general and, for our purposes, I cite the DCFR and 
PETL.  I have shown here the differences in theoretical and practical approaches in 
the jurisdictions under consideration.  They differ intra- and inter-jurisdictionally.  
That does not exclude, however, that we can learn from other jurisdictions’ 
approaches to causation – far from it.  The House of Lords has referred to both 
Germany and France in Chester v Afshar and I think that Luxembourg was certainly 
inspired in its recent decision on nosocomial infections by French case law on the 
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subject.838   Learning from each other is something quite discrete from claiming that 
laws resemble in each other in areas where, I hope to have shown, they do not at all. !  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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6.6 Problems with Causation 
Given this classic method of comparison of jurisdictions above, it is my submission 
that my research and my conclusions show that there can be no functionalist 
comparative solutions across the jurisdictions in question here. I believe a fortiori 
also that difficulties will also be encountered within jurisdictions.  This is because 
thankfully philosophers and thinkers have struggled with the question of causation 
for millennia.  Disagreement is especially noticeable in the United Kingdom 
where judges are permitted to give dissenting opinions.  This makes the United 
Kingdom a choice jurisdiction for further research in this regard.  So lawyers and 
jurists cannot agree what causation is, what its limits should be and whether and 
to what extent, it actually is something distinct from damages.  It is this which I 
wish now to examine in this final chapter.  If there can be no common notion of 
causation on even a national level, then it is pointless to attempt to define it on an 
international level.  This is not a bad thing, rather, just what is.   
 
It is not the purpose of this paper to go over the metaphysics of causation or even 
of causation in the law.  No consensus has been reached either among 
philosophers or among lawyers or academics as to what each is.  Simply, I think it 
serves this paper to show the disagreement that could arise among one of the 
fundamental linchpins of causation and, moreover, the one that is forwarded by 
the PETL: the conditio sine qua non.  
 
In his though-provoking article, “‘Factual Causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: 
What’s the difference?” David Hamer, argues that there is in all reality a false 
dichotomy between factual causation and legal causation: a dichotomy that is used 
primarily in the United Kingdom and common law countries and to a lesser 
extent in Germany and France.839  This is relevant for the purposes of this paper 
as it shows that one of the fundamental ideas in causal legal thought – the conditio 
sine qua non – in itself is not about fact.  It involves, as I seek to argue, a value 
judgement.  This further strengthens my argument that it is impossible to 
construct a European idea of causation (or an idea of causation more generally) 
and hence European concepts of tort law as not only are the jurisdictions at odds !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
839 D HAMER, “‘Factual Causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: What’s the difference?” (2014) 77 
Modern Law Review 155 
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with each other, but also philosophy.  There is no agreement on what factual 
causation is.  !
6.6.1 Factual and Legal Causation 
The dichotomy between factual causation (the conditio sine qua non) and legal 
causation (causa causans), as I have shown, is a staple of most European 
jurisprudence in some form or another.  The United Kingdom employs it as a 
starting point on any causal problem, Germany in as much it uses hinwegdenken and 
policy and France uses when it suits the courts.   Hamer, in his article, presents a 
scenario that can be seen as highlighting problems with regard to factual 
causation.  What is the behaviour to be substituted in a hypothetical world?  The 
example is the following 
Peter is hit by Dan’s car while Peter is walking across the road at an intersection.  
According to Peter, he was struck when Dan drove through a red light.  Peter claims 
to have suffered a broken leg in the accident, and to have subsequently suffered 
burns when the ambulance that was rushing Peter to hospital was hit by lightning.  
In hospital Peter goes into anaphylactic shock in an allergic reaction to antibiotics, 
suffering permanent brain damage; the treating doctor had failed to check Peter’s 
records.840 
 
Our instinctive reaction is probably that Dan should not have driven through the red 
light.  Yet what if he had a justification so to do, for example, he was driving his wife 
in labour to hospital? Do we really say that Dan is a legal cause of the anaphylactic 
shock because of the doctor’s negligence? Probably not, though he is surely the 
“factual” cause.  Would we all agree even that Dan is the “factual” cause of Peter’s 
burns when the ambulance was struck by lightning? I suggest not.   
 
In Chester v Afshar the plaintiff honestly said that she would not have known what to 
do in the event she had been told of the risk of the operation.  Her claim was 
successful.  In such case, factual causation is mixed with legal causation.  Recovery 
and causation were allowed simply on the grounds of policy.  Hart and Honoré’s 
comments in this regard (from 1985) are prescient 
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If in such cases the courts wish to do justice, and yet not openly to flout the authority 
of rules stated in bald causal terms, one expedient is to take such matters into 
account under the heading of causation and to extend this term to cover the 
limitations of policy thought desirable.841 
 
This is exactly what was done in Chester.  Although the causal rule was not framed in 
statute, the Law Lords clearly had some hesitation (and some dissent) about allowing 
causation in this case.  The conditio sine qua non would not have produced a fair 
result as they saw it and the plaintiff’s right to bodily integrity was taken as 
fundamental.  Justice had to be done.  
 
Statute can often set out the possible hypothetical world.  In the famous case of Gorris 
v Scott842the plaintiff and defendant had contracted to transport sheep by ship.  The 
plaintiff’s sheep had not been penned in as was required by the Contagious Diseases 
(Animals) Act 1869.  The sheep were washed overboard in a storm.  The court more 
or less accepted that if the sheep had been penned that they would not have been 
washed into the sea.  However, Kelly CB opined 
There was no purpose direct or indirect to protect against such damage…the Act is 
directed against the possibility of sheep or cattle being exposed to disease.843  
 
As Hart and Honoré, write such problems are difficult and will often involve 
questions of judicial legislation.  In Germany and the United Kingdom especially, the 
judges must find the mischief.    
 
Another controversy tackled in Hamer’s article is whether there is a fundamental 
difference between past events and future hypothetical events.  Although I shall not 
take a deterministic view of reality unless and until all the mysteries of quantum 
mechanics are solved,844 I think it would be well near impossible to constitute factual 
possible worlds for medical negligence cases.  It is here, and I agree with Hamer in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
841 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p94 
842 (1874) 9 LR Ex 125  
843 ibid, at 130  
844 BBC Radio 4, In Our Time: The Physics of Reality, 2 May 2002 : http://www.bbc.co.United 
Kingdom/programmes/p00548dl  
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this, that issues of burdens and standards of proof are relevant.  We talk about legal 
fictions.  In my opinion, this can be seen clearest with perhaps the biggest difference 
among the jurisdictions – recovery for loss of chance and in the special regimes that 
exist in each of the jurisdictions.   
 
Consideration of the conditio sine qua non here was designed just to show that all 
is not as it may seem and it is not as simple as asking the question “but for the 
defendant’s conduct…?”.  The question “but for?” is a relative one.  The 
counterfactual can often be difficult to determine.  What behaviour indeed must 
be substituted? This can be a puzzling question and sometimes statute may 
provide an answer.  Yet more often than not, a value judgement has to be made as 
to where to stop the “cone” of causation.  All causes are equivalent after all.  So 
lawyers must stop somewhere.  This is what “factual causation” really is.  Let us 
not pretend that it is not a value judgement.   
 
The second branch of causation that is often considered after “factual” causation 
is some kind of causal filter and for our purposes, we shall just call it legal cause.  I 
do not believe that they are readily separable from each other.  I hope the below 
shall highlight this.  I hope this shows also that legal causation is not only about 
the scope of liability as may be thought.  
  
! ! ! ! !! 258!
6.6.2 Legal Cause 
Hamer further develops his article by suggesting that legal causation in itself is not 
just about the scope of liability.845 In the Dan/Peter example above, Hamer holds 
that Stapleton would have considered Dan’s parents and even events such as Caesar’s 
crossing the Rubicon, the Cretaceous-Palaeogene extinction event and the Big Bang 
as causes.846 He says that even to refer to such things as “causes” is to deny how 
people understand the word in everyday life.847 People in every day life, Hamer 
suggests, would negate the suggestion that the Big Bang is actually one of the causes 
of Dan’s liability above.  Stapleton and Wright would certainly disagree, holding 
them to be causal, and any other selection to be purely normative.  He states, quoting 
Wright,  
…the defendant’s tortious act was a necessary condition for the occurrence of an 
injury, it is unnatural to deny that the act was, as a matter of fact…a factor in 
producing the injury…To state otherwise is to make a noncausal, nonfactual policy 
judgement about responsibility for injury.848 
 
I would agree with this.  I am not insisting that any other opinion is wrong but I think 
it underlines the importance between causation in the law and causation in any other 
discipline.  People will understand causation…simply how they understand it. I do 
not see how it can be denied that these remoter causes – Big Bang, Caesar’s crossing 
the Rubicon – can be repudiated as causes in the factual, historical and even 
scientific - sense.  Even using the “but for” test, there is a value judgement made in 
excluding them – even from the conditio sine qua non!  Essentially, the test is (i) 
“legal” factual causation and (ii) legal causation. Adjectives like “proximate” and 
“potent” cause can then be employed when cutting the causal “cone” for given 
purposes.   Yet it is where we cut the cone of causation that we want to know this 
answer.  It does not admit of a right or wrong answer.  In Dan’s example, if asked, I 
might not answer that the cause of Peter’s injury was Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon, 
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845 D HAMER, “‘Factual Causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: What’s the difference ?” (2014) 77 
Modern Law Review 155 at 177 
846 D HAMER, ibid, 129 referring to J STAPLETON, “Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope 
of Liability for Consequences” (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 941, at 1000-1001 
847 D HAMER, ibid at 179 
848 R WRIGHT, “Causation in Tort Law”, (1985) 73 California Law Review, 1735 at 1783 
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but if cross-examined on the question, I certainly would not deny it.  In fact, I do not 
understand how anyone could deny the fact; it might simply not be our initial, 
intuitive response.  It might necessitate a change in one’s understanding of factual 
causation but nonetheless, there it is.  Hamer writes 
In law and in everyday life people purport to discriminate between stronger and 
weaker causes, and Wright and Stapleton fail to demonstrate that these judgements 
are other than what they seem.849 
 
I do not believe this is true.  I think Wright adequately shows what these judgements 
are.  They are non-causal, nonfactual policy judgements about responsibility for 
injury.   
 
Where Hamer is correct, however, is in his assertion that many people do not 
understand causation in this way.  I tend to agree.850 They would simply point to 
lightning as Peter’s cause of the Peter’s burns without necessarily mentioning the Big 
Bang or perhaps even Dan’s passing through a red light.  I would accept this.  
Lighting is a freakish occurrence.  For some people, it may render inefficient 
anything that came before it.  Causation can be legitimately understood in this way.  
What I think is of most relevance to this paper, is that it can be understood in this 
way – and in many other ways! As I have suggested, there can be no “common 
sense” with causation in difficult cases.  I think the case law presented in this paper 
shows this without doubt.  I hope further to add to the disagreement in 
understanding causation by highlighting these examples also.   
 
What Hamer does show in this paper is that notions of factual causation and 
“legal” or normative causation are fluid.  Their concepts may not be as rigid as it 
may seem.  Determining what is a conditio sine qua non requires, in my opinion, 
a causa causans judgement in the first instance.  This ensures that we deal with legal 
causation.  I wish to underline again and again that what a court is looking for is 
not causation scientific, it is not causation historical, it is not causation economic, 
but legal causation.  These other disciplines may be helpful, informative and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
849 D HAMER, “‘Factual Causation’ and ‘scope of liability’: What’s the difference ?” (2014) 77 
Modern Law Review 155 at 179 
850 I have, however, no data on this.  
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valuable when coming to our legal conclusion but they remain separate 
disciplines.  They may be subject to experts’ opinions but a court is only looking 
for causation in the law.  I have already shown this in case law. I refer to the 
hepatitis B vaccine / multiple sclerosis cases in France as the epitome of this.  
Given then that the causal question can often be so impenetrable and unyielding, 
loaded with unknowns and uncertain variables, the extraction of what the causal 
question is itself can often be demanding and challening. Even when we think we 
have the question, as I have shown above, there is not necessarily one way to 
confront it. There can be dispute over the substitution of counterfactual behaviour 
or by de-limiting the causa causans somewhere.  People do understand causation 
differently.  I would suggest that the Big Bang is a cause of my birth.  There are 
many various causes.  Other people may deny this.  How relevant the Big Bang 
becomes in a causal problem, depends, of course on, the causal problem.  Bearing 
all this in mind then, I suggest that it is going to be well near impossible to try to 
define causation or to try to hone in on any “one theory above all” in principle for 
European law. Any pretensions in that direction are misguided.  
 
Not only is there no agreement among the jurisdictions in question here, but 
moreover there is no agreement within the jurisdictions – as best represented by 
the United Kingdom Law Lord decisions – and among what people generally 
using “common sense” may regard as causation.   Yet this is not a bad thing.  It is 
not to be criticised.  Let us admit that we cannot define causation, and just live 
with the word “causation”.  It will be interpreted according to the judge and there 
are many causal doctrines from which judges can pick to attain the result they 
desire.    
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6.7 Projects in Europe towards the Drafting of a European 
Civil Code 
Notwithstanding what I hope to have shown above, there exists nonetheless a desire 
to harmonise European tort law.  The European Parliament called for a European 
civil code in 1989,8511994,852and then in 2000.853 Attempts have centred primarily on 
contract law.854 However, tort law has followed suit with the inclusion of tort law in 
Book VI of the DCFR855 on non-contractual liability arising out of damage caused to 
another and the drafting in 2005 of the Principles of European Tort Law.856   There 
have also been other “Knowledge-Building” research groups857such as the Pan 
European Organisation of Personal Injury Lawyers, the Ius Commmune Casebooks for the 
Common Law of Europe project and the Common Core for European Private Law 
Project.  The last three scour the texts of European case law reporting on solutions 
offered in the jurisdictions in question and present them.  Infantino writes 
…any attempt to codify or harmonise tort law should be undertaken with the 
understanding that the enforcement of top-down rules also requires the collateral 
support of a bottom-up harmonisation.858  
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851 OJ, 1989, C 158/400 
852 OJ 1994 C 205, 518 
853 OJ 2000, C 323, 377 where the European Parliament stated that “greater harmonisation of civil 
law has become essential in the internal market” and called on the European Commission to draw 
up a study in this area.  
854 Following on from the European Commission’s Action Plan 2003 (COM (2003) 68) and the 
development of European contract law together with revision of the acquis communautaire 
(COM(2004) 651); for an interesting critique on the deficiencies of the provisions of the DCFR and 
the PETL see P GILIKER, “Can 27 + ‘Wrongs’ Make a Right? The European Tort Law Project: 
Some Sceptical Reflections” (2009) 20 Kings Law Journal 257 
855 funded by the European Commission  
856 The DCFR can be found with commentaries in Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law (“Principles and Models”) (prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code 
and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), 2009, Sellier, Dissen, Germany), 
consultable on-line at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline_edition_en.pdf 
; the PETL were published in Principles of European Tort Law by the European Group on Tort Law 
(Vienna, Springer, 2005) 
857 to use the terminology of M INFANTINO in her article “Making European Tort Law : The 
Game and Its Players” (2010) Journal of International Comparative Law 46 at 78 
858ibid, at 84 
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The bottom-up harmonisation involves a collection and understanding of the 
common law of European jurisdictions.  It is not the purpose of this paper to rehash 
the arguments for or against the creation of a European Civil Code but rather to 
consider and assess the propositions from the DCFR and PETL with regard to their 
provisions on causation with special focus on the legal systems of France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany as representative of the main legal families.859 The DCFR 
even invites such criticism.  It is with this spirit that I approach this paper.  It notes 
The DCFR is an academic text. It sets out the results of a large European research 
project and invites evaluation from that perspective. The breadth of that scholarly 
endeavour will be apparent when the full edition is published. Independently of the 
fate of the CFR, it is hoped that the DCFR will promote knowledge of private law in 
the jurisdictions of the European Union. In particular it will help to show how much 
national private laws resemble one another…860  
 
Of course, it is necessary to understand what is meant by causal language in PETL or 
DCFR.  As Wester-Ouisse has pointed out, each jurist will bring his own 
understanding of causal language to the table.861 This is an additional problem for 
codification, in my opinion.  Not only do the jurisdictions differ significantly in their 
solutions in the area of medical causation but causation itself is a concept fraught 
with value judgements.  It would be an achievement in itself to codify what is meant 
by it in any one of the jurisdictions never mind in all European jurisdictions!   
 
I hope that my research does to some extent evaluate the DCFR and the PETL. I 
hope it shows that national private laws do differ, at least with regard to causation in 
tort, to a significant extent and certainly that they do not “resemble one another” to 
the extent that could facilitate or suggest codification.  I wish to refute this 
proposition by advancing the findings of my research.  I am nonetheless a fervent 
supporter of systems learning from each other – in my research I have shown how 
this has been done.  The French took from the Germans in causation and more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
859 as per the Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe Project  
860 Principles and Models, p8 
861 V WESTER-OUISSE, “Définition de la causalité dans les projets européens sur le droit de la 
responsabilité”, in Le droit français de la responsabilité civile confronté aux projets européens d’harmonisation 
(Recueil des travaux du Groupe de Recherche Européen sur la Responsabilité Civile et 
l’Assurance (GRERCA), Paris, 2012), p391 et seqq 
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recently I showed how the House of Lords has been willing, on occasion, to refer to 
the Continent to consider how a solution in medical causation might be formulated.  
This is something quite separate from what is attempted by certain scholars in their 
enthusiasm for codification.  What instead I want to demonstrate is rather that 
common principles in causation in tort law are unworkable at the European level as 
shown by the dissimilar approaches in causation. It is for others to research on other 
aspects of these projects.  Causation is, however, a pillar on which these projects are 
built.  If confidence is to had in them, then it is necessary that we have an honest 
debate about their interpretations of causation.  I invite reflection and consideration 
on how the articles with regard to causation are both currently drafted.  I hope this 
paper may go some way to advancing that debate.    
 
My main propositions therefore are in this European part of the paper are primarily 
two.  Firstly that there can be no common European idea of what constitutes 
causation.  This can be seen especially in the domain of medicine. Second, there can 
be no understanding of causation that can be reduced to principles.  
 
The third and accessory part of this paper is to acknowledge, however, that causation 
is a concept that is here to stay in a hard law form at the European level.  The ECJ 
has considered causation to some extent and I shall look at this case law.  There is 
also, for example, the Product Directive which still requires that the defect caused 
damage and the Environmental Liability Directive which sets out certain principles 
with regard to causation.  Although there has been no case law at the ECJ level with 
regard to the Product Directive at the time of writing, this does not mean that there 
will be no references to it for interpretation in the future.  I will examine the little case 
law in in the ECJ which deals directly with causation.  It may or may not come as a 
surprise that I shall suggest no principles with regard to causation as I find causation 
impossible to define and is ultimately determined by “feeling”, policy or whatever the 
judge determines himself to be common sense. 
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6.7.1 Contract or Tort 
I showed above that in Germany, France and Luxembourg, a patient’s relationship 
with his doctor is based on contract.  Any remedy therefore is usually, strictly 
speaking, governed by rules governing damages in contract.  However, I also showed 
that many of the ideas and notions of causation were borrowed from delict in all 
three jurisdictions.  It is only the United Kingdom that treats the patient/doctor 
relationship as purely a non-contractual one. 862  I consider therefore that the 
principles of DCFR on non-contractual liability and PETL with regard to causation 
would apply in the event causation were a matter of dispute in a patient/doctor 
relationship as it is here where we can see the most discussion on causation and it is 
this that is important.  The Principles of European Contract Law do not even 
mention the word “causation” nor do they deal with remoteness of damages.863 They 
do, however, deal with foreseeability.864  
 
The fruit of those two groups of scholars favouring codification can be seen in the 
DCFR and in the PETL.  Both favour codification.  I shall consider first the DCFR.    
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862 save in the case of private hospitals, which are the exception.  Most people in the United 
Kingdom use the free National Health Service  
863 cf article 1151 of the Luxembourg Civil Code which states that damages in contract can be 
obtained where they are  “…une suite immediate et directe de l’inexécution de la convention.”  
864 see the Principles on Contract Law: Article 9:502: General Measure of Damages The 
general measure of damages is such sum as will put the aggrieved party as nearly as possible into 
the position in which it would have been if the contract had been duly performed. Such damages 
cover the loss which the aggrieved party has suffered and the gain of which it has been deprived. 
Article 9:503: Foreseeability The non-performing party is liable only for loss which it foresaw 
or could reasonably have foreseen at the time of conclusion of the contract as a likely result of its 
non-performance, unless the non-performance was intentional or grossly negligent. 
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6.7.2 Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)  
Before I consider causation in the DCFR, a word needs to be said about first 
principles.865  The fundamental rule of liability in delict is to be found in Book IV 
1:101.  It sets out a “basic rule”.  It states 
A person who suffers legally relevant damage has a right to reparation from a person 
who caused the damage intentionally or negligently or is otherwise accountable for 
the causation of the damage.  
 
Where a person has not caused legally relevant damage intentionally or negligently 
that person is accountable for the causation of legally relevant damage only if 
Chapter 3 so provides.   
 
The first thing to note about first principles is that it is framed in terms of the victim 
of the damage.  If the victim suffers relevant damage x, then he is entitled to some 
kind of reparation from person y who caused the damage.  This is in contrast to 
PETL and how the jurisdictions under consideration here frame their articles on 
delict.   
 
The next question is what is a legally relevant damage? This is set out at 2:101.  It 
provides that 
Loss, whether economic or non-economic, or injury is legally relevant damage if  
• one of the following rules of this Chapter so provides; 
• the loss or injury results from a violation of a rights otherwise conferred by the law; 
or 
• the loss or injury results from a violation of an interest worthy of legal protection. 
 
Loss caused to a natural person as a result of injury to his body or health and the 
injury as such are considered as legally relevant damage;866 loss suffered by third 
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865 The co-operation of both the Study Group on European Civil Code and the Research Group 
on Existing EC Private Law presented the DCFR as principles to be commented on and discussed.   
Commentaries on the DCFR state that it is to serve as a “possible model” for a common frame of 
reference, for legal science, research and education and as a “possible source of inspiration”.   The 
common frame of reference itself, however, will be more concentrated on contract law.   
866 Art VI 2: 201, DCFR  
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persons as a result of another’s personal injury or death is also protected867as is 
infringement of dignity, liberty and privacy.868  These are the most relevant 
sections for the purposes of this paper. 869  The same interests are protected in 
DCFR as are in PETL. There would then appear to be some agreement and 
harmony that the protection of life and bodily integrity are protected interests: so 
far, so good.   
 
6.7.2.1 Causation in the DCFR 
The provisions of causal requirements between damage and a tortious act are to 
be found in Chapter 4 of the DCFR.  It provides for a general rule and then 
particular rules on collaboration and alternative causes.  Collaboration shall not 
detain me unduly here.  I shall be more concerned with the general rule and with 
alternative causes.  In addition to these specific provisions on causation, it would 
be remiss of me not to consider some of the defences as provided for in Chapter 5 
DCFR as defences in themselves either deny completely or limit causation.  I 
consider these relevant in the context of medical causation.  Defences include 
consent and acting at one’s own risk, contributory fault and accountability.  As I 
shall show, PETL is broader in its causal chapter in that it expounds more 
potential causal scenarios.  Again it is not for me to pronounce on which of the 
PETL or DCFR is “better” but rather to suggest that there can be no common 
understanding of causation in these European codes.   The general rule for 
causation then in the DCFR is 
A person causes legally relevant damage to another if the damage is to be regarded 
as a consequence of: 
• that person’s conduct; or 
• a source of danger for which that person is responsible.  !
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867 Art VI- 2: 202, DCFR 
868 Art VI 2: 203, DCFR 
869 Art VI 2: 204, DCFR protects loss upon communication of incorrect information about 
another; VI 2: 205 protects loss upon a breach of confidence; Art VI 2: 206 protects loss upon 
infringement of property or lawful possession; Art VI Art 2: 207 protects loss upon reliance on 
incorrect advice or information 
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In cases of personal injury or death the injured person’s predisposition with respect to 
the type or extent of the injury sustained is to be disregarded.870 
 
The DCFR approaches first principles differently from either the BGB or the French 
Civil Code.871 The last two do not try to define causation.  Yet here in the DCFR 
there is an attempt to define causation consequentially.  This is the first mistake.  I 
think I have shown with an overview of a causal analysis in medical causation at least 
for the jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, France and Germany that to define 
causation is to err.  This will also be my criticism of the PETL.  Causation is such 
mercurial and ever-changing concept that to attempt to demarcate its limits is not 
wise.   I quote 
La notion de causalité est une redoubtable sirène: elle égare volontiers ceux que 
subtilité séduit et qui cherchent à la pénétrer jusque dans ses mystères intimes.872   
 
I find the quote quite amusing and metaphorically French but it has some truth to it.  
By trying to create some kind of European code, I think it natural that drafters will 
want to, and try to, define as much as they can for the sake of standardization.  
Standardization itself can be “seductive”, it is true. To continue the metaphor, I 
believe my research above has shown, that any attempt of definition will only lead to 
a great crashing on a legal Lorelei.   Yet I even ponder the reason for setting sail… 
 
It could be argued that not much can really be given to this definition as set out in 
the DCFR shown above.  I might agree with this but then why attempt to define it at 
all? It would be better just to stick to the almost taciturn Civil Code and BGB.  There 
nothing is given away with regard to causation and doctrine and case law interpret it.  
This could be criticised in itself – perhaps especially with regard to French law – in 
that doctrine has not come to any decision and the law remains unclear – but I 
suggest that is the nature of causation more generally and especially with regard to 
medical causation.   Moreover, there is no desire to adhere to any rigid precedent in 
France and judges decide the facts more or less as they come before them.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
870Art VI  4 :101, DCFR 
871 I do not compare here the British common law as this by definition is not codified 
872 CC 2 1 Feb 1973, JCP 1974 II n 17882, note by N DEJEAN DE LA BÂTIE 
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Although there is no admission of a wholesale adoption of adequacy theory in the 
commentary to this chapter, I propose that that is what is hinted at here.  The use of 
the word “consequence” suggests to me first of all a definition by exclusion: a 
determination of that of which it is not: it is not conditio sine qua non.  This is 
supported by the commentary thereon.  Second, the use of the word “consequence” 
makes me think of first a philosophical problem and of adequate causation in that 
what would happen “in the natural course of things”. 
 
Unfortunately, as Hart and Honoré have shown, the use of the word “consequence” 
is fraught with difficulty.873 I shall adapt their first example to medicine. 
 
Example 
A, as a result of his negligent driving, causes B injury as a result of which B must 
spend two weeks in hospital where he acquires measles as a result of bacteria that 
were brought through the window by a breeze.  There is no question the hospital was 
negligent.  If we use the DCFR, is B’s contracting measles a “consequence” of A’s 
negligent driving? They note simply 
No short account can be given of the limits thus placed on “consequences” because 
these limits vary, intelligibly, with the variety of causal connection asserted.874 
 
It could be argued that a breeze and bacteria are just part of the environment and 
simply a condition or the circumstances in which the cause operates.875  I agree with 
Hart and Honoré in that it is easy for us to be misled by the use of certain metaphors 
which are used when we describe causation. “Breaking the chain of causation” is 
often used when in fact, what is meant is that what such intervening events do are 
complete the explanation of harm.876  They note  
In truth in any causal process we have at each phase not single events but complex 
sets of conditions, and among these conditions are some which are not only 
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873 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p71 et seqq 
874 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p70 
875 Minister of Pensions v Chennell [1947] KB 250, 256 
876 HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the Law, p73 
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subsequent to, but independent of the initiating action or event.  Some of these 
independent conditions, such as the evening breeze in the example chosen, we 
classify as mere conditions in or on which the cause operates; others we speak of as 
“interventions” or “causes.”877  
 
What I want to show here is that it can be a difficult question as to whether an event 
is a cause or a condition and how can we limit, as Hart and Honoré question, the 
“consequences”.  The usual limited factors of foreseeability, proximity, and policy all 
come into question.   
 
Second, it is necessary to consider the generalisations of consequences.  What is 
meant here, and this is why philosophy and theory are important, is the description 
of the consequence.  In a case like McTear, for example, it is necessary to describe the 
death as “death by smoking”, not just “death” or even “death by lung cancer” – and 
this is where Mrs McTear’s case failed.  Mrs McTear failed to be more precise in 
showing that lung cancer was caused by (or even a consequence of) her husband’s 
smoking cigarettes.  It could have been caused by a number of factors – it could have 
been caused by conditions!878  
 
Another way of testing whether something is a consequence is to hypothetically 
eliminate the act.  Yet this reminds us simply of the conditio sine qua non test which 
is specifically what the DCFR has avoided.  If Mrs McTear’s husband had not 
smoked, it could not be said that he would not have contracted lung cancer and died.  
A more difficult case arises with omissions: in Chester v Afshar, it was not clear what 
Miss Chester would have done had the surgeon informed her of the risks inherent in 
the operation.  This is what provoked the disagreement among the Law Lords: 
should the court stick to principle to allow for consistency or should equity prevail on 
the basis of public policy?  It is not apparent to me that any clearer notion of 
“consequence” would be forthcoming were European jurisdictions to adopt the 
DCFR.   
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Third, the use of the term “consequence” suggests adequacy theory to me.  The 
notion of “consequence” is undoubtedly tied up with that of the adequacy theory.  As 
Hart and Honoré note 
The adequacy theory is concerned with the relation of probability between the 
condition and the ultimate consequence….879  
 
They go on 
But the probability of the occurrence of the third factor can be made indirectly 
relevant to the adequacy of the condition by incorporating…the description of the 
ultimate consequence.880   
 
The authors of the DCFR admit that there is no reduction to a conditio sine qua non 
formula881in what I understand to be some implied criticism of PETL (where the first 
principle is conditio sine qua non) as this would “merely have put a ‘factual’ or 
‘scientific’ concept of causation into words.”882  There is indeed quite a fierce 
rejection of equivalence theory in the DCFR comments.  
 
They continue that 
Numerous exceptions and expansions would have been necessary, even at this level, 
without there being any real prospect of exhaustively covering the subject-matter.883   
 
This seems to imply that numerous exceptions and expansions will not be necessary 
by adopting some kind of “consequence” as a general rule.  As I hope to have shown 
above, philosophy does not permit of such simplicity.   I could not disagree more with 
Lord Salmon’s now famous passage when he opines with regard to fine distinctions 
with causation in the law that it can  
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no doubt be a fruitful source of interesting academic discussion between students of 
philosophy.  Such a distinction is, however, far too unreal to be recognised by the 
common law.884   
 
I believe the contrary to be true.  When codes antagonise or challenge philosophy in 
considering that they can use the word “consequence”885 without thinking of the 
consequences [sic], then they must answer such criticism.  
 
Even when using the “consequence” test as opposed to a “but for” test exceptions 
and expansions will also be necessary if a code is proposed in this way. The DCFR 
authors do recognise the fact that factors to be taken into account do not lend 
themselves to listing and that “Each individual case can make a new calibration 
necessary.”886 I agree with this and even more, I would say that there is no point even 
to set out a first principle of “consequence”. There can be no jurisdictional 
agreement on what a “consequence” is.  I am also near certain that any 
consequential notion will be jettisoned where it does not produce a fair result.  The 
following commentary is telling in that what can influence this are such factors as the 
protective policy aim of the norm of social behaviour, general policy considerations, 
remoteness and probability.  This would appear to be in contradiction with the 
authors’ affirmation earlier on that  
This branch of the law does not impose liability for damages simply for moral or 
general political reasons.  It is not the “duty defaulter”, the “rich person”, or the 
insured party who is made liable, but rather a person to whose sphere of control the 
subsequent mishap may be traced back.887   
 
Therefore what the DCFR is prima facie proposing is, in my opinion, some kind of 
formulation of adequacy theory (though not admitted as such) as a general principle. 
Yet, and in the authors’ commentary to the DCFR, this comes with the blessing of its 
filtering by legal devices and norms such as policy, remoteness and probability.  It 
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also excludes some kind of imposing of liability for general “political reasons” 
(whatever that means) and further we must consider the “sphere of control”.  To be 
honest, I am confused as to what they mean by “consequence”.  They use the word 
once and then comment much on it but their commentary seems to be somewhat 
contradictory.  They allow for policy but would not impose liability simply for 
“general political reasons” if I equate that to policy.  They also refer to probability.  
As shown above, and in my chapters outlining the nature of adequacy, many of the 
formulations of adequacy theory include ideas of probability in them in the first 
place.  To comment that causation can be interpreted using probability is simply 
inviting comparison to adequacy.888 I am certain that the authors were aware of 
adequacy theory when drafting this text.   
 
A third theory that I have exercised herein is that of breach of a particular purpose of 
norm.  It is perhaps used more in Germany than in any other country here.  It is not 
defined in the BGB but that is often what is considered in practice.   If a third party is 
to be held liable for breaching a norm, then this should be stated clearly rather than 
having to fumble about with legal reasoning that is surrounded by adequacy theory 
in commentary to a proposed European code.  It would not have cost the authors of 
the DCFR much to add in a rule about protective purpose given that they have 
sanctioned its use.   I am not saying that I would advocate it but they seem to over-
egg the commentary and they only have one first causal principle, namely 
“consequence”.   
 
The DCFR has refused to discriminate cause-in-fact and cause-in-law.  The authors 
openly state that 
It is not the function of paragraph (1) of this Article to attach itself firmly to a defined 
theoretical position within the broad spectrum of opinion.  The width and 
complexity of the subject do not speak in favour of a precise rule on causation.889   
  
As we shall see below, this is in total contrast to PETL.  DCFR and PETL are at 
odds.  It is curious therefore, in my opinion, why the framers of the DCFR decided to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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define causation, even if one does not accept my comparison to adequacy theory, in 
terms of “consequence” or a “source of danger”.  They peculiarly reject conditio sine 
qua non theory while at the same time noting that the article on causation does not 
firmly attach itself to a “theoretical position within the broad spectrum of opinion” – 
maybe, but it certainly rejects a theoretical position within the broad spectrum of 
opinion.  
 
With regard to loss of chance, the authors comment that 
The question of liability for loss of a chance would be a question concerning legally 
relevant damage, not causation; of course the differences of opinion on this issue 
confirm that these two elements of liability (legally relevant damage and causation) 
partially intersect.890   
 
While I ultimately believe that causation in the law cannot be divorced from 
questions of remoteness of damage, foreseeability and legally relevant damage, I 
think they are being somewhat disingenuous when they say that loss of chance relates 
only to legally relevant damage and not causation.  It is often loss of chance that is 
used in France when full causation to (legally relevant) damage cannot be established. 
I take the example of Wilsher (oxygen was inserted to the heart instead of the aorta 
and there were six different agents at play) where, if it had been decided in France, 
then loss of chance would clearly have been used.  I suggest that any argument with 
regard to legally relevant damage would be just that – namely, that the damnum is not 
an iniuria.  As we have seen, legally relevant damage includes loss incurred as a result 
of injury to a person’s health.  No doubt defendant health providers would first argue 
that loss of (say) a chance to recover from 42% to 25%891is not a legally relevant 
damage.  The defendants have not caused a damnum iniruia datum.  It is not a real 
“asset” in the way the loss of an arm or a leg through a tortfeasor’s negligence would 
be.  Yet had the figures been suitable for the burden of proof in the United Kingdom, 
then the plaintiff may have recovered. The United Kingdom and France have both 
recognised that compensation for the loss of chance can be recovered.  In the United 
Kingdom, however, recovery for a lost chance in the domain of medical negligence 
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has not been permitted to date. 892   Second, I would note that – to use the 
terminology of the DCFR – it could well be a consequence of a health provider’s 
negligence that a patient lose a chance to recover scientifically or statistically.   How 
the act, a, having the consequence of b, where b is a (legally) relevant damage, is to be 
categorised is something for the courts in question.   I think therefore it was 
somewhat unnecessary to mention the fact that causation and legally relevant 
damage intersect – I think this goes without saying.   The commentators were wise 
not to expand further on this point given its controversy in Europe.  
 
Another criticism I make of the DCFR is that they evade the issue of burden of proof.    
They opine 
…the decisive element is the determination that the legally relevant damage suffered 
is to be deemed a consequence of a person’s conduct or the realization of a source of 
risk, for which the person bears responsibility.  Therefore, under paragraph (1) there 
is no room for specific provisions on the burden of proof, and particularly no room 
for the reversal of the burden of proof in special situations.893   
 
The drafters have really concentrated on the substantial here.  It seems to me that 
they really want to concentrate on the words “person’s conduct” or “source of 
danger”.  I do not understand why there is no room for the provision on the burden 
of proof.  PETL provides for it.894  Yet bizarrely, the drafters then go on to say that if 
the matter comes to court, then the judge is afforded a certain amount of discretion 
which “may and must be exercised”.895 They then write 
Whether the existence of a cause-and-effect relationship between the wrongdoing 
and damage can be drawn from [the facts], is not something which seems amenable 
to the allocation of the burden of proof.896 
 
I find this statement quite shocking and it leads me to wonder to what extent they 
have accurately considered research from case law in Europe.  Cause is inextricably !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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linked to the burden of proof.  It is precisely facts that lead to the shifting of the 
burden of proof, especially in France and in Germany.  I have shown how if a judge 
in France is convinced of certain precise, serious and concordant facts then this will 
lead to a presumption that the defendant did indeed cause the damage – if not a de 
iure reversal of the burden of proof then a de facto one.897  Similarly, in Germany, 
there is actual and theoretical reversal of the burden of proof where there has been a 
grobe Behandlung, not to mention the doctrine of Anscheinbeweis.  I am not advocating 
that there should be a reversal of the burden of proof in one case or another but two 
of the jurisdictions more or less reverse the burden of proof.  Would not that have 
been a special situation?  At least PETL more or less leaves it up to national 
jurisdictions898but as I hope I have shown, there is no agreement among the 
jurisdictions under consideration here as to when the burden of proof should be 
reversed, if at all.  The United Kingdom never admits of reversal of the burden of 
proof; Germany does.  The United Kingdom does not allow for the presumptions.  
France does.   
 
6.7.2.1.1 Article 4:101(1)(b) “a source of danger” 
On the second prong of paragraph (1), what exactly a “source of danger” would 
be is not clear.  I wonder whether a faulty medical prosthesis would be regarded as 
a “source of danger”.  The question as to whether a doctor herself should be liable 
for a prosthesis is controversial.  The Product Directive only affords an action 
against the manufacturer in the event a “product” is defective.  In France, it was 
left to the Cour de cassation to decide the matter.899 The PIP breast implant 
scandal where 47,000 British women were affected shows how “dangerous” some 
prostheses can be. 900   I can easily imagine other medical equipment being 
regarded as a source of danger.  What is interesting here is that PETL does not 
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provide for a “source of danger” causal responsibility in such a way.901  It is 
certainly an interesting approach to causation in the medical field but I am not 
sure what it achieves that either an equivalence or adequate cause analysis does 
not especially given where commentators have allowed for Article 4:101(1)(a) to be 
interpreted according to policy.902    !
6.7.2.2 Article 4:103 Alternative Causes 
Article 4:103903 of Book VI of DCFR provides that 
Where legally relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a 
number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable and it is 
established that the damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which 
one, each person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
presumed to have caused that damage.    
  
This is a particularly significant provision as it holds that someone who did not 
actually cause damage could be held responsible for it. Here defendant A can be 
liable for damage B that he maybe did not cause.  The British case of Fairchild come 
immediately to mind here. Such a provision is in particular to deal with the 
circumstances of the latter case.  Just to remind ourselves, in Fairchild the plaintiff was 
employed by employers E1 and E2 who were in a breach of a duty of care by 
allowing P to breathe in asbestos dust.  P contracted mesothelioma.  It could not be 
shown when the cancer was contracted but either E1 or E2 was responsible.  So 
Fairchild would have been ripe for application of this article.  This article goes further 
and allows for the situation where there would be different agents that had potentially 
caused the damage – this being one of the limitations on Fairchild at the moment.  
 
This article seems not to produce a solution in Wilsher.  It will be remembered that 
here although noxious agent (a) materially increased the risk of the child’s being 
harmed by noxious agent (a), evidentially, there was not a sufficient causative link to 
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the harm as noxious agents (b), (c), (d) or (e) could have also caused the harm.   It 
could not be shown that oxygen was more likely [sic] to cause the harm than any of 
the other agents.  The DCFR insist on different persons’ being accountable.904   
 
The authors do make clear, however, that recovery under this paragraph would 
not be possible where one particular person is fully responsible for the damage but 
that person is not financially capable of making full reparation.  In such a case, 
“there is no reason why the victim should have the windfall benefit of other 
persons to sue.”905 So in Fairchild, if it can be shown that the “guilty” fibre which 
caused the mesothelioma actually came from E2 as opposed to E1 then E2 would 
be totally liable.     Science, however, was not at that stage yet.   
 
6.7.2.2.1 Article 4:103 Medication on the Market  
The authors make clear that Article 4:103 is not to be used for pro rata market 
liability.906 This is seen in their illustration here.  
The claimants’ mothers had during their pregnancy taken medication, which was 
marketed in the same chemical formula under different brand names by competing 
companies. This medication caused the claimants to suffer from cancer of the uterus 
years later. They cannot say, however, which brand of medication the mothers 
bought at the time, nor even whether the medication taken came from any one of 
the companies which they now seek to hold liable; the medication may well have 
come from a company which no longer exists. VI.–4:103 does not help the 
claimants’ with either of these difficulties. An “occurrence” within the meaning of 
VI.–4:103 is lacking. This is because even if all of the companies were active and 
present in the market, the claimants could not prove that each had unleashed a 
danger on their mothers. In other words, it is not even ascertained that any one of 
the mothers took medication from different companies. The people involved simply 
cannot remember who brought about the cause of damage. This does not suffice for 
VI.– 4:103.  
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Neither has such a solution revealed itself in the case law.  This paper concentrates 
on Europe but I exceptionally refer to the United States of America where the idea of 
market-share liability was first advocated. I found the solution quite novel and, 
potentially, a solution but moreover another way of thinking about legal causation.  
The case was Sindell v Abbott Laboratories.907  What happened here was that the 
plaintiff’s mother had taken the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) when she was pregnant.  
As a result of the drug, the plaintiff developed cancer.  There were many 
manufacturers of the drug and it was impossible to say which manufacturer had 
made the pills that the plaintiff’s mother had taken.  Importantly the drugs were 
fungible.  The defendants together produced about 90% of the drug.  The court held 
that the defendants were liable in accordance with their market share.  Justice 
Richardson, however, dissented and held that such judicial activism should be left to 
the legislature.  The principal elements of the model are the following: 
• the defendants must actually be potential tortfeasors; 
• the product must be fungible; 
• the plaintiff cannot identify which defendant produced the fungible 
product which harmed that particular defendant; and 
• a substantial share of the manufacturers who produced the product 
during the relevant time period are named as defendants in the action.  
 
For the purposes of this article, the commentary to the DCFR states that two 
occurrences would be lacking for the purposes of Art 4:103.908   This is because, they 
say, that even if all the companies were active and present on the market, the 
claimants could not prove that each had unleashed a danger on their mothers.909  
Arguably, this is an overly restrictive interpretation of Art 4:103 and I am not 
convinced why market-share liability could not be introduced via this article provided 
we are talking about a generic drug.   I believe this is possible as the article says, 
“where legally relevant damage may have been caused by any one or more of a 
number of occurrences for which different persons are accountable…”.910  I suggest !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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here that in a case such as Sindell, damage may well have been caused by one of the 
pharmaceutical companies.  Typically, in such a case, the causal link (accountability) 
could be established using market-share liability.  It could be an interpretation not 
shut off from national jurisdictions.  The authors’ insistence that market-share 
liability is not brought in by this article may well have been their intention but their 
intention does not occlude the possibility of lawyers’ using it in their writs and other 
submissions.911 What is important here is not so much that market-share liability 
could be introduced by this article, rather that there could be different 
interpretations according to national jurisdictions’ proclivities. The solution adopted 
in Europe thusfar (in the Netherlands) with regard to DES is that where 
manufacturer unlawfully put the drug into circulation then the manufacturers were 
jointly and severally liable. 912  By contrast, PETL advocates the market-share 
solution.913 
 
The authors also give an illustration of defences for this article.  They cite one 
illustration of asbestos. 
The injured person, X, was consecutively employed by several employers and was 
exposed to asbestos dust at the workplace. The severe lung disease that X contracted 
can be caused by even a single inhalation of particular asbestos particles. It is 
consequently unclear whether the disease was contracted when X worked for 
employer A or employer B; it is clear only that both acted negligently. A and B are 
solidarily liable. If contributory fault is attributed to X because of a failure to wear 
the necessary protective clothing, X’s claim is to be correspondingly reduced, and 
this holds true whether the contributory fault occurred during the period of 
employment with A or with B. In contrast, if X had occasionally pursued the same 
occupation in a self-employed capacity, so that the cause of the illness could have 
been due to that independent exposure during the same time period, VI.–4:103 does 
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not apply. In such a case it cannot even be established that either A or B caused the 
damage.914  
 
Their result in the above illustration seems quite harsh.  Just because the plaintiff 
might have been self-employed for a certain period (a week? a month? a year?) 
precludes his recovery.  This is quite astonishing and does not appear to be in line 
with any of the European case law.  Another option open to the authors would have 
been to follow Barker v Corus to its conclusion and only allow recovery for those 
periods where the causal connection could be proven.  They appear not even to have 
allowed for this.  They have categorically said that  
In contrast, if X had occasionally pursued the same occupation in a self-employed 
capacity, so that the cause of the illness could have been due to that independent 
exposure during the same time period, VI.–4:103 does not apply. In such a case it 
cannot even be established that either A or B caused the damage.915  
 
This is an extremely punitive result and no jurisdiction in Europe, I submit, would 
follow it.  Totally to deny causation simply because of a period where the plaintiff 
was self-employed is unnecessarily punitive.  The authors say that their illustration 
was taken from Barker v Corus but they have not followed it fully in their commentary.  
Here, it may be remembered, a number of the employers had become insolvent and 
so the question was whether the other employers were responsible for the whole.  It 
was held that employers should only be liable for proportionately – ie for the 
percentage of the whole based on the number of years the plaintiff worked for that 
particular employer.  This decision was highly criticised and there was a great 
political backlash resulting in the Compensation Act 2006 but this applying only to 
mesothelioma – more of this later.   
 
It would appear then that given the commentary that their illustration does not 
accurately reflect Barker v Corus as they suggest.     Causation was not totally denied in 
Barker. 
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6.7.2.3 Chapter 5: Defences under the DCFR 
Understanding the purpose of a defence necessarily affects our understanding of 
causation.  Where a defendant is able to use a defence, and he is successful, then 
the court is ultimately holding that the defendant’s conduct did not cause the 
plaintiff’s harm or that he caused it but the plaintiff himself is in part responsible 
for his own harm.  Causation is stymied to a certain extent.  There are a number 
of defences set out in the DCFR under “Defences”.  The ones on which I shall 
comment are consent and acting at own risk, contributory fault and 
accountability, necessity and ultimately the obligation not to treat without consent.   
 
6.7.2.3.1 Consent and acting at own risk  
Article 5:101 provides the following  
(1) A person has a defence if the person suffering the damage validly consented to the 
legally relevant damage and was aware or could reasonably be expected to have 
been aware of the consequences of that consent. 
(2) The same applies if the person suffering the damage, knowing the risk of damage 
of the type caused, voluntarily takes that risk and is to be regarded as accepting it. 
 
It is a general principle of all the jurisdictions here covered that volenti non fit iniuria.  
The essence of this doctrine is that where the plaintiff assumes the risk of harm, the 
“chain of causation” is broken providing the defendant with a complete defence to 
the action.  The plaintiff’s voluntary action breaks the chain of causation and this is, 
of course, relevant, for the purposes of this paper. This as the commentators of the 
DCFR rightly note, is only “rarely codified”.916 It is interesting to note that “consent” 
to iatrogenic interventions was codified in Germany in 2013 in the Improvement of 
Patients’ Rights Act 2013.   
 
The authors also note that it is only “valid consent” that precludes liability.917 For 
our purposes, one important ground of invalidity is lack of sufficient 
information918and this idea of informed consent, for it is the notion of informed 
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consent that is expressly provided for in the DCFR that is introduced here in 
Article 8:108.  
 
6.7.2.3.2 Patient’s Consent  
Article 8:108 DCFR deals specifically with patient consent.  It provides that 
(1) The treatment provider must not carry out treatment unless the patient has given 
prior informed consent to it. 
(2) The patient may revoke consent at any time. 
(3) In so far as the patient is incapable of giving consent, the treatment provider must 
not carry out treatment unless: 
(a) informed consent has been obtained from a person or institution legally entitled to 
take decisions regarding the treatment on behalf of the patient; or  
(b) any rules or procedures enabling treatment to be lawfully given without such 
consent have been complied with; or 
(c) the treatment must be provided in an emergency. 
… 
(6) In the situation described in paragraph (2) of IV.C.–8:106 (Obligation to inform 
in case of unnecessary or experimental treatment), consent must be given in an 
express and specific way. 
(7) The parties may not, to the detriment of the patient, exclude the application of 
this Article or derogate from or vary its effects. 
 
As I have shown in my research with regard to the various jurisdictions, the question 
as to whether a patient has actually consented to a medical intervention remains a 
central one in matters of causation.  If a patient has not adequately given his consent 
in a way recognised in that jurisdiction then we have either a breach of contract or 
tortious liability.  Even criminal liability is possible.919  In the DCFR, there is 
provision for treatment without consent in contract.  In the United Kingdom, the 
doctor  / patient relationship is governed by tort. Article 8:108 specifically introduces 
the notion of “informed consent”.  This is a particularly American doctrine and it 
was explicitly rejected in the United Kingdom until recently.920 In the United 
Kingdom, it was the law that physician would not be held liable in tort if a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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responsible body of medical professionals found that the physician’s conduct was 
reasonable.  Now, with the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board, 921  the 
doctrine of “informed consent” applies to risks.  In France, the rule is that the 
consent must be “loyale, claire et approprié” and all risks, that, if they were to 
eventuate, would have a significant effect on the patient’s life, must be advised. Often 
in France, breach of this duty often gives rise to a claim as loss of chance.922 In 
Germany, now under the Improvement of Patients’ Rights Act 2013, the treating 
party is obliged to explain to the patient in a “comprehensible manner” any and all 
circumstances relevant to the treatment, the therapy and measures to be taken.  The 
Act, as we have seen, later goes into greater detail about the obligations to provide 
information and the burden of proof.   “Informed consent” is the doctrine whereby a 
patient’s consent is vitiated if he is not given the information that a reasonable patient 
would require in the circumstances.   
 
The typical causal problem that is encountered in cases of patient consent is that a 
patient has not informed of a particular risk, the risk materialises and the patient 
suffers damage.  The causal question posed is, would the patient have gone ahead 
with the intervention in any case had she known of the risk? This is a value 
judgement and is dealt with in different ways in the jurisdictions under question.  
Germany, for its part, insists on the disclosure of even minimal risks; France insists 
on the disclosure of risks, that if they were to materialise would have a serious 
effect on the patient’s way of life and the United Kingdom insists on “informed 
consent”. To recover, a patient need only say that he would not have gone 
through the procedure.  Of course, a witness’s credibility is something that would 
ultimately be assessed by a court.  However, as we have seen, in Germany, courts 
are often very reluctant to believe a patient who states that he would not have 
gone through a procedure where the risk was minimal.  Indeed the whole situation 
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must be taken into account.  So if, having a particular procedure was the only way 
of saving a patient’s life, and a non-disclosed risk eventuated, then, depending of 
course on its severity, courts would be reluctant to believe a patient who stated he 
would not have gone through the procedure had he known about the risk.  There 
is always a fine balance to be made between which behaviour should be taken into 
account.  If we follow a strict equivalence of conditions application then we would 
only take into account that patient’s behaviour; yet that patient’s behaviour must 
not be allowed to trump reasonable expectations of the health care professional.  
There are issues of policy at stake when causation is considered in such situations.  
So again here, what the patient would have or should have done depends entirely 
how the jurisdiction in question interprets the conditio sine qua non.  Do we apply 
hinwegdenken completely subjectively or do we apply an objective reasonable person 
test? The question is not necessarily one of strict factual causation.  I need only 
cite Chester again to show how divided the House of Lords was on this issue.  These 
are value and policy judgements reflecting causation in the law.  
 
6.7.2.3.3 Article 5-102 – Contributory Fault and Accountability 
The framers of the DCFR also consider contributory fault and accountability of the 
plaintiff.  This is an important defence in that it limits causation.  Often courts speak 
of the plaintiff being (say) 20% responsible and he therefore has his damages reduced 
by that amount. I suggest what the court is really saying is that the defendant only 
caused the damages requested by the plaintiff to 80% - it may amount to the same 
thing but I think my theoretical formulation is more honest.   Article 5:102 DCFR 
provides that 
(1) Where the fault of the person suffering the damage contributed to the occurrence or 
extent of legally relevant damage, reparation is to be reduced according to the 
degree of such fault.  
(2) However, no regard is to be had to: 
a. an insubstantial fault of the person suffering the damage; 
b. fault or accountability whose contribution to the causation of the damage 
was insubstantial…. 
(3) Compensation is to be reduced likewise if and in so far as any other source of danger 
for which the person suffering the damage is responsible under Chapter 3 
(Accountability) contributed to the occurrence of the damage.  
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As examples, the framers state that where injured person X contracts lung cancer 
either when X worked for A or for B but it is not clear exactly when and that both A 
and B were negligent then A and B would be solidary liable.923  They mention that if 
X had been provided with protective clothing and X had refused to wear this 
clothing then his claim would be correspondingly reduced.924 They then opine 
In contrast, if X had occasionally pursued the same occupation in a self-employed 
capacity, so that the cause of the illness could have been due to that independent 
exposure during the same time period, VI-4:103 does not apply.  In such a case it 
cannot even be established that either A or B caused the damage. 925  
 
I have already commented on this above at “Alternative Causes”. The last sentence 
quoted above is harsh.   The court is not looking for a scientific proof in these cases 
but rather, where there has been exposure to asbestos fibres, and X contracts 
mesothelioma, is it fair to say that it was caused either when X was working for A or 
B, or indeed when X was working for himself? The answer now is not clearly yes, as 
it is in the United Kingdom. The period for when X was working for himself can be 
dealt with under “contributory negligence and accountability”.  As I showed above, 
this was the solution favoured in Barker v Corus.  In this case, the defendants were 
found to be severally but not jointly liable at common law.  This was reversed by the 
Compensation Act 2006 in so far as cases relating to mesothelioma are concerned.  
Barker still, surprisingly, remains the law for all non-mesothelioma cases.  Germany, 
France and Luxembourg do not need to adopt a special rule for mesothelioma cases 
as such situations are dealt with under their interpretations of causation. 
 
So then, as can be seen by the framers of the DCFR, there would seem to be no 
one understanding of what contributory negligence or accountability is.  Even in 
the United Kingdom, legislation was necessary to overturn the case of Barker v 
Corus and this legislation applies only to mesothelioma cases.  Where other diseases 
and causal agents are at play, to suggest that solutions even in this area might be 
uniform across Germany, United Kingdom and France is foolhardy. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
923 Principles and Models, p3454; as would be the case in all the jurisdictions considered here 
924 ibid 
925 ibid 
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Supreme Court may well again decide as it did in Barker that defendants be 
severally but not jointly liable.  In France and in Germany, I suggest that solutions 
immediately favouring joint and several liability would be found.926 
 
6.7.2.5 Medical Records 
The DCFR deals specifically with a doctor’s obligation to keep medical records.   
This can be relevant as it can go someway towards a plaintiff’s proof in establishing 
whether a measure was taken or not.  If nothing is provided for then causal inferences 
may be made.  The PETL do not deal specifically with medical records and it is only 
Germany where the issue comes up at all in doctrine and case law as being an issue of 
causal concern.  It is also codified there.  In the United Kingdom and France and 
Luxembourg, it is just part and parcel of negligence or fault.  Records are important 
because they provide prima facie evidence that a measure was taken or was not 
taken. As far as causation is concerned, questions arise when diagnostics are lost or 
misplaced.  So, for example, X-Rays become lost but it is not a matter of dispute that 
the X-Ray was taken.  Should there be a presumption in favour of the patient that a 
further procedure should have been carried out as appears to be the case in 
Germany?927 We also had the situation where a doctor failed to carry out an X-Ray 
on a patient whom he diagnosed as having bronchial-pneumonia but in reality he 
had tuberculosis.928  This turns into a question of faulty diagnosis.  The question arise 
then whether our causal enquiry, as in Germany, should read something like: “If the 
physician had carried out an X-Ray, would it have shown something to which (a) the 
doctor would have responded; and (b) would have helped the patient?”929 
 
Yet the DCFR introduces a completely new basis for causation that is to be found 
neither in France nor in the United Kingdom and not, at least as far as I can see, as 
an Anscheinbeweis in Germany.  It is what is spelled out in Articles 8:109(2)-(3).  Here a 
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926 see the respective chapters for France and Germany on problems posed in Unification of Tort 
Law : Causation 
927 C JANDA, Medizinrecht (Konstanz, UVK, 2010), p333 
928 BGH NJW 1987, 1482 
929 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p69 
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health provider has a duty to afford a patient access to his medical records and 
answer questions with regard to the same.  The DCFR provides at Article 8:109 that  
(1) The treatment provider must create adequate records of the treatment. Such 
records must include, in particular, information collected in any preliminary 
interviews, examinations or consultations, information regarding the consent of 
the patient and information regarding the treatment performed. 
(2) The treatment provider must, on reasonable request: 
(a) give the patient, or if the patient is incapable of giving consent, the person or 
institution legally entitled to take decisions on behalf of the patient, access to 
the records; and (b) answer, in so far as reasonable, questions regarding the 
interpretation of the records.  
(3) If the patient has suffered injury and claims that it is a result of non-performance 
by the treatment provider of the obligation of skill and care and the treatment 
provider fails to comply with paragraph (2), non-performance of the obligation of 
skill and care and a causal link between such non-performance and the 
injury are presumed.930 
 
So it can be seen here then that where the treatment provider does not provide the 
patient with access to his records and the patient claims lack of due skill and care by 
the treatment provider causing the patient’s injury, then a causal link between such 
non-performance of the obligation to provide due skill and care and the injury is 
presumed.  The drafters provide quite little commentary on this article although it 
seems quite innovative.  This is not so much a presumption of causation in the case of 
missing records but rather with regard to the “access” and  “interpretation” of the 
records.  Where the access right is denied then there is a presumption of causation.  
So for example, a neurologist decreases the dosage of anti-epileptic medication for a 
patient who had one epileptic seizure in her life after a period of (say) being 15 years 
seizure-free.  It is reduced from (say) 1000mg per day to 600mg per day.  This is 
noted on the records.  An electroencephalograph (EEG) is taken to ensure that this is 
the right course of action and it displays nothing unusual yet the specialist fails to 
note it in the records.  The patient then has an epileptic episode to his injury after he 
is on the lower dosage.  A patient might then seek to argue that the drop from 
1000mg to 600mg was too much in the first instance.  A doctor might be reticent to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
930 my emphasis  
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give his patient access to his records as he knows that he did not note the conclusions 
of the EEG.  It would, of course, be open to the specialist to rebut this but it might be 
difficult where the EEG was not taken in a hospital with witnesses, say at his private 
clinic. 
 
It is important to note here that there is no mention of causal presumptions in the 
event that there has not been adequate record-keeping.  The health provider must 
simply give access thereto.  It can perhaps be seen as somewhat of a missed 
opportunity here.   The authors do deal with this concern, however, in their 
commentaries.  They state that 
If no records, or only incomplete records, are produced it may be argued that non-
performance of the obligation should be presumed.  This provides a powerful 
sanction for the keeping of adequate records.  The lack or incompleteness of the 
medical record may be said to justify the reversal of the burden of proof in a liability 
claim.931    
 
They continue, however, that it may be unrealistic to expect the treatment provider 
to act in such a way as it would be against his interests.932  I am not sure what this 
means.  However, the DCFR is exactly the opposite of the case in Germany.933 
There, if a measure is not noted, then there is a presumption that it has not been 
carried out at all.  In the United Kingdom and France, it seems to be the case that if 
it has not been noted then it will probably be some evidence that it has not been 
carried out but doctors, witnesses and others who can speak to the fact that it has will 
be permitted to: there is no presumption as such in these jurisdictions.  
 
Also important for purposes of causation is the detail of the records.  The authors 
provide an example of poor record keeping 
A patient is diagnosed as having a severe insufficiency of the renal function; her left 
kidney needs to be removed.  The surgeon operating on the patient removes the 
right kidney owing to lack of clarity of the record created by the physician 
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931 Principles and Models, p2023  
932 ibid 
933 §630h(3) BGB 
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responsible for the diagnosis.  In this case, the poor quality of the records contributed 
to the non-performance of the contractual obligation.934  
 
They continue that, although record-keep is important, it can be a “difficult task 
or time-management, organisational and budgetary reasons, whereas the possible 
gain for the patient may not always very clear”.935  I find this quite astonishing.  A 
doctor is trained to keep appropriate records in accordance with the job he does.  
Of course, if a toothache treatment takes 15 minutes and writing up notes 
thereafter takes 30 minutes if “every wad of cotton used in the administering of 
treatment is accounted for” [sic].936  I remain astounded by the example.  No-one 
is asking for such minutiae of notes.  All professional jobs require record-keeping 
and generally, it must be reasonable.  In all of the jurisdictions in question, the 
lack of adequate record keeping resulting in so grave an error as the kidney 
example given above would contribute towards establishing fault. In the United 
Kingdom, the negligence would clearly be at the diagnosis stage as it would be in 
France.  In Germany, it is likely that the burden of proof itself would be reversed 
and this would be treated as gross treatment error.  
 
This proposal by the DCFR is quite radical with regard to the United Kingdom 
and France.  We have seen already in Germany that there is some codification at 
statute with regard to medical records.  In France there is no case law or legislative 
act on the subject but failure to keep proper records is a breach of a contractual 
obligation.937 Any direct damage resulting from the doctor’s fault will result in the 
defendant’s being condemned and having to pay damages. In the United 
Kingdom, the General Medical Council issues guidance about keeping records 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
934 Principles and Models, p2023 
935 Principles and Models, p2023 
936 ibid 
937 Art L 1111-8 CSP, al 1:  Les professionnels de santé ou les établissements de santé ou la 
personne concernée peuvent déposer des données de santé à caractère personnel, recueillies ou 
produites à l'occasion desactivités de prévention, de diagnostic ou de soins, auprès de personnes 
physiques ou morales agréées à cet effet. Cet hébergement de données, quel qu'en soit le support, 
papier ou informatique, ne peut avoir lieu qu'avec le consentement exprès de la personne 
concernée. 
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and any non-compliance with this advice would be admissible in any proceedings 
as evidence against a defendant to establish negligence.938 
 
6.7.2.6 Summary: DCFR 
In the DCFR a patient has a right to his bodily integrity.  A patient will then enter 
into a “contract for treatment” with his physician.  There is a separate section dealing 
specifically with the relationship between doctor and patient.  One flaw I see here is 
that the authors spoke of a “contract for treatment”939.  This is perhaps unfortunate 
where the United Kingdom is included.  One of the remedies for non-performance is 
damages and causation must be shown.  Causation must then be shown between 
damage and the physician’s act or omission.  Causation is prima facie based on a  
“consequential” analysis.  However, other notions such as policy, foreseeability and 
probability, but not, and this is important, “general political considerations” 
according to the drafters are also to be taken into account.  The DCFR also allows 
for alternative causes and the “defence” of contributory fault. 
 
With medical records we see again, there are different suggestions and practices 
throughout Europe in this regard: the similar practice in France and the United 
Kingdom, Germany’s presumption in the BGB and the causal presumption as 
suggested by the DCFR. I note this to further my contention that there can be no 
common understanding of causation on a European level. 
 
Given this consequentialist approach in the DCFR at first principle level, I submit 
that this supports my theory that there is no one, simple common-sense notion of 
causation. PETL choses the conditio sine qua non.  I do not think it matters.  As has 
been stated, it is often just a question of “feeling” or indeed of morality.940 Courts 
often refer to one or the other so there can be no idea of common sense causation.   
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938  see the GMC’s guidance at  http://www.gmc-United 
Kingdom.org/guidance/ethical_guidance/13427.asp  
939 Book IV, Art 8: 110, DCFR 
940 H and L MAZEAUD, A TUNC, Traité, 1471; HLA HART and T HONORE, Causation in the 
Law, p301 
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So while I think the DCFR may mean well, I suggest that it fails in understanding 
what causation truly is.  It says that we should not reduce causation formulaically 
(and I agree) but then it uses the word “consequence” – a highly charged word in 
the world of causation.  Perhaps worse than this, the DCFR framers attempt to 
define “consequence” thereby further entering deeper into the causal quagmire.  
They bring in notions that the word “consequence” can be interpreted using all 
the usual causal armoury (foreseeability, probability, even policy) but then exclude 
“general political considerations” for some reason.  They also fail to see the fact 
that one way of establishing whether b is a consequence of a is to perform the 
equivalence test hypothetical counterfactual. The framers here shy away from this.  
I think that their commentary, however, on causation was bound to end in 
confusion, as causation will remain the mercurial and indefinable concept it is I 
submit my research shows this.  There is no need to define causation.   
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6.7.3 The Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) 
The Principles of European Tort Law were published in 2005 and are the fruit of 
work dating back to 1992 when a group (of mainly academics) met to discuss 
fundamental issues of tort law as well as recent developments and the future direction 
of tort law in Europe.941 This group was formerly called the “Tilburg Group”.  The 
principles have even been mentioned in certain cases around the world.942 PETL, as 
we shall see, have some similarities to, and some differences from, the DCFR.  They 
sit along side the DCFR.  PETL are not to be considered as a restatement of tort law 
in Europe (as there is not yet a core of European tort law).943  PETL are simply a 
proposition of what the majority of its drafters “deem best”.944 As per the DCFR 
then, I propose first to consider briefly the essentials of PETL before concentrating 
on its treatment of causation.  My purpose in considering PETL is to show that its 
principles with respect to causation are unnecessary.  It is therefore my contention 
that the project should delete any expansion on its reference to causation.   
 
The basic norm then in PETL is the following 
TITLE I. Basic Norm 
Chapter 1. Basic Norm 
Art. 1:101. Basic norm 
(1) A person to whom damage to another is legally attributed is liable to  
compensate that damage. 
(2) Damage may be attributed in particular to the person 
a) whose conduct constituting fault has caused it; or 
b) whose abnormally dangerous activity has caused it; or 
c) whose auxiliary has caused it within the scope of his functions. 
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941 Principles of European Tort Law, p12 ; The European Group on Tort Law’s mission statement, as 
found on its website is to “ …contribute to the enhancement and harmonization of tort law in 
Europe through the framework provided by its Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) and its 
related and on-going research, and in particular to provide a principled basis for rationalisation 
and innovation at national and EU level.” : www.egtl.org  
942 see www.egtl.org for references  
943 Principles of European Tort Law, p16  
944 ibid 
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“Damage” as later defined 945  necessitates harm to a legally protected interest 
including here, for our purposes, bodily integrity.  So here PETL and DCFR are 
similar.   We see at (2)(a) above the requirement of causation and at (b) the 
requirement of causation attributable to an “abnormally dangerous activity”.  This 
would seem to be more stringent than the DCFR’s “source of danger for which that 
person is responsible”. 946   With the PETL, an activity must be shown to be 
“abnormally dangerous”.  I wonder to what extent this could be applied to iatrogenic 
procedures, perhaps to experimental ones. The corresponding title in the DCFR 
could even give rise to liability resulting from an X-ray as this could be classed as a 
“source of danger” but hardly an “abnormally dangerous” activity.  Title II PETL 
then goes on to deal with damage and causation.  It provides 
TITLE II. General Conditions of Liability 
Chapter 2. Damage 
Art. 2:101 Recoverable damage 
Damage requires material or immaterial [sic]947 harm to a legally protected interest. 
 
Art. 2:102 Protected interests 
(1) The scope of protection of an interest depends on its nature; the higher its value, 
the precision of its definition and its obviousness, the more extensive is its protection. 
(2) Life, bodily or mental integrity, human dignity and liberty enjoy the most 
extensive protection. 
 
This inventory of legally protected interests is similar to the German provision of 
such rights at §823 BGB.  It is also similar to the categorisation of torts in the 
common law; for example, wrongful imprisonment would be a breach of bodily 
integrity.  French law, however, does not as such list these subjective rights and nor is 
its Civil Code framed in such a way but protection would be afforded civilly to 
someone who had suffered a battery.  So thusfar, it seems that the DCFR and the 
PETL are much of a muchness even though there may be on occasion some slight 
differences in emphasis.  For the purposes of medical liability, protection is afforded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
945 Art 2: 101, PETL 
946 VI :4 :101, DCFR 
947 why not just “harm”?   
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to a patient who has had his bodily integrity violated.  Before moving on to article 3, 
it is worth drawing attention to Art 2:105 which deals with proof of damage.  It reads   
Article 2:105 
Damage must be proved according to the normal procedural standards.  The court 
may estimate the extent of damage where proof of the exact amount would be too 
difficult or too costly.    
 
Here the PETL, unlike DCFR, mention proof in its core document.  The DCFR 
mentions it but only in its commentary.  To say only that “normal procedural 
standards” apply is not revolutionary – not that I am advocating revolution 
necessarily but I think the drafters could have gone further if they are to glean from a 
survey of European tort law what they “deem best”, especially in the area of 
causation in medical negligence.  
 
Although I have shown in this paper that some jurisdictions require “next to 
certainty” to be persuaded and some only “on the balance of probabilities”,948 it 
appears to me that there really is no fair way of telling these standards apart a fortiori 
when use is made of presumptions, the prima facie case or even a reversal of the 
burden of proof in the case of gross negligence. While I am sympathetic to the 
argument that procedural matters are usually governed by the lex fori,949 I find that 
procedure is so caught up with the proof of causation as to be inseparable from the 
substantive law.  Procedure is often determinative of who will win a case.  For 
example, if we think of a grossly negligent German doctor, it is a procedural rule that 
will determine that it is he who must prove that he did not cause the damage.  The 
plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proof all together.   The burden of proof is 
reversed.  In such a case, procedure, it could be argued, is more important than 
substance.  I suggest that if the drafters of the PETL wanted to try to find what was 
“best”, then perhaps they should have recognised how important procedure is when 
establishing causation.  I fail to see how appeal to “normal procedural standards” 
could allow for consistency of decision making in European tort law.  There is no 
harmonisation in this regard.  It falls now to consider causation in the PETL.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!948!even!then!Germany!uses!both!in!its!causal!analysis!!
949 Principles of European Tort Law, p40 
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6.7.3.1 Causation in PETL  
Article 3 PETL states that 
Art 3:101 Conditio sine qua non 
An activity or conduct (hereafter: activity) is a cause of the victim’s damage if, in the 
absence of the activity, the damage would not have occurred.  !
The drafters of the PETL choose the conditio sine qua non as their starting position.  
I have already mentioned what this is and there is no need to describe it further. It is 
perhaps noticeable that, in contrast to the DCFR, the PETL have a principled 
position when tackling causal questions. 
 
Unlike the DCFR, the PETL have opted for, what I would say, is a more or less 
traditional dichotomy of causation: the conditio sine qua non approach followed by 
some kind of filter of this.  Interestingly, the PETL commentary note that  
Only in Belgium is conditio sine qua non probably the sole causal criterion, but the 
outcome of cases does not seem significantly different compared with other legal 
systems.  According to some doctrine and case law, the same holds true for 
France.950 
  
It is true that the United Kingdom and Germany adopt a two- or even three-tier 
approach to causation following an equivalence theory (conditio sine qua non), legal 
causation (scope of liability) and then public policy criteria.  France, for its part, 
dithers between both equivalence and adequacy and it has still to make up its mind (if 
it feels it has to) which of the two it favours.  Nonetheless I would hesitate to agree 
with the drafters of the commentaries to the PETL when they state that  
For practical purposes the difference between the approaches seems of very limited 
importance.951   
  
This may be true in that in cases before the courts there may not be much ink spilt 
over the “approach”; that is, the legal philosophical theory of causation in itself.  I 
think what the drafters of the commentaries were contemplating here was outcome 
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or results.  However, we must be careful to differentiate “approaches” from results.  
Just because the difference in approach (if that is indeed what was intended) with 
regard to theory might be of limited importance does not mean that the results are 
similar.  I would suggest that results are not similar in medical negligence cases in the 
jurisdictions considered as I have shown.  
 
Progressing from this, the PETL then deals with concurrent causes of causation.  
Article 3:102 states  
In cases of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have caused the 
damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the victim’s damage.   
 
This is the classic situation where A and B both shot C in the head at the same time.  
It would be absurd to leave C’s widow without a remedy based on the conditio sine 
qua non.  Jourdain writes  
…les PETL décident que chacune des causes dites “concurrentes” doit être retenue 
comme cause du dommage.  Cette solution qui est conforme à notre jurisprudence, 
mais aussi à celles des autres systèmes juridiques, prend ses distances avec le test sine 
qua non car en l’absence l’une ou l’autre activité le dommage se serait quand meme 
produit…952 
 
In so far as the word “activities” can be interpreted, the above principle at article 
3:102 also makes me think of the case of Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority.953 In 
Wilsher, it might be remembered, it was held that the defendants were not responsible 
for the baby’s blindness where, although they had introduced noxious agent (a) 
(oxygen) into the baby, there were five other agents that could have caused it.  It 
could not have been said on the balance of probabilities that the introduction of 
noxious agent (a) caused the baby’s condition.  What would have to be shown to fulfil 
proof under this article is that each of the agents alone could scientifically have 
caused the damage.  So where four agents (b) to (d) could have caused the RLF and 
agent (a) could not have caused RLF but could have induced (say) a myocardial 
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952  P JOURDAIN, “La causalité”, p5 GRERCA paper at http://grerca.univ-
rennes1.fr/digitalAssets/288/288515_pjourdain2.pdf  
953 [1988] All ER 871 
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infarction, then (a) could not be said to be the cause of the victim’s damage, where 
recovery is for deafness as described in the writ.  As the PETL drafters make clear 
It will not always be clear whether or not the conditions of article 3:102 are met.  At 
the end of the day, it is a matter of evidence.  This gives manoeuvering room for the 
court to solve cases by means of procedural law (ie one party has the burden of 
proof)…954  
 
Yet in Wilsher, there was one dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal who said that 
there could be causation where one party creates a risk that injury will be caused to a 
second party where the first and the second party stand in a particular relationship 
even though “…the existence and extent of the contribution cannot be 
ascertained.” 955  So here we see two quite different approaches in possible 
interpretation of this article.   Article 3: 102 seems to reflect the German provision of 
the BGB.956  So by using the notion of “risk creation” to overcome the causal hurdle, 
then perhaps judges could interpret Article 3:102 as applying here.  
 
Art 3:103 PETL states 
(1) In case of multiple activities, where each of them alone would have been sufficient 
to cause the damage, but it remains uncertain which one in fact caused it, each 
activity is regarded as a cause to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it 
may have caused the victim’s damage.   
(2) If, in case of multiple victims, it remains uncertain whether a particular victim’s 
damage has been caused by an activity, while it is likely that it did not cause the 
damage of all victims, the activity is regarded as a cause of the damage suffered by all 
victims in proportion to the likelihood that it may have caused the damage of a 
particular victim. 
 
From reading this, and the commentaries thereto, I think the first article could be 
applied to Fairchild.  There is a condictio sine qua non.  Both E1 and E2 could have 
introduced the “guilty” mesothelioma fibre into the deceased’s lungs but it could not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
954 Principles of European Tort Law, p45 
955 Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1987] QB 730, 771-772 
956 §830 BGB: (1) If more than one person has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then 
each of them is responsible for the damage. The same applies if it cannot be established which of 
several persons involved caused the damage by his act. 
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be evidenced which employer was responsible using the “but for” test.  Presumably 
here the length of time that each the plaintiff was working at each employer would be 
used to show “likelihood” all other things being equal although jurisdictions might 
opt for other determinants.  My understanding, from the analogy of the classic 
“hunters in the forest case” provided is that each employer would be responsible 
according to the likelihood.957  They continue  
We see no compelling reason to justify why someone should pay for the whole of a 
loss which he possibly…did not bring about.  On the other hand, it would be harsh 
to leave the victim empty handed.958 
 
So I presume the intention, if Fairchild were to be a PETL case, is that the same result 
would follow.  It appears liability would be solidary as per Article 9:101 PETL as the 
damage would be the same and there would be no basis to attribute only part of the 
damage to “each of a number of persons liable to the victim.”959 Yet in one 
important aspect this article differs significantly from Fairchild.  The Fairchild ratio is 
only applicable where the agents are the same or comparatively the same.   If 
different agents had contributed to a plaintiff’s injury for which two or more 
employers were responsible then my contention is that British law is not at the stage 
clearly to allow recovery for the plaintiff as these principles may suggest.  Further, of 
Barker v Corus960 were to be litigated in PETL, I suggest that it reflects British law at 
statute.  That is fine but statute holds only for joint and several liability in so far as 
mesothelioma is concerned: nothing else.   
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Such articles also remind me immediately of cases like Bailey v Ministry of Defence961 
where it could not be said with certainty what caused Mrs Bailey’s brain damage: was 
it the pancreatitis that she had developed or was it the lack of care of the hospital?  
However, although it could not be said with certainty that “but for” the substandard 
care, Mrs Bailey would not have contracted pancreatitis, the ratio of “material 
increase in risk” was employed.  Again, Article 3:103 seems contrary to the prevailing 
case law in the United Kingdom.  There is not an evaluation of the “likelihood” that 
one, as opposed to another cause, may have contributed to the damage.  There is not 
necessarily a condictio sine qua non here as suggested by the commentary to the 
PETL rather there may be a material increase in risk.962  As Jourdain notes, in 
France, where each has contributed to causing damage, then each is considered as 
the cause of the damage.963However, in contrast to France, the PETL solution is to 
advocate proportional liability – a solution which the PETL drafters state as being 
both “innovative” and “…not (entirely) in line with the common core.”964 They seem 
concerned that a defendant should not be liable for a loss that “partially is or may be 
caused by other activities…”.965  Yet even considering Fairchild as an example, 
would not the defendant be liable to the plaintiff where the loss “may” not have been 
caused by that company? The law does not deal with truth.  It deals with what can be 
proven.  If the PETL have chosen likelihood as a measure of liability, then I submit 
that in some cases, the defendant will be liable for damage he may not have caused.  
They continue that  
It does not appeal to the group that a tortfeasor has to compensate a loss not caused 
by him; ie an activity that is not even a csqn of the loss. 966  
 
I have yet to encounter a case in my research where a defendant was held liable for a 
damage that the court said he did not cause.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
961 [2008] EWCA Civ 883 
962 Principles of European Tort Law, p48 
963  P JOURDAIN, “La causalité”, 
http://grerca.univrennes1.fr/digitalAssets/288/288515_pjourdain2.pdf , p6 
964 Principles of European Tort Law, p46 
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Article 3:102(2) shouts the adoption of a Sindell market-share ratio.967 So again, a 
further contrast with DCFR where this was specifically not adopted.  We can 
imagine the example of a particular generic drug causing damage to women during 
pregnancy where there are (say) ten manufacturers of this drug.  M1 has a market 
share of 51%, M2 20% and M3-10 share the rest.  There are pros and cons.  It does 
have the advantage for a plaintiff that no balance of probabilities test need be met 
and so could recover 20% from M2.  Yet if M1 and M2 went bankrupt, the 
maximum that any plaintiff could recover would be 29% as solidary liability would 
be denied.968  
 
Yet as the article presently stands, a defendant with a small market share, say M5, 
would not have to pay everything – he would be limited to the likelihood that his 
particular drug, based on market share, caused the injury.  None of the jurisdictions 
under consideration has adopted the market-share liability ratio.969 France could do 
it by loss of chance; the United Kingdom by material increase to harm or to risk of 
harm with the caveat, of course, that such risk was on the balance of probabilities; in 
Germany, §830(1) could be applied.  It states that  
If more than one person has caused damage by a jointly committed tort, then each of 
them is responsible for the damage. The same applies if it cannot be established 
which of several persons involved caused the damage by his act.  
 
Each jurisdiction could, of course, just decide to adopt the doctrine.  The PETL 
drafters then encourage the market-share liability doctrine but deny joint and several 
liability on the basis that it “…it is obviously an unattractive scenario, it is insufficient 
justification to hold someone liable for a loss he cannot have caused.”970  This may be 
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true but uncertainty in fact can become certainty in law where there is a possibility 
that one of the defendants caused the damage. 
 
In any case, it seems to be excluded in England as even if the plaintiff brought an 
action against D1 who put on the market over 50% of a defective drug, this does not 
establish that D1 caused the plaintiff’s damage.  WVH Rogers says in Unification of 
Tort Law: Causation 
People with brown eyes outnumber those with blue eyes.  But if you were mugged on 
a dark night I doubt if you would conclude from this that your assailant had brown 
eyes.971 
 
Another article where the potential for loss of chance could be developed is in Article 
3:106 with regard to uncertain causes within the victim’s sphere.   It reads 
The victim has to bear his loss to the extent corresponding to the likelihood that it 
may have been caused by an activity, occurrence or other circumstance within his 
own sphere. 
  
The drafters of PETL freely admit that this is partly based on loss of chance.972 They 
note some reluctance in the application of this principle especially where scientific 
opinion differs.  Yet, is this not closing the door after the horse has bolted? Surely the 
use of the verb “may” in Article 3:106 above necessitates scientific uncertainty.  
Scientific uncertainty is often central to many of the medical cases considered here. !
From the common law viewpoint, this article would apply only to the extent that the 
victim would have to bear his loss where such loss is 49% of the chance he caused it 
himself.  If he can prove to 51% that the tortfeasor caused his loss, he can recover 
everything.  Their comment is also interesting in that it allows for the possibility of 
differing scientific experts which is not the norm in Continental jurisdictions.  For 
example then, scientific opinion could differ over the cause of someone’s contracting 
lung cancer.  Was it the result of his smoking forty cigarettes a day or did other 
factors such as lifestyle contribute?  From the commentary, there is a sense of 
distancing from the balance of probabilities.  They note !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
971 Principles of European Tort Law, p50  
972 ibid, p57 
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…in our view, it is quite harsh to leave the victim empty-handed, if –eg-the chance is 
“only” 49%, whereas it does not appeal to most of us that a tortfeasor would have to 
pay 100% of it is at least greatly uncertain whether or not he actually caused the 
entire loss.973 
 
They then consider how difficult it would be for European jurisdictions to accept this 
approach bearing in mind that common law doctrine is “canvassed” in its procedural 
law / law of evidence.  They write  
Seen from a European angle, there is hardly a common core to support the 
balance of probabilities doctrine.974  
 
The loss of chance case of Gregg v Scott comes to mind. The plaintiff argued that he 
lost a chance from 42% to 25% due to a misdiagnosis.  Recovery was denied.  I 
am sure this would have been decided differently if heard in France, Germany or 
under PETL.   
 
Other applications of this article could perhaps be postulated in hospital acquired 
infections.  A patient would have his damages reduced by (say) 10% if it could be 
shown that there was a 10% chance that the patient would have fallen ill naturally 
rather than through some hospital negligence.  This would be in his own “sphere”.  
Yet in the United Kingdom there is an “all or nothing” approach to damages.  These 
solutions would not lend themselves to the United Kingdom.  In the United 
Kingdom, a plaintiff must have contributed to his own damages for them to be 
reduced and so this article would not have any application in nosocomial infections 
in the United Kingdom for procedural reasons. In France (say) if it can be shown that 
the patient would have fallen ill naturally, then the patient may well have to bear this 
loss.  
 
The drafters are wise to remind us here of statistical standard deviations.  If in a 
group of 100, 6 people would normally acquire an infection while in hospital, but 
in our particular case, it is 7, this may simply be a “normal deviation” from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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statistics and should not necessarily, of its own and by itself, show causation.975 So 
it is prudent to remember that when considering expert reports deviation from the 
norm does not show causation. 
 
What can be seen from this article is that to introduce the terminology of “sphere” 
is a novelty.  It is found in German law but not so much in British or French law.  
What is found in these jurisdictions is the notion of contributory negligence or 
indeed “victim’s fault” where damages are reduced or indeed denied because of 
the particular acts of the victim.  I am not sure therefore how receptive the British 
judiciary would be to the introduction of notions of “sphere” when they have legal 
devices that work quite adequately to do the same thing.    The drafters’ 
comments are also correct in that there is no common core to support the 
introduction of a “balance of probabilities” notion of proof across Europe.   
Causation is inextricably linked with procedure and proof.  I submit once again 
therefore that this shows how there can be no common notion of causation across 
Europe given these differing standards of proof.  The sequitor being necessarily 
that if there can be no common standard of proof then causation must be seen to 
be treated differently in the various jurisdictions under consideration here.  I have 
shown in this paper how the use of procedure, be it loss of chance, reversal of the 
burden of proof and the use of presumptions, can often be crucial when 
accounting for contradictory outcomes.  
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6.7.3.2 PETL: Scope of Liability  
The final article with regard to causation concerns the scope of liability.  This is an 
important article as all the jurisdictions under consideration here use some kind of 
filter to the conditio sine qua non test where this test is used initially.  The PETL are 
to be contrasted with the DCFR here. The PETL set out factors to be taken into 
account when determining the scope of liability.  They are factors to be found in all 
the jurisdictions under consideration here but courts will just pick and choose from 
among them to obtain a satisfying result.  Indeed I am reminded of the German 
Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976 when reading the factors to be taken into account 
when establishing a causal connection.  As I hope I have emphasized throughout this 
paper, there is no such thing as common sense when answering a causal question 
which means there can be no objectively correct answer. 
 
Article 3:201 states  
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section 1 of this Chapter, 
whether and to what extent damage may be attributed to a person depends on 
factors such as 
a) the foreseeability of the damage to a reasonable person at the time of the activity, 
taking into account in particular the closeness in time or space between the 
damaging activity and its consequence, or the magnitude of the damage in relation 
to the normal consequences of such an activity;   
b) the nature and the value of the protected interest; 
c) the basis of liability;   
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and   
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been violated. 
 
I also see no reason in listing criteria from which courts should (must(?)) discriminate.  
It is perhaps encouraging to note that every European jurisdiction recognises that the 
sky cannot be the limit976and some kind of causal dam is required to hold back 
floodgates in the disparate causal questions that come before the courts.  The PETL 
differ from the DCFR and the other codified jurisdictions here.  It suggests factors to 
be taken into account when “attributing” liability.  Neither of the national codes nor 
the DCFR does this.  In fact, I think the drafters are right when they note that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The real difference between the various legal systems seems to be that some 
perceive the issue dealt with in Article 3:201 as part of causation, whereas others 
perceive it as an unrelated legal vehicle.977 
 
How right they are.   Causation is in the eye of the beholder.  There are 
disagreements about it and there is no consensus about it.  I do not understand the 
point then of the heading “Scope of Liability” as I have seen that there is often no 
agreement about causation in fact.  So that I am not accused of selective quoting, 
the drafters of PETL finish the paragraph “So for practical purposes, the 
differences are very limited”.978 I disagree. 
 
The PETL drafters, however, quoted what I found to be a particularly pertinent case 
in their commentaries on this article. They quoted that of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
New Jersey Inc v Philip Morris Inc979 where it was noted 
“Proximate cause” is an amorphous concept even under common law.  See Associated 
Gen Contractors v Cal State Council of Carpenters 459 US 519 536-37, 103 S Ct 897, 74 L 
Ed 2d 723 (1983). 
(T)he infinite variety of claims that may arise make it virtually impossible to 
announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.  Instead, 
previously decided cases identify factors that circumscribe and guide the exercise of 
judgement in deciding whether the law affords a remedy in specific circumstances. 
 
However, notwithstanding this apposite quote, the drafters nonetheless attempt to 
relate stateable principles which have been gleaned from the various jurisdictions 
applicable.  I can confirm that this is the case with regard to the factors in the article 
except “foreseeability” where France, though not excluding it all together, prefers to 
opt for the dichotomy of directness and indirectness. The protective purpose rule is 
hardly to be found in France.   
 
The drafters then give some consideration to the relevant factors themselves.  I shall 
consider them here: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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(a) Foreseeability 
As is noted, this is probably the most important and most applied factor.980 This can 
be applied in causation in many ways as we have seen.  What is deemed foreseeable 
in a given situation necessarily has an impact in a causal judgement.  In Germany, 
we have seen the BGH state this with regard to the case of the pregnant woman’s 
child being born a spastic981in that it need not be “foreseeable” what kind of damage 
in detail would occur but that some damage to the foetus would occur. In France, the 
notion of foreseeability is used when determining what is cause étrangère. 982 
However, notions such as foreseeability are simply used as a controlling device by the 
courts when they can cross the causal bridge from fault to damage.  In cases of 
medical negligence, foreseeability itself can be linked to questions of statistics and 
expert evidence.  Do the statistics provided show not only a generalising connection 
but also an individualising connection between the damage and the alleged fault? 
Further, is there any dispute in these statistics and how can this be resolved? 
Unfortunately, PETL do not give any consideration to expert evidence which I 
believe is central to the question of proving causation.  
 
(b) The Ordinary Risks of Life 
“The ordinary risks of life is a somewhat amorphous concept.”983 Thus begins the 
commentary on this factor with regard to the scope of liability.   
 
Every medical intervention poses some kind of risk.  Yet I have found that often the 
causal link between damage and alleged fault is to a great extent attenuated on the 
Continent.  In the medical sphere in particular, I see a move away from allowing 
patients to be subject to the vagaries of the ordinary risks of life.  One would not 
necessarily prima facie think this to be the case given the higher levels of proof 
required in France and Germany with regard to causation (except for 
haftungsausfüllende Kausalität in Germany where the level of proof is on the balance of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
980 Principles of European Tort Law, p61 
981 BGH NJW 1972, 1126  
982 P JOURDAIN, “Effets de la responsabilité” (2009) Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 543 
983 Principles of European Tort Law, p62 
! ! ! ! !! 307!
probabilities).  Yet if we consider the regimes that exist for medical hazards (France), 
medical risks (Germany), security obligations (France and Germany), the potential for 
presumptions (France), loss of chance (France) and reversal of the burden of proof 
(Germany) and the national solidarity fund (France), we begin to see how, what starts 
out as a principle of conditio sine qua non, is significantly diluted and weakened in its 
application.  These aspects of medical law do lessen the force of the idea that we are 
all subject to the ordinary risks in life.  Yet there may well be policy reasons for doing 
this.  Of course, the purpose of this paper is not to say that one of these is “better 
law” or one policy is better than another but rather to show that similar problems do 
not have similar answers in the jurisdictions concerned.    With the examples I have 
given already, I think it is clear that the different jurisdictions opt for different 
solutions.  
 
(c) The Protective Purpose of the Rule  
This, I submit, can most clearly be seen in Germany and in the United Kingdom.  
Germany applies the Schutzzwecklehre (the protective purpose rule).  This is often 
studied together with wertende Überlegungen (evaluation considerations).   We have seen 
how this has been applied already above in wrongful life cases and cases where a 
handicapped child has been born where the doctor had failed to diagnose rubella.984 
In the United Kingdom, we have seen a protective purpose rule openly being applied 
in Chester v Afshar where a doctor negligently failed to warn of risks inherent in a 
procedure.   This was that of a patient’s right to autonomy.985 
 
Article 3:201 is also confirmed in the Unification of Tort Law: Causation.986 So while 
the drafters did well to identify certain principles that may on occasion be found in 
case law in all of the jurisdictions under consideration here, I would argue that it 
serves next to no purpose to state them especially given how jurisdictions frame 
their judgements.  Lawyers will select the principles they require for their 
arguments and judges will select the ones they require to justify their decisions.  
The case of Chester v Afshar again comes to mind.  Here, if we remember, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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985 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL, as per Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe at para 90 
986 see in particular the comparative table at pp136-137 
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patient had not decided what she would do had she been informed of the dangers 
inherent in the procedure.  The conditio sine qua non test had not been satisfied.  
All that had been shown was that she would have taken further advice.  This was a 
3:2 decision in the House of Lords so there was no “common sense” solution.   
Resort was had to (e) in particular – the protective purpose of the rule violated.  
 
In my opinion, the stating of such principles with regard to the scope of liability is 
inherently vague as a check on conditio sine qua non.  Even if we could agree on 
what factual causation actually was, there will always be a normative element to 
legal causation.  This can be framed using any of the judicial devices that are, 
practically, set out in Article 3:201.  More can even be added.  Judgements can be 
framed in terms of foreseeability, temporal and special closeness, mores, policy, 
magnitude of the damage, “normal” consequences of such an act, common sense 
and so on. This does not even begin to cover the special regimes that exist in the 
different jurisdictions (asbestos, medical hazards) or account for shifts in the 
burden of proof.   I am really not convinced that courts, lawyers and legal scholars 
need to be reminded of what constitutes or could potentially constitute cause.  
They know it already though they may not agree on it.  The arguments are there 
in their own jurisprudence and academic writing.  Given that courts have been 
cherry-picking as to what constitutes cause, and the different results in medical 
liability can be seen, I think that such articles are unnecessary.   I am not saying 
thereby that it is useless to define any word in the law, simply that it is pointless 
with regard to causation.  It evades all attempts at definition.  
 
6.7.3.3 Consent  
Only a brief word need be said on PETL’s approach to consent as the drafters 
themselves do not treat the subject in any great detail as compared to the DCFR.   
Article 7:101 PETL states that  
(1) Liability can be excluded if and to the extent that the actor acted legitimately 
...d) with the consent of the victim, or where the latter has assumed the risk of being 
harmed. 
 
I am not certain that the PETL discussion necessarily included consent to medical 
procedures and the causal issues behind them.  I have shown already the number of 
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complex issues that the idea of volenti non fit iniuria raises in the context of medical 
negligence.  It is not possible simply to say that a procedure is unlawful if the patient 
has not “consented” to it.  If codification is an aim, surely more is required.  Not one 
of the jurisdictions treats this in the same way.  France requires that the patient be 
informed in a manner that is  “claire, loyal et approprié”; German consent must now 
be in conformity with the Improvement of Patients Rights Act 2013 and in the 
United Kingdom, there must be informed consent à la Montgomery.  The issue then of 
a counterfactual hypothetical must be dealt with.  What would the patient have done 
had she been properly informed?  This is an essential question to which it is necessary 
to know the answer if a court is to make a decision.  A decision making tribunal may 
not opt for a strict counterfactual analysis but may replace the in concreto responses of 
a victim with that of what a reasonable patient would do in the circumstances as we 
have seen in Germany.   If harmonisation inter alia is the aim, more needs to be said 
of consent here as the idea of consent is not the same in the jurisdictions under 
consideration.  I do not advocate any principles.  Before I am accused of being too 
strict or of ignoring PETL’s statement that for “practical purposes, differences are 
very limited”, I would disagree.  Differences are indeed, very different.  For example, 
if a doctor in the United Kingdom does not warn his patient about a one in ten 
thousand chance of a risk then there could still be informed consent.  As we have 
seen in Germany, the patient may not have consented if not so informed and there 
could even be criminal liability.  I think this is not an insignificant difference.   
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6.7.3.4 Summary: PETL 
While the drafters of the PETL may conceive to create a notion of causation in 
European tort law based on principles gleaned from various jurisdictions, my 
submission is that it is not possible.  The PETL have adopted the German 
codification of certain subjective rights as their “basic norms”, and these are set out at 
Article 2:102. I am not going to comment on this.  European law has already had to 
grapple with such issues in the interpretation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.987  What I do believe is that the PETL are not workable in their present form 
as there is no agreement on one of the fundamental pillars of tort law: causation.  I 
believe this is the case, based on the fact, that there is not one complete, all-
embracing, total idea or concept of causation in the law among the jurisdictions.  I 
believe my research in case law and academic writing shows this.  Hamer inter alios 
shows that there is no one understanding as to what factual causation actually is.988  
To what end does it serve, for example, to state that the basic principle is that of 
conditio sine qua non989 when, first of all, as I have shown above, there is no one 
answer as to what it is? And to what end does it serve to have factors with regard to 
the scope of liability set out?990 This is already done in all the jurisdictions and we 
have seen that there is no uniformity of decision-making. The drafters readily admit 
in their commentaries that there is confusion over this even though practically 
differences from jurisdiction to jurisdiction are “very limited”.  To attempt artificially 
to create some common notion of causation, without even first standardising rules of 
proof, experts’ reports and taking account of the special systems of recovery that exist 
in all the jurisdictions seems foolhardy at best.  Even if we were able to standardise 
rules relating to proof and experts’ reports, this does not by any means imply 
causation would be a non-issue.  This does not really bode well for harmonisation.  
Just to take the example of Article 3:102 with regard to concurrent causes. The rule 
here is that where there are multiple activities and where each of them alone would 
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have caused the damage at the same time, each activity is regarded as a cause of the 
victim’s damage.  In the commentary thereto the drafters note it will not always be 
clear whether or not the conditions of Article 3:102 are met.991 They admit that it is a 
matter of evidence and procedural law. 
 
This shows that causation is inextricably linked to matters of evidence and procedural 
law.  It leaves me thinking that the PETL are trying to be all things to all people. 
Articles 3: 102 may seem exciting in themselves but the commentaries seem rather 
like a damp squib rather than something that could actually revolutionise European 
tort law.  Of course, at the end of the day it is a matter of evidence – not just in 
European cases but in all cases.  It is also a matter of procedural law in all cases.  I 
am not sure to what extent I would agree that this gives “manoeuvring room” but 
certainly a judge is free to say that the standard of proof has not been met.  If the 
judge wants “manoeuvring” room then I imagine he would just refer to some vague 
notion of legal causation not having been met and that would be an end to it.   
 
This brings me on to Article 3:103. Paragraph (1) states that where there are multiple 
activities but it is not certain which one in fact caused the damage, then each 
activity is regarded as a cause to the extent that it may have caused the victim’s 
damage.  This, as we have seen, reflects the idea of “likelihood” but as we have seen 
this interplays enormously with the balance of proof and has consequences for 
solidary liability.  If the likelihood is lower than 51% then there is no full recovery in 
the United Kingdom.  Also, PETL freely admit going against the common core of 
systems by introducing proportional liability.  
 
Similarly, Article 3:102(2) PETL seems to go against the “common core” by allowing 
for only causal link to be attributed to the activity proportionally.  This is the market-
share liability test, which has not yet been adopted in any of the jurisdictions under 
consideration mainly for problems of linking defendants to plaintiffs.  This would be 
particularly relevant for damage resulting from marketed drugs. It does not exist in 
Germany, the United Kingdom or in France.  Germany has not excluded the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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possibility.992 France would allow for a full recovery against any of the tortfeasors 
according to Jourdain (in solidum) but Galand-Carval notes that the problem of 
identification is a bar to liability.993 The United Kingdom maintains its balance of 
probabilities burden of proof so any plaintiff would have to show a tortfeasor’s share 
of the market was more than 50% and thereby recover 100%. 
 
In summary, Jourdain writes of the PETL (and DCFR) together that 
Sur le fond, les divergences entre le droit français et les projets européens sont donc 
plus apparentes que réelles.994 
 
I do not agree with this. There is no use of market-share liability in any of the 
jurisdictions.  Yet the PETL endorse it.  Article 3:106 deals with the loss of chance.  
Neither the United Kingdom nor Germany recognises this.  France does not adopt a 
sina qua non as a first principle.  The PETL do.  There is also no indication on the 
burden of proof or the use of expert’s evidence or science.  It has been seen already 
that France has admitted causation even in the absence of scientific evidence.995  I 
submit neither the United Kingdom nor Germany would allow this to such an 
extent. So it would appear that even after considering a number of European law 
systems, the PETL drafters have nonetheless decided to be innovative and adopt 
solutions that cannot be derived as generalities from research: for example, 
proportional liability, market-share liability and loss of chance.   I submit again then 
that the PETL appear to go against some solutions that would be found in the 
jurisdictions under consideration here.  Of course, they had to adopt a solution one 
way or the other.  They had to chose and I freely admit this.  Yet it is because 
outcomes can be so different that I believe there is no common core with regard to 
causation.  I contend therefore that PETL themselves further show in what a 
confused state the law in Europe is with regard to causation.  Again this is not a 
criticism and actually I find it rather unsurprising.  I do not foresee its becoming 
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“unconfused” any time soon.  Solutions in fact differ significantly. It is my contention, 
that codification in this current form with regard to causation is undesirable.   
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6.8 Summary of PETL and DCFR 
The PETL and the DCFR are both proposals which could have an effect on 
causation and how it is understood at a European level. I think Winiger, 
diplomatically puts it  
Compared to the national codes, which scarcely mention the concept of causation, 
the extensive norms established in the…PETL constitute a major innovation.996  
 
They do indeed.  The PETL go into a lot of expansion under their causation title 
whereas the DCFR is more succinct.  The PETL accept the conditio sine qua non as 
a starting point whereas the DCFR does not really give any guidance simply stating 
that a person causes legally relevant damage if it is “consequence” of the person’s 
conduct or a source of danger – it being presumably left up to the national courts to 
determine what “consequence” means.  I have argued above that this notion is more 
like adequacy theory than equivalence theory.  I have also shown that it can be 
impossible to agree on the notion of the word “consequence”.  Yet with the DCFR 
there is no cause-in-law / cause-in-fact dichotomy as it could be argued exists in the 
PETL.  The DCFR, I find, is much somewhat more “laissez-faire” and somewhat 
more honest when it comes to causation in that it while it may expand to some extent 
in the commentary, it does recognise that  
The formulation has been deliberately kept flexible (“is to be regarded as a 
consequence”) so as to ensure that, in the context of causation, differences between 
individual attributive causes and legally relevant damage can be taken into 
account.997 
 
In any case, judging from the research I have done for this paper, I am certain this is 
what courts would do anyway.  They would adapt, interpret and modify the word 
“consequence” so as to arrive at a satisfactory result.   England (not Scotland) is 
known for arriving at equitable results; France is known for its victim-friendly 
solutions in these cases and Germany is known for its liberal approach to prima facie 
cases and even changing the burden of proof.  These overall policy considerations 
will trump any attempt to hem in the idea of causation.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
996 B WINIGER, “Multiple Tortfeasor” [sic] (L TICHY (ed), Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) p79 at 
p92 
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! ! ! ! !! 315!
The notion of  “informed consent” is not, in my opinion, the same in its content as 
consent that must be “loyal, claire et approprié” in the circumstances and nor does 
the simplicity of the idea conform to the broader notions as enshrined in the German 
Improvement of Patients Rights Act 2013.   “Informed consent” holds as per 
Montgomery that a patient must be informed of all material risks.  Material risks are 
such risks which a reasonable person in that patient’s position would consider 
significant if he knew about them.  In France, a doctor must inform the patient of “les 
risques graves” even if they are not exceptional.998 Additionally, it is for the doctor to 
prove that he has carried out this obligation d’information.999  German law is stricter.  
The DCFR provides for the defence of consent and gives three pages commentary on 
it.  The PETL comment only on it briefly as we have seen.  To replace fully the idea 
of consent to a medical operation in all jurisdictions, I suggest, would be an uphill 
struggle and the approach to counterfactuals in each jurisdiction is different.  
 
I contend again that “practical purposes the differences are very limited” is not 
what I appreciate from my analysis of causation, albeit in one particular area of 
tort.  There are quite significant differences when it comes to rights recognised (or 
remedies offered) with regard to loss of chance, strict liability (notably with 
nosocomial infections in hospitals), medical accidents (aléa thérapeutique), recovery 
for the effects of vaccinations, the use of science and epidemiology and burdens of 
proof to name but some.  I submit therefore that in the matter of medical 
causation, results differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and I 
would counter the drafters’ suggestion by the case law to be found in this paper.   
 
However, although I think even the DCFR went too far in trying to define 
causation, I believe its version is to be preferred, if I had to chose.  Its strength lies 
in its vagueness.  It is vague enough as to mean almost nothing and I agree with 
the DCFR drafters that it is not necessary to begin with conditio sine qua non as a 
starting point.  France sometimes does, sometimes it begins with adequacy: it 
really depends.  Germany and the United Kingdom may purport to have causal 
principles in theory but they are quickly jettisoned when required. This is not to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
998 CC 1 27 May 1998, Bull n°187; D 1998, p530 note F LAROCHE-GISSEROT 
999 CC 1 25 Feb 1997, Bull n° 75 
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say, of course, that we ought to eschew consistency in France but it is rather to 
appreciate, as an outsider, that the tradition in France is different from that of the 
common law where precedent is the aspiration. Neither does the DCFR try to 
limit causation later by listing factors to be taken into account in the scope of 
liability (or legal causation in the United Kingdom).  I am sure the drafters of the 
DCFR knew as well as the drafters of the PETL that such factors appeared time 
and time again in the case law and in academic writing, but I am just not 
convinced of the utility of their being listed.  Hence I would opt for the more 
“minimalist” DCFR approach in this regard in the first instance if I had to choose 
between the two.  My purpose in stating my preference over PETL is simply to 
show that the less that is said about causation, the better.1000  Causation cannot be 
defined.  As van Dam has noted “an important reason why legislators have 
refrained from providing causation rules is that it is hard fruitfully to design a 
generally applicable causation test.”1001Notions such as the conditio sine qua non 
or adequacy theory can be thrown around and used liberally in writs but 
ultimately, the judge will make her decision according to how she understands (or 
indeed “feels”) how causation should be applied.  As we see especially from case 
law in the United Kingdom, there is no one understanding of causation at the 
highest courts, so why should there be an understanding of what it means across 
Europe?  
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6.9 European Court of Justice Case Law, the Environmental 
Liability Directive and the Product Directive    
The thrust of this paper is to show that projects such as the DCFR and the PETL are 
unworkable on the basis that there is no common European (or other) idea of what 
causation is.  Nonetheless causation as a model must be considered on a European 
level to a certain extent.  On a supranational level, there are these important sources 
of European law that treat causation.  I should like to consider them.  One of these is 
Article 340 TFEU.  It sets out the general basis for non-contractual liability.   There 
is very little case law on Article 340 treating causation as such but nonetheless it 
enshrines non-contractual liability in the TFEU. If some kind of pan-European 
notion of causation is therefore envisaged, it is important to know how it is to be 
formed, what its sources are and how scholars and lawyers might be able best to 
argue causation based on previous cases.  Causation at this level of pan-European 
understanding is here to stay.1002  
 
Aside from this, two significant directives use the word “cause”.  These are the 
Product Directive and the Environmental Liability Directive 2004.1003  The latter 
brings in the principle that an operator whose activity has caused environmental 
damage should be financially liable therefor.  The former seeks for maximum 
harmonisation and sets out simply that a producer is liable for damage caused by a 
defect in his product.  Understanding “cause” here is important and, even more so 
for the purpose of this paper, when it relates to “medical products”.   Admittedly 
there is not much by way of case law either at a supra-national level or at indeed at a 
national level but there are green shoots of development that I shall consider herein.  
 
I shall consider first Article 340 TFEU and the case law under it that is relevant to 
causation.  I shall consider the case law under the Environmental Liability Directive, 
and then the Product Directive.  I shall then finish with a word on experts’ reports at 
the ECJ.   
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6.9.1 European Court of Justice Case Law 
Non-contractual liability of EU institutions and their civil servants is set out in Article 
340 TFEU.  It states that  
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any 
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.   
 
Three matters stand out immediately.    First of all, that this is all the TFEU has to 
say with regard to non-contractual obligation.  There is nothing more.  Second, the 
word “caused” is used yet it is not defined.  Third, that there would appear to be 
principles “common to the laws of the Member States”.  The first of these need not 
strike as particularly surprising.  Many jurisdictions have short written provisions in 
their codes and allow case law to fill the gaps.  The second one is interesting in that 
the drafters of the TFEU have chosen not to define causation even thought they had 
the chance – a wise move.  The third one, however, may seem more remarkable.  
The drafters of the TFEU must have thought that there were indeed general 
principles common to the laws of the Members States with regard to tort or at least, 
that they could be found without undue difficulty.  If they did not think this, they 
would not have inserted such a provision.  Notwithstanding the fact that this 
provision has been extant since the Treaty of the Rome was drawn up, there has 
been plenty of time to amend or indeed remove it if later drafters thought otherwise.   
At the time when there were six members of the European Economic Community, 
French law was selected as the spur in this area and it will be seen that French law 
has a large influence in ECJ case law here.1004 It is my position, that there are no 
principles common to the laws of the Member States as I think my research in 
medical causation alone has shown.  However, my contention at this supra-national 
level of law may seem redundant as the ECJ is in fact mandated to follow, find and 
deduce general principles common to the laws of the Member States.  I shall consider 
the case law so far with regard to causation.  There is not much and to understand it 
one must take a global view of recovery in tort to understand what exactly has caused 
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what damage.  I shall first consider how the ECJ approaches causation and then 
move on to consider how the ECJ considers damages.  
 
So where and how then are these “general principles common to the laws of the 
Member States” to be found? First, plaintiffs cannot simply pick a principle in their 
own legal system and have a right to insist that it be followed.  A plaintiff could not, 
for example, refer to German law, insist that given there has been gross negligence 
and therefore that the burden of proof be reversed.  This would be a principle in 
German law but it would not be correct to regard it as a “common” principle.  On 
the other hand, the ECJ should feel free to develop its own jurisprudence in this area 
but reality is that French law has had a dominating influence.  Whether it will 
continue to dominate in the future given the expansion of the European Union is a 
moot point and this remains to be seen.  In order to assess how the ECJ treats 
causation in this area, it is necessary to have a cursory look at how the ECJ treats loss 
and damages in general.   
 
Loss must be set out with clarity and precision and it must be “certain”, “direct”, 
“specific” and “serious”.1005  This is quite similar to French notions of recovery.  A 
hypothetical loss would not be sufficient and therefore this does bring into question as 
to whether a loss of chance would be recognised.1006  Schousboe refers to other 
European case law noting that the court has also not just used the adjective certain 
but also “actual and certain”, “concrete” and “real”.1007 This need not concern us 
overly but damage which falls into this category is derivative economic loss, that is, 
for example, loss of earnings following from an stay in hospital caused by medical 
negligence. 
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My argument in this paper is that causation is not an area where any commonality or 
“general principles” are to be found, and, by dint, there can be strictly no 
implementation of Article 340 TFEU as it stands should a case of this nature ever 
come to court.1008 This is because there are no “common general principles”. I 
suggest nonetheless that it is an article with which the ECJ has to work1009 and the 
ECJ shall attempt to discover these common general principles.  I propose now to 
consider a certain amount of case law that may allow us to reflect on how the ECJ 
has treated causation and how it may treat causation in the future when cases come 
before it.   I am not attempting to forward any principles at all as I believe this is a 
futile exercise.  
 
6.9.2 ECJ Causation 
In Kampffmeyer v Commission,1010 there was no development of the Advocate General’s 
treatment of causation, precisely because the parties themselves had not brought up 
the subject.  He stated 
In order that the Community should be liable it is not sufficient that the action of the 
Commission was wrongful, it is necessary that it should have been the cause of the 
damage; that is the intention of Article 215 which speaks of damage caused by the 
institutions. More exactly, it is necessary that there should have been a direct causal 
link between the action or decision in dispute and the alleged injury.1011  
  
So what appears to be necessary then in European law is that there be some kind of 
“direct causal link”, however this is to be interpreted.  The Advocate-General notes 
some possible interpretations  
One may regard any event without which damage would not have occurred as the 
cause of it; one may keep to the most recent event; one may attribute the damage to 
the events preceding it which were likely to cause it in the natural course of 
things.1012  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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So the Advocate-General spoke quite liberally of causation.  There is the possibility 
for the conditio sine qua non theory (without which the damage would not have 
occurred) and adequate causation (natural course of events). He even suggests the 
prospect of a proximate cause (“one may keep to the most recent event”), an idea 
which has been rejected in France.  It is interesting that these indeed are philosophies 
that can be gleaned from the United Kingdom, France and Germany: conditio sine 
qua non and adequacy.   Yet as we have seen, theories can be interpreted to suit the 
case and I suggest this is exactly what would happen at the European level, regardless 
of the fact that lip-service is paid to one or another theory.   This quote from the 
Advocate-General would seem to justify this.  
 
This case concerned damage resulting from an illegal act under the law of a Member 
State and under Community law.  It appeared there were two concurrent—or 
successive—acts: that of the Federal Republic of Germany which took the protective 
measure and refused certain licences and that of the Commission which, by 
validating that measure, increased the damage or refused to require the German 
Authorities to eliminate it.  If the Federal Government was the primary cause that 
did not prevent the Commission also from having caused the damage.  Mr Advocate-
General Roemer stated in the Vloeberghs case which appears to me to apply mutatis 
mutandis to the present case  
The fact that the attitude of a Member State contrary to the Treaty is the basis of a 
relationship of cause and effect does not exclude the consecutive omission of the 
High Authority from the original conduct of a Member State contrary to the 
Treaty.1013  
 
Terminology such as “direct” cause could be accepted into a later European idea of 
causation were a well-defined one to be developed at a European level.   We perhaps 
see a kind of joint liability (in this case potentially the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Commission) along the lines of the British mesothelioma cases and French 
case law.  This idea of a direct causal link in European law is also to be found in 
other cases.1014 One case also speaks of the Community’s only being held liable for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1013 Joined Cases 9 and 12/60 Rec 1961, at p 475  
1014 Brinkmann Tabakfabriken v Skatteministeriet [1998] ECR l-5255; Lüttcke v Commission [1971] ECR 
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“sufficiently direct consequences”.1015 So the idea of cause has now morphed into a 
reference to “consequences”1016 and only those consequences which are “sufficiently 
direct”.  In the context of causation at European law, there also exists a duty on the 
plaintiff to show that he acted with “reasonable diligence in limiting the extent of the 
damage which it claims to have suffered.”1017 So the plaintiff must act to prevent 
causation continuing to increase damages unnecessarily.  He must mitigate the 
damages. 
 
Van Dam writes in his European Tort Law that  
As in all national jurisdictions, the basic requirement for causation is that the 
conditio sine qua non test or but for test is met.  Causation is not established if the 
same damage would have occurred in the same way in the absence of the wrongful 
Community act or omission in question.1018 
 
Yet as we have seen this is not true.  I have not seen anywhere that it is a “basic 
requirement”.  He footnotes citing the case of Compagnia Italiana Alcool v 
Commission.1019 It is certainly an argument that can be used but as I have quoted 
above, other notions of what causation is actually exist, one not being more “basic” 
than the other. I am not of the opinion that this case lays down any such a radical 
rule.  
 
In the Compagnia Italiana Alcool case, the ECJ considered whether the damage suffered 
by the plaintiffs could be in some way related to a deficiency in providing a reason of 
a decision dated 18 October 1990.  The court had – albeit not openly – used the 
theory of equivalence of conditions, or the conditio sine qua non.  If the deficiency 
had not existed then the damage would have been the same.1020  I assume that van 
Daam was referring to the last sentence here when he made his generalisation about !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1015 Fresh Marine Company SA v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR II-3331 (CFI) 
1016 the word used in the DCFR 
1017 Fresh Marine Company SA v Commission of the European Communities [2000] ECR II-3331 (CFI) at II-
3334 
1018 C van DAM, European Tort Law, p28 
1019 C-358/90 
1020 at para 47 
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the adoption of the equivalence theory as there is no other mention of causation in 
the case.   For me, the Court is simply making an observation rather than 
proclaiming a new theory of law.  It certainly does not appear in declaratory 
language and to say the rule for causation at Community level is the “but for” test is 
in anyway a basic rule is perhaps wishful thinking.  There is nothing, it seems to me, 
to prevent the ECJ starting from an equivalence, proximate, or other theory that 
might be expounded.  The caveat I would add to this, however, would be that any 
theory that is developed at this level would have to have some justification by its 
presence in the national law of more than one Member State. 
 
Indeed to support my above contention, the ECJ has also suggested that it could use 
a “sphere of risk” theory.  When one thinks of “sphere of risk” theory, one 
immediately thinks of the German law of causation.  The ECJ noted in Mulder v 
Council1021 
The Court has also consistently held that, in order for the Community to incur non-
contractual liability, the damage alleged must go beyond the bounds of the normal 
economic risks inherent in the activities in the sector concerned.1022  
 
This case concerned inter alia non-contractual liability of the Commission by the 
adoption of an economic measure allegedly breaching legitimate expectations of 
producers in the milk industry.  With regard to the damages that the Community had 
to pay, the basic principle was set out that this should be 
…the difference between, on the one hand, the income which the applicants would 
have obtained in the normal course of events from the milk deliveries which they 
would have made if, during the period between 1 April 1984 (the date of entry into 
force of Regulation No 857/84) and 29 March 1989 (the date of entry into force of 
Regulation No 764/89), they had obtained the reference quantities to which they 
were entitled and, on the other hand, the income which they actually obtained from 
milk deliveries made during that period in the absence of any reference quantity, 
plus any income which they obtained, or could have obtained, during that period 
from any replacement activities.1023  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Interestingly, in calculating such amounts of milk, reference was made to “farms 
representative of the type of farm run by each of the applicants, taking into 
account such factors as lack of profitability for start-up farms.”     So what we see 
in this case is reference to a certain risk; the Community is liable when damage 
alleged goes beyond that of normal economic risks. The counterfactual is also used 
by the Court here is, in my opinion, a kind of objective adequacy counterfactual.  
What profit would the farm have made in the normal course of events?  !
So it can be seen then that from case law, the ECJ is at a nascent stage when it 
comes to developing a theory of causation.  Indeed, I submit that many of the 
theories expounded by the Advocate-General in Vloeberghs may be used from time 
to time. There has even been the adoption of risk theory and counterfactuals: all 
important language when it comes to understanding what causation is and I 
commend the Court for this.  It has stayed clear of trying to invoke principles and 
at the same time embracing all potential causal arguments.   
 
6.9.3 Damages 
Perhaps first and foremost, Member States are liable to persons as a result of damage 
caused to them for a breach of European Community law based on article 340 
TFEU.1024 There are two kinds of loss to consider: damnum emergens and lucram cessans.   
The former is the reduction in any asset that one owns and the latter is the loss of 
potential profit.   It is important to consider damages, as, in my opinion, this is 
precisely where the court stops the causal chain.  If damages are recoverable then a 
court is saying that the plaintiff caused the recoverable damages.  If they are not 
recoverable then the court is simply saying the plaintiff did not cause the damage: 
remember it is causation in the law with which we are concerned. The ECJ has never 
actually pronounced on the different kinds of damages that are recoverable as such. 
In the case of Ireks-Arkady, Advocate General Caporti stated that  
The legal concept of damage covers both a material loss stricto sensu, that is to say, 
a reduction in a person’s assets [damnum emergens], and also the loss of an increase 
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in those assets which could have occurred if the harmful act had not taken place 
[lucram cessans].1025  
 
Examples of the different kinds of losses have been set out in detail in the case of 
Embassy Limousines.1026 This case was concerned with certain damage incurred by 
Embassy Limousines following information received by it on a certain date.  
Interestingly in the case report, the ECJ made specific reference to causation and 
stated   
It follows that the aforementioned investments show a direct causal link with the 
telephone conversation of 4 December 1995.1027  
 
It is noteworthy here that the ECJ has chosen to use the adjective “direct” in the 
description of the causal link.  It has used this adjective before as we have seen. This 
is similar to French case law.  
 
The damages themselves which were recoverable in this case “included expenses 
and charges incurred by reason of its certainty of winning the contract”, and, 
“expenses of recruitment, medical examinations, training and familiarisation 
expenses for the drivers” and “preparation, negotiation for fleet of vehicles, 
telephone contract and parking”.   The ECJ did not allow recovery for loss of 
profit, for, “…that would result in giving effect to a contract which never 
existed.”1028 The ECJ also allowed recovery for non-material loss.1029 
 
Another kind of loss with which this paper has been concerned is that of loss of 
chance.  I have shown that loss of chance is recoverable in France and 
Luxembourg in medical situations but not in the United Kingdom.  Loss of 
chance is not recoverable at all in Germany.  So what of loss of chance at a 
European level? Is the chance that has been lost to be considered as an asset? This 
is a difficult question and I am not certain that it can be stated categorically that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1025 Case 238/71 
1026 T-203/96, para 104 
1027 ibid, para 101 
1028 ibid, para 96 
1029 Case 238/78, at para 108 
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were a question of medical negligence where the plaintiffs are requesting damages 
based on a loss of chance to be raised in the ECJ that this would necessarily result 
in recovery.  First, a more rounded appreciation of recovery for loss of chance 
would have to be made in the 28 European jurisdictions, if we are to deduce 
“common principles”.  Thereafter it could be argued that loss of chance is 
permissible in financial or economic situations but not in the case of medical 
negligence, as appears to be the case at the moment in the United Kingdom, 
although the United Kingdom has not totally closed the door to recovery for loss 
of chance in medical situations.  It would depend surely on whether the loss was 
specific and direct.  In the latest case I found dealing with the matter, the 
Advocate-General stated in his opinion 
la jurisprudence de la Cour a reconnu à plusieurs reprises que le caractère certain 
d’un préjudice ne doit pas nécessairement être absolu, un tel caractère pouvant être 
établi dans le cas d’une perte de chance sérieuse, directement provoquée par un acte 
illégal de l’Union. À ce stade, je ne vais pas répéter ce que j’ai déjà exposé en détail 
aux points 38 à 69 des conclusions dans l’affaire Giordano et, en l’espèce, il suffit de 
rappeler qu’une perte de chance sérieuse constitue un préjudice réel et certain 
susceptible d’indemnisation.1030  
 
The Advocate-General even speaks in terms of probability, eschewing a common law 
all-or-nothing approach to recovery 
C’est précisément parce que la perte de chance ne couvre pas le montant total du 
profit non réalisé que les arguments invoqués par la Commission confirment 
simplement que la probabilité que les requérants continuent à exploiter leurs quotas 
durant la semaine allant du 16 au 23 juin 2008 n’était pas absolue, mais ils ne 
privent en rien la chance perdue de son caractère sérieux.1031 
 
So interestingly, the request for damages does not simply cover a part of the final 
damage but rather it is framed in terms of probability.  So, although there was no loss 
of profit on a non-existent contract recognised in Embassy Limousines, this does not 
exclude loss of chance all together.  The door is not closed, it would seem, to loss of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1030 Buono and Others v Commission, C13-13, Advocate General’s opinion of 20 March 2014, at para 
90  
1031 ibid, at 93 
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profit on an existing contract but, as in the common law, the loss of profit, or the 
chance to make a profit on something that does not yet exist, is not recoverable. 
Loss of chance is recoverable provided that there chance lost is serious and real.  
Further, there is not as yet any dichotomy between medical loss of chance and loss of 
chance in other situations as there is in British law as yet.1032   
 
The other side of the coin is that loss of profit itself would not appear to be 
recoverable if it is deemed to be speculative.  So, for example, where a patient had to 
stay in hospital longer due to medical negligence and he had already entered into a 
contract before he had gone into hospital and was unable to carry it out and suffered 
loss thereon, then I think the ECJ would argue that the patient could recover.  The 
profit there would be easier to quantify provided it is “actual”, “certain” and 
quantifiable”.  Where, however, the patient had not entered into a contract, but had 
hoped to enter into the contract, as yet then I think the court would be more 
reluctant to say that the medical negligence had actually caused the loss in profit.  
Notions of the profit’s being too “speculative” would be used, rather than common 
law notions of the loss’s being reasonably foreseeable.   This we have seen in Embassy 
Limousines. 
 
Other principles and expressions thereof can be seen in Grifoni.1033 In this case, the 
question was whether the Community was liable for breaching local rules concerning 
the prevention of industrial accidents.  The court stated  
The Court has consistently held that the Community' s non-contractual liability 
and the right to compensation for damage suffered depend on the coincidence of 
a set of conditions [sic] as regards the unlawfulness of the acts alleged against the 
institution.1034 
 
This is surprising language from the ECJ.  It is particularly philosophical and 
logical in its expression. The ECJ talks about the “coincidence of a set of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1032 interestingly, van DAM notes that in twelve EU countries the concept of loss of chance is 
unknown or rejected, whereas in France and the Netherlands it exists.  In other countries, it is 
applied in a modified form: C van DAM, European Tort Law, p342 
1033 C 308/87 
1034 ibid, at para 6 
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conditions”.  As I have tried to explain “conditions” herein, I understand it as 
something “in the background”; but causation requires something more and to 
express a right to compensation as the coming together of certain “conditions” is 
unfortunate.  The causation which is usually in dispute oftentimes refers to 
something out-of-the-ordinary and not something that happens in the normal 
course of things.  Also, a “set” of conditions is spoken of.  !
Perhaps more familiar to us is what the court stated in paragraph 7 
It is therefore necessary to consider whether the Commission's acts were unlawful 
and whether there is a direct link in the chain of causality between those acts and the 
damage suffered by Alfredo Grifoni.  
 
Again the notion of “direct” link is employed à la française.  There is no mention in 
this case of causation sine qua non.  It appears in other cases as we have seen.  
 
The ECJ also treated problem of contributory negligence or proportionate liability 
when it held 
In those circumstances, the damage suffered was caused not exclusively by the 
conduct of the Commission but also by that of the applicant who, even though he 
could have prevented the accident had he taken the necessary care, did not do so 
and therefore partly contributed to bringing it about. Consequently, responsibility 
must be shared equally between the parties.1035 
 
In the case, the plaintiff was held 50% responsible for his own injuries.  
 
Should the case arise then, the ECJ may rely then on expert medical reports and will 
rely on them as fact to show causation.1036 The ECJ will then calculate consequential 
loss.1037 Calculating future consequential loss where there has been a natural or 
“overtaking” event has not come before the ECJ as yet.   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1035 ibid, para 17 
1036 C SCHOUSBOE, “The Concept of Damage as an Element of the non-Contractual Liability 
of the European Community”, p8 
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/2003/2003.afh-
3.pdf  p23 
1037 in this case, consequential loss in the first instance was calculated simply by the number of days 
away from work multiplied by the person’s daily income. 
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Further, in as much as the loss must be proved specifically, it seems to be the case 
that the ECJ would insist on concrete statistical evidence affecting that particular 
individual.1038  We have already seen reference to our objective counterfactual: 
Mulder v Council.  The questions related to how the plaintiffs would have spent certain 
sums if such sums had been paid to them.  The ECJ held that 
In those circumstances, it must be observed that it would be impossible, except in 
particular circumstances, to establish how the applicants would have spent the 
arrears of remuneration which were due to them if the arrears had been paid to 
them in good time. However, in the present cases it is not a question of seeking 
evidence of individual losses, but of verifying whether facts exist which can be 
objectively proved on the basis of precise data which have been made public. By 
producing relevant statistics, which have not been contested by the defendant, the 
applicants have thus proved to the requisite legal standard the deterioration in 
purchasing power which affected their arrears of remuneration during the period in 
question.1039  
  
So here the loss that has been caused can be shown by statistics.  It seems that 
resort can be had to a counterfactual (conditio sine qua non) where this is 
appropriate but only where it is possible to determine the counterfactual and not 
where it is “impossible”.  So, like the jurisdictions under consideration here, 
statistics will play an important part in determining loss.  Schousboe notes that the 
standard of proof is very high and that many cases have been lost on the grounds 
of insufficient proof of damage.1040 !
I imagine that it may well be rare that cases involving medical causation come 
before the ECJ.  They may, however, where employees of European institutions 
are treated by doctors of the European institutions.  Nonetheless, it is noteworthy 
how the highest civil court in Europe treats the issue of causation.  It has no 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1038 Brazzelli Lualdi, joined Cases T-17, 21 & 25/89  
1039 ibid, para 40  
1040 C SCHOUSBOE, “The Concept of Damage as an Element of the non-Contractual Liability 
of the European Community”, p8 
http://law.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_jura/dokumenter/forskning/rettid/2003/2003.afh-
3.pdf  p12 
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guidance from the TFEU and it has left the door open to the import of a number 
of prospective theories.   
 
6.9.4 The ECJ and Experts’ Reports  
As I have also insisted, reports of experts are crucial when it comes to establishing 
causation.  An expert can either make or break a case.  With regard to expert 
evidence in the ECJ, the ECJ has chosen a non-adversarial procedure.  Article 70 of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
provides that  
1. The Court may order that an expert’s report be obtained. The order 
appointing the expert shall define his task and set a time-limit within which he is to 
submit his report.1041  
 
There is no right of cross-examination of the reports as this is subject to the control of 
the President.1042 There exists a possibility to object to a witness within two weeks of 
his being summoned to give evidence.1043 It seems then that a Continental style 
approach to establishing causation is used rather than an adversarial approach as in 
Daubert, as we shall see later.  This is very different from the common law. There is no 
rigorous and testing cross-examination of experts and their reports.     I am curious to 
see how this will develop in the event that science genuinely has two conflicting 
opinions of how damage was caused.  I accept the fact that procedure is not subject 
to the implementation by the ECJ of “general common principles” to be found in the 
Member States – an impossible task – but I simply note the chasm in causation that 
exists between the general principle of preferring a court’s report and that of 
permitting each side to instruct an expert and affording each side the opportunity to 
cross-examine and test as appropriate.  I have some suggestions in this regard below.   
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1041  to be found online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012Q0929(01)&from=EN  
1042 Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Art 70(4) 
1043 ibid, Art 72 
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6.9.5 Environmental Liability Directive 2004 
Certain guidance may also be obtained from the ECJ’s interpretation of the 
Environmental Liability Directive 2004. 1044  In this Directive, the polluter pays 
principle was established.  There are two measures of liability: the first, one of strict 
liability; the second, one of fault-based liability.  The proof of a causal link between 
the activity and the damage is always required.  Although the ECJ does refer back to 
national laws, there is some guidance of what the ECJ may favour when faced with 
future decisions on causation.  It found in the case of Raffinerie Mediterranae (ERG) Spa 
v Ministero dello Sviluppo economico that 
Accordingly, the legislation of a Member State may provide that the competent 
authority has the power to impose measures for remedying environmental damage 
on the basis of the presumption that there is a causal link between the pollution 
found and the activities of the operator or operators concerned due to the fact that 
their installations are located close to that pollution.1045  
  
However, since, in accordance with the ‘polluter pays’ principle, the obligation to 
take remedial measures is imposed on operators only because of their contribution to 
the creation of pollution or the risk of pollution,1046 in order for such a causal link to 
thus be presumed, the competent authority must have plausible evidence capable of 
justifying its presumption.  Such evidence could be as the fact that the operator’s 
installation is located close to the pollution found and that there is a correlation 
between the pollutants identified and the substances used by the operator in 
connection with his activities. 
 
Where the competent authority has such evidence, it is thus in a position to establish 
a causal link between the operators’ activities and the diffuse pollution found. In 
accordance with Article 4(5) of Directive 2004/35, such a situation therefore falls 
within the scope of the directive, unless those operators are able to rebut that 
presumption.1047 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1044 Directive 2004/35/EC 
 
1045 C378/08 at para 56 
 
1046 see, by analogy, Case C‑188/07 Commune de Mesquer para 77 
1047 para 56 et seqq 
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So what the ECJ has done is to approve the adoption of presumptions: something 
that is more akin to France than the United Kingdom and to a lesser extent in 
Germany.  Certainly, of course, such legal manoeuvres can be deduced from 
methods such as prima facie case or Anscheinbeweis but a more “French-friendly” route 
is taken on the causal road.  Then the question arises, so we want to establish a 
presumption, what kind of presumption must it be? There seems no blatant 
translation of a serious, precise or concordant presumption1048so instead the adjective 
chosen is “plausible”.1049  This is a reasonable enough adjective but again my point is 
that I do not know from which of the Member States’ general principles of law the 
invoking of plausible presumptions is permitted?  It is commendable then that the 
ECJ goes further and gives us an example of how such a presumption might be 
established, ie that the installations are located close to the lex loci delicti.  I see this as 
similar to the French case of a patient’s having contracted multiple sclerosis a month 
after her vaccination for hepatitis B as I have considered before.1050 There is no 
scientific evidence but a presumption could be permitted. In these cases, factors such 
as the fact the plaintiff was in good health before the vaccination and the fact that 
other claimants had also contracted the disease were all put forward as establishing 
causal presumptions.   The ECJ went on 
Second, the competent authority is required to establish, in accordance with 
national rules on evidence, a causal link between the activities of the operators at 
whom the remedial measures are directed and the pollution.1051   
 
So, although we see some nods to moving away from a strict application of either 
the equivalence or the adequacy theories, by the use of presumptions, the ECJ 
always refers back to national rules of evidence which are, in my opinion, 
inextricably linked with the substantive rules of causation.  So it would appear to 
me then that presumptions are permitted in tort at a European level at least in 
environmental law provided they are plausible.  Notwithstanding this, the national 
authority has been mandated by the ECJ to bring a case based on the national 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1048 presumably this would be going too far  
1049 Raffinerie Mediterranae (ERG) v Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, para 57 
1050 CC 1 23 Sept 2003, Bull n° 188 
1051 Raffinerie Mediterranae (ERG) v Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, para 65 
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laws of evidence.  I am curious to see further implementation of this, especially in 
the United Kingdom, where the use of presumptions in themselves is not often 
used. 1052  How presumptions may be used at a European level to establish 
causation remains to be seen.  
 
 
 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1052 the United Kingdom does, in this one area permit presumptions.  In the famous case of Rylands 
v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1, it was held that where someone brings on to their land something that it 
is unnatural and that thing causes damage, then there is a prima facie case of liability against that 
person. 
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6.9.6 The Product Directive: Introduction 
According to the Product Directive’s Preamble, it was necessary inter alia because  
“…the existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of 
goods within the common market and entail a differing degree of protection of 
the consumer against damage caused by a defective product to his health or 
property”.1053   
 
This may have been true but it has also had the effect of encouraging judges 
further to develop notions of tort law, including causation in this area.  The aim of 
the Product Directive was to introduce a system of strict liability for damages 
arising from defective products.  The “producer” is liable.1054 
 
The Product Directive aims at maximum harmonisation in the European 
Union.1055 In the cited case, a plaintiff in Spain attempted to rely on a more 
favourable Spanish law of strict liability.  Although the Product Directive 
introduced a system which was less favourable than the extant Spanish system, the 
ECJ held that 
Article 13 of the Directive cannot be interpreted as giving the Member States the 
possibility of maintaining a general system of product liability different from that 
provided for in the Directive.1056  
 
Special systems based on other grounds such as fault or warranty in respect of latent 
defects could exist.  However, as far as the Product Directive was concerned, 
“complete harmonisation” was the goal.1057 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1053 85/374/EEC, Preamble 
1054  Article 3 of the Product Directive defines the producer thus : 'Producer' means the 
manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of a 
component part and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing 
feature on the product presents himself as its producer. 2. Without prejudice to the liability of the 
producer, any person who imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any 
form of distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer within the 
meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible as a producer. 
1055 C-183/00 González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] ECR I-3901 
1056 ibid, para 4 
1057 C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827, para 24 
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6.9.6.1.History of Product Liability in the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany 
All countries under consideration here have a history of consumer protection before 
the implementation of the Product Directive.  In the United Kingdom the case law 
had famously developed from Donoghue v Stevenson 1058  where it was held a 
manufacturer owed a duty of care to the ultimate consumer (even if there was no 
contractual nexus). In France, protection had been awarded the consumer on the 
basis of two aspects of the law of contract, namely the obligation to guarantee against 
defects (garantie contre les vices caches) and the “latent defect warranty” (obligation de 
sécurité).  Presumptions have been developed that professional sellers were actually 
aware of defects at the time of sale enabling buyers to recover.1059 Liability is 
strict.1060  Although contractual actions were the usual way to bring actions, courts 
invented the action directe and the obligation de securité to allow the ultimate consumer to 
sue further up the supply chain.1061  In tort law, there is protection of Article 1382 
and 1384 of the Civil Code in fault and more particularly with case law related to the 
gardien de la chose.  This has been used to introduce strict liability in delict.  In 
Germany, contract law does not play a big role in product liability.1062 There the 
basis of liability is tort law.1063 This is based on breach of a general duty of care 
(Verkehrspflicht) and breach of a statutory duty (Schutzgesetz).  It was not really until the 
1960’s and 1970’s until after the thalidomide tragedy and the Turkish aircraft crash 
in Paris in 1974 (cargo-hold designed by a German company) that the German 
courts began more and more to appear victim-friendly.  It is not the purpose of this 
paper to give an outline of product liability in each of these jurisdictions but rather to 
note those areas where a different result has been achieved, or there exists a potential 
for a different result.  This is important as, in such areas as infections caused by blood 
transfusions and vaccination damage, it is still necessary that the consumer show that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1058 [1932] UKHL 100  
1059 CC 1 21 Oct 1925, DP 1926 
1060 ibid 
1061 CC plén, 12 July 1991, JCP 1991.II.21743 
1062  S LENZE “German Product Liability Law: between European Directives, American 
Restatements and Common Sense” at p100 in D FAIRGRIEVE (ed), Product Liability in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2005)  
1063 ibid 
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the damage was caused by a defect in the producer’s product.  Causation remains a 
key element in understanding the essence of the Product Directive.   
 
Although issues such as causation will tend to be considered according to national 
principles (as there are few principles at a European level offering guidance on the 
matter), courts should be trying to aim towards a complete harmonisation of this 
directive on a European level.  In this respect, one case I admire is A & Others v 
National Blood Authority.1064 I hold it in esteem not because it attempts to find common 
principles of European causation for their own sake but rather there is a hard piece of 
European law where ideas such as “produce”, “producer” and more importantly 
“cause” are scrutinized. Although it was decided in the United Kingdom, I think it 
has broader implications for European jurisprudence.   I shall now consider the case 
of A & Others v National Blood Authority and the consideration of European authority 
therein.  
 
This case was about 112 people who were infected by hepatitis C as a result of a 
blood transfusion.  Although the claimants were successful it was, apparently, a 
“close-run thing”.1065 The reason why the plaintiffs wanted to bring the case under 
the Product Directive was that it would obviate the need for proving negligence.  
Europe was not particularly fecund ground for research on the implementation of the 
Product Directive.1066 There were few decided cases and judicial reasoning tended to 
be much shorter than that in the United Kingdom.  As it turned out, both German 
and French law were consulted.1067 Both parties admitted that blood was indeed a 
product.  Counsel for the plaintiffs noted that  
Bearing in mind that he [the judge] should be alive to there being an “autonomous” 
or Community meaning or construction for harmonising pan-European legislation, 
the judge welcomed the guidance to be obtained from considering the official 
different language versions of the Directive and was tentatively prepared to look at !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1064 [2001] 3 All ER 289 
1065 M BROOKE QC and I FORRESTER QC, “The Use of Comparative Law in A & Others v 
National Blood Authority” at p13 in D FAIRGRIEVE (ed), Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
Cambridge University Press, 2005); this article was written by the protagonists in the case, namely 
by plaintiff and defendant’s counsel and with an afterward by the judge.   
1066 ibid, p20 
1067 ibid, together with Spanish, Dutch, Belgian, Italian and Portuguese law 
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how the Directive had been implemented and judicially applied in other Community 
countries.1068 
 
What is interesting for the purposes of causation in this case is that the judge held 
that for non-standard products it is the courts’ role to determine the legitimate 
expectation of the product which may be higher or lower than the public 
expectation.  In Germany, by contrast, just because blood is infected with HIV or 
hepatitis C does not mean that the product is defective as there is no agreement on 
the product “blood”.1069  
 
In France, however, a blood transfusion centre has been held liable to a claimant 
who contracted hepatitis C following a transfusion.1070  The same has also been held 
in France for infection by the HIV virus.1071This is an autonomous action which was 
available before the Product Directive came into force in France but as Taylor notes, 
it does show how French courts are willing to find victim-friendly solutions.1072 The 
same also applies to suppliers of a growth hormone who were held strictly liable to 
the victim of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease based on article 1147 and in a case where the 
plaintiff’s daughter developed vaginal and uteral infections following the mother’s use 
of the drug distiblène and the manufacturer was also held strictly liable.1073 As it can be 
seen then, parallel systems exist in France and harmonisation will be subject to the 
ECJ’s acceptance or not of these systems.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1068 ibid, p29 
1069 this is taken from S LENZE’s article “German Product Liability: between European Directives, 
American Restatements and Common Sense”, p101, ibid where he refers to the English case of A 
& Others; note, however, in Germany that there is a no-fault liability scheme that was created in 
1995 to cover patients who had been infected with HIV as a result of receiving infected blood  
1070 CC 1 9 May 2001, D 2001 2149, note P SARGOS 
1071 CC 1 12 Feb 2001, Bull n° 35 
1072 S TAYLOR, “Harmonisation or Divergence? A Comparison of French and English Product 
Liability Rules”, in FAIRGRIEVE D (ed), Product Liability in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p221 
1073 TGI Montpellier, 9 July 2002, JCP 2002.II.158, note F Villa and TGI Nanterre, 1 chambre, 
24 May 2002 Revue trimestrielle de droit civil 2002, p527 obs P Jourdain, both as cited by S TAYLOR, 
ibid 
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One area that caused some difficulty in causation has been the “development risks 
defence”. The implementation of the development risks defence by virtue of Article 
7(e) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 in the United Kingdom states that a 
producer can avoid liability by showing that 
The state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product 
into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. 
 
This effectively negates causation if proven.  The ECJ has held that this knowledge 
must be “accessible” when the product was put into circulation.1074 The ECJ noted 
that the word “accessible” will create problems in interpretation.1075  In the French 
insertions into the Civil Code, its Article 1386-12 states that 
Le producteur ne peut invoquer la cause d'exonération prévue au 4° de l'article 
1386-11 lorsque le dommage a été causé par un élément du corps humain ou par les 
produits issus de celui-ci. 
 
This article was inserted following the HIV-contaminated blood scandal in France in 
1984 and 1985.  In Luxembourg also, the French case law seems also to have been 
adopted in that a transfusion centre must provide blood “exempt de vices” even 
where they are “indécelable”.1076  So it can be seen here how France and the United 
Kingdom have arrived at the same norm but by different means.   
 
In Germany, the BGH has stated that this defence cannot be used with regard to 
manufacturing defects.1077 The question on whether a batch of blood infected with 
hepatitis C is defective is undecided in Germany although it is likely that plaintiffs will 
be able to avail themselves of a reversal of the burden of proof following the German 
Bottle Case.1078  The court stated in this case that a product is defective under § 3 I of 
the German Product Liability Act 19891079 if it does not afford the safety which in all !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1074 C – 300/95, 29 May 1997 Commission v United Kingdom, para 28 
1075 ibid, para 29 
1076 G VOGEL, Les grands principes du droit medical et hospitalier, p195  
 
1077 BGH NJW 1995, 2126 
 
1078 BGH judgment of 9 May 1995, ZIP 1995, p1094 
 
1079 This states “§ 3. Defects (1) A product is defective if it does not provide that degree of safety 
which can be justifiably expected, having regard to all the circumstances, in particular (a) its 
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the circumstances can justifiably be expected.  Consumers expect soda water bottles 
to be free from faults such as hairline splits and microfissures which could make them 
explode. The consumer's expectation that bottles be free from faults would not be 
diminished even if it were technically impossible to identify and remove such faults. 
The presence of such a hairline crack constitutes, as the court below rightly held, a 
manufacturing fault, even if it is one which "got away".1080  
 
As the note to the case in English states, there is a Befundsicherunspflicht that applies a 
presumption that the defect arose in the producer’s sphere unless he can show that he 
took all measures to ensure that the product was free from defects.   
 
Again this is something recognised by Mr J Burton in the A & Others case in that 
unless and until there is some common pan-European agreement on essential 
principles, each jurisdiction may well be arriving at different results.1081 
 
So it can be see then that the system for Product Liability in Europe is sui generis. A 
maximum harmonisation at a European level is sought here.  There is not much case 
law on a European level as yet.  Yet I believe cases such as A & Others already show 
some judicial goodwill on the part of British courts to consider how other European 
jurisdictions have interpreted the Product Directive.  Such extensive judgements I do 
not believe will be forthcoming either from France or Germany.  It is not in their 
tradition.  Interpretations of such aspects as “product”, causation and the 
developments risk defence become important when considering how causation is to 
be understood using hard-law on a European level.  I am certain that nations will 
continue to apply their own notions of causation where this becomes an issue in 
Product Liability.  Indeed as Mr Justice Burton has written “The decisions of other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!
presentation;(b) its use which may be reasonably expected;(c) the time when it was put into 
circulation. (2) A product is not defective for the sole reason that later on an improved product was 
put into circulation; this is helpfully translated from the German by The University of Texas 
Project at: https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-
translations/german/case.php?id=1397   
1080  at 2(a) of the English translation of the judgement to be found at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/tgcm/z950509.htm  
 
1081 Mr J BURTON in M BROOKE QC and I FORRESTER QC, “The Use of Comparative 
Law in A & Others v National Blood Authority” at p37 in Product Liability in Comparative Perspective 
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national courts in Europe are, of course, of great interest, but they are normally at 
best persuasive.”1082 I think Nicholas Underhill QC, defendant counsel in A & Others 
goes to the heart of the matter when he notes 
But the fact is that English lawyers cannot hope to educate either themselves or the 
Court to a full understanding of the subtleties of foreign legal systems.  Comparative 
law materials are best used to illustrate or illuminate broad points of principle.  
 
I think this must be correct.  The forays by the British courts into comparative law in 
this case are certainly to be commended.  It can be helpful to note how other systems 
resolve problems but I suggest there remains a “homing instinct” among courts to 
apply what they know best: their own law.   I do find it fascinating to discover how 
foreign jurisdictions appraise similar problems.  I suggest all lawyers and scholars can 
indeed learn from such a comparative exercise, and causation is a fruitful area of 
comparison.  Yet I do not admit of broad principles that can be applied 
overwhelmingly in this area. The Product Directive is here to stay and it can be 
argued that its primary purpose is the boosting of consumer protection.  I say this as 
any previous system of consumer protection which gave more protection is not 
allowed to continue.  In general then, we have seen how the different jurisdictions 
have tackled the problems that the Product Directive have thrown up.  Causation in 
itself may not have been treated explicitly by the ECJ in this matter as yet but it is 
likely that a victim-friendly approach is to be taken if common principles are to be 
adopted, be they from interpretation of the Product Directive itself, as in A & Others, 
or various parallel systems that existed before the Product Directive. 
 
As we have also seen, the Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976 in Germany affords 
consumer protection for those who have suffered damage as a result of taking a 
marketed drug.  The “pharmaceutical enterprise” is liable to the consumer if the 
drug, used correctly, has harmful effects, which, taking into account the state of 
medical knowledge, exceed a tolerable level.1083  So here the drugs can be marketed, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1082 Mr J BURTON in M BROOKE QC and I FORRESTER QC, “The Use of Comparative 
Law in A & Others v National Blood Authority” at p38 in Product Liability in Comparative Perspective; see 
also J REITZ, “How to do Comparative Law” (Autumn 1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 617 where he states “Without explicit comparison to the home country explaining the 
relevance of the foreign law for the domestic legal system, most domestic lawyers will have little 
interest in reading a piece about foreign law.  There are, no doubt, exceptions…” at 619  
1083 Section 84 Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976   
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licenced and sold but even thereafter a risk / benefit analysis of the drugs can be 
made by the courts. The drug in question must be capable of causing the harm in 
question and there is a presumption that the drug caused the harm in an individual 
case only, taking into account the factors listed in Article 84(2) of the Act, which 
include inter alia the temporal relationship between the taking of the drug and the 
onset of the damage.  Familiar undertones are seen here with PETL which also 
includes “closeness in time” with regard to attributing liability to someone.1084  This 
is unique among European legislation in so far as it outlines certain factors to be 
taken into account when establishing presumptions.  However, another drug which 
may also have caused the harm, is not to be regarded as another fact which could 
cause the damage thereby excluding a causal presumption under this Article.  The 
Act has a limited scope, it is true.  It does not cover products, but only drugs.  Yet it is 
interesting to see how certain principles that have been adopted by the German 
legislator with regard to causation could possibly be used in European law with 
regard to product protection.  Emphasis is made on causation in the individual case 
indicating that any epidemiological evidence would necessarily have to be 
individualised.1085  Such kinds of causal principles have also been adopted in France 
in case law with regard to the onset of multiple sclerosis following vaccination for 
hepatitis B.  There was no scientific proof that the vaccinations caused, or that there 
was a risk they would cause, multiple sclerosis and yet the French courts thought 
above this.  Scientific proof is a part of the evidence, but courts also exist to enforce 
social norms and to protect the public.  As we have seen, a legal causal connection 
in these cases was established.  Now, this would not necessarily be the case in 
Germany.  In fact, I doubt it would be the case at all.  Physicians in German have 
responsibility under statute and case law to warn of risks. There is a heavy duty in 
Germany.  Even small risks if their eventuation would grave consequences for the 
patient must be disclosed.  The BGH has even held that risks of up to one in ten to 
twenty thousand need to be disclosed.1086  
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1084 Art 3 :201 Scope of Liability, PETL   
1085 Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976, §84(2) 
1086 BGH NJW 1984, 1395 
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So although the telos of the Product Directive may be maximum harmonisation in 
this area, we can see that what causes damage and what is a defect in product liability 
in this area is fragmented.  Parallel systems to the Product Directive exist in France 
by virtue of recovery allowed under tort.  We have already seen the Pharmaceutical 
Products Act 1976 in Germany and other no-fault systems exist in the United 
Kingdom, for example, the Vaccine Damage Payment Scheme 1979 which allows 
certain people who were severely disabled as a result of a vaccination to recover.  It is 
a no-fault system but again causation between the vaccine and the disability must be 
shown.  My aim here is not to have a raid of product liability in the European Union 
but rather to show how difficult it is going to be extract causal norms from such 
disparate systems.  Yet overall policy may well trump traditional national 
interpretations of causation (this does not exclude, of course, the fact that policy is an 
element of causation nationally) and the ECJ may well decide matters of causation 
based on the Product Directive on this basis.  
 
In conclusion then, although there is hardly any case law at the ECJ on the Product 
Directive, there has been some case law on it at a national level and I think the most 
important for the purposes of this paper is A & Others which gives an overview of 
recovery systems in other jurisdictions.  It does this very well.  Both plaintiffs and 
defendants agree the Burton J did a first class job in his reasoning and this could be 
part of the reasons that the case was not appealed.  It remains to be seen how the 
ECJ will interpret causation in the event of any Article 267 references to it under the 
Product Directive.   
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6.9.7 Conclusions 
So the article 340 TFEU instructs that the ECJ develop European tort law taking 
into consideration general principles that are common to the Member States.  This 
may have been feasible when there were only six Member States1087 but to apply this 
to a European Union of 28 seems hopeful at best.  Yet this would be an empty 
statement were I not to show that at least in one area in tort law there is no 
agreement among the Member States and even within the Member States 
themselves.  This is in the area of causation – cases of medical causation in tort have 
not yet come before the ECJ at the time of writing.   The ECJ has an impossible task 
and I suggest amendment of the TFEU in this case.  I have shown that the Member 
States of France, Germany and the United Kingdom have certain approaches to 
causation but that these principles are flexible to suit the case.  I do not make a 
comment on such flexibility but I merely note it.  Similarly at the ECJ level, there 
seems to be no agreement as to what constitutes causation, notwithstanding some 
suggestions that the sine qua non theory seems to be the “basic” theory.  I have 
shown that there have been suggestions that it could be theory of equivalence (the 
conditio sine qua non theory), the adequacy theory, proximate cause theory and even 
sphere of risk theory.  There seems to be some notion of “directness” taken from 
French law.  This idea is not known in British or German law.  The ECJ has even 
sanctioned presumptions in the case of environmental law.  Overall, however, there is 
no one accepted understanding or consistent agreement as to what causation is at a 
European level.  A cynic may say that the ECJ has adopted the common principle of 
disorder!  And yet behind such a statement there is a truth.  Each of the jurisdictions 
in consideration adopts a different theory at different times; a country may start out 
with a basic principled theory (equivalence theory filtered by adequacy theory) yet in 
certain cases may apply a sphere of risk theory.  Germany comes to mind.  And why 
should the ECJ not do the same? There is no reason why not as it is also my 
submission that causation is impossible to define.  Justice has to be done in the 
individual case rather than a rigid adherence to theory.  Yet the difference between 
the ECJ and other “soft law” projects with which we are confronted such as the 
DCFR or the PETL is that such projects in their current form are simply not realistic 
with regard to causation.  I make no comment on their utility more globally.  My !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1087 then article 215 of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March1957 
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proposition is simply that reference to causation in these projects should be modified 
and I hope my research as cited corroborates this.  It is futile to attempt to define 
causation in code. The ECJ, on the other hand, must work within its mandate.  I 
suggest it is picking and choosing so far from among the jurisdictions, with a strong 
predilection towards France.  I am not critical of this as the TFEU does not attempt 
to define causation in tort law.  What appears at least to be common among the 
Member States under consideration here is uncertainty in causation in difficult cases.  
The ECJ also seems to be flexible with regard to potential future causal solutions in 
which new causal theories may well be introduced which in itself will also create 
further uncertainty.   It is for lawyers to argue these new ideas in causation as 
suggested by the ECJ, or, as may be further adopted by a Member State or Member 
States.   I commend the ECJ in its approach.  My submission simply here is that 
there are no general principles common to the Member States in the area of 
causation.  They do not exist and they cannot be “made” to exist.  The ECJ will 
define causation as case law comes before it and lawyers will argue causal theories 
according to their own clients’ case.  These causal theories will no doubt come from 
European jurisdictions where they have found favour but that does not guarantee 
that the ECJ will indulge them.  We can certainly have a “feeling” for causation from 
the cases I have cited.  This may guide lawyers but nothing is excluded when 
ascertaining “common principles”.   Consequently, I can only recommend that the 
TFEU be amended to remove any reference to general principles common to the 
Member States.  Causation is part of tort law.  There is no such common pan-
European agreement on what causation is.    
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6.10 Proving Causation: Evidence   
As we have seen above, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to prove causation in law on 
the basis of certainty. The plaintiff must simply satisfy the particular burden of proof 
in a given court.  Anecdotal evidence is by no means excluded yet the weight 
attached to it will depend on the jurisdiction.  In Continental jurisdictions, for 
example, hearsay is admitted, while in the United Kingdom, it is not.1088  Anecdotal 
evidence does not just date from another century (see below).  We have seen how this 
is also part of modern day case law with regard to such matters as the hepatitis B 
vaccination in France.1089  Causation in science does not always mean causation in 
law.  Other policy considerations of society, politics and morality have been 
considered.  We can see from this how the idea of causation has developed in 
medicine and how even though medicine is a science, it is oftentimes an inexact 
science and other elements are crucial when it comes to establishing causation.  I 
propose to give some brief examples of “cause by anecdote” before going on to 
consider how cause is established scientifically by expert evidence.  
 
6.10.1. Anecdotal Evidence  
John Snow (1813-1858) was a Victorian physician who made studies into cholera.  
He noted that cholera was a disease primarily of the gastrointestinal tract and this he 
tested by observations on clinical and epidemiological features of cholera.  He 
postulated that it was a local infection of the mucosal membrane of the alimentary 
tract, passed from one patient to another by swallowing.1090  He was the first to 
realise that cholera spread by a self-propagating agent by contaminated food and 
water.  Snow used different epidemiological methods to calculate mortality rates.  In 
one case study of 1854, the Golden Square outbreak showed a distribution of fatal 
cases:  61 of the deaths had used water from the Broad St pump, six had not and six 
were indeterminate.  A nearby brewery had no deaths.  Snow noted in his 
interviewing 
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1088 F DAVIDSON, Evidence, p11 et seqq 
1089 and a doctor in France must now warn his patient of the risk of developing multiple sclerosis : 
Bordeaux, CA 14 November 2014, n° 11/1179.  Interestingly this case was not based on loss of 
chance 
1090 taken from P FELDSCHREIBER’s presentation “Causality in Medicine and Law” from 
Aberdeen University’s seminar “Perspectives on Causation” held on 22 and 23 June 2009.  
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The men are allowed a certain quantity of malt liquor and Mr Huggins believes 
they do not drink water at all; and he is quite certain that the workmen never 
obtained water from the pump in the street.1091 
 
He noted another crucial observation when investigating the case of a widow from 
Hapstead 
I was informed by this lady’s son that she had not been in the neighbourhood of 
Broad Street for many months.  A cart went from Broad Street to the West End 
every day and it was the custom to take a large bottle from the pump in Broad 
Street, as she preferred it.  The water was taken on Thursday 31st of August and she 
drank of it in the evening and also on the Friday.  She was seized with cholera on the 
evening of the latter day and died on Saturday…A niece who was on a visit to this 
lady also drank of the water; she returned to her residence in a high and healthy part 
of Islington, was attacked with cholera and died also.  There was no cholera at the 
time either at west End or in the neighbourhood where the niece died.  
 
What is interesting here is that even from anecdotal evidence and non-scientific 
evidence as such, cause was apportioned.  
 
Another example of causation existing by anecdote was the seroxat episode. 
Seroxat is a trade name for paroxetine, an SSRI (selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitor).1092  During phase I studies, no problems were identified; during Phase 
II and III studies, there was even positive benefits for all.  Post-marketing, 
however, there were sudden and anecdotal reports of akasthisia (extreme 
agitation) and suicidal ideation in children and adolescents.  The problem was that 
it was difficult to distinguish between events of underlying depressive illness and 
drug induced events. Epidemiological data were insufficient to show that the drug 
should be withdrawn from use.  As it turned out, GlaxoSmithKline who had made 
the drug had failed to report certain studies which it had done in children.1093 I 
think then that, even in cases of product liability, it can be difficult to show cause.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1091 on page 3 of the handout  
1092 anti-depressants used to treat depression and anxiety  
1093  http://www.antidepressantsfacts.com/2004-06-15-shamed-GSK-reveals-data-paxil.htm; 
Pharmacy Times, source Daily Mail newspaper, London 
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Anecdotal evidence is evidence and not only (or even) epidemiological reports.  
Courts, as we have seen already in France, will differ with regard to the weight 
they attach to anecdotal evidence.   
 
6.10.2 Scientific Evidence and Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals1094 
Another area where I think that European projects to harmonise tort law have not 
taken sufficient account of in their attempts to mould causation is that of evidence 
and burdens of proof.  It cannot be possible to harmonise or move towards a 
European law of tort when standards of proof are so different.  In the United 
Kingdom, to win his case, a plaintiff must persuade the judge that his version of 
events was more likely to happen than the defendant’s.  This is the “balance of 
probabilities standard”.  In France and in Germany, we have seen that the standard 
of proof is much higher although this may be attenuated by various procedural 
devices to alleviate this habitually heavy burden of proof.   
 
Often scientific causation is determined by reports from experts.  Experts will 
often have to pronounce on whether a causal link can be established or not.  Often 
a report will be framed in terms of probability.  The tendency in the United 
Kingdom is for each side to commission its own reports and for them to be tested 
through thorough cross-examination.  On the Continent, however, it is usually the 
court that appoints its own expert. 
 
This must be seen then as a potential divergence in the area of causation.  For 
example, we have seen in France that French courts are willing to allow recovery 
for multiple sclerosis “caused” by a hepatitis B vaccination although there was no 
scientific evidence showing this.  I would like now to consider the case of Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals which, although an American case, I believe highlights 
many of the many of the shortcomings of the Continental system when it comes to 
the acceptance or otherwise of expert reports.  
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1094 509 US 579 
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In this case, it was alleged that the drug Benedictinee had caused serious birth defects 
in two children.  The defendants, at first instance, had argued based on scientific 
literature that Benedictine had not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth 
defects.  The plaintiffs attempted to refute this based on evidence that Benedictine 
had caused birth defects in animal studies, chemical structure analyses, and 
unpublished “re-analysis” of previously published human statistical studies.  The 
court held that this evidence did not meet the “general acceptance” standard for the 
admission of expert evidence under the Frye1095 rule.  In the Frye case it was held that 
expert opinion was only permissible where it was based on a scientific technique 
generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community.  The United States 
Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.  In 
particular, Rule 702 provided that 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise.  
 
“Scientific…knowledge” is to imply grounding in science’s methods and procedures, 
while “knowledge” connotes a body of known facts or ideas inferred from such facts 
or accepted as true on good grounds.  Where there is a “proffer” of expert evidence 
then a judge should make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony’s 
underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid to be applied and a 
number of factors should weigh in the fact-finder’s mind, such as (i) whether the 
technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (ii) its error rate; (iii) the 
existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and (iv) whether it 
has attracted widespread acceptance within the scientific community.  The scientific 
method, as opposed to other areas of human inquiry is the generating of hypotheses 
and the testing of them to see if they can be falsified.1096 
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1095 Frye v United States, 54 App D C 46 
1096 Daubert, at 593, referring also to Karl POPPER, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific 
Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or 
refutability, or testability”)  
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In this case, for example, part of the expert evidence presented to the court was a 
meta-analysis of epidemiological studies but this meta-analysis had not been 
subject to peer review itself and it was even found to be generated solely for the 
purposes of litigation.1097 Where there was sufficient epidemiological data, it was 
held that studies in animals could not be admitted.1098 
 
The question under Frye was when did a concept, an idea or knowledge become 
“generally accepted” within the scientific community.  The test in Frye was the 
following 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental 
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere in this twilight zone the 
evidential force of the principle must be recognised, and while courts will go a long 
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognised scientific 
principle or discovery, the things from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs.1099  
 
In matter of fact, the evidence was rejected as it had not at the time been generally 
accepted.  However, although this Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence, it 
did not mean that these Rules placed no limits on the admissibility of purportedly 
scientific evidence – the so-called “gate-keeper” role of the judge.1100 
 
In discovering scientific knowledge, what is sought is not what is immutably true, but 
rather how phenomena can best be explained. 1101  It represents a process for 
proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to 
further testing and refinement.  Further, the evidence must also be relevant.  Rule 
401 of the Rules of Evidence determined relevant evidence as  
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1097 Daubert at 589 
1098 ibid 
1099 Frye, at 47 
1100 Daubert, at 589 
1101 Daubert, at 590 
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Any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence. 
  
Finally, vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful  
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of 
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.1102 It was also held that  
…open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific analysis.  Yet there are 
important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for 
truth in the laboratory.  Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.  Law, 
on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.1103   
 
This is correct.  I think that open debate in court about these matters is essential.  
Where we have a report for the plaintiff and one for the defendant.  These can be 
challenged, debated and disputed viva voce.   
 
Why this is important for the purposes of this paper is that it would appear that at 
least England and Wales have been inspired by this decision and have consulted on 
the adoption of scientific evidence based on Daubert.1104  The United Kingdom House 
of Commons Science and Technology Committee also suggested the establishment of 
a Forensic Science Advisory Council to normalise standards for forensic evidence and 
noted that  
The absence of an agreed protocol for the validation of scientific techniques prior to 
their being admitted in court is entirely unsatisfactory.  Judges are not well-placed to 
determined scientific validity without input from scientists.  We recommend that one 
of the first tasks of the Forensic Science Advisory Council be to develop a “gate-
keeping” test for expert evidence.  This should be done in partnership with judges, 
scientists and other key players in the criminal justice system, and should be built on 
the US Daubert test.1105 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1102 ibid at 596; in the USA, juries are still competent in many civil trials 
1103 ibid 
1104 Consultation Paper No 190, The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England 
and Wales (http://www.lawcom.gov.United Kingdom/docs/cp190.pdf)  
1105 House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (2005) Forensic Science on Trial 
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6.10.2.1 Assessment of Daubert 
First, and most importantly for the purposes of this paper, there are two different 
ways of tackling expert evidence: the common law way and the Continental way.  
The common law way generally allows for each side to commission their own 
reports.  We have a thesis (the plaintiff’s report), an anti-thesis (the defendant’s) and it 
is to be hoped a synthesis (the judgement of the court).  In this way, I believe the 
court can pursue a dialectic towards what is true in as much as this is possible for the 
purposes of resolving disputes. Yet this is still not adequate, in my opinion, as the 
House of Commons Committee suggested above. In Continental jurisdictions, 
however, there appears to be one commissioning of a report without much 
questioning of its contents.  There is no Daubert approach. I would doubt therefore 
whether an expert preparing one report for use by the court would highlight (i) to 
what extent the expert’s methods are accepted within the scientific community; (ii) to 
what extent the expert’s peers may disagree with his findings; (iii) error rate and 
standards of control of his report.  I doubt moreover that a Continental (or any) judge 
would necessarily pose himself such questions.  Such questions must be posed by the 
opposition.  On the Continent, however, there is no, or little, opportunity for open 
debate or cross-examination of a report in court.    This would suggest to me that 
there is a simpler “acceptance” of reports than there would be if both sides were 
permitted to allow their own reports in evidence as standard.  This in itself must have 
consequences for proving causal links in science and in law.  Given these two 
different procedural approaches to the nature of proving causation, I do not believe 
that this contributes to any kind of harmonisation in this field.   We can even see the 
example of where French courts permitted recovery for damage purportedly caused 
by the hepatitis B vaccination.  There was not even any scientific proof of a causal 
link and yet the plaintiffs were successful.  I suggest this would be no application 
either of the DCFR standard of causation in “consequential” terms and a fortiori of 
the PETL conditio sine qua non standard.  I submit that such a decision would not 
have been followed in the United Kingdom or in Germany.  While courts are indeed 
there not just to take account of social policy, it must surely be dangerous to base a 
decision on this alone.  Scientific causation would most probably be part of the 
evidence and a fortiori the opportunity would have to be afforded to both sides in the 
United Kingdom to scrutinise such evidence.  
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On the Continent, the right of the parties to ask questions is much more limited.  
The parties, in France, it would appear, only have a right to ask questions through 
the judge.1106 More discerning questions might result if the expert’s report were open 
to challenge from another expert.   My purpose again is not to say which is better but 
simply to state that arriving at causal decisions involves a procedural approach in 
Germany and France that is quite different from that adopted in the United 
Kingdom.  Given that there is less chance to cross-examine, question and interrogate 
an expert on the Continent, it is my submission that scientific causal conclusions may 
often be different.  I can only offer in support of such a contention what was said in 
the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee above in that “Judges 
are not well placed to determine scientific evidence without input from scientists.”   
Therefore if scientific causal conclusions are different then there can be no one 
common understanding or appreciation of causation in the law.  Causation is 
inseparable from procedure.  To attempt a fixed approach on it – for that it what the 
DCFR and the PETL are doing - is disingenuous.  Even if the drafters of the DCFR 
admit that there is no “one size fits all” solution to causation, so I do not see the need 
even to attempt to define it, to describe it, or to amplify the verb “cause” in any way 
whatever.  None of the jurisdictions under consideration here does and therefore 
none of any projects that attempt to harmonise European law should attempt it.    
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6.11 Strict Liability or Negligence in General  
Whether a system takes an approach to causation based on proving negligence or 
on strict liability plays a vital role for the characterisation of causation in that 
particular system.   Whether a plaintiff must prove that a hospital was negligent in 
the organisation of its particular disinfecting procedures on a particular ward or 
whether a court will assume that there is some kind of “protective” obligation as 
soon as the patient enters the ward will be crucial in determining the ease with 
which a patient can show causation if he alleged he contracted an infection during 
his hospital stay.  I hope it has been clear from the research that I have advanced 
that some jurisdictions are more “patient-friendly” than others and that in that 
“patient-friendly” approach, the necessity to prove the causal link, although by no 
means abrogated, is mitigated to a considerable extent.  After I have considered 
whether a country generally relies on strict liability or negligence, I shall then 
consider special indemnity systems adopted by some of the countries.  
 
6.11.1 The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom stands out perhaps as never allowing the requirements of 
causal proof to be mitigated in any significant way.  It insists always that the 
plaintiff prove that his version of events was more likely than not.  This is the 
balance of probabilities test and remains the test for all delictual liability cases.  In 
the United Kingdom, there has been a general rejection of no-fault liability for 
medical negligence claims.  The history of this goes back to the Pearson Report in 
1978.  One of the arguments at the time was that accidental injury should be 
socialised and that the welfare state should cover it, especially with the recent 
history of the Thalidomide disaster.1107   
  
The Commission looked at the different problems that claimants faced when 
bringing claims and one issue that was considered was reversing the burden of 
proof on the basis that physicians were “in a better position to prove absence of 
negligence than patients were to establish liability”.1108  This was, however, 
ultimately rejected for fear of the floodgates.   The plaintiff must therefore !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1107 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p137 
1108 Lord PEARSON, Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, 
(Chairman: Lord Pearson) Cmnd 7054 (London, HMSO, 1978) 
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convince a judge that there has been fault on behalf of the hospital trust which has 
not (say) cleaned the ward in accordance with standard procedure and that it was 
this non-sterilised environment which caused the bacteria to multiply which then 
caused the plaintiff’s hospital-acquired infection.  This is prima facie quite a heavy 
burden.  Similarly, if there are a number of agents which could have caused an 
iatrogenic infection, then the plaintiff must show that the one introduced by the 
doctor’s actions or omissions was actually and scientifically capable of causing the 
infection.   Again this may also be a tough burden, especially where there is 
conflicting scientific evidence (there are no court-appointed experts in the United 
Kingdom) but it is a burden from which a court rarely departs. 
 
We have seen above that a court may, on occasion, help a plaintiff using the 
procedural device of res ipsa loquitur.  It must be remembered, however, that this only 
changes the tactical burden of proof. The legal burden of proof remains squarely 
with the plaintiff.  A res is simply something that needs explaining or elucidating; it is 
something that a defendant would do well to explain if he can lest he lose his case on 
a presumption.  His explanation may find favour with the judge or it may not.  For 
example, if a patient enters into hospital and has the wrong leg amputated then this 
would be a res.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must obtain proof (usually by discovery) 
to 51% that the surgeon was negligent.  The burden of proof still remains with the 
plaintiff.  There is no kind of strict liability in medical negligence in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
What is interesting also is that the Commission thought there would be problems in 
where to delineate those risks that the patient should bear and those which arise from 
a natural progression of the accident.  This is interesting when, as we shall see, 
comparing the regime for medical accidents that exists in France.1109 No-fault liability 
was therefore ultimately rejected.1110  However, one area of no-fault liability which 
was introduced was the Vaccine Damages (Compensation) Act 1979 which provides 
for payment to certain individuals where the cause of the injury has been vaccination.  
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1109 ibid, paras 1365-6 
1110 ibid, paras 1370-71 
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In 2000, the Secretary of State for Heath announced that he would set up a scheme 
for those people who had been infected by variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.1111 
 
A special compensation scheme also exists for those who have been infected with 
hepatitis C or HIV as a result of contaminated blood transfusions.1112 In addition to 
this, protection for claimants now exists following A & Others under the Product 
Directive.  
 
There also exists a trust in the United Kingdom providing compensation for those 
whose injury was as a result of the drug Thalidomide.1113 
 
With regard to mesothelioma, following the case of Barker v Corus, there now exists 
special legislation in the form of the Compensation Act 2006 which provides for joint 
and several liability among those people who have exposed the victim to asbestos and 
this exposure has resulted in the victim’s contracting mesothelioma and only 
mesothelioma.1114 
 
There exists an intra-United Kingdom difference with regard to the treatment of 
pleural plaques. Pleural plaques are of themselves benign but can indicate that there 
is an increased risk of asbestos-related diseases in the future.   In Grieves v ET Everard 
& Sons Ltd,1115 it was argued in England that this exposure put the claimants at an 
increased risk of developing mesothelioma at some stage in the future and that 
recovery should be allowed for a psychiatric illness resulting from such fear.  The 
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1111 details of the scheme can be found at http://vcjdtrust.co.United Kingdom/the-compensation-
scheme  
1112  details of the scheme can be found at 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:fjlwbGHinu4J:www.parliament.United 
Kingdom/briefing-papers/sn05698.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&client=safari  
1113 details of the scheme can be found at http://www.thalidomidetrust.org  
1114  Compensation Act 2006, Article 3.  The fulll text can be found here 
http://www.legislation.gov.United Kingdom/United Kingdompga/2006/29/pdfs/United 
Kingdompga_20060029_en.pdf  
1115 [2007] UKHL 39 
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House of Lords ultimately agreed with the Court of Appeal in holding that fear of a 
future illness was not a stand-alone head of damages.   
 
However, the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 now 
provides in section 1 that1116   
1. Pleural plaques 
 
(1) Asbestos-related pleural plaques are a personal injury which is not negligible. 
 
(2) Accordingly, they constitute actionable harm for the purposes of an action of 
damages for personal injuries. 
 
(3) Any rule of law the effect of which is that asbestos-related pleural plaques do not 
constitute actionable harm ceases to apply to the extent it has that effect. 
 
This Act shows now that there exists a difference with certain kinds of damages 
within the United Kingdom and therefore although causation might be able to be 
proved, the damage is one which is not recognised in England and Wales.   
Therefore damage cannot be legally caused by pleural plaques in England as it can 
be in Scotland.  There is no causation in the law across the Scottish border for 
pleural plaques.  
 
6.11.2 France 
In France, faute is still necessary for the defendant to be held liable.  This is a principle 
of droit commun and it is confirmed in the CPS.  The burden of proof as we have seen 
is in theory quite high but again causal presumptions can come to the aid of a 
plaintiff if they are graves, précises, et concordantes.  Yet like with Germany above, is it fair 
to equate this to strict liability? To a certain extent, I think it is.  If we can show 
certain facts that are graves, précises et concordantes then this will raise a presumption of 
causation that can only be defeated by evidence close to certainty.1117   As we have 
seen, there does not even have to be scientific proof in the cases of multiple sclerosis 
following the vaccinations for hepatitis B.  Sometimes temporal, policy and other 
factors will be sufficient to establish causation.  We have seen already how there is 
strict liability in the area of hospital-acquired infections and medical hazards.  So !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1116 this Act has been held to be within the competences of the Scottish Parliament following a 
challenge that it was ultra vires in Axa Insurance v The Scottish Ministers [2011] 3 WLR 871 
1117 L KHOURY, Uncertain Causation, p45 
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although in theory none of the jurisdictions in question has adopted a no-fault system 
of tort liability, France does come very close to it in certain situations which is far 
from British approach.  
 
As we have also seen, in France there exist special compensation systems for the 
most serious medical hazards and hospital-acquired infections.  For medical 
hazards the law of 4 March 2002 permits claimants to obtain compensation from 
the national solidarity fund where no fault can be attributed to the doctor.  Even 
when there has been a fault that is not causally linked to the damage, it is still 
possible to obtain reparation from the fund.1118 Similarly since the law of 4 March 
2002, it has been possible to obtain reparation for hospital acquired infection save 
where the hospital can bring proof of a cause étrangère where there is a AIPP 
greater than 25%.  Article L-1142-22, al 2 also ensures that the national solidarity 
fund is responsible for providing compensation where damage has resulted from  
- an obligatory vaccination;1119 
- HIV;1120 
- Hepatitis C resulting from a blood transfusion;1121 
- Damages that have been directly incurred as a result of prevention, diagnostic or 
care provided in the course of a serious threat. 
 
Alinéa 3 further provides that the national solidarity fund takes over the provision 
of compensation from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.1122  
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1118 CC 1 11 March 2010, Bull n° 63  
1119  including diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis, tuberculosis, and in certain circumstances, 
endemic typhus, smallpox, typhoid fever and with regard to certain persons, typhus, flu, and 
hepatitis B. 
1120 since 9 August 2004 ; before this date compensation was provided by FITH by virtue of the 
law of 31 December 1991 
1121 since 11 March 2010, ONIAM has taken over compensation once provided for by the 
établissement français du sang (EFS) 
1122 ONIAM took over the obligations of France-Hypophyse by virtue of the law of 30 December 
2002 
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What is interesting here is that, with regard to hepatitis C infections, the damage 
caused could be quite far-reaching.  The Cour de cassation specified that the 
damages recoverable by way of a “prejudice spécifique de contamination”  
comprend l’ensemble des prejudices de caractère personnel tant physique que 
psychiques resultant de la contamination, notamment les perturbations et craintes 
éprouvées, toujours latentes, concernant l’espérance de vie et crainte des souffrances; 
qu’il comprend aussi le risqué de toutes les affections opportunists consecutives à la 
découverte de la contamination, les perturbations de la vie sociale, familiale et 
sexuelle et les  dommages esthétiques générés par les traitements et soins subis.1123 
 
As far as the “serious threat” above is concerns serious health threats in response to 
which the Minister of Health has decided to take action.  In such circumstances, a 
physician will not be liable for any damage caused where he prescribes or administers 
a medicine and a claimant will have recourse to the national solidarity fund.  It 
follows then that where medical hazards, medical negligence or nosocomial infections 
in this regard fall within the ambit of the national solidarity fund then a would-be 
plaintiff will consider such an option certainly before embarking on litigation.1124 
 
As we have seen, at droit commun for medical hazards, a plaintiff can recover from a 
hospital in the public sector if he cannot recover from a private sector.  Such an 
obvious dichotomy does not exist in any of the other jurisdictions here.  In order for a 
patient to recover for a medical hazard, he must show the four conditions.1125 
Although the Cour de cassation has not accepted this idea yet, as I noted, it might 
only be a matter of time.  Here the liability is strict and based on remote risk.  I 
submit that this is one area where France goes far to protect victims.  France’s policy 
is that we all benefit from the advancement of scientific knowledge and therefore one 
who suffers injury thereby should be compensated.   Recovery for “medical hazards” 
can, of course, be obtained from national solidarity fund where the required level of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1123 CC 2 24 Sept 2009, Bull n°226, quoted also in J-R BINET, Cours: droit médical (Montschestien, 
2010), p283 
1124 ibid  
1125 as a reminder, first, that the risk was known; second, that there was no reason to think that the 
patient was particularly exposed to such a risk; third, that the condition of the patient has no 
relation with the initial state of the patient or its evolution; and fourth, that the character of the 
hazard is extremely serious. 
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seriousness has been reached.1126  Again, we have new notions of causation here.  
There is no adequate causation here.  So, and I think this is perhaps the most striking 
difference along with loss of chance in the jurisdictions, if a plaintiff suffers a known 
risk to which the patient was not particularly exposed during an operation, he may be 
able to recover.  This would certainly not be the case in the United Kingdom or in 
Germany assuming all disclosure obligations have been fulfilled.   This is another 
important difference among the jurisdictions under consideration here.  
 
6.11.3 Germany 
In Germany, there has been a general rejection of no-fault liability.1127  The 1970’s 
were the time for reform initiatives particularly in the light of the Thalidomide 
disaster.  In 1971 the Contergangestz was set up to recompense Thalidomide victims 
from a fund financed by a lump-sum contribution by the federal government and 
drug manufacturers.1128 
 
I have also shown how the Pharmaceutical Products Act 1976 should apply though it 
should be noted that its provisions have rarely been used in court.1129 A claimant 
could not, for example, claim against a manufacturer simply because a drug 
produced adverse effects.   
 
In 1995, the HIV-Hilfgesetz was created to provide a basis of no-fault liability for those 
who had experienced proof difficulties under article 84 of the Pharmaceutical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1126 as a reminder this is fixed at an AIPP (atteinte à l'intégrité physique et psychique) greater than 24%, 
not being able to work for 6 months consecutively, or a length of ceasing professional activities of 6 
months non-consecutively in the period of one year or with temporary functional impairments 
greater than 50% for 6 months consecutively, or a length of ceasing professional activities of 6 
months non-consecutively in the period of one year 
1127 C WENDEHORST, “Compensation in the German Health Care Sector” in J DUTE, M 
FAURE and H KOZIOL (eds), No Fault Compensation in the Health Sector (Vienna, Springer, 2007) 
672 et seqq 
1128 M STAUCH, The Law of Medical Negligence, p144 
1129 ibid 
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Products Act 1976.1130 However, it should be remembered that Anscheinbeweis has also 
been applied where a patient had contracted HIV following a blood transfusion.1131 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1130 ibid, p146 
1131 BGH NJW 1991, 1948 
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6.12 Comparative Commentary 
Neither the DCFR nor the PETL has much to say on the subject of strict liability for 
the purposes of this paper.  The DCFR provides for strict liability for damages caused 
by dangerous substances or emissions1132while PETL allows for strict liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities while permitting national laws to provide for further 
categories of strict liability for dangerous activities even if they are not abnormally 
dangerous.1133   I am unsure what this adds. Both Germany and the United Kingdom 
have rejected no-fault tort systems in the strict sense along the lines of Sweden and 
New Zealand and the basic principle in France still remains liability with faute. In 
each jurisdiction under consideration here, proving causation between the damage 
and the alleged tortious act of the defendant remains essential.  Even with the special 
liability systems outlined above, a plaintiff still has to show that the tortious act was 
“caused by” the vaccination, asbestos-exposure or whatever it may be.  So while I do 
not seek to argue that either PETL or DCFR are defunct simply because these 
systems exist, I do think that these special systems contribute considerably to a 
divergence in notion of causation based on “common rules”.  Yes, there are some 
rudiments of commonality in the jurisdictions in special regimes.  For example, we 
see that France, the United Kingdom and Germany (the Anscheinbeweis for HIV) have 
special systems for damage caused by blood transfusions.  However, there is no 
commonality with regard to damage caused by asbestos.  A claimant seeking to 
recover compensation for a hospital-acquired infection will more likely be successful 
in France than in the United Kingdom.  On the other side of the coin, a plaintiff who 
seeks to recover for pleural plaques, I suggest, will have more chance of being 
compensated in Scotland than in any other part of the United Kingdom. So again it 
is my submission that what these special indemnity systems do is highlight the 
differences between societies and what protection is to be afforded people in these 
societies.   I am not suggesting that it is simply because there are special indemnity 
systems in these societies that show that causation is to be understood differently in 
the jurisdictions.  It may be rather that iniuria is understood differently in the 
jurisdictions but I believe all these ideas of causation, damages even fault all become 
one at the end of the day.  I believe it does tend to show how legislatures are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1132 Article VI: 3: 206 DCFR 
1133 Art 5: 102 PETL 
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prepared to protect and defend people in a given situation.  This necessarily has an 
effect on what is understood by public policy.  Some of these special systems have 
even come after court decisions, for example, that of Barker v Corus.  It shows how 
societies in certain situations have changed their causal norms, be it through actually 
defining what a damage is, by placing a damage at the charge of some kind of 
national solidarity fund or indeed by providing a system for reparation where a drug 
itself could possibly have caused loss in the German Pharmaceutical Products Act   
1976.  These different systems show how the jurisdictions diverge.  Special systems of 
liability, in my opinion, reflect policy.  Policy is recognised as a causal instrument in 
all jurisdictions under consideration here.  They show further how there can be no 
understanding of common principles of causation.  The retort from those in favour of 
some kind of European project favouring harmonisation in tort law might well be 
that such codes would permit special systems.  This was, after all, what the PETL 
drafters stated with regard to strict liability.   I would counter argue by noting that 
my highlighting of these special indemnity systems does not of itself show that 
causation differs fundamentally with regard to medical liability in each jurisdiction.  
How could it? I would simply suggest that this is a portion of evidence, that when put 
together with all the other research in this paper, shows that there can be no 
commonality in causation in its refinement in either the DCFR or, especially, in the 
PETL.   
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6.13 Conclusions of this Paper 
I hope to have shown through this paper the different approaches in causation in 
three of the main jurisdictions in Europe (plus Luxembourg) in particular with 
regard to liability in the medical domain. As I said at the outset, I chose these 
jurisdictions for varying reasons: the United Kingdom representing my home and 
a common law jurisdiction, Germany and France representing two major families 
of the Civil Law tradition and moreover because Germany is fruitful ground for 
modern philosophy on causation (as is, it has to be admitted the United Kingdom 
now with Hart and Honoré’s seminal Causation in the Law!).  I believe they are large 
jurisdictions in Europe which it would be impossible to pass over when attempting 
to formulate any kind of European notion of causation but also which are 
representative of three distinct approaches to causation in Europe: crudely, the 
common law approach (the United Kingdom), the dare-I-say-it “empirical” civil 
law approach (France and Luxembourg) and the philosophical-based approach of 
Germany.   
 
My hypothesis in this paper was to evaluate the PETL and the DCFR having 
regard to the traditions in these jurisdictions and potentially to advocate new 
principles or better principles where I thought these principles were deficient or 
wanting in any way.  Yet my research simply in the matter of causation has led me 
to the conclusion that any principles in tort law with regard to causation are 
unworkable and this is only in the medical field.  I dare not imagine the disparate 
case law which exists in other areas.  It may be laudable for the drafter of PETL to 
forward the first principles as conditio sine qua non, concurrent causes or 
alternative causes, yet I hope that I have shown that the outcome in the 
jurisdictions concerned is not “…of very limited importance”.1134 We have seen 
just to what extent differences in jurisdictions exist and I need not repeat them 
here.   
 
My hypothesis of improving or adding to the European projects in tort law with 
regard to causation was wishful thinking.  My research led me to the conclusion 
that there are no common principles of causation in European case law.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1134 Principles of European Tort Law, p43 
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Admittedly, all jurisdictions may well apply the conditio sine qua non but as I 
have shown above, it can be difficult first to agree on what this actually is. Second, 
it is not certain jurisdictions will apply it.  Furthermore, not all jurisdictions apply 
it as a first principle as I have shown: France sometimes does, sometimes it does 
not.  It depends.  My conclusions that I have drawn from my research are 
therefore the following: 
 
First, I have shown that not only are first principles in causation quite discrete in the 
jurisdictions under consideration but also the results in case law can be quite 
different.  Even in cases where one would think the result must necessarily be the 
same across the board raise doubts about the solution. To take the example of Barnett 
where the patient in this case “would have died anyway” notwithstanding the 
physician’s examination of him due to arsenic in his tea does not necessarily admit of 
a uniform solution.  Britain would not hold the physician liable based on conditio 
sine qua non.  France, I suspect, though I am by no means certain, would have found 
some way to hold the doctor liable based on fault.  This is a victim-friendly solution. 
Germany, I believe, may have come to the same solution as the United Kingdom, 
but it might also have held that given the doctor was in breach of his duty to at least 
examine the patient that this was either gross negligence justifying reversal of the 
burden of proof or that there are over-riding policy considerations that the doctor 
must be held liable.   I wonder also whether had this case come before the Supreme 
Court now for the first time if there would not be some overriding policy 
consideration which would require that the doctor be held liable.  Policy is, after all, a 
valid causal argument.  Sometimes, it is just necessary that “legal consequences must 
follow….”.1135 
 
Second, in cases that are perhaps even more on the fringes, the solutions differ yet 
further.  First, with the idea of fault itself, a British doctor can avail himself of the 
Bolam standard where there is a responsible body of medical opinion that would hold 
that the defendant’s actions were not negligent then the court is more or less bound 
to follow this behaviour with regard to putative negligent conduct.  With regard to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1135 as per Lord Hope at para 74 in Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41 
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the advising of a patient of risks, Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board1136 has recently 
become law in the United Kingdom, which adopts the doctrine of “informed 
consent”.  In France the standard is appreciated in abstracto in accordance with the 
bon père de famille standard.1137  In Germany, this is the standard of care “a 
respectable and conscientious medical professional of average experience in the 
relevant field” would afford and a doctor would be liable for risks that a reasonably 
skilled doctor would not have taken.1138 Germany is perhaps stricter than England in 
this regard as just because a defendant follows a particular accepted practice does not 
exclude negligence.1139 So although this might appear at first as having little to do 
with causation, I believe that is inseparably linked with it.  If the standards to which a 
professional is held differ from country to country then causation must also differ. 
 
Third, I have also demonstrated how France allows recovery for loss of chance and 
Germany and the United Kingdom do not.  This is not an insignificant difference 
and one that again shows how there is no common approach to causation.  Decisions 
such as Hotson and Gregg v Scott would be held otherwise in France.  I think there is no 
doubt on this.   
 
Fourth, standards of proof are different in the United Kingdom, Germany and 
France. In Germany and France there is generally a higher standard of proof 
whereas in the United Kingdom, proof in civil cases is on the balance of probabilities.  
This of course must take into account the different attenuations of proof that we have 
seen in this paper, namely, the French presumptions in the event of facts which are 
précises, concordantes and graves.   In Germany, there is Anscheinbeweis and even a reversal 
in the burden of proof where the professional has been grossly negligent.  The United 
Kingdom also has its version of Anscheinbeweis in res ipsa loquitur .   PETL may pay lip-
service to this in Article 4:201 where it states that the burden of proving fault may be 
reversed in the light of the gravity of the danger presented by the activity.  As I read 
this, this would allow courts in the United Kingdom to reverse the burden of proof: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1136 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 
1137 Art 1137 French Civil Code  
1138 BGH NJW 1961, 600 (600) 
1139 BGH NJW 1953, 257 and BGH NJW 1965, 345 
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this is something which has been totally excluded by the judiciary and it remains on 
the plaintiff for him to prove his case to the balance of probabilities.  Acceptance of 
this article would be a seismic shift in procedural rules for the United Kingdom and it 
is not one, I suspect, that would be welcomed.  In any case, I am sure it would be left 
to parliament.  In France, the position might be subtly more different.  A claimant 
must still prove his case but causal presumptions often come to his aid and there is 
never really a theoretical change in the need to prove one’s case although showing a 
certain presumptions that can only be defeated by a cause étrangère may come close. 
In Germany, by contrast, there exists a full reversal of the burden of proof as I have 
shown.  So again, one principle does not fit all the jurisdictions here.   
 
Fifth, and linked to this, we have seen how Continental ways of establishing proof of 
causation differ from the United Kingdom.  In the United Kingdom, expert reports 
are tested thoroughly.  They are questioned and cross-examined.  In France and 
Germany, there is little opportunity for this.  Generally speaking, the experts remain 
court-appointed although there is some latitude for litigants to gather evidence for 
their own side.  There has even been some push for acceptance of Daubert-style 
analysis in the United Kingdom.  Without uniform procedure across the board and 
therefore uniform ways of establishing causation, and uniform remits given to 
experts, there can be no common understanding or possible hope of common 
principles in European causation.  
 
Sixth, we have also seen how there are special regimes for certain areas in the 
jurisdictions concerned. France has aléa thérapeutique, which has no counterpart in any 
of the jurisdictions; it also has a special regime post 4 March 2002 for nosocomial 
infections; the United Kingdom has special liability for asbestos and mesothelioma 
cases (reacting against case law).  Germany has codified provisions for patient 
consent.  Scotland also recognises that pleural plaques are a legally caused damage.  
France and Germany also have notions of subsidiary obligations of patients ex 
contractu with regard to the patient’s security and safety when she is in a hospital that 
know no counterpart in the United Kingdom. 
    
Seventh, however, I think that the idea of “causation” on some kind of supra-national 
level, ie a European level, is here to stay, whether we are comfortable with it or not.  
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The TFEU gives power to the ECJ to develop law on non-contractual obligations in 
accordance with general principles common to the laws of the member states where 
damage has been caused by one or more of the institutions in accordance with its 
duties.  Although my argument is that there are no such common principles, at least 
with regard to causation, the ECJ has nonetheless a certain amount of case law in this 
area.  The jurisprudence has tended to be French-influenced with a predilection for 
the conditio sine qua non theory.  Be that as it may, I am not going to advocate any 
principles with regard to causation as such that the ECJ may wish to follow in the 
future with regard to causation as principles are so mercurial and volatile in this area.  
I shall merely suggest some possible changes with regard to procedure.  Policy will 
trump everything, for example, if ever an Article 267 TFEU reference is ever made 
on the Product Directive.   A solution using causal principles such as “direct” 
causation may be attempted at an ECJ level but at the end of the day, if the result is 
not satisfactory, policy will be called on to the stage.  
 
In conclusion then I would submit that there is no common law, no European ius 
commune and no central notion of what causation is either in the jurisdictions 
under consideration here and even within those jurisdictions themselves.  
Causation is simply a controlling device that is used to obtain a given outcome in a 
particular case.  It plays a central role in a legal relationship.1140  It can either deny 
liability totally or reduce quantum through contributory negligence.  Therefore it 
does not really matter what notion of causation is taken.  The DCFR and the 
PETL should not pronounce on causation.  They must not try to lay down rules in 
its interpretation.  Legal arguments on causation are to be welcomed; yet even 
within the jurisdictions themselves there is no agreement.  Such is the nature of 
causation.    
 
However, causation must be modelled on a European level for cases at the ECJ 
and for this the ECJ should, I believe, think carefully about what road it is going to 
follow in this regard.  I have already suggested one improvement with regard to 
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1140 F BYDLINSKI, “Causation as a Legal Phenomenon”, in L TICHY (ed) Causation in Law 
(Prague, E Rozkotova, 2007) 5 at 12 
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experts’ reports.  It may in substance, as it seems to be doing, choose to be mainly 
French-influenced.  
 
Therefore, in short, my conclusions for this paper are the following 
 
1. There is no common notion of causation in European tort law that can 
be gleaned from a study of France (and Luxembourg), Germany and the United 
Kingdom; 
 
2. Results in medical cases do differ significantly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction where causation is the issue at stake;  
 
3. Results differ in part because of the procedural traditions of the 
jurisdictions in question.  This includes procedure (including burden of proof) and 
expert evidence reports; 
 
4. Given that there is no common notion of causation in European tort law, 
and given that causation is of the essence when establishing liability, the idea of 
defining or expanding ideas of causation such as can be seen in the DCFR or in 
the PETL is pointless.  Attempts therefore to define causation in these projects 
should be deleted; 
 
5. Both plaintiff and defendant should be allowed to advance its own expert 
reports so that they be subject to cross-examination and debate à la Daubert.  I 
strongly believe that judges are not aware of the subtleties of cases to the extent 
that counsel and experts for each side are.  Cross-examination on reports by each 
side will enable matters to be focused, properly assessed and studied, and 
individually scrutinized. 
 
6. The ECJ does have the authority to create a certain body of European 
tort law in its jurisprudence and causation is part of this so causation at this 
European level is here to stay.  It remains flexible on causation in its case law.   
 
Given (6), I would like to suggest the following methods for ECJ case law as it 
develops: 
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7. Causation is not worth defining.  The ECJ appears to have adopted the 
conditio sine qua non but has left the door open to other causal theories. It will be 
interesting to see how they tackle questions of omissions. Nothing prevents them 
from adopting other principles.  They have tackled causation well.  
 
8. The burden of proof should always continue to be with the plaintiff though I 
see nothing wrong with the court’s adjusting this by means of presumptions (as we 
have seen in the Environmental Liability Directive) where there is substantive 
inequality between the parties in terms of their ability to prove the necessary facts;1141 
 
9. My recommendation with regard to experts’ reports applies equally for the 
ECJ. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1141 C 10/55 Mirossevich v High Authority [1954 to 1956] ECR 333 at 343-344 
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